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Class transformations in Puerto Rico

Ferguson, Richard Brian, Ph.D.

Columbia University, 1988

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CLASS TRANSFORMATIONS IN PUERTO RICO

Richard Brian Ferguson

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1988

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ABSTRACT

Class Transformations in Puerto Rico

Richard Brian Ferguson

This is a study of long term social change in barrio Jauca, Santa Isabel, (also known as "Cañamelar", from the previous study by S. Mintz). Data was gathered through 15 months of fieldwork and extensive reading. Chapters cover 20-year periods, up to 1960. (Later developments will be discussed in future work). In each chapter, economic change at the insular level is discussed, with special attention to the sugar industry. This is followed by description of corresponding economic changes on the local level. The local social implications of economic change are detailed, and related to socioeconomic changes described for other sectors of island society. These class transformations are followed out to changes in the insular power structure, which through political processes affect the economic climate, thus affecting further economic changes.

The thesis explores the creation, social organization, and breakup of a rural proletariat of sugar workers. One finding is that the rural proletariat was internally stratified, and this division explains many aspects of social behavior, as well as the differential responses of local people to later economic change. Other substantive findings include: that operations of the locally dominant sugar corporation were shaped by its position in a U.S. national sugar cartel; that the subsequent decline of island sugar production is also attributable to

cartel influence; and that the shifting political trends and development models of the 1930s and 1940s are explainable by changes in the cartel, U.S. foreign policy interests, and insular class structure.

Other points include: that problems of community studies may be dealt with via a holistic synthesis of other research on the "macro" level; that one way to study capitalism is to study the changing structure of one industry; and that the concept of social class should be refined, to which end a model of class is offered which combines structural characteristics and position within a specific historical context.

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
Of course, one is expected to acknowledge one's spouse. And I do. Leslie Farragher made the biggest sacrifices, putting up with nearly a year of separation, several years of no money, plus all the sugar monologues and my generally obsessive behavior while writing this thesis. She also made major direct contributions to the project, first by handling computer processing of questionnaires, and later, for the final four months of fieldwork, joining me as a research assistant. But those dry words do not do justice to the emotional sustenance she has always provided. Thanks, Les.

To Leslie

PREFACE


This project is based on 15 months of field research in barrio Jauca, carried out from May to July 1980, and March 1981 to May 1982. The greater part of library research was done after returning from the field. The thesis was completed and defended in May, 1985. However, it needed to be retyped. Time and money constraints kept me from completing that large task until February, 1988, when this thesis was deposited. Only minor stylistic changes were made in retyping.

CHAPTER I
Introduction



Map 1.2 Barrio Jauca I

1b



Jauca is a village near a small bay, in the center of the south coast of Puerto Rico. For sixteen months in 1948 and 1949, Sidney Mintz lived in and studied Jauca and its environs. Assisted by Charles Rosario, he worked as part of the People of Puerto Rico project, a pioneering attempt to apply the methods of anthropology to an understanding of complex societies (Steward et al. 1956). Around the time of Mintz's research, Jauca had 1,391 inhabitants, and the day to day existence of the community was intimately tied to the production of sugar cane. Within Puerto Rico, Jauca and its surrounding municipality of Santa Isabel stood as the most extreme example of the monopolization of capital, resources, job opportunities, and politics by one U.S. corporation. The dominance of Central Aguirre Corporation, of Boston, was accompanied by the virtually unhindered application of its own corporate logic to local production arrangements. This was "free enterprise" in action, and it transformed the population of Jauca and similar agricultural villages into a rural proletariat, remarkably similar to the industrial workers described by Marx and Engels except that in this instance, the industry involved labor in the cane fields. Within the anthropological literature, Jauca as described by Mintz stands as the extreme case of plantation situations, a "plantation climax" (Wolf 1971: 170).

When I arrived in Jauca in 1980, it had 2,615 inhabitants (population figures from Federal census reports). Aguirre had been taken over by the island government. Politics had

attained a reasonable conformity with liberal democratic expectations. Commercial agriculture still dominated local land use, but it had become a secondary force in other aspects of local life. Sugarcane cultivation seemed about to disappear entirely, to be replaced by fruits and vegetables. Many more people worked in clerical, manufacturing, administrative, and professional fields, but many people had no work at all, and were just scraping by with government aid. The social order seemed to resemble the popularly imagined structure of U.S. stratification, a pyramid of finely graded status levels. Jauca, apparently, had grown a middle class. In doing so, it moved from an almost archetypal conformity to marxist conceptions of class to a situation that seemed better suited to the notions about class of North American sociology. Even though the development of a complex "modern" class system out of a more simple bipolar structure is a process that has occurred in thousands of communities the world over, the transformation here was remarkable for its speed and depth.

The goal of my field research was to describe and explain this process of change. For practical reasons, this dissertation will follow the transformation only up to 1960. Subsequent years will be described in future work. Because the period between 1960 and 1982 involves several new and complicating trends, and because it was possible to obtain greater detail in reconstructing this period in local history, that description will require perhaps as much time and written

space as all the previous decades combined. The cut-off date of 1960 allows a glimpse of the new forces of change developing in but not yet dominating local society; and it encompasses the initial crumbling, although not collapse, of the social order described by Mintz for 1948-49. (While in the field, data also was collected for a general ethnography of Jauca in 1980-82. Write-up of that material will follow completion of the total historical study, and will cover several aspects of local society and culture that receive only passing mention in the present work).

Because of the temporal overlap of this study with that of Mintz, it constitutes a restudy as well as a continuation. I will disagree with Mintz on several points, but generally this research supports his major conclusions. No fundamental correction will be suggested, as was the case with Lewis's (1951) classic study of Redfield (1930), and Freeman's (1982) recent restudy of Mead (1928). The major differences between this analysis and that of Mintz arise not from contradiction, but from expansion of coverage, from a greatly broadened field of analysis.

I share Mintz's interests in the characteristics of different production regimes, class structure, and culture history, but here they will be approached differently. He focused on particular enterprises, first "Hacienda Vieja" and then the U.S. sugar corporation that replaced it, and on their impact on local social life, primarily in terms of how they

organized and applied labor. This remains an important topic here, but it is only one of several. In this study, investigation of the organization of production begins at the level of the United States sugar industry as a whole. This expanded context has several consequences. For instance, it will be argued that certain changes in local labor patterns that Mintz attributes to tendencies of corporate capitalist agriculture per se, are better understood as consequences of a particular structure and dynamic of the over-all industry at a particular time, interacting with prevailing conditions and characteristics of insular and local patterns of production. A more general implication of choosing this higher level system as an analytic starting point is an expanded field of interactions to be included in the culture history. To get from the structure of the U.S. sugar industry to social life in Jauca requires consideration of certain connections of that industry to the economy and political power structure of the United States, and more comprehensive analysis of the colonial relationship of Puerto Rico to the U.S., of the economic and political systems of Puerto Rico, and of the socioeconomic divisions and alliances among the island's population.

This broader scope of analysis is context for discussion of local class structure. I basically concur with Mintz's descriptions of the social characteristics of the rural proletariat as they existed in 1948-49, although specific disagreements in regard to this description will be noted in

chapter five. One basic difference, however, is an attempt in this thesis to locate this local class segment more concretely in the larger economic, political and social field. Another difference is one of emphasis, and results from the changed situation of 1982. Mintz went to the field shortly after the rural proletariat had come into being, and he emphasized those factors that brought or held the rural workers together. I went to the field when the population had become much more diversified, and I became interested in those factors that drew or kept rural workers apart.

This thesis, like The People of Puerto Rico, connects with many points of controversy within anthropological research. The remainder of this introduction will concentrate on four such areas: 1) a series of issues involved in the study of local communities within complex societies, 2) the role of history in anthropological research, 3) the study of an industry structure, and 4) the study of class.

Local communities in complex societies

As anthropology shifted away from an exclusive interest in "tribal" or pre-state peoples, and as greater numbers of anthropologists undertook fieldwork in settlements within state societies, a range of new methodological and theoretical issues arose (see Arensberg 1960; 1961; Manners 1960). Some of these matters remain controversial, others have become routine concerns of research. One now routine concern is the issue of the representativeness of the chosen research site.

For me, the actual selection of the site was not problematic. Having decided to work in Puerto Rico, and desiring the maximum amount of historical information on the local society, Jauca was the obvious choice. There has been more written about Jauca than any other community in Puerto Rico (as listed below). But this still leaves the question of how Jauca is or is not representative of other communities on the island.

In 1948, Mintz selected the township of Santa Isabel ("Cañamelar"), and then Jauca ("Poyal") within it because they represented "an extreme case" within Puerto Rico's sugar cane growing areas of land concentration and U.S. corporate control (Mintz 1956: 319). Data presented in later chapters document this assertion: Santa Isabel surpassed all other municipalities in average size of farms and in percentage of land under corporate control. His characterization is made even stronger by one factor he did not mention, that Central Aguirre Corporation was the most advanced of any U.S. corporation in field techniques and technology. Within the municipality of Santa Isabel, the settlements of barrio Jauca II were centrally located within Aguirre's domain. So Jauca I may be fairly

1. "Jauca" has several referents, even within the contemporary settlement. For clarity in subsequent discussions, I will use "Jauca I" to refer to the entire barrio, "Poblado Jauca" to refer to the original village that grew up along Route 1 in the early decades of this century, and "Jauca" to refer to the contemporary village, a consolidation of nearly all of the residents of the barrio into one continuous settlement, that developed in the 1950s and 1960s.

assumed to illustrate better than most places the full implication of advanced corporate control of sugar cane production. For all that, Jauca I did not stand apart from countless other sugar communities. Mintz (1956: 319) claims that the way of life he describes "is the way of life of several hundreds of thousands of other Puerto Rican people". My research confirms that characterization as being essentially correct, with the qualification that Jauca I may well be the extreme point reached by U.S. corporate dominance, and that many of those hundreds of thousands would lead lives involving socioeconomic arrangements of a more intermediate or mixed nature. Ways in which Jauca I was similar or different from other communities in the 1940's will be mentioned in later discussions.

Present day Santa Isabel is no longer a town dominated by one crop, one major industry, one source of work and income. Like most Puerto Rican localities, production profiles and sources of income are diversified and rapidly changing. Major industries are not the handy and meaningful diagnostics of community type that they were in the 1940's. If Santa Isabel and Jauca no longer stand as an extreme type of one common circumstance, what do they represent today?

One answer to that question is that the locality remains an unusually clear example of general processes with wide ranging implications. Here we can examine the decline of a major capitalist plantation system. Little has been done on this

topic, within or beyond Puerto Rico. Plantation studies have focused on issues relating to the rise or operation of plantations, not their collapse (see below). But it is the fact of the decline of sugar production since 1952 that dominates the recent history of Puerto Rican agriculture. Santa Isabel, as an important area of the most advanced sugar complex on the island, was unusual in the persistence of large scale corporate sugar agriculture into the late 1970s. Jauca retained a substantial agricultural work force, even as it developed a significant middle class. This coexistence of the two social groups is also unusual, even for the south coast sugar zone, and this presents an unusual opportunity for studying and comparing the two in interaction.

In another sense, Jauca today is removed from one of the major social changes in Puerto Rico since the earlier study, which is the explosive growth of urban centers, especially greater San Juan. In 1950, according to the Federal census, 40.5% of the island population lived in settlements of 2501 or more. In 1980, the figure was 66.8%. Jauca has become, relative to all residential circumstances, an unusually small community.

Life in the large cities is different (see Lewis 1965, 1966; 1969; Ramírez 1977; Safa 1964; 1968; 1974). One very relevant difference is that Jauca, by contrast to most current residential areas, has a relatively stable population, and that suggests deeper social roots and the possibility of more long

term social relations. Yet the rural-urban distinction should not be overemphasized. Criticism of Redfield's (1941) concept of a rural-urban continuum are well known (e.g. Friedl and Chrisman 1975; Gullick 1973; Hannerz 1980). Even in 1948, according to Mintz (1972), Jauca I stood as a case that did not fit within the supposed continuum, but which was a distinct type with some characteristics of both. Since then, the distinction certainly has been overwhelmed by the multiplication, spread, and penetration of island wide institutions and patterns, including media, marketing, and a host of governmental bodies--as Wirth (1938) in fact predicted would happen. At some points in this thesis, and more in the discussion to come of the 1960-1982 period, I will argue that proximity to various types of central places has important consequences for local social arrangements, and that Jauca fits somewhere in the middle of the range of possibilities of this measure. But this idea is better thought of in terms of central places or center-periphery relations than in terms of a rural-urban contrast.

There are other important social diagnostics besides community size that separate or join Jauca to other areas in Puerto Rico. These will be discussed within the text. To focus on them now would be to belabor the point that every community is unique.¹ Because of these differences, caution is

1. Those interested in exploring these local differences for the periods subsequent to the People of Puerto Rico project should consult the following sources, in addition to the

always in order before extrapolating conclusions from Jauca to other areas. Nevertheless, in the general events and consequences of the past thirty years, Jauca and Santa Isabel are fully in the mainstream of Puerto Rican history. This is suggested by various social and economic indicators, that show them falling between rural and urban poles (see table 1.1). More impressionistically, conversations in various parts of the island support the idea that Jauca's experience of social change is comparable to the experience of many other areas. In sum, Jauca offers unusual opportunities to examine important aspects of social change, while remaining average enough to stand as a fair representative of the over-all impact of recent island history

A second common concern in community study research is the danger of reifying the community, of making an arbitrarily bounded research unit seem like an actually existing entity. A closely associated danger is exaggeration of the closure of the local social system, of not paying enough attention to the links to the outside. The People of Puerto Rico project has been accused of both (Roseberry 1978: 34-36; see also Thompson 1960), even though they were in advance of most of their contemporaries in dealing with both. The latter concern is not

sources on urban life cited above: Bourne and Bourne 1966; Brameld 1959; Buitrago Ortiz 1973; Fernández de Encinas 1971; Fernández Méndez 1964; 1972; Friedlander 1965; Hernández Álvarez 1967; Hill et al. 1959; Ines de Hernández Álvarez 1971; Landy 1959; La Ruffa 1971; Rodríguez Bou 1966; Rohrlich Leavitt 1974; Seda Bonilla 1958; 1973; Stycos 1955; Tumin and Feldman 1961; Vázquez Calcerrada et al. 1971.

Table 1.1

Santa Isabel Compared to Rural and Urban Puerto Rico
Various Population Characteristics, 1980 Census

	Puerto Rico Urbanized Areas	Santa Isabel Municipality	Puerto Rico Rural Areas
Persons 25 years old or older, percent high school graduates	47.7	30.5	24.3
Persons 25 years old or older, percent completed 4 years or more college	12.8	4.1	3.6
18-24 years old, percent enrolled in school	38.7	23.7	23.7
Civilians 16-19 years old, percent not in school, not high school graduates	21.5	30.3	33.3
Persons 5 years and over, percent who can speak English easily	25.0	16.9	10.4
Person 5 years and over, percent living in different house in 1975	30.7	28.6	25.8
Total persons, percent born in municipality of residence	40.8	46.5	58.4
Total persons, percent born outside of Puerto Rico	10.0	6.5	6.2
Percent of persons below poverty level, 1979	52.7	77.4	77.6
Per capita income, 1979	\$2,651	\$1,357	\$1,356
Median household income, 1979	\$6,544	\$4,250	\$3,886
Percent of families with no workers in 1979	27.4	31.2	36.1
Employed persons, 16 years and over, percent in manufacturing	16.3	24.8	25.9
Civilian labor force, percent unemployed	13.1	17.9	19.4
Nonworkers per 100 workers	232	318	342

Source: U.S. Census of Population, Characteristics of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1984, vol. 53, Tables 40, 41

a problem for this study, as a major focus will be events above the village level and how they interacted with local society. As for the former, reification, even though Jauca is an extremely open community, it does have a real existence as an entity.

Jauca today is geographically bounded, by the Caribbean to the south, and by cropland in the other directions. The closest settlement, other than a few scattered houses, is the town itself, two miles to the west. This physical separation is the basis for other kinds of distinctions. Jauca is an administrative unit. In various organizational hierarchies-- churches, unions, schools, political parties, etc.--the village of Jauca has its own division. It is treated as a unit in various programs and policies, both public and private. During Mintz's fieldwork, the settlements within barrio Jauca I fell together as one operational division of Aguirre. At present there is a normative expectation (often unfulfilled) that government funds allocated to the municipality will be distributed fairly by barrio. When telephone service reached Jauca in 1982, it was installed throughout the settlement all at once. Other examples will be cited in the text. Jauca, or some variation of it, is also a unit in various data sets, such as the U.S. census, a number of insular government publications, and even Catholic Church records. While that is not directly relevant to the question of Jauca's status as an entity, it is important for researching Jauca.

Jauca is an interactional locus. During fieldwork it became clear that a variety of social contacts and interactions occurred with much greater frequency, on the average, between people living in Jauca than between jauqueños and those living elsewhere. (Although for some individuals, for whom Jauca is a "bedroom suburb", this is not the case). Quantitative material collected for the projected ethnography of Jauca should confirm this observation. It is not essential to so substantiate it at this time, for there is another basis for treating Jauca as an interactional locus in this study. Vincent (1977) has borrowed the ecologists' concept of "a square yard of turf" to justify study of interaction within an arbitrarily bounded field. By happy coincidence, this procedure can produce a field of study that corresponds exactly to the actual settlement. A circle of one mile radius, drawn from the schoolhouse in the center of Jauca, includes every residence within the barrio of Jauca I, but no residence from outside of it. All but a handful of these residences are part of the continuous settlement of the current village of Jauca.

Jauca is an emic category, a subjective reality. People from Jauca and its environs speak of it as a community, even if recognizing divisions within it. Older informants comment that in former times, Jauca was well-off because of the relative abundance of cane work. Others note that Jauca has a distinctive style because of its proximity to the sea. Some assert that Jauca has long had a reputation for the toughness

of its males. One hears it said that "one who has tasted the water of Jauca will never want to leave", although that or similar sayings may be heard in most communities of the island. Jauca has a reputation, even a personality, and virtually everyone will comment freely when asked on Jauca, "as it is and as it was".

Jauca then is a valid, meaningful social unit. This study will explore how this unit interacts with various external or internal conditions, including local manifestations of higher order social systems, horizontal connections to similar units beyond the village boundaries, and internal social divisions and social units of family and individual. But Jauca is the focal point.

Another issue regarding community studies raised by Arensberg (1961: 247) no longer seems to be a concern, at least not in the same way. That is the issue of whether a local community is "inclusive" enough, whether it contains within it enough of "the institutions, the culture traits, the forces of the whole society". Since field research has since moved to study even more narrowly defined social fields, it seems no longer expected that a research unit should be inclusive. But the issue has resurfaced in modified form in urban anthropology. Here the debate is whether anthropologists should focus on life in the urban neighborhood, or on the larger structures of the city and how they connect to national society (see Fox 1977; Friedl and Chrisman 1975; Hannerz 1980).

Should it be anthropology in the city, or anthropology of the city, with the decision sometimes being portrayed as a choice of either participant observation or holism (Hannerz 1980: 296-297). Recent urban investigations generally seek a middle ground, by including some discussion of larger social processes and institutions and how they impinge on local life. These attempts at compromise have varied in their success, and to date no accepted guidelines have emerged on how the larger society and local community should be studied together.

Steward confronted this basic issue with the concept of "levels of socio-cultural integration" (Steward 1958: 6-8; also see 1976a 43-63; Manners and Steward 1953: 123), the idea that there exist distinct phenomenological levels in society, and that these require distinct approaches. A banking or educational system, say, may be best studied at a national level, even though it may have local and locally researchable subdivisions. Such a study would be based primarily on the writings of specialists in those fields. Other phenomena operate and are better studied by participant observation at other levels--that of a village, family, or individual. Further, a national society contains two major types of segments: "Locally distinctive segments", such as communities or ethnic minorities; and "horizontal segments", such as classes and castes. Each may have its own distinctive subcultural life style.

This was a major conceptual advance at the time of its

formulation. It helped clarify the study of sociocultural change (which Steward argued proceeded by different rates at different levels), and provided a needed corrective to the more sweeping generalizations of national character studies. But in retrospect, his formulation also had its drawbacks. Wolf (1978: 19-25) criticizes it for reifying the level of the state, and for being a formal, static framework that does not allow for process or interaction (see also Ramírez 1978: 45; Velázquez 1978: 52; Wolf 1982: 14-15). Even within The People of Puerto Rico, the staff researchers made scant use of the levels of integration concept, concentrating instead on a historical reconstruction of (primarily) political and economic changes that provide an institutional framework for change on the local level.

Despite those problems, and hopefully avoiding them, this thesis will use a concept of levels of analysis as one of two necessary abstractions for dealing with the complex historical processes under consideration. I argued above that Jauca is, in certain senses, a real entity, and that it is a valid analytic unit at the local community level of analysis. I will discuss levels below that, those of the family and the individual, but mainly as they relate to social organization at the level of the village, not for their own sake. A second level of analysis used in this study is the island of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico too exists as a social entity, in many of the same ways described for the village of Jauca, and more.

But to propose it as a unit--and given its anomalous political status, perhaps the only unit of its type--does not presuppose any judgment about the closure or cohesion of processes that may be analyzed at that unit level. Some areas, such as the island political system, have a substantial institutional basis and separation from other polities. Others, like the island economy, are more tenuous, having very weak internal coherence and strong external ties. In any case, the balance of internal to external linkages is always a matter of degree and a topic for investigation. A third and final level of analysis employed here is of the United States as a whole, but only for a very restricted topic, the U.S. sugar industry. Other characteristics of the U.S. national level and factors pertaining to a higher world system level will be discussed, but as context rather than as a focus for analysis.

The other abstraction required for this study is in the social content to be examined at each level. No anthropological description includes everything about a society. The scope of material to be covered here requires a relatively narrow selection to topics to be included. Three areas are considered at both village and island levels: politics, economics, and socioeconomic divisions (some of which would be called classes). This selection is consistent with the general tradition of materialist research within and outside anthropology, and the three have been shown to be of fundamental significance in shaping other domains of social

life and belief.

The staff of the People of Puerto Rico project considered island political, economic, and socioeconomic patterns, but as context for their studies of communities. They disavow any attempt to explain the larger context (Steward et al. 1956: 32). This has been raised as a criticism (Roseberry 1978: 34), and one that Wolf (1978: 24) and Mintz (1978: 12) seem to accept. I will attempt to analyze and explain those patterns. This attempt uses systems theory as a conceptual base (see Bertalanffy 1968; Boulding 1968; Buckley 1968; Miller 1971). Systems theory offers a way of thinking about complex patterns of interaction, a general model for ordering data, that can aid in the explanation of actual, concrete process. Systems theory also, I argue elsewhere (Ferguson 1977) can be seen as a sort of demystified dialectics.

Each of the three topic areas mentioned above, at each level of analysis, can be considered a system, i.e. a set of components in dynamic and mutually conditioning interaction.¹ Each component in a system may be considered a subsystem, so that, say, politics on the island level could be broken down into partisan politics, federal administration, insular government operations, etc. Interactions to be studied include

1. "A system can be defined as a set of elements standing in interrelation. Interrelation means that elements, p , stand in relations, R , so that the behavior of an element p in R is different from its behavior in another relation, R' ." (Bertalanffy 1968: 55-56)

those within and between subsystems, between systems, and between systems and subsystems of different analytic levels. Also, the systems react to external inputs, i.e. changes originating outside the defined boundaries of all the systems under consideration. All these interactions are seen as following a non-linear, systems causality, so that change in any component may touch off a series of readjustments in other components. This idea of mutual conditioning does not negate the idea that changes in certain components have causal priority. On the contrary, a central argument will be that sugar production--an economic subsystem with strong vertical linkages across analytic levels--has a prominent impact on other subsystems and systems. It will also be argued that changes in higher level systems are more likely to result in changes on lower level systems than the reverse. But all of these causal priorities are accompanied by less strong, yet still very important, feedback conditioning.

If all this sounds abstract and jargonistic, it hopefully will not appear so in the text, where the systems terminology is fairly unobtrusive. This statement has been to clarify the framework being used, and to address the issue that started this discussion: how can one do field research in a community within a complex society, and still be true to the anthropological ideal of holism? This bounded idea of holism does not imply that all the rest of culture can be reduced to the factors under consideration here. I emphatically reject

any such suggestion. To bring in more topic areas for consideration in the present study, however, would expand the task beyond manageable proportions. Many culture patterns not considered in detail in this historical study will be described and analyzed from a more synchronic perspective in the ethnography to follow.

I mentioned interaction between levels of analysis. To assert that events at the level of the island affect local society is not to show how they do. Much recent literature has stressed how supra-local conditions structure local society, but it is not always clear precisely how that structuring is accomplished. It is not enough to say that higher level political and economic institutions direct changes in their local operations, and that there is a correlated change in local social structure. It must also be shown how, exactly, changes in local institutions translate into changes in non-institutional social patterns. Mintz does this, by describing how the progressive elimination of distinctions in economic opportunities, and the towering dominance of one, uniform institutional context (wage labor for Central Aguirre Corporation) resulted in the individualization, homogenization, and cohesion of the rural work force. This process of simplification of local social structure is discussed in this thesis in chapters three and four. But in chapter five, covering the period from 1940 to 1960, a very different trajectory begins, which came to dominate local social life in

the 1960s. Supra-local inputs, rather than leading to the simplification of local social structure, instead lead to it becoming more complex. Understanding this process cannot stop with a description of changes in local institutional structure, as critical as those changes may be, for that would leave unanswered the question of how the essentially homogeneous population came to be sorted out into the newly created social positions.

To study this process, I will focus on a few social characteristics, which differentiate the people of Jauca. Every individual has a variety of characteristics, achieved or ascribed, which may be the basis of a recognized social distinction between individuals. After 1940, and even more so after 1960, a changing economic situation resulted in a change in the significance of certain social characteristics, and this led to a process of change in other social patterns. To anticipate an instance, a relative improvement in the income opportunities for women compared to men set off a chain of adjustments in individual behavior and attitudes and in family life. Those adjustments in turn contributed to new distinctions in the over-all social patterning of life in Jauca.

History and anthropology

The staff of the People of Puerto Rico project (Steward et al. 1956: Part II), and later Mintz (1953; 1958, 1959) alone employed a "cultural historical approach". For an

anthropologist to "do history" is common today, but was unusual at the time (Hudson 1973: 119-121). Ethnohistory is the main branch of historical anthropology to develop since that time (see Carmack 1972), but ethnohistorians have largely ignored the historical work by the Steward group (Hudson 1973: 133). Within the discipline of history, an anthropological concern with daily life is associated with the subfield of social history (e.g. Gutman 1977a; Hobsbawm 1965; 1981; Rudé 1964; Thompson 1966). One of the best social historians even credits Mintz and Wolf for shaping his perception of culture (Gutman 1977b: 16). There is a great potential for interdisciplinary cooperation between historical anthropology and social history,¹ as well as for controversy, as many social historians advocate idealist explanations, stressing the causative role of cultural traditions and the role of agency in history.

For the past fifteen years or so, there has been a growing body of historical anthropology, based variously on perspectives of dependency, world systems, unequal development, or class analysis. Most of this work has been in colonial or neocolonial situations (see Cohen et al. 1979 for a wide geographical spread), but Wolf (1982) shows how a radical perspective can illuminate aspects of the history of pre-state peoples, normally the province of ethnohistorians. A radical historical approach can be rather upsetting to the established

1. Evans Pritchard (1964: 174, 183, 188) saw this potential as early as 1961.

theory on non-historical studies, as shown by Wasserstrom's (1977; 1978) recent historical work on the well-studied Chiapas area. The historical reconstruction of Puerto Rican society in Steward et al. (1956), despite some superficiality and theoretical defects which can be recognized in hindsight (and which are acknowledged by some of the researchers [Mintz 1978: 10; Wolf 1978: 23-24]) is a pioneering forerunner of this recent research.

What kind of history did they write? By one contemporary standard, none at all. At the time, "history" signified to some the opposite of "science", a concern with ideographic description rather than nomothetic generalization (Pelto and Pelto 1978: 19). Steward (1976b: 209) seems to share that standard. Roseberry (1978: 31) takes that to imply a fundamental disagreement between Steward and his staff, who most emphatically were interested in nomothetic generalization based on historical data (see also Mintz 1975). Actually, it is possible to read their positions as non-contradictory, but there is no question that the staff members placed much greater emphasis on historical factors in their explanations than did Steward, and this difference is even more pronounced in other works by those authors.

In a joint statement (Steward et al. 1956: 504), the staff described their strategy in studying history as simply "to determine the principle factors causing change in Puerto Rico", and then "to trace the concrete effects of these factors in

terms both of general trends affecting all segments of Puerto Rican society and of differential effects on subcultures of the larger society". That is more or less what I hope to do, with a restriction of local effects to just one site. The rub, of course, is determining what are "the principle factors causing change". In many standard accounts of Puerto Rican history, they are identified as the attitudes and decisions of various leaders. In contrast, Steward and the project staff, and this author, all ground the search for cause in the field of production, although differing on which aspect of production is the most promising. This common interest is one definition of a materialist approach.

To some, this may suggest a "frightening anthropological determinism" (G. Lewis 1963: 258). That need not be so. Marx (1963: 15) wrote:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

Engels (1939: 125), quoting Hegel, makes it clear that this is not a philosophy of despair:

(F)reedom is the appreciation of necessity. "Necessity is blind only in so far it is not understood". Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends.

The strong conviction of the present author in materialist determination of history is consistent with a strong hope of being able to change it. That, after all, is the point.

Discussion of the perceived differences between Steward and the project staff touches one other issue related to historical investigations in anthropology. More than history, Steward emphasized the determinative role of the natural environment, as mediated by patterns of work. This difference in emphasis appears today as a basic division within anthropology, separating ecological and historical materialism. In the conclusion I will argue that these types of explanation need not be contradictory. In part, they result from asking different kinds of questions, and from looking at different kinds of societies. Information on possible determinative aspects of the natural environment will be presented in the text.

Other historical issues to be discussed in the conclusion are raised by this being a restudy. Trying to answer the obvious question of "how well does the original study hold up?" will raise two more general concerns. One is the degree to which it is possible to confirm or deny conclusions based on direct observations three decades earlier. That issue raises another, the reliability of historical reconstruction based primarily on informants' recollections. How would my reconstruction of local history differ if I had not had the published sources to use?

The historical method employed by the People of Puerto Rico staff was simple. For trends at the insular level and above, it was summarized (Steward et al. 1956: 32) succinctly as "to

assemble relevant information from the studies of many experts". Local history was reconstructed by using local records, which were and remain limited, but primarily by elicited recollections of informants. The primary elicitation technique was informal conversation, with only limited use of more formal, directed interviews (Manners 1956: 97; Mintz 1956: 320; Padilla 1956: 269; Scheele 1956: 421; Wolf 1956: 174).

Methods for this project are somewhat more involved. For the insular level, the method is similar: assembling information from the work of experts, including both contemporary reports and retrospective studies by historians. A difference is that there is a great deal more historical work to draw on now, even though major gaps remain in our knowledge. Worthy of particular mention are the studies associated with the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriquena (CEREP). My task was not so much to write history as to read it, and then synthesize what I read--making connections between studies of different aspects of island life, interrelating processes and events described for different levels (local, insular, U.S.), and piecing together work from various time periods to create a running narrative. Admittedly, this attempt at synthesis has its problems. Many relevant sources could not be consulted because of time restrictions, and there is always a danger of misunderstanding or oversimplification when dealing with such a range of topics. But I believe these problems are endemic to anthropology's quest for holism, even in regard to

supposedly "simple" societies. The difference is that in this case, the "subject population" will have the opportunity to rake the observer over hot coals for his errors. A similar procedure is used for assembling information on inputs from above the insular level, i.e. those national and international trends which are relevant to this study but which are not analyzed for their own sake, such as shifts in orientation of Washington administrations, wars, major changes in international investments, etc.

A different approach is used for the sugar industry at both the U.S. national and insular levels. Only a limited amount of historical research has been done on these, not enough for present needs. Regarding the sugar industry, I rely on government or private studies of the industry at particular times. These studies exhibit varying degrees of partisanship for various positions within contemporary conflicts. I believe these biases can be recognized and neutralized. A more serious problem in the sources is that virtually all statistics about sugar ultimately rely on reports provided by the sugar producers themselves. This applies to most government documents, including the agricultural census. That sugar statistics (and a great many other statistical data sets) contain gross inaccuracies is obvious to anyone whom examines them closely (see Hagelburg 1974: 54). It may be possible to eliminate some of these inaccuracies, and certainly to deepen our understanding of the sugar industry, by research in government

and private archives. Unfortunately, I was unable to gain access to the most relevant archives. Central Aguirre Corporation, in the final stages of liquidation at the time of my fieldwork, did not reply to written requests for information. The two insular government agencies most directly involved in sugar production also refused to provide any data that was not already published, the insular government at the time being possessed by a kind of bunker mentality. Perhaps future researchers will have better luck. For now, all I can do is point out suspected misrepresentations in statistics, and stress a general warning that the figures are not precise, and are best taken as indicators of general and long term trends.

Historical reconstruction for the village level depends on a combination of written and oral sources. Like the original project staff, I use whatever archival sources available. These include Catholic Church records, demographic registry records, the minutes of town council meetings, records of commercial licenses, tax registry listings on land ownership, a consolidated data sheet on Central Aguirre mill operations, and a few other sources not directly relevant for this thesis. I also use a range of published government statistics on Jauca and its environs.

Two other potentially valuable types of written records were not utilized, for reasons of time. One is island newspapers. A search of their files for references to Jauca and the area could provide an enormous amount of information,

but would also take an enormous amount of work. Other information could be collected by a search through the archives of the various government and private agencies which have operated at some time in or around Jauca, and a thorough search for pertinent records in the Puerto Rico National Archives. Again, all that would require more time than I had available, and except for the National Archives, probably insurmountable difficulties of access.

A final category of written record was unavailable to the People of Puerto Rico staff--their own reports, and subsequent follow-ups by themselves and others. In the case of Jauca, the main sources are reports based on Mintz's original fieldwork (1951a; 1951b; 1953; 1956) and subsequent visits in 1956 and 1966 (1966; 1974), reports on brief periods of fieldwork in Jauca by other researchers in the late 1950's (Brameld 1959; Hernández Álvarez 1964), a dissertation encompassing the history of Santa Isabel (Hoernel 1977), and several recent publications by local residents interested in local history. A good deal of additional information on Jauca appears in other writings of Mintz and his colleagues in the project.

The other source of information was the jauqueños themselves, what they told me during the fifteen months I lived there. This information was of three kinds: from informal conversations, from more directed conversations with individuals of special expertise or experience, and from a series of directed (or "semi-structured") interviews with a

selected group of informants. The last is the most important single source of information on local history, and that emphasis distinguishes this study from its predecessor. The selection of this group of informants is a key methodological point bearing on the representativeness of my data for the residents of Jauca as a whole.

The directed historical interviews and many other ethnographic techniques relevant to the synchronic ethnography were conducted with fifteen families. The number was based simply on an estimate of how many I could handle. These fifteen families suffered through repeated intrusions on their lives. Simply and truthfully, this study would not have been possible without their unselfish cooperation.

Selection of the families was based on the results of questionnaires. Distribution of questionnaires commenced after over four months spent living in Jauca. They went to 20% of the households in Jauca (131 cases), stratified and weighted by residential areas (see Pelto and Pelto 1978: 133-134). The content of the questionnaires will be discussed in the ethnography to follow the historical work, and more methodological details will appear there also. Response was a bit over 80%. (The ambiguity results from a few questionable cases, which remain to be classified as "hit" or "miss"). Two types of households tended to not respond, those with female household heads, and those with household heads with apparent mental problems. Both tend to correlate with the extreme end

of poverty and powerlessness, so that extreme in general may be under-represented. Other non-respondants seemed to be scattered across all points of all social parameters. A preliminary computer tally of questionnaire results was run by my wife, Leslie Farragher, providing an approximate socioeconomic profile of the community.

Selection of fifteen families from the sample was based on two kinds of factors: an estimate of over-all availability and reliability of prospective informants (which I believe did not introduce any new social bias to the field); and social representativeness, as judged by eleven responses on the questionnaires, covering family type, basic demographics, residence history, economic position, education, political affiliation, and religion. Selection of actual familial composites of these traits was as much art as science. I included proportionately more "better off" families, since in absolute numbers they would be represented by too small a sample to be reliable, but the majority of the families are poor. Over all, I feel confident that the selection fairly represents the social variation of Jauca.¹ To illustrate with one dimension, employment, among the families are found people who held for several years the following jobs: cane irrigation

1. There is a possibility, although I do not think it very significant, that some past social group that once existed in Jauca has since disappeared, and so obviously would not be represented in this survey. That being the case, the historical interviews that followed the survey would be biased toward "the survivors". I have no reason to suspect that this is the case.

worker, ox tender, electronic assembler, guard, high school teacher, college teacher, cane cutter, railroad worker, storekeeper, fisherman, housekeeper, government administrator (low level), mechanic, sugar cane mayordomo, cane loader, road maintenance worker, electrical lineman, ambulant vendor, vegetable field worker, and horse trainer. The group also included many people who had experienced various types of unemployment.

In conducting the interviews, two slight biases were introduced. I tried to interview both wife and husband together, but several of the women expressed a lack of knowledge or interest, and so participated less. (This male bias was reversed in other research techniques. Interviews regarding current family life are weighted toward a female perspective). The other bias resulted from the one major change between the original fieldwork proposal and the actual research, as written up here. The original idea was to have an historical baseline of 1940. That was abandoned when it was found to contradict the other research goals of understanding the decline of sugar production and the over-all course of island development. The year 1940 did serve as the baseline of the historical interviews, but general questions were asked about earlier times, and the earlier period was investigated by conversations with older informants outside the fifteen family group.

The interviews were organized by decade, with a fall back

to reference to key events to establish chronology. I found island elections to be good benchmarks. The initial starting date for any family depended on the age and memory of the informants. Seven historical interviews began with the year 1940, three with 1950, one with 1960, two with 1965, and two with 1970. The topics covered were: local economy (including job availability, mechanization, income sources and levels, unemployment, consumption patterns, etc.), migration, unions, politics, religion, family life, male-female relations, relations among compadres and neighbors, housing, education, health care, and several points in regard to local customs, personality types, etc. The local history interview was followed by a shorter biographical interview. The goal was to get a biography for all the household heads in the sample, but various exigencies prevented that, and several could not be obtained or completed. The biographical interviews included the topics: description of parents, education, residences, marriage, occupations, organizational participation (including unions and political parties), life crises, and miscellaneous other questions. Other relevant information is provided by genealogies and lists of compadres gathered for each household head.

I took notes through all interviews, and tape recorded them as a back up except in those cases when the informants were uncomfortable being recorded. I cross checked points whenever possible. My goal in covering a particular topic was

redundancy, and this was largely met. Although there was no interview from which I did not learn something new, I found by the end that the majority of what I was being told I had heard several times already.

Two aspects of the final historical reconstruction need mention. One is a tolerance for a degree of imprecision in certain details, particularly dates. I believe that is inevitable when relying on recollections as the primary source of information. The other is the nearly geometric expansion of chapter length as one gets closer to the present. Two factors produce this pattern. First is the greater amount of information available about more recent times, permitting more detailed reconstruction. Second is a fundamental change in both local and insular society, a great increase in social complexity which makes description of more recent periods necessarily more complicated.

Studying an industry

A recent critic of The People of Puerto Rico argues that the authors would have done better to begin their study with the mode of production, that the book's greatest weakness is its "failure to analyze capitalism" (Roseberry 1978: 29, 33). Wolf (1978: 24) seems to agree, that the study might have been better conceived if it began with flows of capital between various divisions of production in a united world system (see also Mintz 1977). But how, exactly, does one go about an anthropological analysis of capitalism? Recent efforts to

explain local processes in terms of a world capitalist system, or alternatively, of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production, have produced interesting and controversial insights. There may be a danger, however, in overemphasis of these highest levels of generality and abstraction. Important processes and constraints operating between the most general structure and the particular local case may be overlooked.

In this study, the major effort to understand the significance of the economic system will be directed at understanding the sugar industry, the single most prominent division of production in Puerto Rico from the U.S. invasion until the 1950's. As already noted, the industry will be examined at three levels: the U.S., Puerto Rico, and local (Santa Isabel--Jauca I). For some purposes, Central Aguirre Corporation will be treated as a unit of a distinct level, between the island and Santa Isabel. I will describe aspects of the structure and functioning of the industry at each level, the strong ties between levels, and the horizontal linkages of each to social and political patterns. I hope to explain how and why the industry changed, and what were the correlates of those changes. A particular concern will be a condition of oligopoly in the U.S. industry which I believe is basic for understanding local production arrangements, and ultimately, the decline of Puerto Rican sugar production.

I am not aware of any other study that covers similar topics, and so could serve as a model for the present work.

The closest field of research within anthropology (combined with agrarian history) is the literature on plantations and haciendas.¹ Mintz's (1953) article "The Culture History of a Puerto Rican Sugar Cane Plantation: 1876-1949", about the Destino operations in Jauca I, was one of the seminal anthropological studies in this field. Although Mintz calls Aguirre's operations a "corporate land-and-factory combine", it is a plantation by definition (see Wolf and Mintz 1957). Consequently, the present work could be called a plantation study.

At the same time, this study stands somewhat apart from that literature. I do not take up the many issues involving haciendas (see Morner 1973), largely because this study concentrates on the post-invasion period, which for Santa Isabel saw the rapid elimination of haciendas. I do not address, for instance, the question raised forcefully by Quintero Rivera (1974a: 154-164; 1981: 15-22) as to whether nineteenth century haciendas were capitalist or pre-capitalist

1. For general discussions, see: Beckford 1972; Courtenay 1965; Duncan and Rutledge 1977; Keith 1977; Mintz 1963; Morner 1973; Rubin 1959; Thompson 1960; Wagley 1960; Wolf and Mintz 1955; also see The Hispanic American Historical Review. For discussions of sugar growing outside of Puerto Rico, see: Calder 1981; Davison 1973; DeWind et al. 1979; Duncan and Rutledge 1977; Geertz 1963; Gudeman 1978; Guerra y Sanchez 1964; Handler 1965; Hoernel 1977; Jayawardena 1963; Keith 1977; Knight 1972; Mintz 1958 -1959; Moreno Fragnals 1978; Murphy 1982; Ortiz 1973; R. Smith 1956; S. Smith 1975; Taussig 1980; see also Hagelberg 1974; 1984. For discussions of haciendas and plantations in Puerto Rico, see: Bergard 1983; Buitrago Ortiz 1982; Hoernel 1977; Mintz 1953; 1958; 1959; 1974; Ramos Mattei 1981; Scarano 1978; Steward et al. 1956; Uttley 1937; Wessman 1978a; 1978b; 1980.

institutions (see also Mintz 1977: 261-263; Wessman 1978a: 1978b; 1980). Generally, this study differs from most studies by agrarian historians in that it involves the twentieth century dynamic of U.S. capital penetration overseas; and from recent acculturation studies by anthropologists on new production arrangements interacting with people of "traditional" societies (e.g. Gudeman 1978; Taussig 1980) in that this local society has been involved in large scale commodity production from virtually our earliest information. The focus of this work bears the greatest similarity to recent efforts that emphasize variations in capital and other supralocal factors leading to variations in local labor and land utilization (e.g. Edelman 1982; Knight 1972; Murphy 1982). Even these, however, treat the larger context as a source of inputs, rather than an area for analysis.

Neither does industrial anthropology (Arensberg 1978; Holzberg and Giovannini 1981) offer a model. This field's traditional core of shop floor studies is expanding its horizons by considering the larger political-economic environment (Holzberg and Giovannini 1981: 332-335), and Burawoy's (1979) strong programmatic statement calls for greater attention to factors such as competitive vs. monopoly structures. At present, however, these are still more potentials than actualities. Wolfe's (1977) work on the supranational organization of production, based on Steward's concept of levels of integration, also opens promising areas of

research related to concerns developed here. But like world system theory, it focuses on structures above particular industries.

No models appear in the discipline of economics. The subfield of industrial organization deals with the structures of industries, including issues such as oligopoly. There the similarity with the present project ends. Industrial organization as a field of study relies on quantitative data and standard macroeconomic models to investigate relationships between market characteristics, the organization of industries, and industry performance in terms of production and price policies (Bain 1968). That is far from my interest of examining the sugar industry in interaction with other economic trends, with power relations, and with the socioeconomic structure of Puerto Rico. Besides, the sugar industry is so atypical in so many ways that it runs against most generalizations about industrial development.¹ From what I can

1. Sugar is an atypical commodity for at least three reasons. 1) The sources of supply are divided between U.S. and foreign nations, with a critically important tariff barrier adding to the distinctiveness of the two. 2) An identical product is produced by two completely distinct processes (beet and cane sugar). 3) Production of usable sugar involves both agricultural and manufacturing phases. These have significant consequences. For instance, according to standard expectations, the agricultural sector consists of industries with an "atomistic structure" of small, competitive firms (Bain 1968: 585). But sugar refining was one of the first of the great Trusts (below). Moreover, most of U.S. agricultural production (and that of many other nations) is so interwoven with politically structured constraints and supports that it does not operate according to economic models. Economists take this as an indictment of government policy (Bain 1968: 588-609). It may also be seen as a comment on the inadequacy of

see, it has been ignored by industrial organization theorists.

Rather than orthodox macroeconomics, the approach used here has more in common with institutional economics, a.k.a. evolutionary, or holistic economics (see Adams 1980), the heterodox alternative that deemphasizes quantification and that stresses cultural factors, power relations, and the advantages of government planning. Veblen is credited as the founder of North American institutionalism; Myrdal and Galbraith are the best known contemporary neoinstitutionalists. The latter has written about Puerto Rico, and another major institutionalist theorist, Rexford Tugwell, played a major role in Puerto Rican history. I am unfamiliar with the institutionalist literature, and so cannot say how much their approach to industry resembles the one used here. I strongly doubt, however, that any institutionalist has attempted to carry an industry analysis through its interaction with a regional political and socioeconomic system to a particular local operation and its effects.

Similar comments apply to another kind of holistic and evolutionary economics: Marxism, especially as understood by writers associated with The Monthly Review (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Braverman 1976; Sweezy 1968).¹ They provide a solid

macroeconomic theory.

1. Although few radical analysts would consider Galbraith one of them, the institutionalists apparently are seen by some orthodox economists as advocating a similarly subversive view of economic processes:

analysis of monopoly organization in modern capitalism, and many of its economic, political, and social ramifications. But again, they concentrate on the largest structures, the over-all trends in economy and society, not the dynamics of particular industries and particular production units within them.

Analysis of industry structure is not suggested here as a substitute for the study of the larger system or structure of which it is part, but to add to an understanding of that larger system. An industry provides a good starting point for the study of capital flows and sociopolitical linkages. This is especially true for anthropologists, as these neglected areas of industry structure are restricted enough to be feasibly studied, and can be directly linked to on-the-ground behavior in local research sites.

Approaches to class

Class analysis is another and more traditional approach to understanding capitalism, but interest in classes antedate the capitalist revolution. Aristotle is credited with developing the three-level scheme of class structure (upper-middle-lower); the Romans with the term ("classis"), which designated tax categories; and Ferguson and Millar with initiating in the late

Galbraith does provide a ware that is in great effective demand: a critique in viewpoint against the prevailing orthodoxy in economics... His criticism cannot kill itself. But it acts like a virus, softening the way for more deadly critiques on the part of the New Left and its professional radical economists. (Samuelson 1973: 849)

eighteenth century the current of class studies still developing today. Marx and Engels, Weber, Mosca and Pareto, and Durkheim all founded schools of approaches to class, each of which has major subdivisions. These and still other approaches have led to so many controversies that Giddens (1973: 19) concludes "the question of classes and class conflict" is "the problem in sociology". That characterization could be broadened to include all of social science. A general overview of the class literature at this point, however, would take too much space, and raise too many peripheral issues. It is enough to say that there does not exist even a glimmering of a consensus on what class is, how it is to be studied, or how it relates to other aspects of society and social life.¹

The anthropological literature on class is comparatively undeveloped. There is a fairly broad literature concerning the formation of a stratified ruling group as part of the development of early states, but it is difficult to relate these excursions in political evolution to contemporary concerns with class. Potentially more comparable are general statements on the significance of inequality in human societies (e.g. Cancian 1976; Dumont 1970; Fallers 1973) but these have tended to be theoretically distant from the growing materialist

1. For general discussion on class theory, see: Bendix and Lipset 1953; Dahrendorf 1959; Giddens 1973; Gordon 1963; Laumann 1970; Page 1969; and especially Stavenhagen 1975, which contains an excellent synthesis of the class literature with an eye to anthropological relevance.

interest in class within anthropology.¹ Then there are focused studies of particular kinds of non-western systems of ranking or stratification (for collections, see Berreman 1981; Plotnicov and Tuden 1970; Tuden and Plotnicov 1970). Class has received less attention than some of these more exotic forms of inequality, and discussions of it are usually limited in text books and reviews of the field. (Exceptions exist. See Harris 1980; Murphy 1979). Ironically, it was the anthropologist Lloyd Warner who revitalized class as a major issue in North American sociology (Warner 1960; see also Gordon 1963). But henceforth the issue, and Warner himself, fell within the domain of sociology.

There have been two major class-related controversies within anthropology. One was over the "culture of poverty", Oscar Lewis's (1959; 1963; 1964; 1965, 1966) hypothetical pattern of sociocultural organization, attributed to many of the poor in western or westernizing societies. The manifold problems with this construction have been noted elsewhere (especially in Leacock 1971; Valentine 1968). All that needs mention here is that much of the confusion surrounding this and similar concepts is in part due to their ambiguous handling of class (see Valentine 1968: 121 ff.). Lewis declares that poverty should not be confused with class position, nor the culture of poverty with poverty itself (see Leeds 1971: 263-264

¹ There is also a growing literature on sexual stratification (Caulfield 1981; Schlegel 1977).

n. 25). Yet he repeatedly equates the latter (see Leeds 1971: 239-240), and is nebulous about the relationship of the former (e.g. in Lewis 1964; 1965, 1966: xlii-lii). These ambiguities underlie the most controversial aspect of Lewis's formulation, the assertion that the internalized culture prevents individuals from escaping poverty, and so perpetuates poverty (Lewis 1965, 1966: xiv; see also Valentine 1968: 69). This confuses the elementary distinction between the perpetuation of class divisions and the placement of individuals within a class structure.

Purged of this most controversial point, Lewis's focus on lifestyle rather than the larger structure of inequality is similar to many anthropological investigations of the poor (e.g. Hannerz 1969; Liebow 1970; Stack 1974). Without question, this is a legitimate topic of inquiry, and has produced very valuable information. Yet this approach carries with it the danger of misunderstanding the basis of the subcultural lifestyle. For instance, Gans (1982) takes a subcultural approach to class, but also pays attention to broader socioeconomic and historical considerations, and these enable him to explain patterns commonly attributed to ethnicity instead by economic position. Recognizing this danger (which in a sense is a special case of the dangers of community reification, discussed above), some fieldworkers now put their studies in the framework of a wider class structure, as in Belmonte (1979) and Susser (1982). The latter is especially

noteworthy for its attention to the larger societal structures shaping local class relations.

The other class-related controversy has involved the concept of pluralism. The idea of a plural society has had various formulations with differing relations to class. As first expounded by Furnival (1948) in relation to European colonies in the tropics, the plural sections are ethnic-occupational groups created and maintained by colonial policy. This is not opposed to a materialist view of class structure, but can be seen as a variant type created by imperialism. That is not the case with the concept of pluralism as developed by M.G. Smith (1965a; 1965b; cf. Despres 1967), and applied to the West Indies. In this formulation, the plural segments are based on more subtle sociocultural differences, particularly differing values, which can characterize even horizontally layered groups with similar backgrounds, such as the blacks and coloreds in Grenada. This broader conceptualization makes of pluralism a general view of stratification. The controversy that developed over this view was with "consensualists" (Braithwaite 1953; 1960; R.T. Smith 1956), followers of Parsons (1951) who see a societal consensus on values as the basis of stratification. Although this was one of the most significant theoretical discussions of class-like phenomena by anthropologists, it was a debate between very similar positions, both being idealist, emic, and synchronic in orientation (Ferguson 1976). More recently, in discussions

about Africa, Smith (1969a; 1969b; see also Kuper 1969) broadens his concept even further, so that pluralism encompasses all forms of stratification. Smith asserts that class is only a subtype of pluralism, and that the basis of all types of pluralism is not economics but rather differential incorporation in the political system, which he seems to accord prime mover status (Ferguson 1976). My knowledge of the African literature is limited, but it seems that Smith's polemic has gone largely unchallenged (cf. Leon and Leons 1977), demonstrating the limited concern of anthropologists with Marxist conceptions of class.

Anthropological research on class has grown, however, as more work is conducted within complex societies. Researchers in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, especially in urban areas, have been forced to consider class as a category, in relation to tribal and other forms of organization--although here the question has often been whether classes truly exist (Fallers 1973; Goody 1976; Gugler and Flanagan 1978; Hannerz 1980; Plotnicov 1970). In Latin America, where there is little doubt about the existence of class, a very large social science literature exists on classes, elites, and masses (e.g. Horowitz 1970; Lipset and Solari 1967; Morner 1971; Petras 1971). Anthropological descriptions of whole societies have long emphasized class, however phrased, as a preeminent structuring principle (e.g. Adams 1967; Butterworth and Chance 1981; Heath and Adams 1965; Wagley 1965; Willems 1975). In

this literature, major issues have been the relationship of race and class, the significance of class structures in relation to the "traditional-modern" division suggested (and disputed) for many nations, the historical origins and nature of the middle class or classes, the political orientation of different classes, social mobility, and so on. Despite all this work, the idea of class or stratification--in usage, the two terms overlap--has usually been accepted without much reflection or refinement. Butterworth and chance comment:

Research on social stratification has been small in quantity and has shown little cumulative development. There is still a lack of agreement among investigators as to how social classes should be defined: whether on the basis of income, education, occupation, social prestige, or cultural traits. Consequently, many of the studies we do possess are highly idiosyncratic and subjective... (1981: 108).¹

This assessment could be applied to all anthropology. The underdevelopment of anthropological discussions of class is illustrated by the above quote itself. The list of possible definitional characteristics makes no reference to any Marxist criteria. Recently, several researchers have invoked the Marxist idea of class (DeWind 1979; Nash 1979; Peace 1979), but for relatively clear-cut circumstances of industrial workers in conflict with management. There are positive signs of greater theoretical concern with the concept of class (e.g. in Mintz 1979; Plotnicov 1970; Post 1979a; Roseberry 1976; Stavenhagen

1. Anderson (1970) makes a similar pessimistic appraisal of political scientists' use of the term, noting (pg. 237) that they have relied too much on borrowings from anthropology!

1975; Worsley 1981), but there remains much to be done.

Class is an inescapable issue in writings about Puerto Rican society. No concept has been more central, and none used in such radically different ways. Class organizes The People of Puerto Rico, which in large part is a description of multiple class subcultures. Even within that one book, there is some confusion as to the meaning of the term. Steward (1956: 8) treats classes as divisions within levels of integration, defining them simply (and ambiguously) as "sociocultural groups or segments arranged in a hierarchical order". In a summary statement, the staff (Steward et al. 1956: 470) repeat this definition, but clarifies that classes are based on "occupational specialization induced by world-wide industrial trends", and that they have "fairly definite positions of status and power and to have somewhat distinctive subcultures".

Individual authors vary in their uses of the term. One reading of Manners (1956) sounds like straightforward North American sociology: class is an analytic abstraction based upon empirical investigation, and defined by occupation or other economic factors because these are found to explain more sociocultural variation than other indices. This view produces three strata (one with two internal layers), each with rural and urban sections, for a total of nineteen separate social groupings (pgs. 135-136). Another reading sounds very Marxist: the fundamental class distinction of the community is

"determined by the relationship... to the instruments of production". While there are middle groups of small landowners, and numerous urban groups somewhat removed from agriculture, the community is fundamentally divided "between the group which owns land and employs labor and the group which is landless and is employed to perform the labor" (pgs. 160, 168).

Wolf (1956: 202-203) asserts "that classes cannot be defined solely in static terms, but... must be understood with reference to the total culture of a particular society undergoing historical changes", and identifies historical economic trends which led to four rural classes: peasants, middle farmers, agricultural workers, and hacienda owners. Urban class structure is more complex and shifting, especially the very complex "middle classes" (pgs. 255-260). Mintz does not specify his conception of class. He notes five levels above that of the agricultural workers, some of which have rural and urban divisions, to a total of ten social groups (1956: 352). The analytic significance of these groups is not clear, for the landless rural proletariat is said to "most closely approximate a true class grouping... united by social, economic, and political identity, with a growing consciousness of class and of their position in the insular picture as a whole" (pg. 393). Padilla Seda's scheme seems similar to Mintz's, although she also resembles Warner in using terms like "upper" and "lower middle" classes. These middle classes are

socially mixed conglomerates, with some of their component subgroups of recent origin. But the majority of the population is described by Padilla Seda as in transition to a rural proletariat, still retaining vestiges of their previous small landholder roots, while developing a self identity as industrial workers which transcends the immediate locality (Padilla Seda 1956: 290).

There has been criticism of the use of class in The People of Puerto Rico. Quintero Rivera (1974a: 153) charges them with excessive interest in describing subcultures; Roseberry (1978: 34) scores them for conceiving of classes as "local groups", and slighting "ties with extra-community economic and political forces"; and Velázquez (1978: 52) claims that the authors "carefully avoided" the topic of power.¹ The project researchers do not, however, equate class with subculture, despite an occasional terminological lapse. Classes in their view have subcultures, but are based on occupation. The occupational divisions are further related to major divisions in the over-all structure of production and distribution (e.g. Steward et al. 1956: 42, 49, 60). True, a central goal of the researchers is to describe and understand local expressions of class subcultures, but there are many discussions of various linkages to the larger society, including links of power. And if they did not pay enough attention to the larger class

1. Gordon Lewis (1963: 238) criticizes the researchers for dealing with "social categories rather than persons". If that is considered a failing, it applies to this thesis as well.

structure, as I will argue myself, recent discussions of insular class patterns have not paid enough attention to the fact that many points of class conflict are local in expression, and local oppositions may vary considerably from larger island patterns.

In retrospect, a basic problem in The People of Puerto Rico is the failure to adequately conceptualize class. The loose "marxish" framework there employed is inadequate for understanding the social trends of change already begun by their fieldwork, and which now dominate insular society. The staff is at its theoretical strongest when discussing major divisions in the structure of agricultural production, especially in the case of the rural proletariat. But a proletariat, as Aron (cited in Giddens 1975: 61) points out, is the "class par excellence", no other class grouping is so distinctive or recognizable. Moreover, the proletarians of Santa Isabel during Mintz's time may well have represented the extreme of a rural proletarian pattern (Wolf 1971: 170-172). The staff is least adequate in concept and theory when dealing with the growing "middle classes". The middle class, of course, is the most troublesome grouping(s) from a Marxist point of view. More recently, several articles (Frucht 1971; Horowitz 1971; Mintz 1971; Wolf 1971) have drawn on the project discussions to focus attention on the conceptualization of class.

Other approaches to class in literature on Puerto Rico can

be dealt with more briefly. In the 1950's, class was a central category in several investigations of Puerto Rican society by North American sociologists. The most elaborately developed of these is the study by Tumin and Feldman (1971), and since Tumin is a major class theorist (see his [1953] rebuttal of Davis and Moore [1945]), it seems fair to let this study stand for the lot. Although Tumin and Feldman have roots going back to Weber (via Parsons)(pg. 3), in their hands class becomes a purely nominal category with no on-the-ground existence. Class position is measured uniformly throughout the island by educational level, education being in their view the best predictor of other sociocultural traits and determinant of life chances (pgs. 6-8, 464-465). They exclude by definition factors of politics and power (pg. 4), and other "macrosocial and macroeconomic dimensions of society" (pgs. 22-23). In this perspective, class is not seen as contributing to the sociohistorical dynamic. In fact, that dynamic is ruled out of consideration, and they rely on a simple projection of current conditions and trends into the future (pg. 5). Tumin and Feldman write that their approach to class is fundamentally different and non-comparable to that used in The People of Puerto Rico (pgs. 27-28 n. 28). It is not, nor is it comparable to the idea of class examined here. I will also suggest that theirs is not very enlightening, as illustrated by their failure to understand, or to even investigate the possibility, that the characteristics they assign to their key

diagnostic, education, were historically specific.¹ (See Quintero Rivera [1974a: 149 ff.] for other criticisms of the Tumin-Feldman position).

More recently, there have been several studies by anthropologists and others which portray class primarily as a subculture. Oscar Lewis (1965, 1966) brought the "culture of poverty" to Puerto Rico in La Vida, a narrative about life in a San Juan slum. To my knowledge, only Rohrlich Leavitt (1974: 70-72) among anthropologists has since then accepted the concept applied to Puerto Rican communities. However, Lewis's statements (1965, 1966: xiii-xiv) on the type of social conditions expected to generate a self-perpetuating culture of poverty clearly encompass Jauca, at least for certain periods. For this reason, it will be necessary to comment on the applicability of the concept in the conclusion.

Another example of a subcultural view of class is found in Gordon Lewis's classic Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (1963). Lewis includes factors of economics and power in his

1. Tumin and Feldman's lack of interest in history is demonstrated by their failure to specify when their survey was conducted. (I guess it was around 1955). But this is only one of several important omissions in regard to their procedures. While they discuss in great detail their selection of a sample and other statistical concerns, they do not say anything about the circumstances under which the survey was conducted. That is particularly unfortunate, since one of their major points is the high esteem in which islanders hold education, and since the surveys, presumably, were being administered by relatively highly educated people. The possibility of systematic bias is very real. More detailed methodological discussions in roughly contemporary sociological work (e.g. Stycos 1955: Appendix A) does nothing to assuage this fear.

discussion of insular class structure (pgs. 239-259), but not in any systematic way. His emphasis is on portraying how people live. Safa (1974; 1978) advocates a radical political position and stresses economic conditions. Her use of such terms as "proletariat" and "poor" is confusing (e.g. 1974: 104, 108, 110), but it seems that her critical diagnostic of class position is poverty, and her main interest the sociocultural adaptations to that condition. The general comments on subcultural approaches made earlier apply here: these studies have produced very valuable information, but their approach will not lead to an understanding of the nature, or even all the effects, of the class division of Puerto Rican society.

The final kind of approach to class to be mentioned here is historical, and influenced strongly by Marx and the social historian Thompson (1966). This recent work has created a new class paradigm for understanding Puerto Rican history. Quintero Rivera is at its forefront, and he offers a substantial theoretical discussion (1974a: 147-153) "to clarify the concept of social class". His view is that class must be understood as a social relation, based on interaction within a framework of a specific, historical structure of production, with the most significant individual identity corresponding to place within the major divisions of production. Analysis of class implies the total examination of society and its dynamic, including economics, politics, and social and cultural life. This formulation clearly contrasts with the nominalist and

subcultural approaches, which Quintero discusses, but does not provide much clarification beyond that. We are left without clear criteria for determining what is or is not a class. (Viewing class as a relation does not lessen the need for such criteria). In practice, Quintero Rivera (e.g. 1978: 59, 65-71) and others (e.g. Bergard 1980: 636; Buitrago Ortiz 1982: 8-15, 21), adopt fairly conventional headings (e.g. small farmers, day workers, hacendados, merchants, etc.), with a tendency toward finer distinctions or "splitting" of major categories within the system of production, and the use of several other terms (e.g. sectors, interests, quasi-classes, etc.) which are not clear in meaning or in relation to class.

My concern is not with terminological neatness per se. Scholar and layman agree that class is a fundamental underpinning of Puerto Rican society, and that appreciation of class is necessary to understand that society and its history. But the idea of class is usually pre-set and not critically examined, and so class research is often non-comparable, non-cumulative, and difficult to generalize to other societies.

I do not propose to come up with the "correct" concept of class in this thesis. No such thing exists. What I do propose is to investigate general conditions giving rise to social patterns which people call classes, and in doing so identify some of the varieties of class structuring. In order to avoid premature categorization, I will avoid using the word "class" in the historical reconstruction, except when referring to emic

views on class. Instead, I will use more neutral terms, such as "socioeconomic group", with group meant in a non-technical sense. The discussion of socioeconomic groups will also remain unfinished even at the end of this dissertation, as the major analysis of the more North American-style stratification pattern will fall under the chapter to come on 1960-1982. I hope, nevertheless, that the preliminary conclusions will be of some value in themselves.

CHAPTER II
The Spanish Period

Ponce de León brought civilization and its lust for gold to Puerto Rico in 1508. The gold boom played out by 1530, but by then the island had a small established Spanish population. Some were growing various crops, among them sugar cane, which was first planted locally in 1515 (Turner 1965: 8). Farming, like gold extraction, relied largely on forced native labor, but Ponce had begun a policy of "pacification" that would virtually exterminate the native population in the decades to come. When the decline of the natives was matched by the out-migration of Spaniards after 1530, African slaves were brought in to reconstitute the work force (López 1974a: 15-21; Hoernel 1977: 42; Wagenheim 1975: 40-45; also see Sauer 1969).

The main reason behind Spain's continued presence on the island once the gold was gone had nothing to do with agriculture, however. It was to counter the threat posed to Spain's New World sea lanes by French and British privateers. This threat became more pressing as the lucrative silver shipments picked up after mid-century (Furtado 1976: 23). In 1531, the Crown began to fortify San Juan as a central base, and in cooperation with the Roman Church, to reassert its political grip on the colony. Crown measures around 1546 gave some assistance to Puerto Rico's sugar growers, but hardly enough to create either the market or technological infrastructure needed for vigorous growth. Moreover, coastal planters had to cope with raids by British, French, Arawaks, and Caribs, leading many to move into the interior (Hoernel

1977: 42-46; López 1974a; Wagenheim 1975: 45-47). In the west, San German, Puerto Rico's second town, relocated away from the coast; and in the south, by 1567, a scattering of small-scale agriculturalists had settled in the Coamo valley, about 8 miles north of present day Jauca. The municipio of Coamo was officially founded in 1579, and by the middle of the next century, it would be the third most populous town in Puerto Rico (Hoernel 1977: 46; Rivera Bermúdez 1980: 26-31).

The demoralizing capture and sacking of San Juan by the British in 1598 dimmed any hopes for significant economic investment and growth. With a small internal market, and stifled in external trade by Spanish mercantile policies, Puerto Rico's economy in the seventeenth century showed only sporadic and impermanent gains for its four main products, sugar, cattle hides, ginger, and cocoa. The most vigorous growth, in fact, was in the bustling counterband trade that developed on the south coast, with the town of Ponce at its center (López 1974a: 28-30; Wagenheim 1975 47-48).

The Bourbon reorganization that followed the War of the Spanish Succession led to new policies for Spain's empire. The trade in silver had greatly diminished, and with it, Spain's trade with the New World. The new idea was to promote local economies in order to generate a tax base capable of supporting a political and military superstructure. The policy would build on the largely self-sufficient agricultural estates that had grown up throughout the empire, whose owners had long

sought a more open market for their products. Further, the empire was to be defended from attack, and Puerto Rico's strategic position again made it important to the Crown (Furtado 1976: 24-31; López 1974a: 30-31). In 1724, a new pro-agriculture policy was introduced in Puerto Rico. Cattle raising, which was seen as having less potential, was restricted, leading to a long-term extension of "respectable society" into the central mountains, which formerly had been inhabited mostly by fugitive soldiers and slaves. Coffee and coffee growers would play an increasingly important part in island affairs (Hoernel 1977: 48-49; López 1974a: 32).

Despite these developments, Puerto Rico in 1765 was still a backwater, isolated by mercantile rules, and with most of its scattered population living in isolated poverty (López 1974a: 34-39). In that year, however, after the drubbing Spain had suffered from Britain in the Seven Years War (Suchlicki 1974: 47), and in apparent recognition of the moribund state of the mercantile empire (Furtado 1976: 25), a Crown representative recommended widespread reform to stimulate economic growth and military strength (Wagenheim 19713: 38-43). European migrants with capital were given incentives to settle. Population rose from 44,883 in 1765 to 155,000 in 1800, thus providing both a local market and a potential labor supply for local enterprise. The slave population remained relatively small, rising from 5,037 in 1765 to 17,500 in 1794. In 1778, island haciendas were more reliant on free labor than on slaves, and by 1800 the

island's elite, now a clearly recognizable group, were complaining of a scarcity of labor, or more precisely, of labor willing to work for them under their conditions and rate of compensation. The rural poor, it seems, preferred life on their own to work for some patron (Hoernel 1977: 51; López 1974a: 33).

The sugar industry had been recognized by the Crown's agent as a potential source of growth. By 1776, Irish immigrants were extending flourishing sugar estates around San Juan, even though they still were below the level of sugar production of Puerto Rico in 1564. Growth continued, receiving an important boost in 1791 as the revolution in Haiti cut off that island's supply of sugar to Europe, and many refugee Haitian planters reestablished their operations in Puerto Rico (Hoernel 1977: 50; López 1974a: 36; Ramos Mattei 1981: 18; Mintz 1956: 330; Turner 1965: 8). The first reference to Santa Isabel, or Coamo Abajo as it was then called, appears from this period, as a port for Coamo's coffee crop in 1770 (Hoernel 1977: 50). In 1776, a passing priest commented on Coamo Abajo's haciendas, which apparently had established some reputation for hot peppers and for dates, the latter grown on an offshore cay (Rivera N.D.a: 11).

In 1796, after its defeat by the seemingly invincible armies of revolutionary France, Spain became an unwilling satellite of its northern neighbor. This meant that Britain became Spain's enemy, and British ships quickly checked Spain's sea forces

(López 1974a: 33). The Irish sugar growers near San Juan were expelled for suspected complicity with the British, resulting in a sharp set back for the local sugar industry (Hoernel 1977: 55; Ramos Mattei 1981: 19). The royal administration could not cope. Puerto Rico's economy was in chaos, fueling a creole resentment of Spain that had become evident by at least 1782 (Hoernel 1977: 56; López 1974a: 39-40). Spain was forced to recognize its lack of control of the seas, and finally gave legal recognition to the contraband trade, as long as it was with neutrals like the United States (López 1974a: 37). Spain's external problems fed into internal power struggles, and those contributed to Napoleon's takeover of Spain in 1808. In 1814 the French were forced out, and the reactionary Ferdinand VII came to power. But in that brief interval, the Latin American wars for independence had begun, and Ferdinand had to confront that irreversible process. Although Puerto Rico did not launch its own war of independence, it had enjoyed the more liberal colonial policy prior to 1814, and struggled with Spain afterwards to retain those improvements. After 1823, the Crown's power was brutally projected in Puerto Rico by a succession of hated governors, who confronted a growing opposition of liberal creoles (López 1974b: 42-50).

The reaction squelched political rights, but it compensated with economic concessions. Ferdinand allowed the able administrator Ramírez to remain at his post in Puerto Rico. In 1815, the Crown reinforced efforts for growth by a program of

repartition of Crown lands, the Cedula de Gracias, and incentives to encourage new immigrants with capital to invest. Royalist refugees from French and Spanish America streamed in for the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Coamo was made a regional administrative center for the Cedulas (Hoernel 1977: 56; López 1974b: 48-51). Ramírez encouraged sugar production. The center of cane cultivation shifted from the San Juan area to the southern and western coasts, with the south having the highest yields of cane per unit of land. Sugar production rose steeply. Sugar became Puerto Rico's leading export in the 1820s, far outdistancing coffee in significance by 1830 (Hoernel 1977: 57-59; López 1974b: 51; Ramos Mattei 1981: 20). In what would become Santa Isabel, one of the recipients of the 13 land grants under the Cedula was Pedro Capo, a Venezuelan royalist refugee (Hoernel 1977: 243-245; Mintz 1953: 237). His estate was called Hacienda el Destino, but may be better known through Mintz's writings as "Hacienda Vieja".

Mintz (1953: 226; 1956: 330) describes the Cedula as the beginning of the "slave and agregado plantation" period (an agregado is a landless agricultural worker), but the early social characteristics of this type of organization are obscure. We can surmise that the sugar estates were more reliant on slaves than agregados in Santa Isabel, based on the general observation that slaves were more associated with coastal sugar production than with mountain coffee estates.

The island slave population had fallen to 13,333 in 1802, but rose to 17,536 in 1812. The elite was still crying out about a shortage of labor (Hoernel 1977: 53-56). Crown measures instituted in 1824 were designed to coerce free men to work for the estates. One of the measures was to run subsistence farmers off Crown lands (López 1974b: 62; Mintz 1951; 1956: 332). Although this measure did seem to create rapidly growing numbers of landless laborers, apparently it did not lead a sufficient number to work on the estates, at least on the sugar coasts. By the 1830s, the advanced coastal sugar plantation used slave labor almost exclusively (Hoernel 1977: 61; Ramos Mattei 1981: 23). At the same time, a credit drought, combined with colonial policies that drew off capital, had closed off any major investment in new technology (Steward et al. 1956: 53), and this made the plantations even more reliant on labor intensive strategies. The coercive labor rules were tightened in 1837 (Mintz 1951; 1956: 332).

After 1840, general technological progress facilitated a rapid expansion of world trade. Ocean freight charges fell, and so did prices for many commodities. Protectionism was challenged, and between 1846 and 1849, Britain led the world in lowering national tariff walls (Furtado 1974: 42-48). World market prices for coffee and sugar tumbled (Hoernel 1977: 66; Ramos Mattei 1981: 20). Coffee cultivation in Puerto Rico shifted away from capitalized estates using some slave labor to become a sideline cash crop for small subsistence farmers (Wolf

1956: 188). The Puerto Rican sugar industry entered another period of hard times.

Recent growth in sugar production had been the result of the incremental addition of new immigrant producers, while taxes and a lack of credit had discouraged technological upgrading. Advances in the sugar industries of Cuba and the United States were making Puerto Rico's sugar technology obsolete. There was talk of renovating the industry, and even a few attempts at it. But the owners of large plantations were still making a very comfortable living, even with their older technology, and in the absence of outside financing they were not about to give up that life style for the uncertain results, in both economic and social terms, of new production arrangements. Instead, the planters' strategy remained a mix of small-scale technological improvements and more intensive application of labor (Hoernel 1977: 65-67; Mintz 1956: 336; Ramos Mattei 1981: 20-22).

More labor was difficult to obtain. Slaves were becoming scarce. The British, whose West Indian plantations had already been converted to free labor, and who did not appreciate slave labor competition, put on enough pressure so that slave imports fell off. After large slave uprisings in the Caribbean, and smaller revolts within Puerto Rico (which were followed by brutal race laws), the local government was not inclined to permit continued importation anyway (Hoernel 1977: 66; López 1974b: 60-61; Steward et al. 1956: 57; Wagenheim 1973: 58-63). The number of slaves peaked at some 51,000 in 1850. An

epidemic in 1855 killed about 30,000 people, perhaps a third of them slaves. This aggravated the labor shortage, especially on the south coast, which had by now become Puerto Rico's premier sugar region after some soil depletion in the west (Hoernel 1977: 68-69). In another attempt to force free labor into the plantation fields, the government instituted in 1949 the most stringent of the coercive labor acts, a form of work book (la libreta), along with other measures, all of which proved to be of limited success (Hoernel 1977: 62; López 1974b: 62; Mintz 1951; Ramos Mattei 1981: 24).

Despite the labor scarcity, Puerto Rico's sugar output remained fairly steady, even rising, despite occasional Crown interference. The sugar, like many Puerto Rican products, was increasingly sold in the United States. Demand from the U.S. market shot upward during the U.S. Civil War and the Cuban wars for independence which began in 1868. Puerto Rican sugar production peaked around 1870. Still, income from sugar had already been declining, and there had been an attrition of smaller growing operations from 1830 onwards (Hoernel 1977: 71-72, Quintero Rivera 1978: 22; Ramos Mattei 1981: 20, 33; Steward et al. 1956: 55).

The mid-century decades were an active time for Santa Isabel and Jauca. Santa Isabel became an independent municipality in 1842, breaking away from Coamo. The official reason for this change given at the time was to end the area's reliance on the civil and religious authorities in Coamo, which was a good

journey's distance (Rivera N.D.a: 13). Hoernel, however, interprets this as a move to consolidate Crown land and water patronage (1977: 244). Another factor was that Santa Isabel had become Coamo's richest division, and the local residents resented being forced to contribute to municipal construction in the town of Coamo (Rivera N.D.a: 15). At any rate, the break away of Santa Isabel was in fact a relatively late episode in the long term decline of Coamo as the regional center. One municipality after another had split off, beginning in 1736 (Rivera Bermúdez 1980: 271, 400).

Coamo was not well suited to sugar production, although it did produce some. Neither was it well situated to participate in the active commerce along the coast, especially after the construction of the main road between Ponce and Guayama sometime before 1846 (Rivera N.D.a: 23), which passed far to the south of Coamo. Ponce gradually became the center of centers for the south coast. Even today, however, Coamo's former dominance is reflected in the ownership of northern Santa Isabel land by Coamo families, and in the disproportionate number of individuals from those families among the professionals and civic leaders of the area.

The new municipality of Santa Isabel had a solid economic base. In 1841, sugar was its number one product, but cattle and coffee were important too. It had a brick and tile workshop, and a port, which served both legal and contraband trade, and which was improved in 1848. Tobacco became an

important local crop, briefly, around 1853. But sugar was superordinate, and the main cane growing area was a fertile, relatively well-watered stretch of land extending about four miles to the east of town, including the present barrios of Felicia I and Jauca I. Hacienda el Destino had been operating and expanding in this stretch since the 1820s. By 1841, there were four trapiches (ox powered cane crushers) operating in Santa Isabel, and five by 1853. The local forests, reported as abundant in 1776, were described as distant and stripped of high quality wood by 1846. In 1853, local planters were constructing irrigation canals, and approximately ten caballerias (somewhat under 2,000 acres) were in all types of cultivation (Rivera N.D.a: 11-13). The later 1850s, however, were stressful years for growers, with drought from 1856 to at least 1860, a terrible cholera epidemic in 1856, and a general scarcity of free labor. The extraordinary productivity of local soils remained attractive despite all this. The last of the great estates in the fertile eastern strip, Hacienda Florida, began operations in 1863; it was followed within a decade by Hacienda Mercedes, owned by Juan Cortada of Ponce, in the drier western reaches of the municipality. Mercedes may have been the last of the haciendas to be established in Santa Isabel (Rivera N.D.a: 11-13; N.D.b: 9-10; Mintz 1953: 232, 237).

Santa Isabel seems to have been similar to most rural towns of the time (see López 1974a: 65). The total population of the

municipality was 858 in 1841. Thirteen landowners are named, in a list which may not be complete. There were nine merchants, some of whom also owned land, and eight artisans. Adding in Church and state officials, who are not enumerated, would probably produce a total of some 25 to 30 leading families, perhaps 10 to 15 more of intermediate status, with the rest of the population laborers and their families. Within the total population were 258 slaves, of whom 132 were imported directly from Africa, and 119 free "mulatos". The source is ambiguous on whether that total of 119 includes adults and children, or only adults. If the former, it would suggest that the agricultural labor force of 1841 consisted almost entirely of slaves and freed slaves. If the latter, it would suggest a work force of approximately 50% slaves, 20% free mulatos, and 30% white agregados¹ (Rivera N.D.a: 15). The population was young, with 60% under 21 years old. This no doubt contributed to the more than doubling of Santa Isabel's population, to 2,415, by 1863. This figure is not broken down by race, but it may be inferred from later censuses that most of the increase was among the non-white population (Rivera N.D.a: 33). I suspect that many of any non-elite whites who remained in Santa

1. These percentages are offered as rough approximations only. They are based on two estimates: that subtracting the slaves, "free mulatos" and the elite and intermediate workers from the total population would leave 200-250 white agregados; and that since so many of the slave population had been directly imported from Africa, they probably had a disproportionate number of adults among them, and so were probably disproportionately represented in the labor force.

Isabel in the 1840s fled to the interior as the sugar estates gobbled up more land, and as the town government, in 1852, established a Junta de Vagos to enforce the coercive labor laws (Rivera N.D.b: 9). (The movement of freed blacks was most likely constrained by the race laws of this period.) A commentator in 1887 reported that free men from coastal sugar zones had been evicted from their lands in large numbers after mid-century, and subsequently moved into the mountains (Clark et al. 1930: 613). That would explain why the prime south coast sugar lands were the least densely inhabited areas of Puerto Rico at the time of the U.S. invasion (Picó 1975: 247). Many areas of the mountains remained sparsely settled until well past the middle of the 1800s, with some land still available to the poor as late as the 1880s (Wolf 1956: 188-198).

The growth of the agricultural estates following the Cedula transformed Puerto Rican society. The gentry rules over the rural population, whether slave or free, by a variety of coercive controls. A seignorial life style developed, with highly deferential patron-client relations between worker and patron. There also were differences within the gentry, between native and immigrant planters, and between coffee and cane growers. The latter distinction was especially significant, because the main market for coffee was Spain, while most sugar was sold in the U.S. This would be associated with different political sympathies later on (López 1974b: 68). But the most

active cleavage within Puerto Rican society in the later nineteenth century was between the landed gentry and locally resident peninsular merchants, who sometimes controlled the marketing of agricultural products and provided production advances in credit to growers. The Spanish trade regulations which favored these merchants were burdensome for planters, as were the ways the merchants manipulated credit. Hacendados and merchants both attempted to move into the other's field of operations (Quintero Rivera 1974a: 101). The hacendados dominated Puerto Rico socially, but they lacked political power. Against the intransigent conservatism of the Spanish merchants, the hacendados adopted a liberal world view. Despite their own oppression of the rural work force and the open resistance they sometimes encountered from workers and even their own managerial help (see Buitrago Ortiz 1982: 10), they crowned themselves the representatives of the "great family of Puerto Ricans". By the 1860s, children of hacendados were studying in liberal centers abroad, and returning to form a small core of professionals (Quintero Rivera 1974a: 98-99; 1978: 15). This basic division of society would underlie the development of Puerto Rican politics in the tumultuous 1870s.

The 1870s were a time of major change on several fronts. In 1873 both slavery and the forced work laws were abolished. Their time had passed. The growth of capitalist industry made outright slavery an anachronism in the world system of production and exchange. Continuing British pressure, combined

with a major slave uprising in Cuba in 1868, tipped the scales in favor of abolition (López 1974b: 76). At the same time, Puerto Rico now had a large landless rural population, and they had to make a living somehow (López 1974b: 64). The jealous policing of unused or marginal land by landowners, which continued in brutal application up to at least 1940, insured that few would be able to run off to start a subsistence farm. The cities would absorb some of the newly free workers, but most seem to have stayed where they were. Many Puerto Rican hacendados openly favored the abolition of slavery. The increasing prominence of higher quality beet sugar in European markets had made it clear that the continued viability of Puerto Rican sugar production would require major technological improvements, and the compensation that the Crown had promised for freeing slaves was seen as the source of the capital injection they needed (Ramos Mattei 1981: 25).

Talk and action on modernizing Puerto Rican sugar production went further in the 1870s than it had in the 1840s, for now it was clear that survival might depend on it. But success was still limited. Efforts at major changes, such as the creation of cooperative central grinding mills, typically failed quickly. As before, scarce capital was the main problem (Hoernel 1977: 74-79; Ramos Mattei 1982: 17-28). Mintz (1956: 336) notes that the decades of apparent stability preceding 1887 actually had been years of decline, as the haciendas grew more antiquated and less able to generate new investment

capital. Then, the promised compensation for the freed slaves was delayed by 17 years, leaving many hacendados with unpayable debts for new machinery bought on credit (Ramos Mattei 1981: 25). As the world capitalist system went into a depression in the 1870's, tariffs began to fluctuate. A complicated sequence of tariff changes beginning in the early 1880s resulted in new tariffs and export duties on Puerto Rican sugar shipped to the U.S. Sugar production and exports declined, and smaller units closed down in large number. Coffee and tobacco, on the other hand, benefited from the tariff changes. Tobacco became an important export, and coffee passed sugar as number one in value of exports in 1879 (Ramos Mattei 1981: 36-39; Steward et al. 1956: 54-56).

As if that were not enough, around 1890 the spread of high quality centrifugal sugar reached a point where the cruder types of sugar made in Puerto Rico could hardly find a market (Steward et al. 1956: 54). The sugar industry of Puerto Rico was in a severe depression. Many operations folded, sold out, or went into a kind of low-level survival mode of vegetable and cattle production. It was not unusual for workers to be paid in kind (Hoernel 1977: 74-77). Some estates did continue to produce sugar. Ramos Mattei (1981: Part Two) describes some of the survival measures of one of these firms. But Ramos also points out (1981: 108) that what was really required to make Puerto Rico a world class sugar producer again, was the destruction of the small scale hacienda system of production,

and its replacement by heavily capitalized industrial production. This the hacendados could not, would not, do.

The sugar estates of Santa Isabel did better during the crisis than many of their contemporaries due to the extraordinary quality of locally grown cane. That quality is shown by awards given to sugar from Haciendas Alomar and Florida in 1882 and 1895. A commentator in 1895 noted that Alomar sugar, even though not centrifuged, was of such quality that it could be sold in European markets (*Rivera N.D.a: 25-29*). While much of Santa Isabel's land was converted from cane cultivation to other uses, notably cattle raising, during the lean years, still a great deal of land was devoted to sugar. Hacienda el Destino devoted 210 cuerdas to cane in 1884, 271 cuerdas in 1894, and 450 cuerdas in 1900, by which time the recovery of sugar had begun (*Hoernel 1977: 245-246*). (A cuerda is .9712 acres). A survey of land use and ownership in 1896 shows that of a total of 22,500 cuerdas listed for the entire municipality, 1,328 cuerdas were in cane, 159 cuerdas in food crops, 20 cuerdas in tobacco, and the rest in pasture, scrub, and presumably, settlements. The survey lists a total of 141 farms in Santa Isabel, with 105 owners. But eight individuals who each possessed 500 cuerdas or more owned a total of 15,664 cuerdas (*Hoernel 1877: 250*). Sugar production at this time was concentrated in the prime area to the east of the town (*Mintz 1953*).

Despite continuing sugar production, local growers were

feeling the effects of the crisis. This is seen by government assistance to local growers in 1872 (Mintz 1953: 232), and the latter's list of woes in 1888: drought, dismal market conditions, high production costs, lack of credit, etc. (Mintz 1953: 234). The impact of the crisis was also marked by changes in the ownership and organization of several local estates. One hacienda in the western part of the municipality appears to have shut down operations entirely by 1880 (Mintz 1953: 223). Another, Hacienda Florida, was sold to a local merchant-landowner, who consolidated it with other holdings, set up a separate ranch for the work animals, and installed relatively modern grinding equipment to become a "tiny central mill" (Hoernel 1977: 247-248). Two others, Alomar (also called Hacienda Santa Isabel) and Destino, went through some reorganization, and a third, Hacienda Carmen, changed hands in 1884 (Hoernel 1977: 245, 247-248).

Mintz classifies the period from the abolition of slavery and other overt forced labor to the U.S. invasion as the period of the "family-type hacienda", which was distinguishable from the slave and agregado plantation primarily by its reliance on free labor (Mintz 1953: 228). We have much more detailed information about life under this system, thanks especially to Mintz's (1953: 237-244) reconstructions based on the recollections of older informants. Only the most salient details can be mentioned here, beginning with the demographic profile.

In 1872, Santa Isabel had 2,138 inhabitants, or nearly 300 fewer than 1863, perhaps as a result of the flight of free workers to the mountains. The total number of white inhabitants was 528, and those "de color" numbered 1,610. Of the latter, 387 were slaves and 1,218 were free (Rivera N.D.a: 33). For 1880, a census of "workers", probably signifying agricultural laborers, lists 395 for all of Santa Isabel, with 131 of them in Felicia I and 95 in Jauca I. Most of them were freed slaves or descendants of slaves but there were also "many white agregados" (Mintz 1953: 231-232, 239). In 1897, Santa Isabel had grown to 4,032 inhabitants. Jauca I, with 963 people, was now more populous than the town itself (at 878), with Felicia I coming in third (with 660--Rivera N.D.a: 35). So the population of Santa Isabel was growing, especially in the areas where there was work, suggesting that by the last decades of the century the net outflow of workers from the municipality may already have reversed.

On Hacienda el Destino there was year round work for men, women, and children. Men were paid the most, up to \$.30 per day. Freed slaves commonly had more job skills than long-standing free men. Workers lived in shacks or barracks left over from slave time. They had few if any services available to them, but did have access to some land for raising subsistence crops. Also residing in Destino were a few field administrators and artisans, and the manager of the estate. For Destino late in the century, the manager was a member of

the owner family (Capó). Elsewhere in Santa Isabel, the managers varied from being the landowner himself, to a non-related hired administrator. Apparently all the managers and their families lived on the haciendas, and so had personal face-to-face interaction with the workers. The hacienda was a relatively autonomous unit, especially during the sugar depression. Although they were about the business of commodity production, the workers remained fairly isolated from direct contact with the outside world.

In addition to Destino and the nearby estates, there was another small settlement at the turn of the century that would form the nucleus of the present day village of Jauca. It was a small settlement along the highway, known as Poblado Jauca. The origin of this settlement is obscure. Mintz does not discuss it, and local informants today can provide little information, so what follows is partly conjecture on what data they could remember.

All evidence suggests that free workers had been cleared from the land east of town by mid-century if not before. With the exception of some small farms, mostly in the northern and western parts of Santa Isabel, and some scattered hacienda watchmen, the people of Santa Isabel who lived outside the town lived, virtually exclusively it seems, on the haciendas. The first to settle along the roadside in Jauca I were probably freed slaves, who were given a few cuerdas of land on what is now the eastern border of the village of Jauca in order to keep

them in the area. This site was at the periphery of their former owner's fields, and also was the site of a natural spring. Descendants of those freed slaves still live there, and the memory of that area as a distinct black settlement remains clear in Jauca today.

One consequence of the sugar crisis was that some landowners began to sell off pieces of their estates (Hoernel 1977: 74). That happened here. Around the end of the century, a few individuals bought parcels of land a short distance to the west of the freed slaves' settlement. One purchase of a few cuerdas was made in 1898 by a man who moved from Coamo. They were soon joined by a handful of merchants from Coamo, Salinas, and perhaps even Ponce, to judge from one last name ("Guilbe"--see Ramos Mattei 1981: 22). Merchants may have been drawn because of the road, which was the highway linking Ponce to Guayama and to San Juan after 1852 (López 1974b: 53). The Poblado Jauca location was also midway between Jauca I's two haciendas, and perhaps was suitable for a rest stop on the journey from Salinas to Santa Isabel town. The settlement soon grew with the addition of a few artisans and relatively skilled sugar workers, who bought or rented housesites from other small owners. By 1897, one of the municipality's four schools was operating in Poblado Jauca, with 24 students (Rivera N.D.a: 35). In sum, Poblado Jauca around the turn of the century seems to have been a small but relatively prosperous settlement.

While Santa Isabel's haciendas struggled through the sugar

crisis, Puerto Rico had entered a period of political struggle. The sugar crisis aggravated the conflict between hacendados and merchant capitalists, and this conflict was often expressed in terms of creoles vs. peninsulars. A revolt for independence before the crisis in 1868 had failed (the "Grito de Lares"). The reform measures that followed did not settle anything, but did allow the formation of Puerto Rico's first political parties in 1870. One represented the hacendados and other liberals, the other represented the merchants, Spain, and the status quo. Even this reform had little impact, other than perhaps hastening the abolition of slavery, and making it clear that liberals who favored complete assimilation into Spain could not live within the same party as liberals who wanted greater autonomy within the Spanish dominion (López 1974a: 74-79; Wagenheim 1973: 69-100).

Stepped up political agitation brought barbaric reprisals from the Spanish governor in 1887. Some of Santa Isabel's leading citizens were arrested for autonomista activity (Rivera N.D.a: 21). Spain's posture was provoking increasing resistance throughout the Spanish Caribbean. The Cuban revolution beginning in 1895 set the stage for U.S. intervention. Obviously losing its grip, Spain conceded autonomy to Puerto Rico in 1895. But eight days after the first autonomous Puerto Rican legislature convened in 1898, U.S. marines landed in Guanica Bay (López 1974b: 79-83; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 26-48).

At the beginning of Puerto Rico's second colonial era, its population stood near 950,000, and it already displayed all the characteristics of a dependent economy. For two centuries there had been a trend away from agricultural self-sufficiency. The island imported more of its food, as land was devoted whenever possible to export crops. Spain's colonial policy had purposely suppressed any local manufacturing (López 1974b: 55-58; Quintero Rivera 1974a: 93). Nevertheless, a distinct artisan population had been growing in the cities since around 1870. By the time of the invasion, they had already developed a radical internationalist world view. In 1899, they formed the island's first labor organization, the Free Federation of Labor (FLT). Santa Isabel had a sizable artisan population at this time, who even had their own social club (Mintz 1953: 242), so the municipality may have been involved in this new type of labor activity.

The founding of the FLT was an important step in Puerto Rican history. For the first time, a voice was raised to speak for those without land or capital. For four centuries, the poor of Puerto Rico had been squeezed for every bit of value that could be extracted from them. They had resisted by flight and occasional revolt. With the FLT, they would begin with organized, protracted action in their own behalf, and this action would ultimately transform the structure of Puerto Rican society. But it may be inaccurate to view this changing attitude of labor as a product of the urban artisans alone.

Mintz (1974: 174-175) may have overstated the general persistence of the old hacienda life style up to 1900--of the relatively isolated production units, bound together by personalistic ties between laborers and owner-administrators. Within Santa Isabel, this may be an accurate description for Hacienda el Destino, but Destino was still being operated by a member of its original founding family at the time of the invasion. Other Santa Isabel estates had changed hands and/or modernized and reorganized production during the late nineteenth century. Conversion to new production techniques probably resulted in some labor displacement, and this certainly occurred when one of the haciendas ceased operation all together. Complete shutdown seems to have been a common event during the crisis in sugar areas less well endowed than Santa Isabel. By 1899, 81 of 289 estates in 45 municipios had ceased cultivation (Mintz 1953: 229).

A breakdown of traditional agricultural arrangements would explain why the new rulers were so immediately preoccupied with the "excess population problem", as expressed in several schemes to export people (Bonilla and Campos 1982: 6; Campos and Flores 1981; History Task Force 1979: 108). More direct evidence of a rupture in traditional patron-client relations in Santa Isabel is the fact that the FLT had a local chapter of 40 agricultural workers by 1902 (Salinas and Juana Diaz also had chapters), and that Santa Isabel sugar workers participated in the successful strike of 1905 (Iglesias 1973: 332, 361). True,

this was after the U.S. invasion, but as will be shown below, it was before U.S. capital had made any significant local inroads.

The economic convulsions of the last three decades of the nineteenth century were not restricted to Puerto Rico, or even to the world sugar system. It was a period of general restructuring of the world economy. Prior to this, industrial capitalism had enjoyed almost half a century of boom conditions, of expanding world trade and deepening investment, of mass production and swelling industrial capacity, of extending markets and reduction of the national and international obstacles to free competition. It all culminated in the Panic of 1874, which touched off nearly twenty years of depression. Those two decades saw a frantic rush of European industrial conquest, a great increase of overseas capital investment, and development of a strong trend toward consolidation and monopoly within industries. The underlying causes and relationships of all these occurrences are the subjects of extensive debates (see Barrett Brown 1974; Eichner 1969; Heilbroner 1962), which I do not intend to enter. It need only be noted that all these trends were involved in Puerto Rico's new relationship with the United States. The facts of Puerto Rico's conquest and the subsequent investment of U.S. capital in the island are well known, even if the cause-effect relationship between the two events and between both and other factors is less obvious (see Hoernel 1977; Navas

Davila 1978; Quintero Rivera 1974a; Wagenheim 1973). What is less widely known is the development of a monopoly situation with the U.S. sugar industry, even though this would have a great impact on later developments in Puerto Rico.

Eichner (1969) describes the development of the monopoly. In the mid 1870s, sugar prices had been so volatile that no long range planning or security was possible. By 1893, the Sugar Trust had been formed, under the lead of Havemeyer of American Sugar Refining. The primary goal of the Trust was to maintain a stable profit margin by regulating the amount of sugar to reach the market. The Trust was concentrated in the sugar refining industry, but it could also regulate raw sugar production, as illustrated by Spreckels' restriction of Hawaiian raw sugar production, despite the vigorous protests of the Hawaiian growers, through his control of the west coast refineries (Eichner 1969: 253, 270-271). The outbreak of the Cuban wars for independence drastically cut the supply of Cuban raw sugar to reach the U.S. after 1895, and "American refiners searched the world for new sources of supply" (Babst 1940: 135). The relationship of this need for sugar to the subsequent acquisition of sugar producing areas in the United States' fling at old-style imperialism cannot be investigated here. What will be examined in the coming chapters will be the relationship of the powerful U.S. sugar interests to what occurred in Puerto Rico after the conquest.

CHAPTER III
1898 TO 1920

Sugar and Puerto Rico's Economy

In 1898, the United States passed from being a major trade partner to become the colonial power ruling Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's recently won autonomous government was abolished, followed by a short U.S. military regime, and then rule by a series of appointed North American governors. The Foraker Act which established the post of governor also provided for an elected House of Delegates, but its powers were so restricted as to approach zero (see García Martínez 1978: for the act itself; Wagenheim 1973 for reactions of contemporary politicians; and Hoernel 1977; Quintero Rivera 1978; and Ramos de Santiago 1970 for discussions). Some political aspects of the early colonial period will be discussed later. Of more immediate significance for understanding developments in Santa Isabel is the early economic policy of the colonial administration. The conquerors continued to see the island as had the Spanish, as a source of agricultural commodities. The structure of agricultural production, however, would change dramatically.

Coffee had risen to be Puerto Rico's principal export during the sugar crisis. It was a high quality product, but expensive. Its main markets had been in Spain and the rest of Europe, and these were cut off when the island was included within the U.S. tariff walls. Puerto Rican coffee could not compete with the cheaper Brazilian product in the U.S. market,

and coffee production went into a long decline. Tobacco on the other hand benefited from its altered position in the world market, and from the active interest of organized North American investors. Tobacco production rose under American rule (see Hoernel 1977; Quintero Rivera 1978; Steward et al. 1956 for data and discussions on these crops). The biggest change, of course, was the spectacular growth of sugar production.

Two pieces of federal legislation dominated sugar production, and by extension, Puerto Rican society, for the next several decades. One was the inclusion of Puerto Rico within the U.S. tariff in 1901 (Smith and Requa 1939: 10). No single fact was more significant in the growth of local sugar production. Without tariff protection, Puerto Rican sugar would not have been commercially viable, at least not in anything like the industrial pattern that developed (Gayer et al. 1978: 160). Cuba, for instance, with abundant land and an extensive pattern of cultivation, could easily undercut Puerto Rican sugar prices (Clark et al. 1930: 631). The other federal legislation was a clause in the Foraker Act which limited the ownership and control of land to 500 acres. Although no serious attempt was made to enforce this clause until the mid-1930's, its presence on the books influenced investment patterns, and provided a rallying cry for opponents of the later dominance of the U.S. corporations (Guerra Mondragón 1972; Villar Rocés 1968).

There has been unending debate over why the U.S. Congress passed this law, and why it was not enforced (see Villar Roces 1968). The debate could be extended to cover the varying tariff regulations applied to the conquests of the Spanish-American War. Clearly these events were somehow associated with the structure of the U.S. sugar industry, but the limited information available from these early years makes it so that little else can be stated with certainty.

The Sugar Trust was in full force at the time, prior to the initiation of anti-trust action against it in 1907 (see Eichner 1969). The Trust was buying heavily into the developing U.S. beet sugar industry, and at the same time, it pushed through a special tariff reduction for the Cuban raw sugar that fed Trust refineries (Pomeroy 1970: 206). The role of the Trust in early U.S. investment in Puerto Rican sugar is not clear. It was the stated intent of many legislators in passing the 500-acre law to prevent the Trust from pouncing on Puerto Rican cane lands (Guerra Mondragón 1972: 168-169). Hoernel (1977: 215-221) interprets this as an effort to support Arbuckle and his allies--competitors of the Sugar Trust who had great influence in government (see Eichner 1969: 213-228). The 500-acre clause could be held in abeyance, as a threat to block investment by the Trust.

Hoernel believes that the Trust's influence did not penetrate Puerto Rico until after the First World War, and that the split between Arbuckle and the Trust persisted until then.

He does not present documentation of either point, but this is admittedly a difficult task, given the secrecy with which all the principals operated. There is a suggestion that the Trust was active earlier and that some of the U.S.--Puerto Rican sugar corporations were affiliated with it from the start, in a workers call to strike in 1905 which refers to South Porto Rico Sugar's association with "el Trust de azucar" (Iglesias Pagán 1973: 359). But I lack more substantial evidence linking the corporations to the cartel until the mid 1920s, so Hoernel may be right. Perhaps the Trust was too involved with its efforts to dominate North American beet sugar production. Statements made in Congress that the Sugar Trust and the Tobacco Trust already controlled the best land in Puerto Rico in 1901 (Guerra Mondragón 1972: 168) do not fit the facts, and probably were just scare tactics. But Hoernel's related contention, that "neither individuals nor corporations from the United States were very interrested in Puerto Rican real estate until 1917" (1977: 229) is not supported even by his own data (1977: 226-257), and is not consistent with the picture to be presented here. Whether inside the Trust or not, U.S. investors were preparing to move into Puerto Rico in force immediately after the invasion (Guerra Mondragón 1972: 168-169).¹ This was part

1. Spokesmen for the U.S. corporations later claimed (Smith and Regua 1960: 17-18) that the existence of the 500 acre law slowed the expansion of the corporations from what it would have been without the law. It is difficult to evaluate this claim, since it can be interpreted as serving interests in a later propaganda war, and since the U.S. colonial administrators made their opposition to the law plain as early

of a larger process--the first wave of U.S. capital investment overseas, which concentrated in primary commodity production in the Americas (Burbach and Flynn 1980).

Because of the tariff, and despite the 500-acre law, the situation was propitious for expansion of sugar production in Puerto Rico. Prices for sugar were good, and U.S. consumption was rising until 1914 (Turner 1965: 67). In fact, the recovery of sugar in Puerto Rico began even before the extension of the tariff, and long before U.S. corporations became a force on the island. Production of sugar increased dramatically through 1913, a result of both the expansion of cane acreage and increased production per acre (see appendix). The labor force working in sugar reached 79,261 in 1919, which represented 40.1% of the entire agricultural work force of 197,797 (Clark et al. 1930: 14).

The ownership arrangements were complicated and varied by region. Those hacendados who had managed to survive the sugar crisis tried to modernize to take advantage of the revitalized market. That was still a difficult task, given colonial administration measures which fixed land prices at a low level, froze credit, and devalued Puerto Rican currency thereby creating a specie shortage. These measures made capital scarce and expensive, and that made it difficult for many hacendados to keep the land (Mintz 1956: 338-339; Quintero Rivera 1974a:

as 1901, and never made any move to enforce it (Guerra Mondragón 1972: 163-173).

107-110, 1978: 64). Possession of capital continued to be the most important feature in success in the sugar industry. Much land was taken over by creole and peninsular merchants, whose acquisitions at first outpaced even those of the North American corporations (Quintero Rivera 1980: 63-65). The purchase of one of the U.S. corporations will be described below in the discussion of Santa Isabel.

By 1914, the Puerto Rican sugar industry entered a period of uncertainty, instability, and structural change, brought on by factors at the insular and international levels. A sharp drop in world sugar prices in 1913 (Poors Industry Service 1933: 7) was followed by federal government regulation during the World War of sugar production, marketing, and prices (Bernhardt 1948: 3-30; Babst 1940: 42-102). A reduction of the tariff on sugar imports in 1913 (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 35) was accompanied by an increase in U.S. capital investment in Cuba (Hoernel 1977: 118), and by the removal of quantity restrictions on raw sugar imported to the U.S. from the Phillipines (Dalton 1937: 230). The federal government began to reconsider the Puerto Rico 500-acre law, and anti-trust action initiated in 1907 was dragging on in the courts. Although the 500-acre act would ultimately be reaffirmed in the Jones Act of 1917, and the American Refining Sugar Trust would be broken-up, these federal actions paradoxically had the effect of legitimizing the operation of a looser cartel in the U.S. sugar industry (Eichner 1969: 291 ff.), and of allowing

the continued expansion of U.S. corporate holdings in Puerto Rico (Guerra Mondragón 1972: 171 ff.).

On the insular level, cane growers were required to return some cane land to food crops during the War (Clark et al. 1930: 489). There were violent strikes by cane workers in 1917, and again in 1922 (Mintz 1953: 249; 1974: 141). The reasons for these strikes is not specified in the sources at my disposal. (Wage and sugar price trends suggest that the first strikes were related to windfall profits made because of the War, and the second to wage cuts as the prices fell.) The most serious disturbance was the outbreak of sugar cane diseases. Sugar cane mosaic appeared in 1915, severely cutting yields from 1917 to 1919. A resistant variety of cane was developed by the government--a significant fact to be discussed again later--in 1919, but then gomosis hit the cane in 1920. Again new varieties were developed, but these were not in general use until the late 1920s or early 1930s (Samuels N.D.: 13; Smith and Regua 1939: 10-11).

Sugar production charts (Appendix) show that in 1913, Puerto Rican sugar production and acreage devoted to cane went into a period of reduced growth which lasted into the later 1920s. While I found no data bearing directly on this point, it seems likely that these adverse conditions accelerated the trend to structural conversion to a modern system of production. In 1910, 105 of the old, inefficient hacienda mills remained in operation. These would soon close down (Clark et al. 1930:

615; Mintz 1953: 230). The viability of many was undercut by the extension of railroads leading to the huge new mills of the North American corporations. The railroads were built between 1901 and 1910 (Smith and Regua 1939: 10). There were three U.S. owned mills operating at this time, as well as several smaller mills owned by hacendados who had managed a major upgrading or by merchant capitalists who had recently brought in. These were joined after 1910 by a wave of recently formed Puerto Rican corporations starting or taking over mills (López Dominguez cited in Mintz 1953: 230). I found no breakdown of who was growing what proportion of the cane that was ground by all these mills, but some relevant trends may be noted. Land acquisition by U.S. corporations continued in the second decade of the century, but at a more gradual pace than their initial pruchaces (Herrero cited in Quintero Rivera 1978: 53). On the other hand, the increased demand for cane by an expanded mill system led to relatively high payments for colono cane. Many hacendados who gave up their mills continued to grow cane, and they were joined in this by new colonos, often with relatively small pieces of land (Clark et al. 1930: 614-619). In short, despite the less than optimum overall conditions, locally owned operations of varying sizes appear to have done all right through the first two decades of U.S. rule, after the initial post-conquest shake out.

Developments in and around Jauca

Developments in sugar production around Santa Isabel

mirrored the larger trends just described. Changes in land ownership correspond to the ability of investors to muster capital. In 1902 Destino added a new cantrifuge to its small mill. Yet despite this suggestion of the Capó family's interest in continuing operations, they decided to sell out to an agent of Aguirre in 1905 (Mintz 1953: 244). Florida, which had been purchased and upgraded by a Santa Isabel merchant-planter in 1898, and was the most advanced local production unit at the turn of the century, continued to upgrade its mill and to expand the cane acreage it handled up until 1909, reaching a total reported investment of \$440,000. But in 1910, it too sold out to an Aguirre agent (Ferraras Pagán 1902: 53; Hoernel 1977: 248-249). Mintz (1953: 235) reports the building of a "modern central" in Santa Isabel in 1908. This can be no other than Central Cortada, on the holdings of Juan Cortada of Ponce, whose land had gone inactive during the sugar crisis. Development of this central seems to have included the formation of the Santa Isabel Sugar Co., which was to manage sugar cane cultivation on the lands of Alomar. (The Santa Isabel Sugar Co. also was incorporated in 1908 [Farr 1930: 9] and was acquired by Aguirre together with Central Cortada in 1924 [Farr 1926: 10]). Undoubtedly, this large project drew on capital from outside Santa Isabel. Besides Destino and Florida, there apparently was one other small mill within Santa Isabel that also closed down between 1902 and 1911, but details on this are lacking (Carrel 1912: 116; Ferraras Pagán 1902: 50-

52).

There were several other major land transactions in Santa Isabel over these two decades. The Diaz family, who loom so large in the life history of Taso Zayas (Mintz 1974) expanded their local holdings. Informants recall the Diaz family as originally merchants from Guayama. One informant told me that 292 cuerdas that the Diaz's obtained from his family in 1904 were involved in the alleged failure to repay a loan. (The informant still asserts that his family was swindled out of the land.) Sometime between 1905 and 1915, the Serralles family, associated with Central Mercedita of Ponce, acquired 1613 cuerdas in the western part of the municipality (Hoernel 1977: 256). The Serralles operation had been exceptionally strong even in the sugar crisis (see Ramos Mattei's [1981] study of the Serralles' operations), and with the industry's recovery, they rose to be among the most influential sugar producers between Santa Isabel and Ponce. They remain important today, as the major producers of refined sugar in Puerto Rico, and the manufacturers of Don Q Rum. But their expansion early in the century seems to have been stopped by an enterprise whose capital resources the Serralles could not match--Central Aguirre Corporation.

Reconstructing Aguirre's expansion is no easy task. Aguirre's penchant for "mystery" and refusal to make information available to researchers was noted in 1902 (Ferraras Pagán 1902: 53). They seem to have deliberately

concealed their landholdings, which officially remained non-existent until the 1920s (see Gayer et al. 1938: 130-131), out of fear of the 500 acre law. My own attempts to obtain Aguirre records ran into one frustrating dead end after another. Nevertheless, scattered sources do provide sufficient information for a general picture to emerge.

Central Aguirre was one of three U.S. corporations to start up sugar operations in Puerto Rico soon after the conquest. Fajardo Sugar Co. and South Porto Rico Sugar Co. were the other two. Aguirre began its corporate life as "DeFord and Co." in 1898. Four Boston investors put together an initial capital fund of \$525,000 in anticipation of Puerto Rico being included within the U.S. tariff (Cochran 1959: 26). It reincorporated in Puerto Rico in 1901 (Gayer et al. 1938: 63). Production of 96% pure sugar¹ rose steadily until 1906. Thereafter, growth was more erratic but still trended strongly upwards. South Porto Rico was formed in 1899 and reincorporated in Puerto Rico in 1903 with \$5,000,000 in capital; Fajardo began its Puerto Rico operations in 1905 with \$2,000,000. Together, the three U.S. corporations would invest about \$10,000,000 in their first decade of operation (Cochran 1959: 26; Gayer et al. 1938: 62-63).

1. Sugar mills produce raw, or 96% pure sugar. White table sugar ("direct consumption sugar") has passed through a second process of refining. The refining stage determined how much sugar actually reached the consumption market, and refining was jealously controlled by the most powerful interests. Puerto Rico had little to do with refining, for reasons discussed below.

Aguirre's move into Santa Isabel came quickly. It is reported as already affecting sugar production in Santa Isabel, although in any unspecified manner, by 1902 (Ferraras Pagán 1902: 46). By 1905, Santa Isabel hacendados were purchasing land for Aguirre (Mintz 1953: 235-236). Its major acquisitions of Destino in 1905 or 1906, and Florida in 1910 (through land agents) has already been noted. It is not clear, however, that Aguirre was actually operating these holdings. Mintz notes in passing (1956: 348-349) that Aguirre assumed control of Destino field operations in 1913. I suspect that Aguirre may have been purchasing land in advance of its ability to absorb it fully, in order to block purchases by other expanding firms, such as that of the Serralles. Santa Isabel marked the westernmost limit of Aguirre's expansion. The municipio's land was valued at \$75-100 per acre in the 1910 census--above that of any other municipality except for San Juan, so Aguirre's interest would be understandable. The convincer which made many hacendados sell out may have been the building of Aguirre's railroad, the Ponce and Guayama, which was incorporated in 1903 (Farr 1930: 10). That would explain why so many hacendados sold out to Aguirre to 1904 (Mintz 1953: 244; 1956: 347), although the railroad apparently had not reached Santa Isabel by 1906 (Mintz 1956: 244). At any rate, Aguirre's agent owned a total of 3,462 cuerdas of Santa Isabel by 1915 (Hoernel 1977: 256), and 3812 cuerdas by 1920 (Registro de Tasación). I also suspect that it was in the later teens that Aguirre started its local

store, and built the free standing wooden shacks that were to house much of its work force (see Clark et al. 1930: 17).

Changes in land use from 1900 to 1920 reflect the growth of sugar cane production in Santa Isabel. Whether at the behest of Aguirre or on local growers' initiative, cane acreage expanded. Woodlands were being cleared for new plantings at least by 1907 (Mintz 1953: 246). Two observations bracketing the decade show the changes in Santa Isabel, and the even more dramatic changes in neighboring Salinas, the location of Central Aguirre.

[Santa Isabel, 1901] There are large meadows used for pasture ground, where large herds of cattle graze. All the tropical fruits, besides sugar-cane and tobacco, are grown in large quantities.

[Salinas, 1901] The principal industries are the manufacture of salt, cattle-raising, and sugar cane culture. (McLeary 1901: 252-253)

[Santa Isabel, 1911] It is located... on the Ponce and Guayama Railroad... in one of the richest sugar growing sections of the Island. There are two large sugar mills in the town, and a great number of the residents of the district are employed in these and in the surrounding sugar plantations. The district was formerly devoted largely to cattle raising, which is giving way to some extent to the sugar industry, which from year to year places more land formerly used for grazing under cultivation.

[Salinas, 1911] The principal industries in the district are the manufacture of salt, cattle raising, the growing of sugar-cane and the manufacture of sugar. The sugar industry is by far the most important, and as the irrigation work in the vicinity is extended more land is being devoted to the raising of sugar-cane, while at the same time the yield per acre of the present estates is being continually increased. The sugar mill known as the "Central Aguirre" is located

not far from the town. (Carrel 1912: 111-112, 116)

The process of cane land expansion continued as Aguirre assumed direct management of production, and new publicly and privately funded irrigation works were built around 1913 (Mintz 1953: 348). Aguirre's total sugar output grew sharply from 1913 to 1917 (see appendix). Total acreage in farms in Santa Isabel grew from 12,535 cuerdas in 1910 to 15,983 cuerdas in 1920. Most of this growth, however, seems not to have been in corporately owned or administered land ("managed" land), which censuses reports list as actually declining from 9,355 cuerdas to 5,716, but in owner operated farms, which rose from 2,935 to 9,676 cuerdas. (Of course, this may just be one of the rather famous inaccuracies of the U.S. Census of Agriculture.) The number and total cuerdage of farms in the 10-175 cuerda range remained small but constant. The total amount of cane produced in Santa Isabel rose from 3,071 tons in 1910 to 3,744 in 1920, which is proportionately less than the expansion of farm area. Admittedly, interpretation of such census figures borders on divination, not only because of errors but because of countervailing trends that may be concealed by the aggregate figures. But the modest rise in sugar produced for the area, at least does not indicate any major improvement in field production efficiencies, as was suggested for neighboring Salinas. In Santa Isabel, even into the 1920s, local colono growers continued to be prominent in sugar cane cultivation

(Mintz 1974: 123-128; and see below). Nevertheless, labor and social life had already begun a deep transformation.

The first drastic change was the closing of the old hacienda mills, a strong trend in the area by 1904 if not earlier. This eliminated the main source of work in skilled or semi-skilled categories, and much of the work for women (Mintz 1953: 244). Countering that trend was the expansion of cultivated areas and land improvement projects, which may have lead to an over-all increase in labor needs. If wages followed the general south coast pattern, cane workers' pay had remained around nineteenth century levels, or \$.40 maximum per day for 13-14 hours of work, and rose to around \$.65 maximum for a (supposedly) 10 hour day as a result of the strikes of 1905 (Iglesias 1973: 355-362; Rivera Martinez 1971: 49).

Increased demand and wages for labor on the coasts, combined with the degeneration of the coffee industry, led to an island-wide reversal of the established patterns of internal migration. Foermerly, coastal workers had gone to mountain coffee farms for work in sugar's off-season. Now, mountain dwellers began to come to the coast for work in the cane harvests (History Task Force 1979: 106; Quintero Rivera 1978: 53-55). The pattern held true for Jauca (Mintz 1953: 245-246). The new migration pattern may have been partially responsible for the conversion of remote mountain peoples to a cash-economy orientation, as described by Manners (1956: 138). All together, by 1910 there had been a clear advance in the process of

proletarianization (see Mintz 1974: 175) in the increased reliance of rural workers on cash payment for labor, in the diminishing of skill differences within the work force, and in the rise of union activity.

Proletarianization increased as Aguirre assumed direct control of some field operations, by 1913 at least (Mintz 1956: 348-349), and as over-all cane acreage expanded. The alternative life style of subsistence farming, which may only have been an option since the sugar crisis (see Hoernel 1977: 228), went into eclipse as farms of under 10 cuerdas in Santa Isabel dropped, according to U.S. Census of Agriculture, from 53 in 1910 to 11 in 1920, with the number of tennant farming arrangements dropping from 30 to 6. Small subsistence farming never completely disappeared, however, even from heavily caned-over Jauca I. For the northern, hillier area of Santa Isabel, older informantts remember a good number of small farms into the 1920s at least.

Workers' subsistence plots on corporation land were eliminated, and a fee was imposed for the formerly free right to graze worker-owned cattle on company land, thus eliminating one small means of capital accumulation by the poor. When the management of field cultivation shifted from owners or their resident managers to the corporation, there developed a temporary reliance on intermediate labor contractors, who could and did cheat workers even as they competed among themselves for job assignments. Piece work became more common. Destino

and other old haciendas, including Florida, were now operating as local administrative centers (colonias). As mentioned earlier, Aguirre built housing and established a company store in these centers. The stores used a credit system that deducted purchases in advance from pay, so that many workers saw very little cash at all. Combined with the workers' reliance on the corporation for housing, which could be taken away at a moment's notice, and for the rudimentary health care provided on the colonia, Aguirre was establishing a pattern of control over its workers that went far beyond a simple relationship of employer and employee (Mintz 1953: 245; 1956: 349).

Although I found no data on the topic, Aguirre was probably attempting to compress the harvest/grinding period in its own operations and those of its colonos, as the maximum utilization of a mill for as brief a harvest as possible is a regular economy goal for large modern mill operations (Mintz 1956: 353). If so, then this period would mark the beginning of the alternation of harvest and a very difficult "dead time". This seasonality touched every part of life during Mintz's fieldwork, but had not been very pronounced under the hacienda form of organization (Mintz 1956: 353). Aguirre may also have been implementing some labor saving techniques or technology, since this was reportedly its policy since around 1910 (Clark et al. 1930: 646).

Along with the workers who lived in Colonia Destino under Aguirre's supervision, other workers lived in a settlement

called "Boca Chica" under the watchful eye of the colono, Pastor Díaz (see Mintz 1974). A few other colonos are noted for the area, and their dominance must have increased as one moved further from the center of Aguirre's operations. It is not clear to what degree these colonos implemented the production changes that were affecting the labor force under Aguirre. There may have been a relatively traditional and a relatively modern division within the labor force, each with its own particular problem and interests. There may have been differential participation of these workers in the strikes of 1917. Although both would certainly have had grounds to strike, it will be shown below that the main targets of organized labor into the 1920s was the native growers, not the U.S. corporations. But perhaps the lesson of the strikes was that the rural work force had reached a point of solidarity that transcended this and other local social divisions. And there were other divisions.

One social division was associated with the growth of Poblado Jauca. Mintz's culture history focussing on Destino still provides little information about the village. An informant who remembered it around 1920 recalled it as maintaining the somewhat elevated economic level that is suggested above for its earlier years. He remembered a few residents who worked as laborers in the cane fields, but they were accompanied by fishermen, artisans, lowest level sugar management, merchants, and even a few people who grew a couple

of acres of cane. Mintz does note (1956: 373) that the village grew by gradual addition of highlanders who had moved through a stay in the colonias. When life on the colonias is described below, it will be appreciated what a great step this was. Only the most successful workers could manage it. So Jauca village of 1920 appears to have been at least one big rung above the colonias, and this slightly higher status persisted for some time. The full leveling of the rural work force, characteristic of complete control by Aguirre, still had some distance to go. But perhaps this early florescence of Poblado Jauca was as much a result of U.S. corporations' penetration as was the later leveling. If Pastor Díaz was "a prototype of the old-time hacendado" (Mintz 1974: 169), it seems probable that a group of such hacendados, with full control over local land and labor opportunities, would never have allowed an independent village to grow as this one did. In fact, an informant recalled Díaz moving some families from Jauca back to Boca Chica, although he could not recall the circumstances.

Another division within the labor force was between the long-established coast residents and the new arrivals from the mountains. Compared to the coast population, the highlanders were lighter skinned, more actively Catholic and less involved in the Spiritist practices common in Jauca, more patriarchal in family organization, and enmeshed in larger and more involuted kinship networks (Mintz 1952: 246-247; and informants statements). Manners (1956: 149) suggests that the highlands

sent mostly its poorer folk to the coasts, and this lower level tended to persist in their new home (Mintz 1953: 247).

After two decades under U.S. jurisdiction, the labor force in Jauca I was characterized by at least three types of division. (The additional divisions of age and sex will be discussed in a later context.) The number and depth of the differences would increase if one were to examine the agricultural labor force of the whole island. Even restricted to the sugar cane zones, greater opportunities for subsistence agriculture, available work in non-cane commercial crops, different colono arrangements, the presence of a sugar mill--all these would result in social differences that were not significant in Jauca I of 1920. Yet by 1920, rural workers, especially from the sugar areas, had become the core of a potent political movement, challenging the established creole power structure (see Quintero Rivera 1971: 34). This political force would occupy a central place in later developments in island economics and politics, and in the social alignments that were both cause and effect of those developments. But to understand all that, we must first examine some aspects of the colonial policies instituted by the new U.S. administration.

Island Politics

Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (1974: 166-167) states very clearly the U.S. colonial policy goal of converting Puerto Rico into a little piece of the United States, and its population into able workers for modern production. Means to this end included the

encouragement of Protestant missionaries and the force-feeding of English in the schools.¹ While Roosevelt himself did not agree with all aspects of this policy, he did feel that the best means of promoting the development of the island would be to encourage local investment by "'big American corporations'" (Roosevelt quoted in Guerra Mondragón 1972: 171).

Quintero Rivera (1974a: 106-110) argues convincingly that the policy of Americanization included more than the encouragement of U.S. investment and the promotion of U.S. culture, that it also involved a deliberate policy of undermining the landed gentry who dominated island society and politics. The latter effort included restricting the powers of

1. These policies did result in significant social development of the island, especially in comparison to the abysmal record of the Spanish colonial governments. Education, public health, and economic infrastructure all showed major advances. Whatever the underlying motives behind these improvements, they can only be judged as positive aspects of U.S. colonization. Arguably negative aspects of the first decades as a U.S. colony include the decline of self-sufficiency in food production, the increasing concentration of land in a few hands, the over-concentration of external trade with one much larger partner, the structural stagnation of the economy, and the cultivation of a corrupt and servile government (see Clark et al. 1930; Collazo Collazo 1981; Corretjer 1977; Cristopolas 1974; Descartes 1972; Diffie and Diffie 1931; Lewis 1963; Maldonado Denis 1972; Méndez 1980; Morely 1974; Navas Davila 1978; Perloff 1950; Quintero Rivera 1974b; 1978; Regua 1943; Wagenheim 1973). (The extent of landholding concentration is not entirely apparent in aggregate figures for the island, since the fractionalization of holdings in the decaying coffee industry counter the consolidation of more valuable sugar lands.) The apparent structural shift in the economy between 1910 and 1940 away from agriculture and toward manufacturing, which is stressed by Collazo Collazo (1981: 28-32), seems less significant when his data source is consulted (Perloff 1950), revealing that most of this shift involves nothing more than an increase in those working in sugar mills.

municipal governments, which had been the hacendados' stronghold; temporarily restricting suffrage, at time when the hacendados often had effective control over the votes of their workers; the legalization of unions in 1902 (González 1957: 456), which enabled workers to organize against their bosses, the growers; and the fiscal policies designed to encourage land transfers, already described. The over-all agricultural reorientation of the island also weakened the hacendados. Coffee production, the basis of their hegemony in the center of the island, had gone into decline. Tobacco production prospered, and tobacco is the traditional crop of the small independent farmer (Manners 1956; see also Ortiz 1973).

The political and economic alignments that arose under these circumstances are very complicated, too complicated to go into in detail. A source of complication was the ambivalent interests of many socioeconomic groups. For instance, the corporate Puerto Rican sugar growers and processors, including some of the merchant capitalists described earlier, generally lined up on the side of the U.S. corporations, even as they attempted to maintain some distance from the latter to obtain preferential treatment. The hacendados and later the sugar colonos generally opposed the U.S. rule as it undercut their social dominance and subjected them to unfair economic policies, yet they were drawn to the U.S. as the "dream market" for their agricultural commodities (Quintero Rivera 1978: 61). The growing numbers of the professional, administrative, and

commercial "middle class" were even more divided. Some retained a nationalistic identification with the land gentry that had given rise to the professional group during the hacendados romance with liberalism, but growing numbers were dependent upon and identified with a continuing U.S. economic presence (Quintero Rivera 1978: 56-59; Scheele 1956: 431).

The basic economic alignments of the political parties from about 1905 to the early 1920s was as follows: the corporate sugar interests and those members of the "middle class" with direct ties to U.S. interests were in the Republican party, which favored statehood and some formulations of autonomy; the hacendados, colonos, and other "middle class" were in the Federalist and later the Union parties, which favored other autonomy formulas and included a strong leaning toward pro-independence positions. The economic basis of parties was not a simple matter, but actually a complicated dialectic between material interests and estimates of what type of relationship with the metropole would best serve them, all balanced against the often conflicting aims and interests of other segments of local society, who were simultaneously pushing their own agenda. This tension will be described in more detail later in regard to organized labor's political party.

But economic interests--simple or complex--were never the sole basis for party affiliation. Differences between self-identified liberals over which party better represented their ideals; a strong tendency to back or oppose a party on the

basis of personal disputes with its representatives (the "wounded dove" syndrome); a sporting attitude toward politics that sometimes led to fierce factionalism; the latent racial antagonisms of Puerto Rico that were engaged because of the color of Republican leader Celso Barbosa; and not least, the considerable persuasive skills of various political leaders--all these created a strong non-economic dimension in political identification. Often individuals and even entire municipality administrations differed from what one would expect on a purely economic basis (for documentation and discussion of these political matters, see: Cristopolos 1974; Quintero Rivera 1974b: 210-211; 1978: 58-71; 1981).

The central political conflict of the first two decades of American rule was similar to the central conflict under Spanish rule: a struggle by insular politicians, whose main power was the haciendas, to wrest from the metropolis more power to govern insular affairs. With little real power in government, they were defenseless before the colonial policy of Americanization. Their efforts were in vain at least until the passage of the Jones Act in 1917, which will be discussed below.

Throughout these two decades, the hacendados were challenged on a second front by the growing strength of organized labor. Soon after its founding, the FLT began to organize the rural work force, and with tremendous success (Quintero Rivera 1971: 34; 1974b: 198). This shift away from an urban proletarian or

artisanal base, which was still dominant as late as 1904 (Iglesias de Pagán 1973: 327-333), led to a relative weakening of the radical internationalist wing of the FLT, and a strengthening of the economic faction associated with Iglesias Pantin (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1978: 24). Iglesias Pantin, a Galician born labor organizer who arrived in Puerto Rico in 1896 (Iglesias de Pagán 1973: 395), was a dedicated follower of the conservative U.S. labor leader Samuel Gompers (see Iglesias de Pagán 1973). In 1912-1913, the hacendado dominated Union Party went through a complicated political shuffle, the end result of which was to move them further toward a pro-independence position. The FLT leadership, in turn, rejected independence and actively lobbied in Washington for the extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico (Cristopolos 1974: 128-129; Quintero Rivera 1974b: 198-201). This pro-U.S. orientation of the FLT has been interpreted by some as a result of personal characteristics of Iglesias (e.g. Maldonado Denis 1972: 133). It may be better understood as the outcome of the dialectic involving the arrangement of interests and power within Puerto Rico, and the island's relationship to the U.S. To explicate this point, the next section describes the conditions and balance of forces around 1915-1917, as they would have appeared to the sugar workers who formed the mainstay of FLT power.

Feelings about the United States were undoubtedly ambivalent. Economically, the colonial government had been

both slow and stingy in providing for social improvements (see Regua 1943). The penetration of U.S. corporations had prompted the collapse of old hacienda mills, and workers had grievances against U.S. operations' managers from the very first (Iglesias de Pagán 1973: 359). On the other hand, inclusion within the U.S. system had led to a recovery of the sugar industry and to more work. The right to unionize and strike had been granted by the colonialists, and strikes had led to significant improvement in wages and hours. Moreover, U.S. sugar corporations often would prove to be more amenable to paying higher wages than were smaller, Puerto Rican producers (below). Politically, Gompers and the AFL had on occasion spoken out in the U.S. for the poor of Puerto Rico, thus raising hopes for more progress (Iglesias de Pagán 1973). At the same time, a realistic appraisal of the federal government's position on the colonial question left little basis for expecting that any radical change in the island's status would be tolerated.¹

Within Puerto Rico, the sugar workers main conflict was with established local growers (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 200-201). Even in Jauca I, which at a later date would represent the extreme case of U.S. corporate dominance, local growers would

1. For instance, in Congressional hearings on the pending Jones Act, a Senator made it absolutely clear to Munoz Rivera that independence for Puerto Rico was simply out of the question (Maldonado Denis 1972: 106-110). The idea of taking over U.S. corporate holdings would have seemed even more far-fetched, given the reigning Ewart Doctrine, by which the U.S. executive claimed the right to intervene in sovereign states to protect the property and investments of U.S. citizens (Aguilar 1968: 68).

continue to dominate life and labor into the 1920s (Mintz 1974: 123-128). As late as 1927, Taso Zayas' plunge into Socialist politics was due to a conflict with Pastor Diaz (Mintz 1974: 123), (suggesting a perhaps unappreciated aspect of "personalistic" employer-employee relations--it may be easier to hate and fight a particular individual than so diffuse a thing as a managed corporation). Even in areas where U.S. corporate growers were already becoming established, they may have been welcomed initially because of the higher wages they paid.¹

The central point in the dialectics between internal and external struggles was the fact that the hacendado spokesmen who championed the cause of independence were also vociferously anti-labor (Campos and Flores 1981: 105-106; Lewis 1963: 61). De Deigo, the eloquent defender of independence within the Union Party, also promoted a bill to allow cane growers to call out the police against strikers (Quintero Rivera 1971: 45). While a sizable radical minority within the FLT still hoped for an independent workers' republic, they were stymied by the near certainty that independence under present conditions would lead to the hegemony of their main enemies, the hacendados (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 200). The independentistas call for patriotic

1. Data documenting higher wages in U.S. operations is available only from the late 1920s and the 1930s (Clark et al. 1930: 186, 193, 625, 644; Gayer et al. 1938: 230). Since the ability to pay these higher wages is attributed to the higher productivity per worker, and since that characterized U.S. operations from the start, it seems reasonable to infer relatively high wages for earlier years.

unity of the great Puerto Rican family, under their leadership, was ridiculed in workers publications (Quintero Rivera 1971: 45). Even within the economistic orientation of the FLT, a competing ideological militancy was taking hold among many workers. Quintero Rivera (1971: 44) quotes a conservative sociologist and Unionist politician as complaining in 1922 that in the course of their strikes, the agricultural workers had developed a sullen attitude, and had come to see the local owners as exploiters of labor, rather than their protectors.

With the growth of the FLT, labor had become an important actor in the local scene. Labor's next step was to move beyond unionism to political activity. A workers' party had been formed at the same time as the FLT, but it was virtually inert from the start. In 1915, sparked by the success of local political action by radical artisans in the city of Arecibo, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party was formed as the political arm of the FLT. Again, it was divided into radical and economistic tendencies, and this resulted in a compromise platform that sidestepped the status question, and hammered on improving workers' rights and conditions. The appeal of this position is demonstrated by their spectacular electoral successes: 14% of the vote in their first campaign in 1917, and 34% in 1920 (Quintero Rivera 1971: 72-94).¹ As will be shown

1. Wells (1969: 101-102) recognizes the fundamental nature of this political shift, but attributes it to a change in Puerto Ricans' value structure, from deference values to welfare values (Wells 1969: 101-102). I see nothing more complicated in the shift than the expression of the interests

in the next chapter, the rise of the Socialist Party
transformed the political climate of Puerto Rico.

of those who never before had been allowed to speak for themselves.

CHAPTER IV
1920 to 1940

Chapter IV is much longer than the two preceding chapters, for two reasons. First, more data is available for the 1920-1940 period than before, both for Jauca (from Mintz's writings and my field interviews) and for the supra-local trends of concern in this thesis. Processes and conditions that could only be outlined or suggested previously can now be followed out in some detail. Second, 1920 to 1940 is a critical historical period for the issues at hand. Between the two world wars, the U.S. sugar corporations' dominance reached a high water mark, then began to recede. The sugar workers, as characterized by the people of Jauca I, crystallized into the fully formed rural proletariat described by Mintz. As a result of these and other factors, Puerto Rico's political and economic system was set on a new historical trajectory.

As description and analysis become more complicated and detailed, topical subdivisions become more important in the narrative. Chapter IV is organized as follows: The first section covers island politics up to 1929 or thereabouts. This provides continuity with the end of Chapter III, and also essential information for understanding the coming dominance of the U.S. corporations. The next section, on the island economy, has six subdivisions. The first two describe the sugar industry during the boom years from 1920 to 1929, first the structure of the U.S. industry, and then sugar production in Puerto Rico. The next two do the same, but for the depression years of 1929 to 1940. The next subdivision

describes general changes in island production and employment, including non-sugar sectors. The last addresses employment circumstances specific to the sugar industry. Then follows a section discussing conditions in Jauca, similar to that of Chapter II, only expanded. The final section completes Chapter IV and provides a lead in to Chapter V by bringing trends in island politics up to 1940.

Puerto Rican Politics I: 1920-1929

The politics of the 1920's is among the most complicated areas of Puerto Rican history, but an understanding of the general trends is necessary to understand the economic and social developments of the decade and later. The following overview is based on data and discussions in: Quintero Rivera 1971: 141; 1974b: 199-201; Pagán 1959; Ramos de Santiago 1970; Silvestrini de Pacheco 1979: 25-35; Wagenheim 1975: 68-73; and Wells 1969: 98-111. Since none of the points to be raised here are particularly controversial, I will dispense with individual citations.

The sudden entrance of the Socialist party coincided with the redefinition of insular government under the Jones Act, which superseded the Foraker Act as the island's political charter in 1917. As the United States prepared to go to war, Puerto Rican politicians received some concessions in their long struggle to modify the blatantly colonial and bitterly resented form of administration that had been imposed on them after the invasion. Among other things, the Jones Act imposed

United States citizenship on Puerto Ricans (contrary to the desires of many local leaders), and expanded the powers of the locally elected legislature, especially in giving it the power to approve or reject most of a governor's appointees. This was not enough power to govern the island, but it was enough to effectively check the initiatives of the usually incompetent appointed governors, and so lead to a regular condition of stalemate between the two divisions of island government. Even if stalemated, the government remained a vital source of patronage. Control of government jobs seemed to be the central function of legislators, and increasingly electoral politics aimed at capture and control of the legislature for its own sake.

Along with the new form of government and the entrance of the Socialists, a third factor would shape political trends through the 1920s, and that is the decline in the clear goals or sense of purpose of the established parties. The status question receded, as many leaders, notably Munoz Rivera as early as 1912, became convinced that the U.S. would allow neither independence or statehood. Various formulations of political autonomy came to dominate the political field, which was also consistent with the fact that most interest groups saw both benefits and drawbacks resulting from continued association with the U.S. Another factor muting status controversies was the death between 1913 and 1921 of old-line leaders committed to conflicting positions (Matienzo Cintron,

Muñoz Rivera, de Diego, and Barbosa). Advocates of statehood generally went along with, however reluctantly, politically expedient support for autonomy. Those most committed to independence often did not go along, leading to a campaign to suppress the independentistas. Advocates of independence were first frozen out of the Union Party by Muñoz Rivera in 1915. By 1921, they had realigned within the Union Party after Muñoz Rivera's death, but were officially banned from most government service by the infamous Governor Reilly, who further refused to appoint any Unionist to government because of their guilt by association with "anti-Americans". The Unionists again distanced themselves from the independence option, but Reilly's heavy handed tactics were to backfire, as they contributed to the formation of the militantly pro-independence Nationalist party in 1922. The Nationalists had begun as an association within the Union party. By the mid-1930s, they were a catalytic force in Puerto Rican politics.

Additionally, and undoubtedly related to the temporary decline in arguments over political status, was the fact that the older socioeconomic conflicts that had fed partisan politics, were themselves changing. The insular forces had won a partial victory in the modification of colonial rule in the Jones Act. Moreover, the political backbone of those forces, the hacendados, were dissolving as a major political grouping, just as the merchant capitalists before them had been eclipsed or assimilated by North American capital. Two decades of

hostile colonial administration had taken its toll. Many haciendas were gone; others had become appendages of North American corporations. The ideal of Puerto Rico unified under its landed gentry was becoming less of a viable goal than an anachronistic dream.

The mitigation of major differences between the established parties by 1920 paved the way for a bewildering succession of schisms and alliances between political factions. The goal of politics was to capture the legislature and its patronage, and strange bedfellows became commonplace. Even so, the major division of the 1924 and 1928 elections still had some correspondence to social and economic cleavage within Puerto Rican society.

The first new power block to appear was La Alianza. Leaders of the Union Party were worried about the Socialist electoral threat, especially after the Unionists had been weakened by the defection of the Nationalists. The Union Party leader Barcelo negotiated a pact with the head of the Republican Party, Tous Soto, to join in an alliance, and share the spoils of government. Tous Soto was a corporate adviser and later lawyer for South Porto Rico Sugar. Barcelo, while recognized as the spokesman for hacendados, had ties through marriage to Fajardo Sugar, and had an often demonstrated ability to go with whatever political wind was blowing strongest at a given time. La Alianza was an alliance between the economically dominant agricultural producers.

In reaction to La Alianza, a second, informal coalition was formed. When the Republicans agreed to join with the Unionists, some of the more popularly inclined Republicans defected and formed their own party. This group entered into a coalition, informal at first, with the Socialists. This joining of Socialists and ex-Republicans was not as strange as it might appear, since the leadership of the Socialist party by this time had been permeated with lawyers, and had committed itself fully to the game of electoral politics.

The deliberate moderation of the Socialists, combined with the need of La Alianza to appeal to a broad part of the electorate, meant that in practice, there was not a great deal to distinguish the two groupings. The Socialists continued to appeal to the sentiments and interests of workers, and their percentage of the vote grew. But that strength was offset by the greater organizational strength of the Alliance, and the latter's continued appeal in the mountain areas still dominated by the haciendas. La Alianza easily won the election of 1924. It won again in 1928, but just barely. Alliance control of the legislature was an important factor in the growth of the U.S. corporations' control of Puerto Rican sugar production--not that La Alianza encouraged that growth necessarily, but that it did nothing to oppose or obstruct the North American behemoths as they entered into a phase of consolidation.

Economic Change and Power Shifts in Puerto RicoThe United States Sugar Industry I: 1920-1929.

A laissez faire attitude toward U.S. sugar corporations, or even outright support of them, would not result in their local growth unless other conditions also favored expansion. Puerto Rico was part of the United States sugar supply system, a system which was largely self-contained and isolated from the rest of the world after World War I. The U.S. sugar industry consisted of several major divisions with sometimes divergent and sometimes parallel interests. The industry was characterized by complicated political interactions involving intra-industrial conflicts and government regulations. The constantly changing balance of forces in the industry was a key dynamic resulting in modification of Puerto Rican political and economic life, both on the insular level and in the specific case of Jauca.

Understanding the industry is very relevant to anthropological research on the social dynamics of capitalist organization of agriculture, of which Mintz's work was a pioneer. But the structure of the U.S. sugar industry seems so far removed from the social phenomena that it ultimately affected, that it has received relatively little attention from social scientists interested in Puerto Rico. (Hoernel [1977] is an exception.) Granted, this is difficult research to do, since so much of interest was cloaked in secrecy. But the abundance of reports on the sugar industry, especially from the

later 1920s on, reveal the basic outlines of what occurred. Archival research would fill in the details. The section describes the U.S. sugar industry that emerged from World War I, setting the stage for the following discussion of the Puerto Rican sugar industry after 1920.

The previous discussion of the sugar industry ended with a description of the impact of World War I and contemporary events on local production. The war had much broader consequences for world sugar production (See Babst 1940: 13-118; Bernhardt 1948: Part I; Dalton 1937: 33-52; Poor's Industry Service 1933: 19 ff.; Turner 1965: 69-71). Most of the United States' European allies' sources of sugar had been cut off by the fighting. There was a dramatic expansion of output on this side of the Atlantic. U.S. sugar beet production, Cuban cane sugar, and U.S. refining capacity increased almost explosively, under federal government encouragement and a form of government regulation of the entire industry that the federal Food Administrator--none other than Herbert Hoover--frankly called "a combination in restraint of trade" (quoted in Bernhardt 1948: 14). (Ironically, antitrust action against American Sugar Refining was pending throughout this period, although it was no longer pursued with much vigor.) The sugar industry was content with this arrangement, but the government moved quickly to get out of the trust business when the war ended. The uncertainties of deregulation and of post-war supplies combines with a pent-up demand to send

sugar prices soaring to an incredible peak of \$.2357 per pound in 1920, followed by a glut of sugar and a price crash to \$.181 per pound in 1921. This extreme vacillation encouraged an already apparent trend, in which our European allies encouraged development of their own, self-enclosed sugar supply systems via raised tariffs. The U.S.-Cuban producers found themselves with an excess capacity, and the government responded by raising the U.S. sugar tariff from \$.01256 per pound of raw (96%) sugar, to \$.02. This new rate effectively excluded the foreign sugar (except for Cuba's--see below), that had been a significant source of U.S. supplies until a few years before the War. Despite this exclusion, the U.S. sugar industry of 1921 was still faced with a major problem of oversupply. On the other hand, domestic consumption of sugar was rising, and the election of Harding-Coolidge in 1920 seemed to indicate a more favorable attitude toward business.

Around 1921, the U.S. sugar industry had several distinct subdivisions (see Dalton 1937: 145-274; Poor's Industry Service 1933: 1-14; U.S. Tariff Commission 1926: 1-14; Production figures cited from U.S. Tariff Commission 1926: 11-12, 16-19). The most strongly organized were the sugar refiners, who took the 96% raw sugar delivered from cane sugar mills, and converted it to direct consumption sugar. Refiners were in direct contact with the sugar market. Through the old Sugar Trust, they tried to regulate the supply of refined sugar, and so to maintain its price and their profit margin. Part of the

trust's efforts to control its business environment included buying into beet sugar production and into Cuban cane growing and milling, and also acquiring and then dismantling competing sugar refineries. The influence that sugar refineries had in the federal government seems to have varied. They were attacked through anti-trust action in 1907, but that litigation was allowed to come to a less than conclusive end in 1921, when American could show a diminution of its control over the industry. On the other hand, the refiners were nearly always strong enough to have a higher tariff imposed on refined over raw sugar.

Beet sugar producers also produced direct consumption sugar, and so are always in at least potential competition with both refiners and raw sugar producers (cane growers and mills). But growing beets required a high labor input, and so beet sugar was relatively expensive, averaging \$.0656 per pound in production costs in 1920-21 and 1921-22. Beet sugar could rarely compete with cane sugar from tropical, low-wage areas in a free market, and it flourished only under strong government protection. (The first commercial production of beet sugar was promoted by Napoleon as a war measure.) Beet sugar production was stimulated by the government during World War I, and in 1921, it accounted for 23.1% of U.S. supplies. The distribution of beet enterprises throughout the western and mid-western states gave this division of the industry nearly irresistible political clout, which was amplified by the

support lent to beet interests by wheat growers, who had been converting their land to sugar beet production because of the weak market for wheat. Beet producers were the main force behind protectionist tariff policies of the 1920s.

Raw sugar from sugar cane was produced in five areas, each distinguished by the pattern of capital investment and placement in relation to the U.S. market. There were sugar cane operations in the continental U.S., first in Louisiana and Texas and later in Louisiana and Florida. In 1921 they contributed 6.6% of U.S. sugar, with an average cost for Louisiana raw sugar which, when refining costs are calculated in, put it slightly above the current cost of beet sugar. U.S. cane growers could also muster powerful political support, and often joined with beet producers in advocating tariff protection.

More important sources of raw cane sugar were the United States' three "insular areas", Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Phillipines. Hawaii had become an incorporated territory of the U.S. in 1898, after a revolt against the Hawaiian queen in 1892 had created an independent republic. The revolt and later the treaty establishing incorporation were in part the work of resident sugar growers of U.S. background, who wanted to ensure their favored access to the U.S. market. These resident investors would later stand out as a remarkably organized and independent group within the U.S. industry. The history of Puerto Rico's association with the U.S. and the U.S. sugar

market need not be repeated here, except to call attention to the contrast that Puerto Rico was a possession, rather than an incorporated territory, despite the fact that Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens. The Philippines had been acquired at the same time as Puerto Rico, but they had not been treated the same. The people were never made U.S. citizens, and it was not included completely within the U.S. tariff until 1909, and even then had quantitative limits put on sugar imports up to 1913. Even after unlimited and un-tariffed access was granted, Philippine sugar shipped to the U.S. remained of limited volume and low quality--useful mainly to keep refineries busy during the off-seasons of other areas--until after 1923. But Philippine sugar had the greatest potential for expansion of the insular areas, and at a later date it did expand. In 1921, Hawaii produced 11.8% of U.S. sugar, Puerto Rico produced 9.1%, and the Philippines 3.2%. Production costs for the Philippines could not be found, but both Hawaii and Puerto Rico were producing sugar which came in at more than a cent per pound under mainland beet sugar, with average refining costs calculated in. The three insular areas were too diverse in their methods of sugar production and their relationships with the U.S. to ever form a unified power block. But they all shared one common characteristic which would greatly affect their respective futures--they all lacked effective representation in Congress.

By far the most important supplier of U.S. sugar was Cuba.

Cuba had a special position in the U.S. system. Its abundant lands allowed it to produce low cost sugar, and to expand or contract production as demand required. This, combined with its proximity to the U.S., its longstanding attraction for U.S. investors even under Spanish rule, and the fact of its invasion by the U.S., led to a treaty in under which Cuban raw sugar was given a 20% reduction of any standing tariff on sugar. At the same time, the U.S. gave itself the right to intervene in a range of internal Cuban affairs, including the often exercised right to intervene militarily to protect "life and property". The property of concern was usually the U.S. capital, which entered Cuban sugar production in a pattern roughly comparable to that of Puerto Rico. Cuba differed from Puerto Rico in that its abundance of land allowed a form of extensive cultivation of cane that resulted in very low cost sugar (under \$.03 per pound around 1921, or \$.04 if refined at the going cost). Its capacity was such that it could supply half of the U.S. needs and still sell sugar on the world market. Cuban raw sugar sometimes competed with Puerto Rican raw for access to U.S. east coast refineries, as both were harvested at the same time. Cuban raw often won the competition because some mainland refineries had Cuban holdings, and because low cost Cuban sugar could be refined and sold on the world market without paying the U.S. tariff. (For further comparison of Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar systems, see Hoernel 1977.) Cuban sugar production mushroomed under federal encouragement during 1920. The price

fall and subsequent U.S. tariff increase in 1921 sent it into shock. Cuba supplied only 45.5% of U.S. needs in 1921, where at least 51% was the rule for the years immediately preceding and following. Price recovery after 1923 helped Cuban sugar, but in the long run it was faced with narrowing world and U.S. markets. Moreover, the instability after 1921 was accompanied by increasing influence, or outright takeovers, of Cuban sugar enterprises by North American banks.

The basic divisions just described do not provide an adequate picture of the U.S. industry. For that, we must also consider the linkages between and within these divisions. Linkages took various forms. Interpenetrating stock ownership within and between divisions was common (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 26).¹ Various industry associations existed at different times, some of which will be mentioned below. The most widespread form of connection was an interlocking directorate, at a time when the interlocking directorate was identified as the pre-eminent means of industrial collusion (See National Resources Committee 1953; Whitney 1958: 410).

In 1926 (the earliest data I could obtain) many of the largest sugar producers and refiners were joined through

1. From 1926 or earlier, to 1937 or later, American Sugar Refining owned 25% of the common stock of National Sugar Refining, 26.6% of the capital stock of Michigan Sugar (a beet sugar producer), 50% of the capital of Spreckles Sugar and Beet, plus considerable holdings in Cuban cane land and mills (U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 1937: 123; Farr 1926: 5). This was after American had divested considerable holdings under anti-trust prosecution.

interlocking directorates in a hemispheric cartel, centering on the Caribbean region.¹ The interlocked firms, with almost exclusively North American directors, had total assets of \$737 million, and controlled more than 3,000,000 acres of land outside of the continental U.S., i.e. excluding their extensive beet sugar land (calculated from Farr 1926). Aguirre Corporation alone shared directors with American Sugar Refining, Cuban Dominican, National Refining, Cuban American, Fajardo, Atlantic Fruit and Sugar, and Guantanamo Corporations. Indirect links brought in six other major firms, Amalgamated Sugar Refining and Great Western, both beet producers, Manati, New Niquero, Sugar Estates of Oriente, and the formidable United Fruit, whose enormous land holdings were not specified by location, and so are not included in the 3 million acre total. (United Fruit's world wide holdings of owned and leased lands exceeded 1.8 million acres in 1926.) South Porto Rico was interlocked with Cuba Cane in 1926, but these two did not, in that year, interlock with the larger cartel (Farr 1926). Of course, that does not mean they did not cooperate with them.

I am not arguing that these interlocked corporations perpetrated actual conspiracies, although I would not be surprised if they did, but that there simply must have been a recognition among them of the major problem facing the sugar

1. The cartel described here was geared to the U.S. market. Its relation to sugar produced for the world market or for other protected markets of Europe merits investigation, but cannot be pursued here.

industry--overproduction--and that therefore there probably existed a tacit agreement that technological or organizational innovation that boosted production capabilities was against their common interest. Industry spokesmen complained that anti-trust laws prevented rational management of the industry (Babst 1940: 161), but throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s there are scattered but rather compelling hints about the industry's ability to restrict the amount of sugar reaching the market (Babst 1940: 101-102; Poor's Industry Service 1933: 10, 25; U.S. Tariff Commission 1926: 57). In contrast, Hawaiian sugar producers, who were outside of and often opposed to the cartel, were far ahead of cartel production techniques by 1926 at least (Farr 1926: 64; U.S. Tariff Commission 1926: 8-9; and see below). It will be shown that the cartel's interest in restricting production had direct implications for the course of Puerto Rican history, and for understanding the processes of change in production arrangements described by Mintz.

A student of federal anti-trust policy writes: "If outright conspiracy and cartels are facts of life, as indeed they are, then so too are the instability and continual breakdowns of such arrangements" (Asch 1970: 82). The problem is that the most profitable course for any particular firm may be to support the general collusion, while individually cheating on the arrangements in order to expand its own share of the market (Asch 1970: 78). This is precisely what occurred in the U.S. sugar industry as the problems of oversupply grew more acute by

the 1920s.

In the mid-1920s, the once steadily growing per capita consumption of sugar levelled off (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 17; Hughes 1948: 31).¹ This softening of demand of course aggravated problems of excess capacity. In the refined sugar sector of the industry, cheating on agreed upon marketing arrangements had begun, apparently as early as 1921, as some refiners offered secret rebates and other incentives to wholesalers. The competition got much worse by 1927. In response, the major refiners organized in 1928 the Sugar Institute, to set and regulate rules of trade, to promote consumption of sugar through advertising, and to stimulate research on industrial and non-food uses of the product. Within a few years, the government would decide that the Institute was an illegal combination in restraint of trade (Dalton 1937: 265-269; Farr 1934: 101; Hughes 1948: 128-154; Poor's Industry Service 1933: 14-15).

The oversupply of raw sugar was just as bad in the mid-1920s, but in this sector developments took a different turn. Basically, the strategy here was to squeeze out Cuban sugar from the U.S. market. Falling prices combined with tariff increases in 1921 and 1922 had shaken severely Cuban cane production, but price resurgence in 1923 brought some stability and even expansion of cane growing. By late 1925 however,

1. In the U.S. in the mid-1920s, the change in demand was felt rather suddenly because of a "slimness craze" that swept the nation (Dalton 1937: 268; Hughes 1948: 131).

prices for Cuban raw sugar were back down to \$.02 per pound, and Cuba's absolute and relative contribution to the U.S. sugar market began to fall. In 1926, a tariff commission requested a \$.005 cut in the duty, but President Coolidge refused, citing the damage that tariff reduction would do to U.S. beet growers. The collapsing sugar industry brought general economic devastation to Cuba, along with political strife bordering on anarchy. Cuba tried unilateral production cutbacks,¹ much to the dismay of U.S. sugar magnates with investments in Cuba, and then tried an international marketing agreement known as the Chadbourne Plan, but none of these efforts could stop the steady deterioration of Cuba's position (Candelas 1959: 34; Coolidge 1948; Dalton 1937: 199, 246-250; Lamborn and Co. 1931; Poor's Industry Service 1933; Suchlicki 1974: 103, 130; U.S.

1. The production cutbacks imposed by the Cuban government from 1926 to 1928 were very substantial, equivalent to the contemporary production of Hawaii and Puerto Rico combined. Moreover, no provisions were made to give U.S. owned enterprises preferred treatment. Statements by Earl Babst, head of American Sugar Refining, show the dilemma faced by cartel members with interests in both Cuban cane and North American beets. While Babst recognized the intolerable situation in Cuba that had been caused by increased protection for beets, and that Machado had made every effort to negotiate an agreement with mainland interests before ordering the cutbacks, Babst heatedly criticized Cuban "interference" in private enterprise, and spoke ominously of the dangers of jeopardizing "private property... of foreign nationals" (Babst 1940: 125). He urged Machado to have faith in the inexorable workings of the free market. (Babst's faith in the free market did not prevent him from howling like a banshee in 1932 when a loophole in the tariff let Cuban refined sugar compete in the U.S. market [Babst 1940: 181-229]. This, he claimed, was contrary to "sound colonial policy" and nothing less than a threat to U.S. national security [Babst 1940: 210, 229]).

Tariff Commission 1934: 35-38).¹

In this instance, Cuba's loss would be the gain of Puerto Rico and the other insular areas. While the high tariff had been maintained to protect high cost mainland U.S. sugar producers, it also created an extremely profitable situation for those lower cost producers inside the tariff wall. The displaced Cuban sugar was replaced by greatly expanded production in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 38). That brings us to the development of Puerto Rican sugar production during the 1920s. It will be shown that the pace and form of sugar industry expansion was not a simple, straightforward consequence of corporate capitalist organization, but a result of the interaction of developments in the larger U.S. industry, just described, with local social, economic, political, and ecological

1. Part and parcel to these developments affecting Cuba was a major shift in ownership of Cuban sugar production. The boom of 1920 had been financed locally by North American banks. With the collapse of 1921, and the following decade of depression for Cuban sugar, the banks took over ownership or management of many firms. About half of Cuban nationals' holdings and several major U.S. operations passed to National City Bank (Lynsky 1938: 79; Poor's Industry Service 1933: 20). It seems that these bank operations were run without concern for the good of the cartel. Most of the expansion of Cuban cane planting between 1923 and 1925 was under bank direction, not by the remaining established sugar firms (Dalton 1937: 249). Later, it was a committee put together by the banks that drew up the Chadbourne Plan (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 21), in what might be considered an early forerunner of Trilateralism. Babst, of American Sugar Refining, strongly criticized the Chadbourne Plan (Babst 1940: 163 ff.). It would take this study too far afield to pursue the implications of these events further. They are noted here because similar developments play a part in Puerto Rican politics of the 1930s.

circumstances.

The Sugar Industry in Puerto Rico I: 1920-1929.

Overall, Puerto Rico's economy was rather torpid in the early 1920's. Coffee, food crops, and general standards of living were either stagnating or in decline (Clark et al. 1930: xxi; Koenig 1957: 248). Tobacco production, another area heavily influenced by a North American cartel (see Hoernel 1977) was to increase, but this affected only a limited number of people. There would be a small boom in tropical fruit production, but this did not live up to the high expectations (Clark et al. 1930: 14; Diffie and Diffie 1931: 199 ff.; Saldana 1926; Steward et al. 1956: 66-74). Needlework, mainly the embroidery of handkerchiefs and sewing gloves at home, had arrived on the island around 1917, fleeing anti-sweatshop legislation and seeking lower wages. It grew steadily into the 1930s, but never became more than a form of supplemental income (Wagenheim 1973: 184-187; Silvestrini de Pacheco 1980: 79; and see below).

Even sugar production was relatively stagnant entering the decade. The problem with cane diseases kept production level flat from the late teens up to the early twenties, even through the 1920 price boom. The varietal revolution already described solved the disease problem and boosted field productivity, just as the newly raised tariff began to cut Cuban sugar. There was an initial jump in over-all sugar output due to the improved varieties, followed by an expansion of cane acreage. The

previous big expansion of cane acreage, under wartime stimulus, had pushed cane cultivation into the foothills, and industry analysts thought this represented the maximum profitable area that could be cultivated (Clark et al. 1930: 612), indicating that the expansion of acreage in the late 1920s and after, was moving into previously unprofitable, low yield land. All together, sugar tonnage nearly tripled between 1923 and its peak in 1934, going from 400,000 tons to over 1,100,000 (see appendix).

Equally dramatic was the increasing control over sugar production by U.S. corporations. As described above, the 500 acre law was now, semi-officially, a dead letter. Local political power tilted in favor of the corporations, and as will be seen later, the federal administration on the island was solidly pro-corporation. The U.S. market offered great profits for anyone who could deliver the product, and the U.S. corporations were ready to take advantage of the opportunity. By 1926, U.S. owned mills produced just under half of Puerto Rico's raw sugar. This proportion would remain roughly stable for the following decade of rapid expansion of island production (Gayer et al. 1938: 73), although I suspect that the U.S. corporations' share would have grown again had Puerto Rican sugar ever returned to a less expansionist state under free market conditions. U.S. corporations' landholdings were nearing their all time peak by 1928, with approximately 103,000 acres owned, and 145,000 leased, with a quarter of that

actually planted in cane (Farr 1929: 60; Gayer et al. 1938: 130-131).¹ Yields of cane per unit area were higher on U.S. corporation land than on holdings of most Puerto Rican corporations, and much higher than on colono land, so that for 1934-1935 (the only data available) the U.S. corporations produced 31.2% of the sugar cane on only 23.3% of the land devoted to cane (Gayer et al. 1938: 78). While the U.S. corporations will receive most of the attention in discussions to follow, it should be remembered that at no time did they control more than half of the island sugar industry, by any measure. Even in the 1930s, most of cane growing, milling, and raw sugar production in Puerto Rico was scattered among some 7,500 producers operating a bewildering variety of enterprises (Dalton 1937: 213).

The facts of the growth of sugar production and U.S. corporate control are widely known, even if the timing of these events has not been entirely appreciated. What has received less--almost no--attention is how this expanding role of the U.S. corporations occurred, either in how they acquired new holdings or in exactly how they increased their holdings' productivity. These concerns are worth considering not just

1. Precise statements about earlier trends in land acquisitions are not possible due to the prevalence of hidden ownership, and the general lack of early data. For instance, note the absence of any listed holdings for Aguirre Corporation prior to 1928 in Gayer et al. (1938: 130-131). The best indicator I found on U.S. corporation growth prior to the 1920s is the data on Aguirre's total sugar output, presented in the appendix.

for their own sake, but because they had an important impact on the subsequent course of the sugar industry in Puerto Rico and on major developments in island politics. Those two areas, in turn, have obvious relevance for understanding the implications of capitalist corporate management of agriculture. The following discussion will approach these issues by looking first at the island conditions that favored U.S. corporate takeovers, and then at the investment strategy which appears to have guided the corporations' behavior.

One important local condition favoring takeovers was the financial strength of the U.S. corporations. The three established U.S. sugar corporations had scored tremendous profits during their years in Puerto Rico. Information provided by the corporations themselves, with no independent check on accuracy, shows combined earnings of about \$50 million between 1901 and 1922 (including an estimated \$5 million for the unreported earnings of Fajardo prior to 1920). Almost no profit was registered during the weak price and cane disease years of 1921 and 1922, but from 1923 to the end of the laissez faire period in 1935, the three took in another \$55 million. Most of these earnings were paid out as dividends--\$36 million in dividends from 1923 to 1935--but much was reinvested in sugar, especially in the 1920s. Net investment of the three operations went from \$19 million in 1919 to \$28 million in 1933, and leveled off around \$35 million by 1929 (Gayer et al. 1938: 149-156). In addition to the three established

corporations, a fourth U.S. enterprise, United Porto Rico Sugar, was incorporated in 1927 with capital of over \$11 million. United was formed by the acquisition and merger of 5 existing Puerto Rican mill operations (Farr 1928: 62; Guerra Mondragón 1972: 174).

United appears to represent a completely new entry of U.S. capital, and may have been related to the expanding role of banks in Caribbean sugar industries (see below). At any rate, United's acquisitions highlight the preferred form of investment for other U.S. corporations in the 1920s, the take-over of established local operations. Fajardo bought one local mill complex, and Aguirre two. South Porto Rico demonstrated a variation on the theme when it acquired a huge field and mill complex in the Dominican Republic (Farr 1947: 129-130; Guerra Mondragón 1972: 174).¹ An important point for later

1. Just as this study concentrates on the role of U.S. corporations over local enterprises, it also concentrates on the one U.S. corporation most involved with changes in Jauca, Aguirre Corporation. A more detailed study on the U.S. corporations would have to examine the evident differences among them in production systems and investment strategies. Some general comments illustrate the differences that could be pursued (from Clark et al. 1930: 643, 645; Farr 1928: 9, 55, 62; 1933: 13, 24, 44; Gayer et al. 1938: 82-83, 105, 151-157).

Central Aguirre Corporation had the most stable long-term earnings and dividends payment record of the group. It also had the reputation of being the most advanced in applying existing technology to field operations, such as irrigation, fertilizing, soil analysis, etc. (Farr 1926: 10). (This is significant for appraising Mintz's [1956: 338-340] discussion on the rationalization of production under corporate administration). Aguirre was the least reliant of the U.S. corporations on colono cane, and its Central Cortada in Santa Isabel ground the least colono cane of any mill in Puerto Rico, only .1% in 1934-35. (In 1933, Aguirre entered into an agreement with Monsanto Chemical to provide molasses for the

manufacture of butyl alcohol, but the significance of this move is not clear).

The Fajardo Sugar Co. was the weakest of the older three U.S. corporations in earnings, despite an active program of investment that even included an agricultural station that worked on cane varieties. Fajardo owned cane lands that were second only to United's consolidated holdings. It was strongly affected by natural conditions because it relied primarily on rainfall rather than irrigation, and it was severely set back by the hurricane in 1928. It paid no dividends from 1930 to 1935.

South Porto Rico operated only one mill, but it was the largest in Puerto Rico (Central Guanica). It owned the least cane land of the U.S. corporations, and was the most reliant on colono cane, which accounted for 56.3% of the cane it ground in 1934-35. South Porto Rico's operations are complicated by its extensive holdings of land, mills (including Central La Romana), and other properties in the Dominican Republic. Since Dominican sugar was excluded from the U.S. by the tariff, South Porto Rico was the only U.S. corporation active in Puerto Rico and also producing for the world market. At times, it ground Dominican cane at Central Guanica, and also shipped Puerto Rican workers to participate in Dominican harvests.

United Porto Rico sugar, later called Eastern Sugar Associates, is the most mysterious of the four U.S. corporations. As noted in the text, it was created in 1927 and involved the acquisition of five Puerto Rican owned centrals. After making an acceptable profit for a few years, operations went into the red. This set off a series of major reorganizations, which would ultimately figure into political developments of the later 1930s. The source of United's initial capital is not clear, but it clearly was not a "team player" with the other U.S. corporations. The two studies commissioned by those three corporations (Clark et al. 1930; Gayer et al. 1938) have no in-house data provided by United/Eastern, and indeed seem to avoid discussing that operation.

Other important areas which should be considered in a study of the U.S. corporations as a group include: (1) the reasons behind the less dramatic corporate reorganizations that occurred (Farr shows Aguirre reincorporated in 1905, 1918, and 1926; Fajardo in 1919; and South Porto Rico in 1917 and 1926); (2) interpenetrating stock ownership between U.S. and Puerto Rican corporations (mentioned in Clark et al. 1930: 644; Smith and Regua 1960: 17); (3) links of each firm to other U.S. sugar corporations (for instance, Fajardo's board of directors was especially connected with the board of directors of National Refining and several Cuban based operations); and (4) differences in mill operations, which are an extremely

discussions is this fact that the major investment of U.S. corporations in the boom years was acquisition of prime cane lands and mills, rather than any major effort toward research and development of more productive means of cultivation.

How did the U.S. corporations acquire the new holdings? Why did so many local producers get out of the business just as things began to look very good for Puerto Rican sugar? Probably, many of these transactions were not entirely voluntary. From 1913 to 1923, the unsettled and negative aspects of local sugar production (described in Chapter III), coupled with rising overhead in taxes, irrigation fees, maintenance costs against soil depletion, and land values, all combined to diminish the ability of smaller producers to expand or even retain their holdings (Clark et al. 1930: 327-328; Smith and Requa 1939: 48-49). The final blow for many locals may have been a double-barrelled change in credit terms and payments for cane delivered to the mills.

Like most agricultural producers, the sugar cane growers and processors depended on outside financing to cover the operating expenses in advance of the sale of the harvest. A bad harvest or worsening credit terms can break an operation, especially a small one. In the 1920s, a restructuring of the local, U.S.-finance-capital-dominated, credit market left local producers, especially smaller ones, facing much high payments for

important part of overall operations, but which fall outside this study.

advances. The lenders had established a new policy of cooperation to lessen competition between themselves.¹ The preferential credit terms enabled larger mills to drive out

1. The U.S. corporations obtained much of their operating capital in the U.S., at a rate of about 6%. Local mills were more reliant on "local" banks (60% of local bank capital was owned by foreigners, mainly North Americans). In the 1920s, local banks established a rate formula agreement for loans. This set a minimum of 8% on the largest loans, with the smallest loans hitting 10% (Clark et al. 1930: 375-388). Prior to this agreement, the "shrewd Latin borrower was able to play off one bank against another, and thus obtain bargain rates" (Clark et al. 1930: 387). Under the new system, the "latin borrower" was operating at a clear disadvantage compared to his U.S. counterparts. This disadvantage was multiplied by the financial arrangements relating to colonos.

Independent cane growers were effectively excluded from the open market for loans in the 1920s. Besides the higher rates charged on smaller loans, they faced a second obstacle in the mills' approach to financing. Mills regularly re-loaned bank advances to their own growers. Naturally, they wanted to be paid back. With the introduction of the new scale of payments for colono cane, which was based on the sugar content of cane at the mill, a critical concern for colonos was to have their cane ground immediately after cutting, at the peak of its sucrose content. To insure repayment of their loans to colonos, mills gave borrowers' cane preferred treatment. Growers who borrowed in the open market would then receive less payment for the cane that they grew. An official of the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank cited these factors in explaining why the Bank charged higher interest rates on loans to sugar colonos than for loans to tobacco or coffee growers (Clark et al. 1930: 616-617).

This arrangement worked in favor of U.S. mills, which had cheaper advance money because of their access to North American financial markets. The going rate on advances to colonos was 9-12%. This meant extra income for the mills, and less for the colonos. When several mills competed for a limited amount of cane, the colonos could demand a better deal. In one instance, probably from the later 1920s, some 80 colonos were induced to give their cane to an unidentified U.S. mill, in exchange for an interest rate on production advances of only 6% (Clark et al. 1930: 616-617). This would be about cost of the loan for U.S. mills (themselves borrowing at 6%), but below cost for local mills. Ultimately, this advantage could force local mills out of business, thus eliminating the competition for colono cane, after which presumably interest rates would go back up.

smaller mills that competed with them for colono cane, and to absorb colono holdings in default of repayment of production advances (see Footnote 1 on previous page). (This represents the third time in less than 50 years that credit terms contributed to a substantial change in the ownership/management of local sugar operations.)

The second factor leading to assimilation of small holdings into larger operations was the formulas used to determine payment for colono cane by mills. It was mentioned earlier that entering the 1920s, colonos enjoyed relatively favorable terms for their cane. By the late 1920s, when the corporations' power was more firmly established and the competition among mills for cane was reduced, new payment formulas were devised and imposed by the mills. Not only did these new formulas pay at a generally lower rate, but they put all the risk for a bad season on the growers. On top of that, colonos believed that they were being cheated outright by falsified chemical assays used to determine payments (Clark et al. 1930: 616-626, 644). One study in the late 1930s claimed that colonos were being cheated \$.12 on the dollar (Hoernel 1977: 279; also see Gayer et al. 1938: 87 ff.).

This combination of circumstances left many colono operations running in the red and deeply in debt to the mills, even in the boom years of the later 1920s. Clark et al. (1930: 616, 626, 644) predicted that many more colono operations would be absorbed by the corporations. But they also add a

qualification relevant to Mintz's hypothesis that under a corporate "land and factory combine", "all available land is concentrated in large-scale holdings" (Mintz 2956: 415). They note

[T]he great centrals may not find it to their interest to monopolize the cane fields of their tributary territory. So far as such lands form continuous level tracts, which require extensive irrigation or drainage for profitable exploitation and can be cultivated by steam plows and tractors, they will naturally fall under unified control. But the amount of land of this character in Porto Rico is limited. A marginal belt exists where cane is now planted and may be planted more generally in the future as a result of economies due to improved tillage and scientific seed selection, where small growers may continue to thrive (Clark et al. 1930: 645).

On top of these factors of ecology and economies of scale, preserving some colonos would be attractive indeed if the colonos were forced to accept an unfair burden of the production costs of cane. So even in Puerto Rico's boom years, the imperative to expand and consolidate land holdings was a qualified one.¹

What kind of production changes were attendant to the takeover of small operations by large corporate mills? Earlier, I discussed changes resulting from the initial wave of conversions after the U.S. invasion, but what was the impact of this new changeover, when the antiquated trapiches were already

1. In the projected Part II of this study, I will describe how recent investment strategies of large-scale investors in tropical agriculture emphasize the benefits of leaving the actual growing in local hands, and concentrates on merchandizing the product.

long gone from the scene? Mintz (1956: 415) emphasizes the use of new machine technology under the corporations. Mill spokesmen go further, claiming that the U.S. corporations in Puerto Rico employed the most advanced field technology in the world through the mid-1930s (Smith and Requa 1960: 181). The issue is important, because the ultimate demise of the Puerto Rican sugar industry is related to its state of technological backwardness, which can be traced back to this general time period. The mill spokesmen cited above claim that the backwardness was a result of excessive government regulation. It appears, however, that the real cause was dynamics within the sugar industry itself.

Without question, the initial entry of the large corporations, U.S. and otherwise, produced a great jump in productivity, and a second big jump was realized when the corporations took advantage of the higher yielding cane varieties introduced by the government. The corporations also were quicker to implement other less dramatic production innovations that came along. But excepting the two spurts in productivity just mentioned, no data that I am aware of demonstrates that corporate management itself led to significantly higher levels of production. Information marshalled by Clark et al. (1930: 620 ff.) and by Gayer et al. (1938: 78) showing higher absolute yields in canefields under corporate management are, those authors admit, complicated by the fact that the corporations had some of the very best land,

and that many of the smaller producers were working fields with only marginal potential. I found no information suggesting that the major corporations made any substantial effort or investment to discover or develop new cane varieties or systems of cultivation--and this type of research is the key to increasing productivity--with the exception of Fajardo's small experimental station. Contrary to industry spokesmen's claims to technological supremacy, Puerto Rican field operations were far behind those of Hawaii by the mid 1920s. Puerto Rican field operations would not approach the technological sophistication of Hawaii's of the 1930s until the 1950s (see Anon. 1949; Koenig 1953: 179-181; Mollett 1961; Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association 1979: 18).

The Hawaiian growers, unlike the corporations in Puerto Rico, did invest heavily in research and development, and the results are shown by comparing yields for the two areas. Hawaiians produced 4-6 tons of raw sugar per acre prior to 1923, when there began a 30 year rise which finally leveled off at 10-11 tons per acre around 1953 (Hawaiian Sugar Growers 1979: 10). Puerto Rican production (see appendix) went from a peak of about 2.5 tons of raw sugar per cuerda prior to the cane diseases, to stabilize just after the varietal revolution, around 1928, at 3-4 tons. (Important technical differences between the two cultivation systems make the trends more significant comparisons than absolute production levels). Yields in Florida and Louisiana canefields were comparable to

those of Puerto Rico (Hawaiian Sugar Growers 1979: 23-25). Undoubtedly the single most important factor leading to Hawaii's increasing superiority was those growers' investment in cane variety research. In contrast, nearly two-thirds of Puerto Rico's cane in 1953 remained a variety developed in 1923 (Samuels N.D.: 11; Smith and Regua 1960: 22). Why this difference in investment strategy? I believe the contrast was overdetermined, a result of both differences in local production arrangements, and of different situations in regard to the larger U.S. sugar industry.

Within Puerto Rico, and in Puerto Rico's relation to nearby sugar producers, competitive aspects of the sugar industry discouraged investment in research and development. When one firm had, on various occasions, come up with some small advance, other firms quickly adopted the innovation without having born any of the development costs (Gayer et al.: 1938: 67). For the island industry as a whole, the same concern may have applied in relation to surrounding producers. Because of similarities in production techniques, they could "borrow" any advance made in Puerto Rico. For example, the disease resistant varieties of cane developed in Puerto Rico spread throughout the Caribbean, and even to Colombia (Knight 1977). These factors help explain the singular lack of cooperation among Puerto Rican growers to develop more advanced techniques, well-noted at the time (Clark et al. 1930: 612-613; Gayer et al. 1938: 67), and why it was left to the government to develop

the varieties to overcome the cane disease (Clark et al. 1930: 480-481). Hawaiian growers in contrast were highly organized and the unique environmental conditions of Hawaii made their advances less easily transferable to competitors (Anon. 1949; MollFett 1961; Vandercook 1939). In fact, a later attempt to transfer Hawaiian techniques to Puerto Rico was a failure (Samuels N.D.: 6).

The lack of cooperation of major firms in Puerto Rico was also due, however, to another factor, a factor which further explains why research and development was least likely to be sponsored at the industry level where it would seem to be most rational, that of the combined U.S. cane growing firms. At this level of the industry, where costs and benefits could be shared, the major threat to prosperity was the problem of overproduction. There was no major obstacle to cooperation among firms at this level. The industry was quite capable of joining together to promote advertising, political lobbying, and research aimed at increasing consumption (see Farr 1929: 84), and even the contentious Puerto Rican producers could band together for purposes such as those (Gayer et al. 1938: 67). But to seek an industry-wide increase in productivity comparable to that of the varietal revolution in Puerto Rico, would have been suicidal. Again, why was Hawaii different? Hawaiian sugar growers were outside the sugar cartel. They had successfully resisted attempts to control them, and were operating as a unified group, with their own refinery,

shipping, and marketing system, and they were trying to expand their share of the U.S. market. Since land for new plantings was scarce in Hawaii, research and development for increased productivity was their means to that end (Anon. 1949; Mollcett 1961; Vandercook 1939).

The nearly complete absence of sugar refineries in Puerto Rico is a separate consideration that supports the contention that the structure of the U.S. industry and Puerto Rico's place within it limited the investment by U.S. corporations. The refiners' margin was an enviably solid source of profits (see Poor's Industry Service 1933: 15). No technological problem prohibited refining in the tropics, as demonstrated in Cuba. The low labor costs in Puerto Rico would have given it a competitive edge over mainland refiners. Yet except for some small sugar blanching operations to produce consumption sugar for local use, the U.S. corporations did not go into refining. Why? Clark et al. (1930: 457) point to the corporations' connections to mainland refiners. As noted above, the independent Hawaiian growers set up their own refinery, and even within Puerto Rico, the innovative and independent Serralles family began a refinery using a process that required only a limited initial capital investment, around 1925 (Farr 1927: 71). Later, when the sugar cartel broke apart, mainland refiners managed to have new refineries in Puerto Rico prohibited by law, and Puerto Rican industry representatives screamed that this frustrated their new interest in developing

refining (below).

The major investments that U.S. corporations did make, other than the wholesale acquisition of mills and property, was in known technology and techniques useful for replacing labor, and in housing and marketing arrangements that aided in the control of labor. The mechanization of work was promoted during the depression years especially. For that reason, and because consideration of these labor-related investments will lead directly into discussions of life in Jauca from 1920 to 1940, discussion of them will be postponed. The next section continues the story of the U.S. and Puerto Rican sugar industries after the crash of 1929.

The United States Sugar Industry II: 1929-1940

World prices for sugar plummeted in the early years of the depression, hitting a low of \$.005 per pound in 1932 (Turner 1965: 31). Inside the U.S. tariff walls, prices were down but not disastrously, and consumption was off but not collapsed (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 7, 17). Any decrease in demand, of course, would aggravate the problem of oversupply. The drop in world sugar prices led to another rise in the U.S. tariff, to \$.025 per pound (96%), meaning a full \$.02 duty at Cuba's reduced tariff rate. Cuba's sugar shipments to the U.S. began to fall precipitously (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 35, 38).

Although the higher tariff was intended to protect the politically powerful mainland beet and cane growers against Cuban sugar, it also meant reinforced profits for the insular

producers within the tariff wall, who produced sugar much more cheaply than the beet industry. Shipment of raw sugar from the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico all began to rise in the mid 1920s, and turned sharply upwards after 1929, replacing almost entirely the Cuban sugar that was displaced (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 38). The problem of excessive supplies had not been solved, on the contrary it was getting worse. For refined sugar, an important cause was antitrust decisions against the Sugar Institute in 1934, upheld on appeal in 1936. That stymied the refiners' partially successful attempt to regulate the market (Bernhardt 1948: 128-154; Poor's Industry Service 1933: 10; U.S. Department of Agriculture 1935: 2). For raw sugar, the problem simply was a capacity grossly out of line with demand. The total consumption needs of the U.S. and Cuba combined under normal (i.e. non-Depression) conditions in the mid 1930s would not have exceeded 7 million tons annually. The capacity of the two nations stood at 9 to 10 million tons over that figure (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 22). The problem facing the industry was how to hold back production (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 33).

An early casualty of the infighting was the Phillipine sugar industry. Phillipine sugar had been the fastest growing division of the U.S. industry since 1929, and it had the potential for continued growth in the future (Dalton 1937: 231-232). Its prospects for growth were dealt a crippling blow in 1933, when Congress legislated a phased-in transition to

independence, along with quantitative limits and tariff duties on sugar imports. Of course, no one factor can be cited as the cause for such widely ramifying political events (see Friend 1965: 81-83, 107-108, 141-144), but the role of the U.S. beet sugar producers and the Cuban cane growers in pushing this exclusionary act was substantial enough for Poor's to credit the passage of the independence bill to those interests (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 10). But even the exclusion of some of the Philippines' sugar could not solve the problem of excess capacity, or resuscitate Cuba. A more general solution would require the active, long-term intervention of the federal government.

The advent of the Roosevelt administration in 1933 brought changes in several important aspects of federal policy. One of the new administration's priorities was to stimulate agriculture by restoring the buying power of farm products to parity with those of manufacturing industries. Even though it would readily side with the more powerful agricultural interests, the Department of Agriculture would not shy away from active intervention in farm production (Mertz 1978: 21, 36). The new administration was also more willing to confront the problem of Cuba, and the new Secretary of Commerce had previously represented Cuban sugar producers (Matthews 1960: 131-135). At least three compelling reasons called for action on Cuba (as neatly summarized in Poor's Industry Service 1933: 9). First, Cuba had been one of the United States' main

overseas markets prior to the Depression, and market stimulation was an important part of the New Deal recovery strategy (U.S. Cuban Sugar Council 1948: 87-93; U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 25). Second, a lot of U.S. capital invested in Cuba had suffered a dizzying plummet in appraised worth, from \$750,000,000 in 1921 to \$35,000,000 in 1932 (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 8; also see U.S. Cuban Sugar Council 1948). Third, the economic debacle and consequent political agitation was nearly beyond control. Government representatives spoke of "actual starvation" and "unparalleled" disorders verging on "anarchy" (Dalton 1937: 251), all of which culminated in the overthrow of Machado in 1933. In the past, lesser disturbances were dealt with by sending in the Marines, an action legitimated by the Platt Amendment. A military approach might have been very costly in the climate of 1933. Instead, the U.S. government abrogated Platt and pledged economic assistance via a new sugar policy (Dalton 1937: 24-244, 251; also see Babst 1940: 141-142; Turner 1965: 101 ff.).

The New Deal sugar policy developed as an amendment in 1934 to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. (Sugar had not been covered by the original Act because of complications involved in regulating imports from foreign nations). The Sugar Act added a system of quotas to the tariff as a means of regulating the amount of sugar in the U.S. market. The basic program worked as follows. Each year, an estimate of the coming year's total sugar consumption needs was made for the Secretary of

Agriculture. He divided the total proportionately among established sugar producing areas, using a formula based on historical output levels in designated years before the Act. A tax was placed on sugar at the refineries, and money collected as that tax was repaid to sugar producers provided that they adhered to provisions of the Act. Those conditions and the rules of payments to producers varied by sugar region, but always included some restriction on production for sale in the U.S. market. Sugar producers who went along with the production restrictions and other conditions then benefited by receipt of the government's "conditional payments".

If this sounds fair, it was not. The federal government had been forced into the role of arbiter and regulator for the sugar industry because of the economic and political havoc created by the industry following its own imperatives. Industry spokesmen (e.g. Babst 1940: 207-211) approved of this new government activism. After all, they had not wanted the government to stop acting like a trust after World War I. But the considerable regulatory power now vested in the federal government was, in its application, responsive to the relative political strength of the various divisions of the sugar industry.

The most powerful lobby of the time was the combined forces of the refiners and beet sugar producers, the "unholy alliance" as Secretary of the Interior Ickes called them in a 1936 diary entry (Ickes 1954: 1228; and see Dalton 1937: 145-152, 269-

274). As explained earlier, the beet sugar producers had common interests with the high cost cane growers of Louisiana and Florida; and the refiners had special ties to cane growers in Cuba. The strength of the mainland divisions stands out clearly in transcripts of public hearings on proposed revision of the Sugar Act in 1937 (U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 1937). The stated goal of the framers of the original Sugar Act had been to restrict mainland sugar production only as a last resort (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 25). In the final draft of the original Act, mainland producers had to accept only restrictions on future growth, and even those limits later would be raised when found to be too confining. Refiners also got what they wanted---severe restrictions against any new offshore refining, despite very vocal protests from representatives of Hawaii and Puerto Rico (Dalton 1937: 149 ff., 174, 187, 272; Mathews 1960: 131-135; Smith and Requa 1939: 17; Turner 1965: 73-88, 101-107). Cuba was to receive a quota allotment above its sales in the immediately preceeding years, and a substantial tariff reduction that allowed for greatly improved earnings on the sugar it did sell in the U.S. This did not restore Cuba's economy to pre-sugar-cutback levels, but it did lead to a more than doubling of the value of its sugar crop between 1932 and 1936 (Dalton 1937: 252-254).

The insular areas paid most of the cost for the new sugar system. Because of the way the quotas were calculated, they had to cut back production. The magnitude of these cutbacks

can be calculated in different ways. One reasonable calculation produces the following figures for the forced production drops under the Act: Hawaii 10.9%, Puerto Rico 18.1%, Philippines 29.8% (Dalton 1937: 209). This discriminatory treatment was the result of straightforward power politics. The insular areas had no representatives in Congress.¹ If the Sugar Act had been left entirely to Congress and the powerful mainland sugar lobbies, the insular areas would have suffered even more (Ickes 1956: 128). But the executive branch had to consider other factors, such as the important markets for U.S. manufactures represented by the insular areas, and the potential unrest that might result from too drastic a cutback of sugar production in islands that produced little else (Dalton 1937: 201-205). The Secretary of Agriculture retained broad discretionary powers in regard to quotas, conditions, and payment arrangements for the insular areas (Dalton 1937: 109, 121). In a later section, I will discuss how the application of this discretionary power in Puerto Rico was closely related to insular political conflicts of the period.

1. A delegate representing Puerto Rico was informed by Senator Lonergan that neither Puerto Rico nor Hawaii were part of the United States (U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 1937: 125). After Hawaii failed in a court challenge to the Act's restrictions, it petitioned to be made a state. The petition was not even considered by Congress. Puerto Rico was considered at the time to have even less chance of being admitted as a state; and for the Philippines, statehood was out of the question (Dalton 1937: 192-194, 285).

The Sugar Industry in Puerto Rico II: 1929-1940.

The major changes in local sugar production were outlined in the previous discussion. The amount of raw sugar produced in Puerto Rico soared during the first years of the Depression, rising from 586,578 tons in 1928-29 to 1,113,697 tons in 1933-34. Cane acreage went from 251,018 acres to 300,126 acres over the same period (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 25; and see appendix). Puerto Rico was the most profitable division of the U.S. sugar industry for the period from 1925 to 1932 (Poor's Industry Service 1933: 6, 26). Then came the Sugar Act. The quota for Puerto Rico for the 1933-34 crop was 807,312 tons--far below the actual production for that year. Subsequent quotas up to 1941 fluctuated, but represented no significant improvement (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 34). The island's quota was proportionately divided down to the level of individual farms. Imposition of the quota was followed by several years of supervision by federal representatives to dispose of sugar stocks over the quota already on hand, and to cut back new production (Dalton 1937: 219-228; Smith and Regua 1939: 105-114; Turner 1965: 222-243, 258). On the other hand, the conditional payments to Puerto Rican producers, once some initial uncertainty about these payments was resolved (below), provided a major source of income. Conditional payments in Puerto Rico for 1937 to 1940 surpassed \$38,000,000 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1962: 8), and came to account for about 20% of the total income going to the sugar producers

(Candelas 1959: 36).¹

The developments in the U.S. sugar industry in the early 1930's set the basic quantitative parameters of sugar production in Puerto Rico for decades to come. There would be ups and downs in output levels (see appendix and later discussions), but the fluctuations were around a central range of 100,000 to 110,000 tons that was to remain unchanged until the early 1960's. The high prices supported by the tariff brought production up to that range, the quotas kept it from rising more, and the conditional payments kept it from falling. The quota restrictions cannot be held responsible for a decline in research and development in the local industry, however, as sugar spokesmen have claimed (Requa 1948: 9), and other more reliable sources have recently reiterated (Samuels N.D.: 3). As discussed above, the biggest producers were little interested in boosting production, and over-all levels of investment had peaked several years before the quotas were imposed.

The Sugar Act, especially as modified in 1937, led to changes in the internal structure of Puerto Rican sugar production. The first of the conditional payments to Puerto

1. Producers claimed that the conditional payments were not new income, but earned income from sales interdicted and delayed by the federal tax at the refineries (Requa 1943: 13-14). While this argument was politically expedient for the producers, it is far from convincing. Because of the different government regulations and protective measures, U.S. consumers in the mid-1930s were paying about one quarter of a billion dollars annually over the world price of sugar. Puerto Rico's share exceeded \$30 million per year (Dalton 1937: 224, 275).

Rico had been heavily weighted toward the largest producers. This was a political embarrassment, given the general and growing anti-corporation sentiment of the times (Dalton 1937: 109; and see below). In the 1937 revision, a new sliding scale of payments was instituted that favored smaller growers. Other stipulations allowed for the transfer of fractions of the island quota from larger to smaller production units, and a separate federal program encouraged the start-up of new small farms. These provisions made marginal cane growing operations profitable, and the percentage of total cane land in small holdings began to increase (Koenig 1953: 248; Minimum Wage Board 1942: 78; Smith and Requa 1939: 49-51). At the same time, the overall cutbacks led to some reversion to simpler, less intensive cultivation techniques (Uttley 1937: 42). All together, these changes probably made Puerto Rican sugar production considerably less efficient.¹ The sugar production of the four U.S. corporations declined in absolute terms and as a percentage of the Puerto Rico total during the later 1930's (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 30). Their profits also dipped, even though supported by the conditional payments (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 106). A corresponding rise in earnings among mainland sugar producers meant that Puerto Rico no longer led

1. The jump in field productivity indicated in the appendix charts is the opposite of what should be expected for this time. A possible explanation for this anomaly is that growers were reporting greater than actual cutbacks in acreage during the federally supervised adjustment period. That would make the average productivity per unit of land appear greater than it really was.

the industry in profitability after 1938 (U.S. Department of Labor 1944: 31).

Besides the production restrictions, receipt of conditional payments in Puerto Rico was contingent upon fulfillment of three other requirements: (1) if a producer also ground colono cane, that the colonos receive fair compensation for the cane, as determined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, (2) that workers be paid a fair wage, and (3) that child labor not be used, with some stipulated exceptions (Turner 1965: 93). The regulations in regard to colono payments were to stop some of the abuses that have already been mentioned, and can also be seen as part of a broad political movement against the corporations. The labor provisions simply backed up gains already won by militant union action (Turner 1965: 251-254). Unions and wages are elements of the larger picture on labor, which will be described shortly. Here it need only be mentioned that support of the unions' gains was consistent with the federal goals of avoiding potentially insurrectionary situations and stimulating buying power of consumers.

Market Considerations and Relief Efforts, 1920-1940.

Involvement of U.S. capital in overseas markets increased during the 1920s. Before that, U.S. capitalists had been interested mainly in mining and production of tropical agricultural commodities, but by the roaring twenties they moved into large volume sales, beginning principally with a few food staples such as condensed milk and cooking oil (Burbach

and Flynn 1980: 119). The trend to increased sales was particularly noticeable in the U.S. insular sugar areas. Exports to Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines rose from \$39 million in 1900, to \$412 million in 1925, at which time they represented 9% of all U.S. exports (Dalton 1937: 201-202). Scheele (1956: 431-432) describes U.S. manufactures entering the San Juan market in the 1920s, and how this produced a new socioeconomic group associated with strong links to the U.S. Most manufactured items were beyond the means of the poorest folk in the remote countryside (Clark et al. 1930: 19), so there market penetration was probably restricted to the food staples. In sugar areas under U.S. corporate control another pattern developed. The corporations set up company stores in most of their important centers. These dominated marketing in their respective areas, and sold a variety of goods in addition to food (Clark et al. 1930: 424-428).

Cuba's imports from the U.S. fell off after 1925, and the other three areas after 1928, with the combined total of imports from the U.S. dropping to \$180,550,000 in 1932 (U.S. Tariff Commission 1934: 178-180). This loss of sales was felt even more acutely because of the generally depressed markets of the 1930s. Puerto Rico was officially designated as an "export area" even though part of the U.S. (Mathews 1960: 136), and the federal relief programs to come were intended, in part, to boost the island's capacity to absorb U.S. manufactures (Ross 1976: 28, 39-41). A study about the federal Depression

programs in the U.S. southern states (Mertz 1978) documents the goal of raising purchasing power, but also shows how difficult it was to implement, given employers' objections to raising wages of their own employees. Puerto Rico's overall purchasing power did slowly recover, and entering the 1940s, the island would be the second largest purchaser of U.S. goods in Latin America, the ninth largest in the world, and the number one importer in per capita terms (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 106). Part of the recovery in purchasing power was due to federal relief efforts.¹

The need for poor relief was not a product of the Depression. The rural poor of Puerto Rico had lived in miserable conditions long before 1929. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. was unusual, in his term as governor, for trying to provide some aid, and he and others were eloquent in calling attention to the dreadful conditions that existed (Clark et al. 1930; Diffie and Diffie 1931; Roosevelt 1974). Then came the Depression, the advent of which was accompanied in Puerto Rico by two devastating hurricanes, San Felipe in 1928 and San Ciprian in 1932. They pulverized what was left of the coffee industry, and severely damaged other crops (see Gayer et al. 1938; Steward et al. 1956). Even so, Washington was to extend

1. The depression saw a general rise in the world's tariff barriers. Rather than lose their new overseas markets, many manufacturers of products such as food staples set up overseas plants, jumping the tariff barriers (Burbach and Flynn 1980: 119). These tariff-hoppers were forerunners of the flood of U.S. overseas manufacturing investment to penetrate protected markets after World War II (below).

the New Deal assistance program in Puerto Rico later than on the mainland, and with significant restrictions and omissions of program aid,¹ and then only after some federal administrators concluded that the island was drifting toward "anarchy" and a general strike (Mathews 1960: 139-140). But the aid finally did arrive, and in substantial amounts. For the first time, Washington acknowledged responsibility for the welfare of Puerto Ricans. It spent or loaned about \$175 million between 1933 and 1941 on direct relief, work relief, and other programs (excluding the sugar payments) (Jaffe 1959: 36-38; Perloff 1950: 32). At one point, an estimated 35% of the population were receiving some form of federal aid (Lewis 1963: 125).

The first federal agency was the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA), in 1933. It was strictly a relief agency, and it was replaced in 1935 by a more ambitious program that grew out of the Sugar Act, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA). PRRA's most general goal was to modernize agriculture, with the specifics of that goal dictated largely by local political alignments. Obviously, the federal government was interested in creating markets for U.S.

1. Direct relief for hurricane damage totalled about \$13 million, including \$3 million provided by the Red Cross, and \$6 million in government aid to coffee growers. The hurricane damage was estimated at \$85 million (Ross 1976: 27). Federal work relief arrived two years later than on the mainland. In 1939, benefit programs for maternal and child welfare and for public health were extended to the island, but Puerto Rico was denied old age and unemployment assistance, and aid to dependent children (Requa 1943: 7, 13).

manufactures, not competitors (see Ross 1976: 39).

Nevertheless, partly to provide work relief and partly to build up the island's infrastructure, PRRA projects went beyond agriculture. It built schools, housing, roads, resorts, hydroelectric plants, and a successful cement factory (Perloff 1950: 31; Ross 1976: 3). Despite the ill-repute of government "make-work" projects at the time of this writing, in Puerto Rico this kind of aid not only provided critically needed wages, but it paved the way for future development, and left behind numerous architectural gems that are still enjoyed by thousands. PRRA also provided a source of employment and a training ground for a generation of young planners, and was a major player in the political dramas of the mid to late 1930s. For the manual laborers it employed, PRRA construction projects provided a fleeting acquaintance with a relatively desirable and high paying type of work, one that would not become available on a regular basis for at least a decade.

Other trends of the time, sometimes combined with relief efforts, produced some significant modifications in the overall structure of employment. Manufacturing employment registered significant growth in the 1920s, but its impact was limited. Most of the growth was in raw sugar manufacture and in garment work. Work in the sugar mills is very different from work in the cane fields, but it does not indicate a shift away from an agriculturally based economy. Most of the garment work growth of the 1920s was in home needlework. Needlework

was an exclusively female occupation, providing supplemental income to poorer families, sometimes at a wage of under \$.01 per hour (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1980: 83). The somewhat erratic efforts of the federal government to set a minimum wage in Puerto Rico, which began in the mid 1930s and culminated with a \$.25 hourly minimum in 1940, were enough to send many needlework enterprises packing to foreign lands in search of still cheaper labor (Ross 1976: 42-43). (This would not be the last time Puerto Rico saw the mainland industries it had managed to attract lured away by a still better deal elsewhere). Textile work in factories paid better wages than home work, and it did prove to be a solid, if still small in numbers, source of manufacturing jobs from the 1920s on.

Other new types of work had shown substantial growth in the 1920s, and maintained a moderate growth rate even through the 1930s. It seems doubtful that this later growth could have continued without all the federal assistance money coming into the economy. Two groupings merit attention: construction, other textile products, and transportation and communication; and, wholesale and retail trade, finance, government, and professional and other services. These two groupings, one mainly blue collar and the other mainly white collar, represent those types of jobs that would later provide the economic growth and avenues for individual social mobility associated

with Operation Bootstrap.¹ Generally, these lines of work show a pattern of slight or moderate growth up to 1920, major expansion during the 1920s, and diminished but still substantial growth through the 1930s. Total employment in the indicated types of work rose from 54,262 in 1910 to 62,203 in 1920, to 112,199 in 1930, to 150,819 in 1940. This represents an increase from 13.8% of the entire work force in 1910 to 29.4% in 1940. In contrast, and despite all the PRRA's efforts at pump priming, total agricultural employment had remained relatively stable, even declining slightly after 1910. In 1910, 239,973 worked in agriculture, in 1940 it was 228,811 (Perloff 1950: 64, 401; Steward et al. 1956: 76).

A parallel development was the growth of unemployment, especially in the 1930s. Puerto Rico's population grew by 96% between the U.S. invasion and 1940, but the number of jobs grew by only 62%. One estimate puts unemployment at 60% of the labor force after the initial impact of the 1928 hurricane and the 1929 crash (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 202). Naturally, the failure of the economy to generate enough work increased the concern of island leaders with the "surplus population problem". The existence of such a problem had become dogma, and was connected with various plans and controversies over

1. These groupings may be contrasted to the more traditional types of employment, including agriculture, agricultural product processing, home needlework, and domestic service. "Other manufacturing" is not included in the totals mentioned in the text because it continued in a downward trend until the 1940s.

birth control technology and population export schemes (see Earnhardt 1978; History Task Force 1979: chapter 4, 119-122).

In later discussions, it will be argued that the changing numbers in all these employment categories affected the political battles of the 1930s, and so had important indirect consequences for life in Jauca. But through 1940 and even later, the area around Jauca remained relatively insulated from change in employment possibilities. Sugar cane still ruled, and so the next section will focus on changing employment conditions in sugar cane agriculture, and how those changes were related to conditions in the sugar industry already described.

Working in the Cane, 1920-1940.

In discussing the investments of U.S. corporations, I noted that while they shied away from technology to boost production, they were very interested in applying known technology (tractors, pumps, winches, etc.) to cut labor costs. James O'Connor has observed that oligopolies tend more toward input minimizing than output maximizing, and that observation seems apt in this case. The U.S. corporations were trying to minimize labor inputs as early as 1910 (Clark et al. 1930: 646). Even though Puerto Rican labor was cheap and productive, labor costs still accounted for about half the cost of cane throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Gayer et al. 1938: 92). Of course, the emphasis on mechanization and the specific way of going about it is not something automatic, but will depend on

circumstances. The high wages and scarce labor in Hawaii were responsible for the Hawaiian growers' zeal to develop machines that would need less labor as well as boost total output (USDA 1958: 20-21); while the reliance on an extensive form of cultivation with a low labor input in Cuba resulted in the opposite effect there (Hoernel 1977: 144). Within Puerto Rico, the changing circumstances after 1929 led to a marked change in the labor tactics of the big corporations.

Prior to 1929, the tactic had been to restrict growth in field labor and in wages, while increasing productivity. Employment in sugar cane agriculture grew only slightly, from 84,153 in 1910 to 84,827 in 1920. Comparable figures were not calculated for 1930, but undoubtedly would have shown more of an increase, given the rapid expansion of the industry at that time (Gayer et al. 1938: 163; Perloff 1950: 401). Real wages remained about the same in 1928 as in 1913, despite a brief rise in the boom years of 1918-1920. Labor productivity, however, had risen greatly over this time. It was this combination of factors, along with the tariff protection, that made Puerto Rican sugar so profitable (Clark et al. 1930: 479-483, 626, 639-640).

After 1929, U.S. and other corporations became much more aggressive in dealing with labor. The price paid for sugar dropped by a third between 1928 and 1932, even with increased tariff protection. This drop was compensated for by the increase in exports to the U.S., which rose by about a third

(Gayer et al. 1938: 40; also see Clark et al. 1930: 642). While income thus remained relatively stable, the rate of profit was threatened because of the lower unit value of the product and the potential rise in costs of expanded production (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 105-106; and see individual company reports in Farr, various years). Rather than accept lower dividend payments, which in fact were to increase during the Depression (Gayer et al. 1938: 154-159), the U.S. corporations opted instead to cut back on their payrolls. Total payroll for field and mill operations of the U.S. corporations, excluding Eastern, fell from \$5.3 million in 1927-18, to \$4.4 million in 1932-33, to \$3.9 million in 1934-35 (Gayer et al. 1938: 184).

The payroll cutback was accomplished through lower wages and increased mechanization. Wage rates fell from 1928 to 1933, after which they rose slowly back to just above 1928 levels (Gayer et al. 1938: 191). The 1928 pay, it will be recalled, was about the same as pay in 1913. During the 1931-32 harvest, some field wages had fallen from \$.90 to \$.50-\$.60 per day (10 hours), which in real terms was comparable to wages in 1901. And those wages, it will also be recalled, were no higher than wages during the sugar crisis of the 1880s. The decline in employment is more difficult to document. A reported 113,161 were employed in the peak production year of 1934 (Gayer et al. 1938: 163), but the absence of figures for 1930 makes that number hard to interpret. Mechanization was preceding rapidly, however, with specific measures including the replacement of

oxen by machines, which also had the effect of opening pasture land for cane cultivation (Koenig 1953: 181), and the application of a new "gyro-tiller" machine, which eliminated several types of work in field preparation (Gayer et al. 1938: 171-172).

Both aspects of the payroll cutback were felt more heavily during the dead time than the harvests. The cut in wages was deeper for work in the dead time (Gayer et al. 1938: 174). The jobs eliminated by the gyro-tiller, and the lessened need for animal caretakers, struck particularly at employment possibilities between harvests. Between 1927-1928 and 1934-35, the total payroll for the three U.S. corporations for all field operations in the month of least employment, i.e. the bottom of the dead time, fell by 42% (Gayer et al. 1938: 184; and see Table 4.1). The cuts in income for sugar workers, combined with the loss of income from the hurricane-ravaged coffee industry, and tobacco production which fell after a market glut in 1932 (Mathews 1960: 137), led to an overall decline in Puerto Rico's annual per capita income from \$122 in 1929-30 (when it was one-fifth of the U.S. average), to \$86 in 1932-33. It would not regain the 1929 level until 1940, and if adjusted for inflation, until even later (Perloff 1950: 31; and see Table 4.2). Over the same period (up to 1933), the cost of living in Puerto Rico had risen by about one-third, thanks to the Agricultural Adjustment Act's price supports beginning in 1932 (Mathews 1960: 137; and see Table 4.3). Not everyone was

Table 4.1

Percentage decrease in field operations employment and payroll, from month of greatest employment to month of least employment, Fajardo, Aguirre, and South Porto Rico corporations.

	1927-28	1932-33	1934-35
Decrease in number of field employees	32.8	39.0	57.1
Decrease in field payroll	54.8	63.6	68.6

Source: Gayer et al. 1938: 184.

Table 4.2

Net per capita income for Puerto Rico, 1930-1940.

1930 - \$122	1936 - \$114
1931 - 107	1937 - 118
1932 - 97	1938 - 119
1933 - 85	1939 - 112
1934 - 106	1940 - 121
1935 - 103	

Source: Creamer, in Curet Cuevas 1979: 17.

Table 4.3

Price per hundredweight of selected food items in Puerto Rico, December 1932 and December 1933.

	1932	1933
Fancy rice	\$2.40	\$4.10
California red beans	3.00	5.25
Codfish	19.00	28.00
Hams	20.00	25.00
Flour	3.50	6.50
Lard	14.50	18.00

Source: Mathews 1960: 137.

suffering however. The three established U.S. sugar corporations paid out over \$21 million in dividends from 1929 through 1935, at an average payment rate that was about 20% higher than before the crash (Gayer et al. 1938: 156).

The explanation of falling wages and workers' incomes cannot be found in the traditional association of pay and productivity, for labor productivity, as measured in tons of cane produced per worker, rose by 41% between 1927-28 and 1934-35 (Gayer et al. 1938: 176). Rather, as concluded a research staff contracted by the U.S. mills (Gayer et al. 1938: v), the decline was a result of the unfettered operation of a "free labor market", under the circumstances of a labor glut due to the release of coffee and tobacco workers (Gayer et al. 1938: 222). The invisible hand had not been kind to the people of Puerto Rico. Real wage rates may well have reached an all-time low, and actual earnings undoubtedly had. In contrast to the sugar crisis of the 1880s, workers by 1930 were much more dependent on earnings for their survival, as corporations and probably colonos as well had deliberately curtailed the possibilities for subsistence production by their workers (Clark et al. 1930: 500; and see below).

A Puerto Rico government study in 1942, after wages had risen somewhat, showed that earnings of sugar workers were significantly below minimal survival requirements (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 180-185). Therefore it seems justified to call workers' compensation in the early 1930s "starvation wages".

And despite all the payroll reductions by the U.S. corporations, their sugar workers may have been better paid than other agricultural workers. Although the data is not entirely clear on this point, it seems that workers for other sugar producers were paid less (Gayer et al. 1938: 186, 193). That must have been the case for colonos' employees if, as was alleged, the centrals were paying colonos less than cost for their cane (Gayer et al. 1938: 90). Coffee and tobacco workers definitely were paid at a much lower scale than sugar workers (Curet Cuevas 1979: 29). Many people had no work at all. Literally, people were starving (Clark et al. 1930: 37).

These conditions, combined with the attitude of some U.S. administrators that their workers were "some sort of lower animals'" (Mathews 1960: 139), produced a potentially explosive situation. Strikes against sugar producers mushroomed from 1931 to 1935. Worker action before the 1931-32 harvest resulted in contracts with some mills, promising wages of \$.75 to \$1.25 for 8 hours of field labor. The strikes continued to spread, leading to the first general industry contract for the 1933-34 harvest. Deadlocked negotiations in 1935 over an 8-hour day for the mills and the elimination of piece work produced an atmosphere of crisis. The now-sympathetic insular government intervened on the workers' side, and backed up labor with a general 8-hour law (Gayer et al. 1938: 68, 176-180, 221-226). The union leadership was discouraging strikes at this time, in favor of dispute mediation (below). Strike action

fell off after the mid 1930s (see Table 4.4). Federal backing of negotiated contracts via the Sugar Act conditions helped to stabilize wages at a fairly high level--\$1 to \$1.70 per day from 1938 to 1940 (Turner 1955: 251-262). But mechanization and overall production cuts continued to restrict the need for labor, and this contracting demand was only partially offset by the 8-hour law (Gayer et al. 1938: 66). Hours worked continued to decline, so actual earnings rose only from \$3.60 per week in 1932-33 to \$3.75 in 1935-36 (Gayer et al. 1938: 181, 228). Moreover, that increase would actually register as a decline if cost of living increases were figured in; and both the mills and colonos frequently violated agreements and paid below the official rates (Gayer et al. 1938: 66, 228). Still, the precipitous drop in wages and earnings had been arrested, and the sugar workers were making more than many people in Puerto Rico, or even in the mainland United States.¹ Work conditions had improved a bit, and workers now had established grievance procedures (Gayer et al. 1938: 227-228). Further improvements would require major political changes in Puerto Rico, and those were not long in coming.

1. Earnings of organized sugar workers in Puerto Rico were well above contemporary earnings of agricultural workers in several U.S. southern states (Gayer et al. 1938: 226-227; and see Mertz 1978), where daily wages for adult men could be as low as \$.40 per day (Piven and Cloward 1972: 82).

Table 4.4

Strikes and labor controversies in the sugar industry of Puerto Rico, 1931-32 to 1935-36.

	Strikes	Number of workers involved	Controversies	Number of workers involved
1931-32	10	3,355	10	267
1932-33	14	13,594	5	9,660
1933-34	18	33,333	2	653
1934-35	10	6,845	6	51,480
1935-36	5	2,250	6	61,062

Source: Gayer et al. 1938: 223.

Economic and Social Change in Jauca

Aguirre and Sugar Production.

Any understanding of life in Jauca from 1920 to 1940 must begin with an appreciation of the local dominance of Aguirre, and of its policy of directly administering local cane production, rather than relying on colonos. Understanding that, in turn, requires attention to local ecology.

South coast land could produce very high tonnages of cane under efficient and intensive cultivation. Its natural advantages were made even more prominent by over-use and depletion of land in other areas. "Gran cultura"¹ cane could yield up to 100 tons of cane, or 4 tons of sugar, per acre in some parts of the south (Roberts 1942 in Mintz 1956: 322). The very most productive lands seem centered around the Ponce area, with Central Mercedita producing an average of 7.06 tons of sugar per cuerda for all holdings in 1934-35. Aguirre was not far behind with an average of 5.00 tons of sugar per cuerda (Gayer et al. 1938: 123). Santa Isabel, with perhaps the best

1. In Puerto Rico and much of the surrounding region, three types of cane cultivation are practiced. "Gran cultura" is planted between harvests, in July through October, and harvested after 16 to 17 months. "Primavera" is planted during the grinding session, January through June, and harvested about 10 months later. The third type, ratoon cane, sprouts up from the roots of harvested cane, so does not require reseeding, but needs about 14 months until harvest. These three methods involve different inputs and productivity for land and labor. The relative emphasis given to one or another is an important business decision (see Clark et al. 1930: 629, 639-640; Mintz 1956: 356). For instance, Cuba, with high wage rates but abundant land, emphasized ratoon production (Clark et al. 1930: 640; Hoernel 1977: 144).

mix of agricultural soil over all for any municipio on the island,¹ contained some of the most productive of Aguirre's holdings. A former mayordomo recalled that around 1940, local fields yielded up to 110 tons of cane per cuerda of gran cultura, with 60 tons for primavera and 40 tons for ratoon. With potential yields such as these, it would have been in Aguirre's interest to insure stable production by assuming direct management.

A second ecological factor concerns water availability. Sugar cane needs abundant water, but the south coast is a semi-arid region. It receives an average of under 50" of rain per year, with pronounced wet and dry seasons. Santa Isabel gets under 40" (Morris 1979: 24; Picó 1975: 399). The seasonal deficiency must be counteracted through irrigation. The level south coast plain, only a few miles from the highland rain belt and above the "most copious aquifer in Puerto Rico" (Morris 1979: 32), was ideal for irrigation, and Aguirre was well-known for its investments in wells and pumps (Farr 1928: 9) which supplemented government irrigation works. In 1940, over 10,000 cuerdas of Santa Isabel were irrigated (see below). One need not be an ardent follower of Wittfogel to appreciate that an

1. The Ponce-Patillas plain is sometimes called the agricultural treasure of Puerto Rico. If so, Santa Isabel might be the crowning gem. Some 4,000 of its 22,500 cuerdas are in mixed soil types in the semi-arid hills in the north, but most of the rest of the surface is a level blend of some of the best soils for agriculture, and cane in particular (Junta de Planificación 1976: 61, 120, 176, 192; and see Picó 1975; Morris 1979).

extensive irrigation system will function more efficiently under a unified command. Many of the land purchases by the U.S. corporations had been to obtain water rights (Clark et al. 1930: 627, 645; also see 356-362). In sum, in Santa Isabel, Aguirre encountered circumstances identical in those described by Clark et al. (quoted above) as favoring expansion and consolidation of corporate administration.

In the early 1920s, Aguirre expanded and consolidated its control of local production. It acquired Central Machete to the east in 1920, and Central Cortada along with Santa Isabel Sugar Co. in 1924, giving it greatly expanded landholdings and mill capacity (Farr 1928: 9). By 1921 it had assumed official ownership of lands formerly held by agents to circumvent the 500-acre law, under its landholding subsidiary Luce and Co. (Registro de Tasación). Aguirre's combined owned and leased lands were reported at 26,000 acres in 1925 (Farr 1926: 10). In 1927, it owned 21,500 acres and leased 15,600 more (Farr 1928: 9). The three mills had a combined annual grinding capacity of 122,000 in 1927, up from the 88,000 tons listed as the combined capacity for 1925 and the 95,000 tons for 1926 (Farr 1926: 10; 1927: 9; 1928: 9), indicating a very substantial program of mill expansion. After 1927, landholdings and mill capacity remained fairly stable, showing only small increases until 1936. Sugar production was increased by an expansion of cane acreage within controlled lands (Gayer et al. 1938: 128) and through attainment of higher

yields of sucrose from cane, which peaked above 13% in the mid-1930s (Aguirre statistics). Total sugar production of Aguirre's three mills rose dramatically from 1924 to 1928, and peaked in 1934. The federal quotas imposed in 1935 were far below Aguirre's past production levels, so much so that Central Cortada ground no cane at all in 1939-40 and 1940-41, when its quotas fell to 85,360 tons and 81,779.5 tons respectively (Farr 1940: 13, 148; 1941: 13). (Grinding capacity for those years stood at 130,000 tons). I suspect that minor fluctuations in land owned or leased by Aguirre after 1935 were responses of various sorts to the quota limitations. Aguirre's net income fluctuated widely (see appendix), usually between \$1 and \$3 million annually, tending toward the upper part of that range before the quota, and the lower part after the quota.

Aguirre's expansion in Santa Isabel took its biggest leap with the acquisition of Central Cortada and its owned and leased lands in 1925. The mill itself was located in barrio Descalabrado, near the western limits of the municipality, and rather distant from Jauca considering the limited transportation facilities. Occupations listed in town birth records show Descalabrado second only to the pueblo itself for diversity of employment, but Jauca seems to have been insulated from this and other direct fall-out from the mill's presence.

Aguirre continued to acquire relatively small holdings in Santa Isabel at a rate of 50 to 200 cuerdas total per year. This may have been to secure water rights or facilitate

consolidation of other holdings. A big exception was the 1928-29 fiscal year, in which, according to tax records (Registro de Tasación), Aguirre acquired 46 separate holdings, for a total of 2,325 cuerdas. Of those, 33 were of 10 cuerdas or less, and 17 of those were in Jauca I. The majority of the new acquisitions were in Descalabrado.

The manner of acquisition appears to have varied. One informant recalled that Aguirre could buy land easily because it offered people twice the going rate for it. Another claimed that much of the new land was acquired via foreclosures on unrepaid loans or production advances. It may be that circumstances associated with the hurricane of 1928 contributed to the difficulties in repaying advances, and so accelerated Aguirre's takeovers that year.

Aguirre also leased lands. In addition to those brought along by the purchase of Santa Isabel Sugar, it took control of the Boca Chica lands of Pastor Díaz sometime in the mid 1930s (Mintz 1974: 177).¹ Aguirre was not, however, unswervingly opposed to colono growers. One of Aguirre's administrators, Marcelo Oben, acquired and farmed land in Santa Isabel in the late 1930s. At least one local land owning family, the Riveras, also continued to grow cane on substantial acreage,

1. Lease arrangements could change. At a later date, cane from Pastor Diaz's land was sent to the Boca Chica mill near Ponce (hence the local name of Boca Chica for Diaz's operation). So too was cane from Colonia Quatro Hermanos, to the north of the Jauca I settlement, and perhaps other local operations as well. Still later, they shifted back to sending cane to Aguirre.

although they left the harvest to Aguirre's direct management (according to informants).

By 1930, Aguirre already had the most concentrated land holding in Puerto Rico (Gayer et al. 1938: 116). In 1935, with more detail available from the U.S. agricultural census, Santa Isabel was first among Puerto Rico's municipalities for average size of farm (1,001 cuerdas), first for the percentage of farmland operated by managers (99.7%), and first for the total listed value of farm implements and machinery (\$727,853). Aguirre owned 7,388 cuerdas of Santa Isabel in the mid 1930s, more than it held in any other municipio. Its local dominance was increased, as no other big sugar enterprise had major holdings in Santa Isabel (Gayer et al. 1938: 126), and as already described, it leased still more land. Major expanses outside of Aguirre control were the low hills in the northern section of Santa Isabel, which to this day remain pastures owned largely by the older families of Coamo.

Aguirre control led to expansion of cane acreage.¹ In 1918, much of Santa Isabel was still covered with brush (Mintz 1974: 58). In the 1920s, uplands and other areas which had never been used for cane were seeded (Mintz 1974: 96). By the 1930s, cane was spreading everywhere and driving out other planting, even local garden plots (Mintz 1974: 173). Jauca informants

1. For the entire Ponce-Patillas plain, cane went from 16,809 cuerdas in 1896 to 61,000 cuerdas in 1928 (Clark et al. 1939: 498-499). Figures for the next six years are not available, but would undoubtedly show a very major increase.

recall that expanded cane plantings replaced at least four separate house clusters scattered over the fields to the north of the present village, each of which had 3 to 5 houses, and often a few acres of land planted in subsistence crops. Parts of the Polbado Jauca settlement that projected into arable land were relocated and compressed into the space between Route 1 and the Ponce and Guayama Railroad tracks. Agricultural census data for Santa Isabel show a drop in farms of 10 cuerdas or less from 11 in 1920 to 5 in 1940. Farms of 10 to 49 cuerdas went from 8 to 4; and those of 50 to 174 cuerdas from 6 to none over the same period. Federal programs of swamp drainage to combat malaria opened up new wet lands for planting including much of the fertile low land between Poblado Jauca and the beach. Aguirre even tried to plant cane in saline mud flats. One experiment in the 1930s put cane in land that was so marshy that no wheeled vehicle could be brought in, and workers had to carry out the cut cane stalks on their backs (according to informants). According to the census, the total amount of land in farms reached 22,482 cuerdas in 1939. Of that, 11,224 were actually cultivated, and 10,752 were irrigated. The area of cane harvested (less than area planted in cane due to the 18 month growing period of gran cultura) and the tonnage of cane produced rose dramatically up to the imposition of the production restriction (see appendix).

Labor Opportunities and Conditions.

As cane came to dominate Santa Isabel land, work in sugar

cane dominated the labor situation. Informants recall some temporary government work in the 1930s, constructing drainage systems to fields and settlements, etc. (also see Mintz 1974: 97, 172-173). There also was some on and off work for women, in home needlework and sewing in small workshops in the town. Informants recall that needlework was never a major occupation locally, as the wages paid compared so unfavorably with going wages in the cane fields. They remember it as an occupation more common in the highlands and on the cash-poor west coast (and see Clark et al. 1930: 14; Mintz 1974: 159). Other work included the traditional local mix of small store ownership, a few tiny colono operations, some artisan work, and fishing. The growth of Aguirre had led to a reduction of the relative significance of these opportunities, and probably reduced them in absolute numbers. For most people in Jauca I, "work" meant work in the cane.

Birth records from 1931 to 1933 (1931 is the first year with usable data) list the occupations of 33 fathers resident in Jauca I. They are: 1 listero (a low level management position for Aguirre, involving book keeping and task assignment), 1 merchant, 1 fisherman, 1 man listed as self-employed, and 29 agricultural laborers. A 50% sample of birth records from 1940 shows, of 18 fathers: 1 driver, 1 listero, 1 mayordomo, and 15 agricultural laborers.

Jauca I was decidedly more occupationally specialized in field labor than Santa Isabel as a whole, because of the non-

field employment both in and out of the sugar industry available in the pueblo and in Descalabrado, where Central Cortada was. The sample for 1940 for all of Santa Isabel provides 182 fathers with listed occupations (no mothers are listed as employed): 38 were not involved directly in sugar production, 13 were in the sugar industry but not as field laborers, and 131, or 71%, were agricultural laborers. 63% of all non-field laborers were in the town or Descalabrado, while those two settlements accounted for only 42% of the total number of births.

The birth records provide a skewed sample, overrepresenting men in their 20s and 30s, and that may distort the job picture, overrepresenting the relatively unskilled field labor. Another data source, the U.S. census taken in 1939, lists 1,116 agregados (landless field laborers) for Santa Isabel. There are some problems in interpreting that figure, but it suggests that for a total municipal population of just over 11,000, 70% should be taken as the upper limit of agricultural laborers in the adult male population, and the actual percentage may have been considerably lower.

A variety of tasks existed in cane work, such as tending the oxen that pulled the cane carts, irrigation ditch work, cutting cane, distributing fertilizer, loading cane into railroad cars, etc. Some work was available nearly year-round; other work only during specific seasons. Some jobs needed large numbers of workers; others only a few. The general pattern for a local

resident was to have two or three specialities in relatively stable types of work, and to be shifted around to wherever needed during the peak periods of the harvest (see Mintz 1974). I suspect that it was this pattern of regularly shifting laborers that led to two trends emphasized by Mintz (1974: 173-175): the simplification of tasks (although informants clearly can appreciate skill differences in the most "unskilled" of work), and the elimination of both independent labor contractors and the gradual restriction of the independent decision-making power of the mayordomos (see Gayer et al. 1938: 225). By the late 1940s, the workers were shifted around according to orders passed down from a central administration.

Part of this rationalization of production, and part also of the trend towards labor replacement, was the mechanization of several tasks. Around 1927, the old practice of digging irrigation ditches by oxen had been supplanted by a new system reliant on human labor. (The oxen required year round tending, and valuable land for grazing). In the later 1930s, the ditch diggers work was cut back by the new use of digging machines. This cut down labor requirements in the one area that stood out as requiring skill and training (Mintz 1974: 131-135, 173). One informant recalled that under the new system, one man could do the work that formerly had employed 7 to 11 men. Several informants emphasized that the new system of irrigation delivered less water to the cane, and so it grew less and produced less sugar. But that may not have bothered Aguirre

after 1935, operating as it was under an enforced production cutback. Another important labor replacing innovation was the use of winches to load railroad cars with cane. That was initiated in the area around 1929 (Mintz 1974: 132).

Despite these efforts at labor replacement, older informants recall that through the 1920s and 1930s, there was plenty of work for all during the harvest, and usually enough work to scrape by for most people during most of the dead time. They say that during the worst of the dead time, the two months before the new harvest, some families did experience hunger for lack of sufficient income. Mintz (1974: 137) contains an episode indicating a scarcity of work at the beginning of one harvest sometime in the late 1920s or early 1930s.

Pay scales in Jauca do not seem to have dropped as they did elsewhere. Figures presented in Mintz (1974: 54, 70, 134, 145) show wages in the \$.80 to \$1 per day range from 1922 to 1932 at least. Working for piece rates, some individuals in some tasks could make \$18 or even \$25 per week, although probably few reached those figures. The stability of pay rates and the relative stability of work available was probably a consequence of the expansion of cane production around Jauca. Non-jauqueños say that the barrio had a reputation for prosperity because of all the work available, and older Jauca residents agree that for most of the year, they had "enough" (bastante). But even in Jauca, when the dead time was at its deadeast in November and December, when wages fell to \$.65 per day for the

two or three days per week one could get work, simply keeping alive became a desperate struggle.

Jauca's relatively favorable labor situation attracted workers from elsewhere on the coast and, in greater numbers, from the mountains to its north. The pressure from the high country was great in many sugar areas because of the havoc in subsistence and coffee cultivation caused by the hurricanes, although as we saw in the previous chapter, the pattern of migration from the highlands dates to the first decade of U.S. rule. Many highland workers retained their mountain homes, and came to Jauca just for the harvest season. For as long as informants could remember, people had been coming down from the hills--usually having been recruited by independent labor contractors--to work for five and a half days in the fields. They slept in barracks on the colonias, and returned to the mountains on weekends. Others remained in the barracks for the entire harvest period. Later, probably around the late 1930s, although informants were not clear on the date, some workers were picked up and returned to their homes each day by Aguirre trucks. Even then, other workers continued to live in the barracks.

Permanent migration from the mountains to the sugar coasts was another long established pattern. In the barrio of Jauca I, Aguirre's monopolization of land, and consequently of house sites, allowed them to control new permanent migration. Apparently Aguirre did not want new migrants, for U.S. census

data indicates the population of Jauca I grew by only 10% between 1920 and 1940, while the population for the municipality as a whole grew by 58%. Such an attitude would be understandable. Aguirre had all the workers it needed. More resident laborers would only be a nuisance.¹ Moreover, the seasonal tides of temporary workers were an impediment to strong union organization, and a stimulus for local workers to accept piece rate standards (as many of the highland people were interested in maximizing cash income over a brief period) (Mintz 1956: 358).

Aguirre's manipulation of the labor force via its control over house sites was not unusual. The coercion of workers by restricting their access to a place to live was a well established pattern throughout the island (Clark et al. 1930: 14-15). Taso Zayas provides a case illustration, with Pastor Diaz's arbitrary expropriation of the cane worker's house site (Mintz 1974: 123). Informants told me how Aguirre's watchmen (jurados) in the 1930s, would burn any shack thrown up on the scrub land of the beach. They recall many instances of eviction or threat of eviction from Aguirre owned housing on the colonias. This could be as penalty for political opposition, and was certain to result from any physical retaliation against Aguirre personnel, regardless of the often substantial provocation. Expulsions were common enough to

1. As Clark et al. (1930: 36) note: "It is becoming increasingly difficult for the jibaro to find a place to live. He is not wanted unless absolutely needed".

confer a name for the period of the 1930s, referred to as "la mudanza". The threat of being left homeless, literally placed on the road with one's family and few belongings, often blacklisted and so unable to obtain any work locally (Mintz 1974: 147-149), was an effective means of controlling workers. But eviction and blacklisting were not the only weapons in Aguirre's arsenal.

Informants recalled how the foremen might withhold work for a week or so from a man who refused to work a day because of illness. Workers' reliance on credit from the company store put them into a situation approaching debt peonage; and the practice of paying workers in tokens, to be redeemed for cash after the store tabs were deducted, meant that some workers received very little cash, and that of course meant that they could not take their trade elsewhere (Mintz 1956: 375 ff., 393; 1974: 142-143). Company representatives (Smith and Regua 1939: 85) claimed that workers were not actually required to buy from the company store, and some informants agree. Other informants claim that the store manager and listero cooperated to withhold work from those who bought at non-company stores. Perhaps this was a matter of individual corruption, rather than Aguirre policy.

Although not entirely clear, it appears to have been Aguirre's policy to eliminate local subsistence production opportunities, as it definitely was for some colonos in the 1920s and 1930s. Taso Zayas relates how Pastor Díaz tried to

have him thrown in jail for, Díaz alleged, taking coconuts from the beach (Mintz 1974: 125). An informant told me of a similar action by Diaz when the informant's father had collected land crabs, which then existed in great abundance, from vacant fields belonging to the colono. Aguirre Corporation may not have stooped to this level of pettiness, but it did, as already described, eliminate small subsistence farms and the possibility of grazing cattle on open land. That this was more than a concern with efficient land utilization is suggested by Aguirre's local watchmen killing any goats they found loose in the fields, rather than returning them to their owners; and the refusal to allow garden plots on the local colonias, even where they did not compete with the cane.

In sum, the free market may have delivered workers to the corporations and other growers, but employers were not content with market forces to regulate their labor force. They used a variety of non-market mechanisms to, as far as was possible, reduce workers to a condition of utter dependency and docile subservience. In regard to labor as in regard to mills and cane lands, Aguirre wanted more than freedom to operate. It wanted control.

Social Patterns and Job Selection.

Jauqueños response to the structure of job opportunities was conditioned by and in turn affected the structure of local social relations. While most local people worked in the cane, there were different kinds of cane work. What kind of person

took what kind of job? Exploring that and related questions will rely on data from the late 1920s and 1930s, as earlier information and recollections are too incomplete.

There seems to have been no uniform scale of preference for one type of work over another. Different work combined different, non-comparable qualities, including the physical conditions of work, its seasonality, its pay, and the potential of injury on the job. Irrigation ditch digging, for instance, was relatively skilled, stable, and well-paying work, but it regularly led to early physical incapacitation (Mintz 1974: 140). The railroad work that Taso Zayas eventually obtained was much sought after because it provided year round employment, but in wages it could not match what a skilled cane cutter could make at piece rates during the harvest (Mintz 1974: 133, 202). Nevertheless, one former railroad worker told me that he knew only one man who gave up that security for temporarily higher wages. A man who chose temporarily higher wages would find himself in need for greater parts of the year, and also unable to provide for others in need in the dead time. Probably, stable work would be the choice of most settled local men. But an individual without extensive or serious local responsibilities, such as an unmarried young man, or more importantly, the seasonal migrants from the mountains (Mintz 1956: 358), might go for the highest wages available. These ambivalent attitudes are reflected in seemingly contradictory estimations of cane cutting work. Several informants told me,

with what seemed to be pride, that few cane cutters (picadores) lived in the area, that most came in from elsewhere during the harvest, especially from the highlands (see Mintz 1979: 178). Yet one man, in an opinion echoed by others, said that cane cutters were "like an elite" because of the money they made.

For those who accumulated or inherited a little capital, fishing could provide an alternative to cane work that was not present in nearby "landlocked" barrios. The main hurdle in becoming a fisherman was the initial investment needed to get a boat and the necessary equipment (see Mintz 1956: 362). But individual personality factors also entered in, especially for those who went along to work with the boat owners. Fishing was a risky profession, in terms of danger at sea, simple bad luck, and occasional uncertainties in disposing of the catch. Fittingly, informants, including fisherman, recall them as a slightly roguish lot in the main.

Formal education was not a significant factor in obtaining local work. Most jauqueños did not progress beyond the second or third grade, but one individual who accomplished the rare feat of obtaining a high school degree in the 1930s still found no work available but the cane. A different type of education, however, was very important. Familiarity with a particular kind of work gave one a big advantage when it came to hiring. Individuals often began learning a task while a child, going along with their fathers to the fields, or bringing lunches and otherwise helping out a work crew (e.g. Mintz 1974: 68-69).

Age and sex were other relevant criteria in the job market. After the unions and federal regulations put restrictions on child labor in the mid 1930s, males under 16 years old were more limited in the work they could obtain. Previously, many jobs had been available, although at less than adult's pay even if for identical work. After the new regulations, some youths continued to work surreptitiously, or doing tasks not covered by the regulations.

Opportunities for women to work had been fairly restricted locally after the shutting down of the old hacienda grinding operations. The mainstays of female employment in Puerto Rico in the 1920s and 1930s were needlework, tobacco processing, and domestic work (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1980), and these were all limited in availability in Santa Isabel. A few women established small businesses of selling lottery tickets, or bringing hot meals to men in the fields. Taso Zayas' wife Elí Villaronga was one of these industrious women. But this kind of opportunity was limited, and informants agree that an abandoned wife or widow often had no alternative to a few low paying, heavy, health destroying tasks in the field, such as laying down pesticide. On top of that, it appears to have been a regular pattern for field foremen to demand sex from these women. A stigma of sexual immorality is still perceived, at least by some, as tainting women field workers. None of this specifically contradicts statements by Mintz (1956: 371, 379) on the economic status of women, but the over-all impression of

independence conveyed by those passages seems to me to have applied only to a few individual women.

Political affiliation affected job opportunities, especially in the blacklisting of individuals with known Socialist leanings (e.g. Mintz 1974: 147-149). Informants recall that pressure to step into line politically increased before elections, but fell off afterwards. Another very important factor in getting work was personal contacts. Often, a friend, kinsmen, or compadre opened the first door to a new type of work, a pattern repeatedly demonstrated in individual employment histories I collected. A good relationship with one's supervisor on the job was also essential, especially when it came time for the supervisors to dole out the limited work available during dead time (e.g. Mintz 1974: 70, 134). A special type of contact was needed for serious social mobility, to attain the rank of listero or higher. That, and the possibility of work in small commercial enterprises, will be discussed below.

Most people in Jauca I in the 1930s occupied an essentially similar place in Puerto Rico's structure of production. Families survived by work in the cane. But within the population, there was considerable variation, that affected the type of work held at that time, and would partially determine the varying impact on families and individuals of later structural economic change. The following sections describe how this variation, along with the different circumstances

associated with different types of work and other factors, affected the over all organization of langueneños as a social group.

Ties and Divisions in Local Society.

One divisive issue was piece work. By the late 1920s at least, most field tasks had both a regular day rate, and a sometimes optional piece rate. Piece work was popular. Several reliable informants told me that a skilled and industrious piece-worker could sometimes quit work after half a day with sufficient pay. Piece rate earnings could go as high as four times the regular day rates (Mintz 1974: 70, 134). (Earnings at piece rates were often boosted by bringing one's children along as assistants). But informants also recalled the regular abuse of piece work by employers (a common pattern--see Gayer et al. 1938: 225-226). Locally, informants recalled the worst abuses as occurring when someone was learning a new type of work; but even established workers could sometimes suffer under mandatory piece rate payments (e.g. Mintz 1974: 137, 186).

The most general problem with piece rate, from a labor point of view, is that it tends to lower the average compensation per unit of work. A more salient problem for Puerto Rico in the midst of the Depression was that it reduced the number of people needed to do a given amount of work. Union struggles of the early to mid 1930s were over labor cutbacks as much as wages, and elimination of piece work, along with child labor,

were central issues. Jauca I, I have suggested, was not feeling the scarcity of work as intensely as other areas, and today informants are uncertain as to why piece work was such an issue back then. They recall disagreements among local workers, some for piece rates and some against. And they recall that the union was strongly against this type of payment, although they more often cite the occasional abuses of piece work than the scarcity of employment as the reason for this opposition. Significantly, the only individual who immediately noted and then emphasized the concern with creating more jobs in the struggle over piece rates was a retired mayordomo, who in the 1930s worked in several areas outside of Jauca but under Aguirre control. It seems then, that the attitude toward piece work separated jauqueños from workers in other sugar areas as much as it created internal divisions, as may be inferred from Mintz's (1956: 357) comments on an inverse relationship between the strength of union locals and the prevalence of piece work in the 1940s.

A more serious division of the labor force within Jauca I resulted from strikebreaking. Taso Zayas's discussion of strikebreakers (Mintz 1974: 142) shows both the compelling need that could force a man to return to work and subvert a strike, and the developed appreciation of the need for solidarity in staying out of work. This attitude of solidarity appears to have been an effective form of social control, for Aguirre's method of dealing with strikes typically involved trucking in

workers from elsewhere and then locking the entrance gates to the colonias, thus isolating the imported scabs and the regularly resident workforce from contact with their workmates outside. People residing inside Destino and other company settlements were less able to resist pressure to work, as it was usually accompanied by the threat of eviction and/or suspension of credit at the company store. Here is where non-wage forms of control were especially important, for with the colonia residents and the trucked in workers, Aguirre could continue a harvest. Under these circumstances, workers outside the colonias sometimes responded with violence, including the torching of cane fields. One woman who lived in Destino recalled that people in the colonia sometimes refused to work despite company pressures, or even wander away from their houses, for fear of being attacked by men with clubs hiding in the cane. She claims not to have known where these men came from, i.e. whether they lived in the area or not. She expressed no resentment about their actions, explaining to me that what they did was for the good of all the workers.

Another factor that can divide a local population is the possibility of individual social mobility. In Jauca, this possibility was very restricted. Although there was no one scale of job desirability, some jobs, such as working for the railroad, were sought by many more people than could be accommodated at that work. Personal contacts were critical to landing a job like that. But even this type of work did not

fundamentally alter one's position in the community. A railroad worker still had not joined the ranks of management, nor could he enjoy a living standard markedly above the local norm. Moreover, the rationalization of field production had eliminated many of even marginally superior types of work, as already described for the case of irrigation ditch digging.

The main chance for mobility most commonly cited by older informants was small store ownership, often set up with the winnings of the local lottery. Informants can name a few locally successful individuals today whose rise began when they or their fathers' began a small store on lottery winnings. From Mintz (1956: 392) and informants' statements, it seems stores and other small commercial enterprises were becoming less viable as Aguirre's local control increased. As diets shifted to rely heavily on imports (rice, beans, dried codfish, etc.) (Mintz 1956: 401), production and marketing of local crops fell off. (One informant recalled that men selling vegetables once walked down from Coamo, but that none were seen after the mid 1920s). And regardless of any coercive techniques used to make workers shop at company stores, the "tiendas americanas" are uniformly recalled as selling goods at prices below those of independent stores. Undoubtedly that was possible because of differences in sales volumes, but may also have been related to the close relationships that developed between the U.S. sugar corporations and the shipping lines that served the island (see Clark et al. 1930: 436, 444). At any

rate, even a reasonably successful new store operator had to work hard to maintain the good will of his clientele, and for the first years of operation would often net no more than a cane worker (Mintz 1974: 371). The transition to a qualitatively more affluent life style would take years, if it came at all. In the meantime, the fate of his enterprise would follow closely the economic ups and downs of the sugar workers it served.

A major avenue of advancement was a clearly defined sequence of jobs within the Aguirre management. A man who reached the top rung of mayordomo primero typically progressed through each of these lower steps. But this does not imply any local rags to riches stores. Every mayordomo about whom I could collect personal information was himself the son of a mayordomo, or raised by other individuals of high socioeconomic status. Informants agree that without this social edge, the most a worker could aspire to was the position of capataz, usually the subforeman of a small work crew. This was doing very well by local standards, and the union considered capataces to be part of management. But it was the limit.

Nothing that I know of suggests that Aguirre had deliberately put a cap on workers' advancement, and I do not know why they should want to. The limit of mobility seems explainable, rather, as a result of the typical local pattern of helping those people close to you. Within the social circle of the administrators, favoritism would be shown to individuals

with connections. Policy or not, the limit had the effect of retaining ambitious men within the ranks of labor; and, it seems, of aggravating the horizontal cleavage of local society. Of the local union leaders about whom I could collect personal information, a majority were men who had hit the mobility barrier, including a capataz and a listero (although neither held those posts while active in the union). Other local union leaders, however, reportedly were field laborers.

Spatial arrangements influenced local social patterns. As described above, the expansion of cane acreage led to a greater nucleation of population. Within each crowded nucleus, daily interaction was of course intense. Separate nuclei were linked by the daily interactions of men in the fields. Men from Polbado Jauca worked with men from Destino, Boca Chica, Texidor, and elsewhere, especially a smaller settlement to the northeast called Cayures, (now practically disappeared). People remember these five centers as forming a community, with even nearby Colonia Alomar separated from them by work assignments and social interaction. Within this community, informants told me, everyone knew each other equally well-- there was no sense of difference in regarding individuals from any of them. This remembrance appears to be somewhat exaggerated, however, for when one informant from Poblado Jauca who had stressed this unity was asked on another occasion about a list of names of men resident in Jauca I in 1932, he could not remember several individuals who he said "must have been in

Destino".

One native of Jauca recalls that when he was a child, ca. 1915, there were only 15 or 20 boys about his age in the whole community. The people who grew up together often kept up strong ties as adults, and even today form a kind of social core for the community. But even in the 1930s, most adults were not born and raised in Jauca I. Of 24 Jauca I parents whose municipalities of birth are listed in Santa Isabel birth records, only 11 were born in Santa Isabel. Presumably, some of those were born in barrios other than Jauca I.1

Temporary workers in the colonias may have been resented for their disruptive effect on local labor solidarity, but permanent migrants to Jauca I eventually became accepted members of the community, even the somewhat different mountain people (Mintz 1956: 357-358). Fitting in, being accepted, was an important goal for newcomers because, as an informant related, newcomers to the barrio could not get credit at local stores until the owners decided they were stable and reliable.

An important result of the in-migration of others and the out-migration of jauquenos--impossible to quantify but by all

1. The others came from the following municipalities: 3 from Juana Diaz, 4 from Coamo, 1 from Salinas, 5 from Villalba, 2 from Orocovis, and 1 from Yauco. For all of Santa Isabel, of a total of 296 parents, the municipalities of birth were: 42 from Santa Isabel, 67 from Juana Diaz (these were concentrated in Descalabrado), 52 from Coamo, 41 from Villalba, 7 from Barranquitas, 6 each from Ponce and Salinas, 3 each from Orocovis and Yauco, 2 each from Aibonito and Adjuntas, and 1 each from Lares, Cayey, Utuado, Cidras, Arroyo, Rincon, Caguas, San Juan, Ciales, Guayama, Jayuya, Santurce, Peñuelas, and Mayaguez.

accounts considerable--was that local people were exposed to and often linked in active social ties to people elsewhere along the sugar coast, and in the mountains (e.g. Mintz 1974: 55-57, 143, 154, 159, 176). While it is most difficult to establish this type of thing, from many conversations it seems that jauqueños self-identification with the poor of Puerto Rico dates from at least this period. A common self-reference of older people today is "we, the poor" ("nosotros, los pobres"). While identification with other sugar workers was so obvious a thing to do that it needs no explanation, the rural workers of the mountains were distinct in so many ways from the sugar workers that in the absence of strong social ties between the two populations, it is questionable if a sense of common identity would have developed.

The distinction between recently arrived highlanders and coast dwellers was one of the social divisions of Jauca I discussed for the 1898-1920 period. Other older distinctions also faded in significance by the 1930s, due largely to the increasing dominance of Aguirre. Any division based on the coexistence of more traditional and more advanced production regimes was eliminated as Aguirre took virtually complete control of production. Also, the comparatively high social and economic status of Poblado residence over the colonias was diminished as Aguirre's leveling of employment situations progressed. For instance, all of the local ditch diggers listed in Mintz (1974: 134), according to informants lived

either in Poblado Jauca, or in one case, in a house set off from any settlement. Irrigation ditch digging had been the most highly skilled cane work job, and none of its practitioners lived on the colonia. But as described above, the mechanization nearly eliminated this type of work.

Nevertheless, some social-residential distinctions remained. Informants recall that those who lived in Poblado Jauca in the 1930s were still regarded as better off than those living in the colonias. The former were called the "independents" (see Mintz 1974: 169), and the latter were sometimes called "slaves". Within Destino, and probably within other colonias as well, other distinctions were present. One informant recalled a hierarchy of residence. Families with permanent residence in one of the 40 wooden houses were at the top; those in the wooden barracks or "cuartel", including bachelors and some families recently arrived in Jauca I, were lower; and at the bottom were people living in the old stone slave barracks, which included among others some alcoholics and mentally deficient individuals. The stone barracks was called the "zafacon", and anglicism based on "safety can", a trash receptacle. There does not appear to have been any single criteria for ranking the Poblado and the residences within Destino, but rather a combination of living standards, political freedom, the likelihood of being used as a strikebreaker, and general conformity to local norms of acceptable adult behavior.

Significantly, other informants denied any hierarchy within the Destino residences, and seemed unhappy talking about the different situations of Poblado Jauca and Destino. They stressed that everyone was the same, equal, and united (unida).

A similar reaction and denial of differences was encountered in questioning older informants about the local meaning of color or "race". Racial attitudes are a complicated issue in Puerto Rico. Recently, the old view of Puerto Rico as a nation without a "race problem" has been challenged (Gonzalez 1981). I found present day racial views difficult to fathom, and projections back in time should be made with great caution. But from Mintz (1956: 409 ff.; 1974: 95) and my own observations, a few characteristics seem clear: although racial features were and are noted in interpersonal contacts, and often commented on, there is at the same time a strong commitment to the ideal of equality, and race was and is not a major factor dividing local society, up to and including marriage patterns. I believe that this commitment to equality, which will be discussed again later, explains the denial by some of status differences associated with residence.

One factor contributing to a sense of solidarity among local people was their awareness of sharing a distinctive life style, that set them apart from other social groups of Puerto Rico (Mintz 1974: 172). Mintz (1956: 382 ff., 399 ff.) describes that subculture as it existed in the mid 1940s. Checking that description with older informants suggests that it could be

applied without major modification to local life at least back to the early 1930s. Only those aspects of the subculture that directly related to the unity of division of local people will be discussed here.

In the 1930s, the local subculture still retained elements of ritual that reinforced the local social cohesion, despite the long-term trend toward a highly secular world view and the decline of many folk traditions stressed by Mintz (1956: 406, 409-412). The rituals were primarily associated with major events in the life cycle. Even today, deaths are often followed by a prolonged type of wake (velorio) that draws in a wide cross section of the community. This tradition was still more significant in the past (see Mintz 1956: 407).¹ Another set of observances of the past have largely faded out of local life--the rituals associated with birth. These may have begun to fade away in the 1930s, as the government then began to impose procedures and standards on midwives (Mintz 1974: 116, 173). They went into sharp decline in the 1940s when home births and midwives were replaced by hospitals and doctors. Some birth customs are mentioned by Mintz (1956: 382), and I hope to describe and discuss others on another occasion. Here it is enough to note that informants often became animated and nostalgic talking about these customs, suggesting that they were strongly charged with meaning.

1. One mark of the significance attached to participation in wakes is a comment frequently heard in praise of a former mayor, that he was always right there to help at a wake.

By far the most significant of customs associated with birth was a form of baptismal rite (see Mintz 1956: 386 ff.). Baptisms typically were performed in the home without a priest, although formal Church baptisms were sometimes performed at a later date. The relationship established by baptism involved the parents and god-parents more than the god-parents and god-children. Parents and god-parents became compadres, or compays in the local dialect. The relationship between compays, then and in some cases still, is referred to as something sacred ("algo salgrado"). It entailed heightened respect and obligations of mutual assistance. Compays would behave in a more restrained manner in each others' presence, and address each other with the formal "usted" instead of "tu", even if, as was often the case, the compays were close relatives.

A compadre relationship could be established in other ways than through baptism. A midwife automatically was a comadre; so was the woman who carried a child to the church door for formal baptism. The Church ritual of confirmation required sponsors, and they became compays of the child's parents. Even without involving a child, individuals could become "voluntary" compadres (de voluntad). Children might "baptize" a doll in imitation of their parents, and sometimes continue to consider themselves compays for life (known as "compays de muneca"). Often the same person would be made a compay in different ways. Most adults in the community would have a substantial network of compays, and this network would overlap and reinforce

networks of neighbors, family, friends, and workmates. Mintz reported that a individual's compadre network could often include 40 people, but my own elicitation of lists of compays suggests that the average compadre network was much smaller. One thing all older informants had in common was their agreement on the most important criterion for choosing a compay: a responsible, reliable personal character.

The same criterion was involved in establishing a durable marriage relationship (see Mintz 1956: 375-376; 1974: 89-92). Physical attraction and pure infatuation played a major, probably dominant role in initiating a courtship.¹ But a young woman's parents would usually keep a strict guard over her, allowing only those suitors who were established as hard workers. One result of this strict gatekeeping was the prevalent pattern of elopement, or "jumping over the fence"--one of a seemingly infinite set of phrases referring to this practice.

Although elopement rarely involved an official church or civil wedding, most parents would acquiesce to the fait accompli once the couple had spent a few nights in one of the man's friend's or relative's home. Under certain circumstances, parents could legally compel a civil wedding,

1. I asked one older informant if, in the old days, a young man would look for a wife who could be counted on to perform household tasks. Laughing, he replied that that was the last thing on a young man's mind, and that if the woman could not even boil water, the man would not find out about it until later.

but the more common pattern was for the man and woman to continue living as husband and wife without any official marriage ties. (During Mintz's fieldwork, 70% of all unions were of this consensual type [1956: 375]).

Consensual unions could easily split apart, but so did official marriages under the trying circumstances. A married couple of whatever arrangement was engaged in a difficult struggle to survive. Conversations with informants suggest that the main requirement for persistence of a union was not the type of marriage tie, or even matters of love and affection, but mutual respect and fulfillment of necessary tasks (see Mintz 1956: 359-360). Perhaps it was the recognition of the fragility of marriage that explains why this life cycle event was so lacking in ritual.

The dominance of instrumental concerns in marriage and the presence of wide networks of social ties and mutual assistance have been documented as responses to many poverty situations (e.g. Eames and Goode 1973; Stack 1974; also see Mintz and Wolf 1950). Social ties can reinforce or cut across major social divisions. In Jauca, and presumably elsewhere in Puerto Rico, workers had been linked to mayordomos and other higher-ups by ties of compadrazgo. In the 1930s, however, compadrazgo became more exclusively a horizontal linkage, unifying members of the rural work force. The mayordomos began to refuse requests to be godparents of workers' children, perhaps related to the mayordomos' gradually diminishing discretionary powers, that

left them less able to act like patrons (Mintz 1956: 389; 1974: 175-176). This two-sided trend meant that the gulf between workers and management grew, just as the work force forged stronger internal bonds.

The Individual and Local Society.

Mintz (1974: 175-176; 1979: 186) stresses that corporate dominance led to a breakdown of the community characteristic of hacienda life, and to the "individualization" of life. He attributes this to the increasing dominance of wage compensation paid to individual workers, so that one's living circumstances depended more directly and exclusively on one's performance on the job. Although it was questioned earlier whether the late hacienda period was quite as communal as Mintz suggests, older informants support the observation that the long term trend was towards an increasing prominence of the individual, and a loosening of the weave of the local community.

This individualization led, as Mintz (1979: 186-187) notes, to the possibility of identification with broader social groupings. But it also led to the potential of conflicts between and among the workers. The basic source of conflict was the condition of desperate poverty. Informants frequently observed that everyone, in the 1930s as now, looked for little ways to improve their condition (mejorarase). One common strategy was to play the lottery in the hope of winning enough to start a small store (see Mintz 1956: 366) or public car

service. A more restricted approach for males was to marry a woman with special economic potential--two incomes being then as now a way of living above the local norm. The differing attitudes toward piece work and other job characteristics, described above, merit a second mention here as self advancement strategies.

The danger of self-interested behavior was that under existing circumstances, it could lead an individual into social relationships with conflicting demands. A worker would try to maintain good relations with all his bosses in order to insure regular work. He would also try to keep up good relations with a store keeper, often also a company employee. At the same time, he would need to maintain a close bond with his peers, who could provide food, shelter, and other vital aid in times of stress. These different loyalties could become contradictory during labor actions. Within the colonias, loyalty to the boss often won out, because of the boss's ability to deprive a worker of his home and store credit. Outside the colonia, loyalty to one's peers had a greater chance.

Apart from its negative sanctions, the corporation offered little incentive for loyalty. With mobility opportunities virtually non-existent, and living conditions awful at best, workers recognized the obvious, that their fate was inexorably joined, and that they had to cooperate to achieve any significant improvement of life (see Mintz 1974: 141-142).

Nevertheless, the conflicting pulls were a source of great interpersonal conflict. One man could name six individuals murdered in Jauca I in the 1930s, and the fights of the time were countless. Local specialists in spiritism remember the decade as a period of strong, malicious sorcery (brujeria).

Open interpersonal conflict was reduced through valorization of the ideal of "respeto". "Respect" is not an adequate translation for this central value. My understanding of it coincides with that of Manners (1956: 144), who says that respeto denotes "the proper behavior and response to others in social situations" (also see Lauria 1964). It is, among other things, a form of etiquette, expressed in perhaps its most developed form in the somewhat distant but very proper ideal behavior between compadres. The formalization of behavior associated with the code of respeto made it possible for a responsible newcomer to quickly fit into the community.

Respeto did not eliminate open conflict entirely. A severe abuse of the code could lead to a violent reaction, but that was itself a part of the system of social control. A man of respect could be counted on to behave responsibly, to avoid trouble, and to assist those he could. But he would also react strongly against anyone who showed him a lack of respect, and this potential for violence undoubtedly acted as a check on

behavior.¹

The past significance of respeto was often illustrated in informants comments about present-day interpersonal conflicts, which many attribute to an over all decline in respeto. The impact of respeto was multiplied by an incredible network of street-life observers and gossip transmitters--still existing today--that made any behavior, respectful or otherwise, quickly know to everyone in the community. Two other values also reduced the potential for internal problems among the workers. One, already mentioned, is the emphasis on the unity of the community, that all are one and equal. The other is a marked reluctance to acknowledge interpersonal conflict, or to minimize it when it is acknowledged. The existence of these two attitudes may be projected back to the 1930s, because of the great frequency with which they surfaced in historical interviews and informal conversations with older informants.

Jaqueños as Part of a Political Force.

The late 1930s saw the culmination of a long, gradual process of homogenization of the people of Jauca. But the people were more than merely similar. They were solidary, bound together with strong social ligatures and an equally strong ideology of hanging together or hanging seperately, even if the coercive measures of Aguirre could sometimes force

1. Other concepts, such as machismo, dignidad, and hombre humilde enter into understanding the personality structure engaged in patterns of interpersonal conflict. I hope to discuss these ideas in another work.

strikebreaking. Moreover, this solidarity transcended the local community, going beyond the web of particularistic social ties as shown by the participation of local people in union and political movements of much broader scope.

Strikes were commonplace in the 1930s. Taso Zayas' narrative provides most of the information that is available on those labor actions. His life shows (Mintz 1974: 123-130, 141-153) the progression from a youth who gets involved in radical politics as a result of a personal grievance, to a more mature individual with a deep commitment to a cause and a program, and then to a somewhat jaded adult who nevertheless keeps the faith, albeit with less enthusiasm. His discussion of strikebreakers (Mintz 1974: 141-142) is particularly instructive.

The major strikes of 1933-34, which bordered on insurrection, were concentrated in the south and southwest of Puerto Rico (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979: 69-70). These were areas of marked U.S. corporate dominance, and the strikes took on a growing pro-independence sentiment, as shown by the invitation to speak sent by strikers to the fiery Nationalist leader Albizu Campos (see Quintero Rivera 1971: 96-107; 1974b: 212; Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979: 72). Santa Isabel was cited as one of four municipalities whose cane fields were "paralyzed" by wildcat strikes over wage scales in early 1934 (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979: 69). (Santa Isabel was also cited as in the lead of a bakers' strike in 1934 [Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979:

80)).

The Socialist Party won the municipal elections in Santa Isabel in 1928 and 1932, but lost to Liberals in 1936 and 1940. It will be shown below that the Socialists had a problem retaining the loyalty of the workers, but the fall off in Santa Isabel came earlier and harder than for the island in general. The reasons for that are not entirely clear. Political activity among workers was closely linked to their union activity, and by the early 1940s Santa Isabel had clearly fallen out of the vanguard of union action. The social divisions and other factors contributing to a weaker union will be discussed in Chapter 5, although many of them clearly had roots at least as deep as the mid 1930s. A more direct and immediate set of problems for the Socialist Party were the consequences of its early victories. Taso Zayas' disillusionment at not receiving a patronage job he expected--and deserved by local norms--illustrates what was probably a common problem (Mintz 1974: 151). More generally, the disenchantment that grew once the Socialists gained political power at the insular level must have been keenly felt in areas like Jauca I, that were in the center of the workers' fight.

To ask why union and political activity wavered is to get ahead of things. More fundamental questions, certainly for the understanding of social class, include why, in the first place, did the similarity of existence lead to solidarity in action at all? Why did the sense of solidarity transcend the local

community and its dense networks of ties, to link up with other similar communities made up of total strangers? Why did the solidarity not extend to still other communities, whose members seem to have been similar in certain ways to the sugar workers of the coast? Three considerations are relevant to all these questions. While in practice they operated together, they can be separated here for analysis. They are: social distinctiveness, similarity of basic interests, and commonality of enemies.

Within the Jauca I community, the distinctiveness of the sugar workers was emphasized by the clear gulf separating them from the managerial hierarchy. A gap of non-relations, in compadrazgo and undoubtedly a variety of associational patterns, was reinforced by the clear dividing line or barrier existing in regard to job advancement possibilities. Not only was the work force instantly identifiable and bounded, but their circumstances clearly favored a group strategy of advancement.

In other situations elsewhere in Puerto Rico, such an unambiguous dividing line was not always present, but there still existed a basic bottom level in the socioeconomic scale, and advancement upwards was extremely difficult for its members. A worker looking beyond local borders would notice this essentially similar position. He would have no way of avoiding the recognition in regard to other sugar workers or new or potential recruits to those ranks, as those people could

be brought in as strikebreakers. Beyond the limits of sugar production, there was the connection demonstrated by lateral mobility in work (see Eames and Goode 1973). A cane worker, a coffee picker, an unemployed urbanite--these and many other economic positions could be occupied by virtually any adult male living in the area where the position existed. The same could be said for the more restricted work possibilities existing for women. This essential similarity in the island's occupational scale was reemphasized with every individual or group migration in Puerto Rico.

The other two factors--common interests and common enemies--are two sides of one coin. The immediate objectives of sugar workers, as inferred from their demands in the early 1930s (Gayer et al. 1938: 221-228), were a higher wage (although one still below estimated minimal needs [see Minimum Wage Board 1942: 126, 183]), a tolerable working day, and restrictions on child labor and piece work, which as we have seen were part of the effort to secure enough work for adults who needed a job. These demands represent little beyond a claim to the right to physical survival. In fiercely struggling just to survive, the sugar workers were in the same condition as the vast majority of Puerto Ricans in the terrible 1930s. But their specific goals depended on their specific circumstances, and what or whom they had to confront in striving for these goals depended in part on the arrangement of other social groups who had conflicting or complementary interests. A strategy for

advancing a group's interests, if it was to have any hope of success, had to consider the likely moves of potential friends and enemies.

Differences in interests, allies, and enemies increase in magnitude as one includes higher order categories of poor. Even within Jauca I, distinctions such as residence on or off the colonia have been described. Moving to the level of the municipio, we find distinctions based on residence in a town. For instance, by 1940 one Juan Monseratte had established himself as an important landlord, with 23 houses spread over 17 small landholdings (Registro de Tasación 1940-41). Residents in his houses may have felt more akin to the growing number of urban renters (see Clark et al. 1930: 40-43) than to the rural work force. Another distinction on the level of the municipio arises from the presence of a major mill in Descalabrado, for mill workers had their own axes to grind (see Gayer et al. 1938: 221-229; Murphy 1983). Going to the level of all sugar workers regardless of location raises the important distinction of being employed by a huge North American corporation, or by a resident small grower, and everything in between. At the level of all agricultural workers, disregarding the crop, there is the distinction of peasant from proletarian (see Mintz 1979; Wolf 1981), and important differences in social arrangements related to the production of the different crops (see Clark et al. 1930: 13-39; Steward et al. 1956).

At this level, major political divergences are plain. The

strength of the Socialist Party, at least in 1920, was concentrated in the sugar cane growing municipalities, and especially in those with larger, more concentrated landholdings (Quintero Rivera 1978: 121). In areas with less cane, and where North American capital penetration was slight, the Socialist Party was far less consequential (see Wolf 1956: 246). After a tour of the island in 1929, Clark et al. (1930: 37) noted that although the mountain people seemed to be literally starving to death, that "there is a degree of submissiveness to misfortune and a lack of class feeling that to an outside observer is difficult to understand". As long as the mountain haciendas had remained viable, the hacendado's control over his laborers remained more or less intact. The degree of their hegemony was such that even after the devastating blows of the market crash and hurricanes, and even while the poor of the mountains had begun to flood into the cities (see Tugwell 1977: 55), hacendados were still able to maintain traditional patron-client relationships, although diminishing in strength and significance, into the late 1930s (González Díaz 1980a: 157; Wolf 1956: 245).

To return to the discussion of expanding levels of inclusiveness, and to move beyond the agricultural sector to consider all industrial workers, brings in such a diversity of conditions and interests that the most salient unifying feature that can be cited is common membership within the FLT and support for the Socialist Party, which were together the only

show in town. To move to the final and most inclusive category, all of the poor, including those with no regular work, goes beyond even the widely cast net of the FLT and PS, as neither organization paid special attention to the unemployed (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 202).

Simply stating that differences existed at various levels as I have done here, of course does not explain the differences. It would be far beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to attempt even a simple description of the on-the-ground material interests of all the major divisions of the poor. It is both more relevant and more feasible to consider them from the perspective of their role as insular political entities. From that perspective, the sugar workers as a whole formed the broadest active grouping of the island's poor, and were allied with numerous smaller industrial and artisanal groupings with the FLT and Socialist Party. After 1940, however, this alliance would be brought into a much broader front including both the mountain workers and the unemployed. That change would be less a result of major changes in the basic interests of any of the groups, as a consequence of a restructuring of other insular political forces and conflicts. The new political structure that emerged would have a great impact on life in Jauca I in the 1940s and after, and to understand that structure, the discussion will now turn to political events on the insular level.

Puerto Rican Politics II: 1929-1940

The last discussion of island politics left off around 1928, with the second and final victory of the Alliance of Unionists and Republicans. (La Alianza, if not overtly biased in favor of the U.S. corporations, was at least neutral in regard to their expansion.) After the election of 1928, the victors began to fight among themselves over leadership, patronage, and political status issues. La Alianza was practically dead in 1929, although the official disbanding would take a little longer. A government shuffle put an ad hoc good-government group in power, while Barcelo and Tous Soto were forced from party leadership.¹ For the 1932 elections, the two wings of the Republican Party came back together, and along with some former members of the old Unionists formed the Unionist Republican Party. (One of the Republican wings had been in La Alianza with the Unionists; the other in a tacit alliance with the Socialists). The Unionist Republicans then entered into a formal pact with the Socialists, to form La Coalición. The remainder of the old Unionists, once again under the leadership of Barcelo, reincorporated as the Liberal Party. In 1932, La Coalición faced off against the Liberals, and the coalition won (Mathews 1960: 20-28; Ramos de Santiago: 88-92). This was the

¹ Tous Soto left politics for good. He had been a clear representative of U.S. sugar corporation interests, and his disappearance from local politics makes it more difficult to understand the linkages between those corporations and various political parties and positions. The exact connections, as well as the corporations' ties to federal agencies, is an area in need of research.

first electoral defeat for the party representing hacendado interests since 1904 (Quintero Rivera 1978: 125). Although the situation is not entirely clear (see previous footnote), it seems that the U.S. corporations had no reason to fear a victory by either side. Neither the Liberals nor the Socialists, and certainly not the Republicans, were about to threaten the corporations, which would continue to operate without any constraint other than those of the market for two more years. What finally undermined their inviolability was a change in U.S. colonial policy, played out within the tangled web of island socioeconomic cleavages and political alignments. A description of those cleavages and alignments is the next topic in this essay.

The party of most obvious concern for this study is the Socialist Party. In 1932, the workers' party would seem to have had reason for celebration. As the political branch of the FLT, it had the support of a diverse but broad and militant spectrum of workers. As a partner in La Coalición, it had taken control of the island legislature. But that was to be a hollow victory. At the time of their electoral victory, they had suffered an ideological defeat. Growth of the industrial work force had ceased, as over all sugar employment stagnated and as some manufacturers moved out of Puerto Rico seeking lower wages. Several FLT strikes had failed. The radical labor movement lost its sense of historical invincibility (Quintero Rivera 1981: 41-43). Women's unions suffered

especially, as needlework and tobacco manufactures declined (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1980). The hacendados still exercised control over many rural workers and peasants in the highlands (above), and the ranks of the unemployed swelled explosively. Unable to adjust to this growing reserve army of the unemployed, the FLT did not try to organize them, leaving them without significant political representation in the island (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 202). All these factors strengthened the position of the more conservative factions within the Socialist Party, who would be quite willing to compromise with their partners in La Coalición in order to maintain control over the spoils of government.

In playing politics with the Republicans, the Socialist Party was to confirm the fears of more radical skeptics about accommodationism. In compromising, they failed to pass any major legislation demanded by the rank and file, at least not in acceptable form. When workers in the sugar and other industries pushed their own demands in often violent strikes in 1933 and 1934, the Socialist Party leadership and the FLT leadership (the two were interchangeable) seemed worse than irrelevant--it seemed to side with management. In the interests of "industrial peace", Socialist government ministers assumed the authority to speak for the workers, and then proceeded to negotiate contracts that were perceived as favorable to management. They ordered strikers back to work, and even kept quiet when the police were used to "restore

order". Workers complained about the newcomer lawyers who had flooded the party hierarchy, and found that their elected political representatives were at times hand in hand with the corporations (as is specifically noted in regard to one strike against South Porto Rico Sugar [Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979: 128]). When workers protested, the Party cracked down hard. Individual dissidents were purged from union ranks, unions not affiliated with the FLT were suppressed, and a left faction within the FLT, Afirmación Socialista, was expelled in 1934. Afirmación Socialista had taken a radical position with pro-independence leanings. The Socialist Party stuck with its pro-statehood stance, citing the gains made under the U.S. flag, which had been considerable, especially for the union and party hierarchy. Despite all challenges, the Socialist Party remained in control of organized labor until the late 1930s (Quintero Rivera 1971: 95-117; Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979).

The Union Republican Party had a more complicated social base. Its core was the U.S. and local sugar corporations along with other practitioners of more modern agriculture, all of whom suppressed differences between themselves in the face of the twin challenges of the old gentry and the workers. This block included numerous managers and associated personnel of those enterprises. These agro-industrialists were joined by some local leaders of big capital, such as the holder of the electrical power monopoly for the western part of the island (Mathews 1960: 31), by merchants and other groups with direct

linkages to the North American economic penetration, and by a growing number of professionals, especially lawyers, who had an indirect stake in the U.S. presence because they worked in the "americanized" part of the economy, and/or who felt allegiance to the progressive ideals that they believed to be represented by the United States (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 200-201; 1978: 65-67). Idealistic allegiance to the U.S., however, was already becoming difficult to sustain by 1932, given the terrible administrators Washington kept sending to govern the island (Quintero Rivera 1981: 40). The Union Republican Party could agree on a vague pro-U.S. stance, but any more detailed program was prevented by their internal diversity.

Cooperation between them and the Socialists was made possible by the practice of making some third party pay the cost of one or the other's advance. For instance, the two could agree on a weak program to compensate workers for job related accidents by passing most of the costs of the program on to the taxpayers, rather than to industry (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979: 37-40, 91-93, 162). But this kind of solution was less possible in the cane fields and sugar mills, which often led to local political struggles that did not conform to island-level political alignments.

The Liberal Party was the most complicated of the three major parties. Although defeated by the Coalition in 1932, the Liberals captured a plurality of the votes in that election. Its traditional source of strength, as the old Unionist Party,

had been in the highlands, among the hacendados and the rural workers they controlled. As already noted, this hegemony lasted until the late 1930s. A few former hacendados who had converted to industrialized sugar production remained within the Liberal Party, and their presence exerted a pro-U.S. influence (Quintero Rivera 1978: 96). They were joined by many sugar colonos, whose long term dissatisfaction with North American sugar mills did not necessarily mean dissatisfaction with the United States (González Diaz 1980: 51). After the production cutbacks of 1934, however, the colonos became more militant and organized, under the new Asociación de Colonos (Mathews 1960: 184). The colonos were at least as strongly opposed to organized sugar workers as they were to the U.S. corporations, and in the late 1930s they broke ranks with the Liberals over the latter's support of the PRRA's cooperative mill project (Central Lafayette), which the colonos felt was too pro-labor (see below). Finally, the Liberals included a sizable "middle class" group, mostly the offspring of the hacendados and other professionals who were not so closely tied to the U.S. economy, and/or who resented the rampant cultural penetration, or "americanization", of Puerto Rico. This was an especially important group. It was able to forge close ties to all the other divisions within the Liberal Party, and even beyond (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 203; and below).

With all this diversity, the Liberal Party had trouble even agreeing on a status position. Up to 1932, they expressed a

non-specific preference for autonomy within the U.S. system (Quintero Rivera 1978: 96). In that year, they switched to favor independence. This was a response to the general trend of sentiments of the period, and to a relative strengthening of the radical wing after part of the old Unionist Party went with the Republicans (Mathews 1960: 28-29). The Liberals' support for independence would increase in the next few years, in response to repressive federal policies (Mathews 1960: 97; and below). Beyond a status position, the Liberal Party was too internally divided to produce anything that can be called a program. The Liberal Party, like the Socialist and Union Republican parties, seemed to lack a sense of direction, as the old conflicts of the early post-invasion years became moot.

A sense of drift permeated Puerto Rican society. The accumulating effects of the North American cultural penetration (see G. Lewis 1963: 291-317; Méndez 1980), produced a crisis of identity, as expressed by Pedreira (1978) in his famous Insularismo (see also Quintero Rivera 1981: 39). As both partial cause and consequence of this drift, the priority task of political parties was to control patronage (as documented throughout Mathews 1960).¹ Puerto Rico in the 1930's was

1. The obsession with patronage was not simply a result of a scarcity of jobs for the more educated party loyalists, but was in part a consequence of U.S. colonial administration. The Jones Act had made hirings the one area that the Legislature could control. It certainly did not have the power to undertake major political initiatives. Moreover, colonial governors such as Gore had been blatant in using patronage to support their favored groups (Mathews 1960: 62, 66-68, 82-85). Private citizens from North

experiencing a fundamental change in the socioeconomic basis of its political party structure, a basic transformation away from the earlier pattern that had linked one party to one dominant constituency. The decline of hacendado power, the weakening of organized labor's position, and growing divisions in the U.S. political and economic power structure (below) undermined the old foundations of principal parties. New interest groups were emerging, but none large or strong enough to seize political power (González Díaz 1980b: 42, 44, 50; Quintero Rivera 1981: 39). Within this fragmentation and diversification of economic interests, an increasingly important interest was control of government for itself.

The representative of any interest group had to cope with an intricate and shifting structure of forces on the political battlefield. To advance those interests, one had to ally with other groups. For the professional politician, the task no longer was to represent one group as much as to muster sufficient support to win. Holding support of diverse groups typically meant the avoidance of strong programs that might alienate some faction, which could then bolt to the opposition. Slight changes in existing political or economic arrangements could trigger major restructuring of alliances and oppositions. Political leaders had to be light of foot, as exemplified by Barcelo, who shifted positions with bewildering speed (Mathews

America set no better example, as in the veritable feeding frenzy set off among the few local Deomocrats by prospects of jobs under Roosevelt (Mathews 1960: 21-23).

1960: 25-28, 257, 261-262, 292, 309). In this highly fluid situation, insular politics would grow distant from the local materially grounded struggles continuing around the island, and so seem more removed from the needs of the people.

Members of one last political party, the Nationalists, were not concerned with gaining control of the Legislature, but with resisting the North American penetration. The history of the Nationalists shows just how upsetting can be people with a cause, when everyone else is being "practical".

The Nationalists had developed out of the Unionist Party in the early 1920s. Their raison de etre was the growing North American presence, and their solution was immediate independence. They participated in the 1932 elections after complicated legal maneuverings by the three larger parties (Mathews 1960: 35-36), but polled few votes. Thereafter, they renounced electoral politics. The Nationalists identified themselves as "a movement of the intelligentsia" (Mathews 1960: 304). Their association with "high culture" (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 202), expressed in an emphasis on the heritage of Spain, distanced them from the Puerto Rican working population. On the other hand, those workers who had identified U.S. corporations as their main enemy were attracted to the Nationalists strong stand against absentee ownership (Maldonado Denis 1972: 118; Quintero Rivera 1974b: 203). As noted earlier, this led to striking workers inviting the Nationalist leader, Albizu Campos, to address them in 1934. What might

have come of this mutual interest will never be known, for the Nationalists were soon swept up by their direct confrontation with the U.S. federal government. Before describing that confrontation, the next section describes the federal policy applied to Puerto Rico after 1932.

The New Deal in Puerto Rico. The election of Roosevelt in 1932 ushered in the New Deal, which would lead to as dramatic and manifold changes in Puerto Rico as it did on the mainland. But the New Deal was hardly the unambiguous blessing suggested by some (e.g. Ross 1976). One man in a position to know, in fact, characterized its initial application in Puerto Rico as having been "wholly reactionary" (Tugwell 1977: 40). As will be described, the local version of the New Deal was a reactive patchwork of initiatives, conditioned in large part by changes in the U.S. sugar industry, other domestic political concerns, the fear of open revolt in Puerto Rico and elsewhere around the Caribbean, and later, pressing international considerations. The changes in New Deal policy had profound long term effects on Puerto Rican history, and immediate impact on island political and economic processes.

Roosevelt's first appointment for governor was hardly an auspicious beginning. Robert Gore had little to recommend him other than loyalty to the President and the support of a U.S. sugar corporation. His clumsy attempts to americanize Puerto Rico, especially through the educational system, and his open favoritism of the more pro-United States Coalición when

dispensing government jobs, polarized politics and provoked the Liberals to attack (Herring 1973; Mathews 1960: 53-56, 66-68).

A prominent figure in the Liberal offensive was a young Senator, Luis Muñoz Marín. The son of former hacendado spokesman Muñoz Rivera, Muñoz Marín had spent several years in New York literary circles, developing soon to be important contacts. He also had good relations with the Socialist Party, and earned, via his writings, a reputation as an eloquent advocate of independence (Maldonado Denis 1972: 120; Mathews 1960: 29; see also Muñoz Marín 1973). In 1932, he assumed the position of editor of La Democracia, a newspaper founded by his father. From there, he launched a daily (literally) barrage against Gore (Mathews 1960: 29-30, 84-85). In November of 1933, a journalist friend and colleague introduced him to Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, with whom he discussed the situation on the island (Mathews 1960: 104). When Gore caved in to pressure to resign in January of 1934, Muñoz Marín received much of the credit for his fall (Mathews 1960: 114). This was the beginning of an incredible political career.

It was during Gore's administration that the PRERA relief program was initiated. PRERA constituted an important modification of colonial government. With it, federal administration became more than just the governor. A separate administrative apparatus had been added. Gore resisted this seeming diminution of his authority, and he found natural allies in Coalition politicians who resented the fact that many

PRERA jobs had gone to Liberals (Mathews 1960: 127-128).

The economic effects of the two major local New Deal organizations, first PRERA and then PRRA, were described earlier. The Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration was strictly a stopgap relief organization, and its director showed no inclination to push it towards any larger responsibilities (Mathews 1960: 149). Humanitarian concerns may have been the motive behind PRERA's expenditures from 1933 to 1936, especially in regard to Eleanor Roosevelt's role in things (Mathews 1960: 154). Yet the federal government had been adept at ignoring Puerto Rico's misery for a long time (see Tugwell 1977: 68-69), and certainly the aid that did arrive was far less than sufficient for meeting basic human needs. A more pressing concern of Washington policy makers appears to have been the threat of civil disturbances, or as they liked to put it, of "anarchy". They saw imminent starvation, a tumult of militant labor actions, and "anti-American" protests at the University (Mathews 1960: 86-89, 103, 106, 112, 119). While Governor Gore was checking on his ability to call out the army (Mathews 1960: 67), all the major political factions of Puerto Rico were in agreement that some broad government intervention was needed (Mathews 1960: 153-154).

When Gore resigned under fire in January of 1934, a former governor and a representative of U.S. sugar corporations both stressed the need for a militarily oriented replacement. General Winship was Roosevelt's choice (Mathews 1960: 112-113).

With the military contingencies prepared for, the federal government could try to deal with the social and economic bases of all the unrest. These really had to be confronted. The food price increases resulting from price supports for mainland agricultural commodities was one of the major sources of discontent; and it was recognized that the prospective cutback of island sugar production then being planned would also cut down available work, and so increase the misery.

The connection between early efforts at major reform of the island's economy through the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA) and the sugar stabilization program has not been appreciated, but the linkage seems beyond question. In February 1934, the Sugar Act was outlined to the U.S. public, with a major cutback of Puerto Rican production included (Mathews 1960: 143-144). Immediately, one insider wrote: "a completely planned economy for Puerto Rico is expected from the sugar stabilization plan" (Black, quoted in Mathews 1960: 154). In March, one of the Agricultural Adjustment Act team, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford Tugwell, traveled to Puerto Rico. His ostensible purpose was to look into soil and forest conservation matters (Tugwell 1977: 25), but the presence of a New Dealer with such strong views on the need for government regulation and planning (see Padilla 1974)¹ and obvious implications.

1. Tugwell, and his reputation, were described by a sympathetic contemporary as follows:

When you reach Tugwell you come very close to the heart

Within a few days of his arrival, Tugwell and Eleanor Roosevelt, who had arrived in Puerto Rico on the same plane, supposedly by pure coincidence (Mathews 1960: 155), heard University Chancellor Carlos Chardón sketch a radical plan centering on local government expropriation and restructuring of one of the four U.S. corporate operations. Tugwell's appointee as the head of the AAA on the island soon afterwards called on Chardón and a few others to formulate a plan for coping with the coming sugar production adjustment, a plan which in their view involved an ambitious restructuring of the

of the New Deal. He has been howled at as a "Bolshevik", "a radical", a man who would abolish the profit system... There is tremendous irony in all of this, for Tugwell is a genuine conservative who would save the profit system and private ownership of property by adapting them to the technical conditions of the power age... Tugwell saw that the basic cause of the depression was the failure of laissez-faire capitalism to distribute the phenomenal surplus made possible by the technological advance of the post-war decade... Tugwell is a collectivist in the sense that Mr. J.P. Morgan is a collectivist, in that he realizes that technological advance tends toward larger and more elaborately interrelated business units... The only question is whether the profits of collectivism shall flow into the pockets of speculators, bankers and idle rich who live on inherited wealth, or whether they shall be widely enough distributed to enable the private ownership of property and the individualistic basis of capitalism to survive at all. ("Unofficial Observer" 1934: 85-88)

economy (Mathews 1960: 156-160).¹ In late March, Chardón wrote to Tugwell identifying the "ever-absorbing sugar interests" as the basis of the island's problems (quoted in Mathews 1960: 161). A few days later, Tugwell was (quietly) suggesting in Washington that the entire sugar industry be socialized and run "on somewhat the same lines as a collective farm in the U.S.S.R." (quoted in Mathews 1960: 162).

All this was happening behind closed doors. As late as March 1934, island Republicans were endorsing the need for broad federal action (Mathews 1960: 161), even while lobbying vigorously for preferred treatment for their own causes (Silvistrini de Pacheco 1979: 169 n. 37). The sugar corporations had even learned how to live with sugar quotas--they simply refused to accept the colono product, and ground only their own cane (farm by farm allocations not yet having been established) (Mathews 1960: 184). Naturally, this practice led to greater political opposition to the corporations, and that helped push the federal government to more vigorous action. In late July 1934, an executive order transferred responsibility for insular affairs from the War Department, which was sympathetic to the U.S. sugar corporations, to the Interior Department (Hoernel 1977: 281;

1. Mathews (1960: 158) suggests that Tugwell was behind Chardón's original presentation. That may be, or it may be that Tugwell had recognized a kindred spirit, whom he let follow his own course. Chardon could influence policy because his basic views coincided with the interests of his superiors, at least for a time. The same could be said about Tugwell.

Mathews 1960: 172-173). A few days later, a representative of the AAA was dispatched to Puerto Rico with production contracts that apportioned quotas among producers and colonos, thus giving some protection to smaller farmers. The North American corporations now saw the trend of things, and began to apply pressure in Washington (Mathews 1960: 189-190).

The Chardón Plan would be the basis of the PRRA program. It aimed at increasing employment and the opportunities for subsistence agriculture (Mathews 1960: 174), apparently in the intent of reducing the threat of starvation. But the Plan also contained provisions directed at breaking the hold of the absentee landowners, namely the U.S. corporations. The original blueprint was to use the funds collected by the AAA sugar tax, not for conditional payments to the producers, but to finance the projected dismantling of the corporation dominated economy (Mathews 1960: 158, 175). As we will soon see, PRRA actually accomplished far less. Nevertheless, the goal was remarkable in itself. Tugwell's comment about Russian collective farms did not stand alone. The New Deal seemed solidly behind some such action (Mathews 1960: 175-176, 214-215, 230) leading to the singular moment in January 1936, when a U.S. Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) criticized the Socialist dominated legislature for not expropriating the holdings of U.S. corporations (Mathews 1960: 244).

These peculiar positions were the result of a peculiar constellation of forces and personalities in place in 1933 and

a brief period thereafter. Liberals were in power in Washington, and Tugwell, as the Undersecretary of Agriculture, was perhaps the most radical of upper echelon New Dealers (see earlier footnote). Their freedom to act was greater in the early years of the New Deal than ever again. The grotesque situation of Puerto Rico in 1932, where literal starvation coexisted with unparalleled industry profits, called for action, especially with labor and pro-independence agitation on the rise. At the same time, the strength of U.S. sugar corporations in Puerto Rico was at a low ebb. They had lost out in their battle for influence in Washington. They were still perceived as dangerous competitors by the continental sugar interests, whose influence within the AAA was demonstrated by the favorable treatment they were accorded. And they had become a big nuisance for federal officials, since beginning a major propaganda campaign against the discriminatory federal regulations (e.g. Puerto Rico Trade Council 1939; Requa 1948; see also Mathews 1960: 183, 189). The consequence of all these factors was that the early New Deal administration seemed prepared to move against U.S. sugar corporations, just as in an earlier period the colonial government had moved against the creole planters.

Efforts to implement the Chardón Plan ran into obstacles from the first. The plan was ready in June 1934, but little movement was apparent for the rest of that year. The obstacles it faced are described by Mathews (1960: 176 ff.). They

include legal problems, insufficient funding, too many responsibilities, and non-stop political infighting--part of which was a protracted struggle between old and new guards of federal administrators. All these problems continued even after the PRRA was created within the Interior Department by executive order in May 1935 (Mathews 1960: 189 ff.).

One federal action welcomed by progressive forces was the appointment in August of Ernest Gruening to head the newly created Division of Territories and Island Possessions, which administered Interior Department programs in Puerto Rico. Gruening was a noted liberal scholar with a strong background in Puerto Rican affairs (Mathews 1960: 186-187), and incidentally, an old friend of Muñoz Marín from their mutual association with The Nation (Mathews 1960: 29, 187, 196). Gruening would not wait while PRRA was held up. An objection had been raised to registration of certain lands involved in the reorganization of United Porto Rico Sugar into Eastern Sugar Associates by the National City Bank of New York. Gruening seized this opportunity to push for enforcement of the long ignored 500 acre law. He was aided by a Puerto Rican Senate resolution offered by Muñoz Marín, who by strategic compromise had lined up support from some Socialist legislators--enforcement of the law having been a plank of their platform since the Socialist Party's inception (Mathews 1960: 214-217). Muñoz was by now thoroughly identified with the New Deal (Mathews 1960: 148, 187, 196). He had used his

influence with Gruening to build up his own patronage base, and Gruening's appointments had a very Liberal bias (Mathews 1960: 211-214, 217-218, 234, 237-238, 240). Even as early as the time of the land bill just mentioned, Muñoz was secretly laying the foundation for a new party under his leadership, which would unite pro-New Deal elements from both the Liberals and the Coalition (Mathews 1960: 218-219). A potential source of support for Munoz were the island colonos, who had recently organized themselves, were antagonistic to the U.S. sugar corporations, and whose leader, Piñero, was an old associate of Muñoz (Mathews 1960: 184, 195, 289).

Most of the Coalition opposed enforcement of the 500 acre law, partly because all the proposed initiatives would be under Liberal control, and partly because the Coalition had its own less radical land reform agenda, which did not threaten to break up the large estates (see Descartes 1972; 186-187). They were allied with Winship and other more conservative federal holdovers, particularly the insular Attorney General (Mathews 1960: 220-233). But Gruening succeeded in replacing the Attorney General with a new appointee, who, in January 1936, brought quo warranto proceedings against the holdings of a "local" sugar corporation, Rubert Hermanos (Guerra Mondragón 1972: 177; Mathews 1960: 236). Although the legal right to enforce the law would not be finally settled until 1941, the initiation of enforcement proceedings was a major step against corporate dominance.

Although the New Deal had brought only limited benefits at the beginning of 1936, it seemed to promise a great deal more. The Liberals, and especially Muñoz Marín, benefited by their association with the federal initiative. The Coalition, on the other hand, suffered by their opposition to and exclusion from PRRA efforts (Mathews 1960: 300), and the Socialist Party within the Coalition looked vulnerable because of its internal dissension. Moreover, a significant electoral reform was in the offing (Mathews 1960: 263), which would probably aid whichever party had the greatest appeal to the poor, and that would probably be the party of the New Deal. The Liberal Party had attached itself to the new up-and-coming faction of the colonial administration, a faction which saw major elements of the old insular power structure, including the U.S. sugar corporations, as expendable. It appeared as if the Liberal Party would ride this wave to victory in the November 1936 elections (Mathews 1960: 249). Then, the Nationalists stepped to the forefront, and all bets were off.

Conflicts involving Nationalists had built ever since they withdrew from electoral politics in 1932. In October 1935, a gun battle near the University in Río Piedras left several Nationalists dead. Tension grew, with Albizu Campos denouncing the killings and threatening retaliation. In February 1936, Francis Riggs, the chief of the insular police, was assassinated by two Nationalists. The two were executed in police custody (Mathews 1960: 249-250; see also Corretjer [1977] for a

Nationalist leader's view of these events).

The federal government took a hard line. Albizu and other Nationalists were put on trial, not for murder, which would have been very difficult to prove, but for sedition. In April 1936, U.S. Senator Millard Tydings introduced a bill calling for an island plebiscite on independence, with independence to be accompanied by full imposition of U.S. tariffs in 25% increments over four years. This tariff would have destroyed the island sugar industry, which alone in the middle of the depression would likely have caused massive starvation. (The Philippines independence bill had a ten year phase in of tariffs, and the Philippines were not nearly so dependent on the U.S. market). In introducing this punitive independence bill, Tydings¹ was acting in accordance with secret instructions of Gruening and Ickes, who thought that the prospects of being suddenly cast out of the U.S. economic

1. The role of Tydings, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, merits more investigation. It is often noted that he was a personal friend of Riggs (e.g. Cristopolus 1974: 140; Wagenheim 1975: 72). What had been neglected are the facts that he played a critical role in the Philippines independence bill (see Friend 1965), for which, it will be recalled, the mainland sugar interests claimed credit; and that Tydings was Senator from Maryland, where American Sugar Refining had a major refinery and other operations (Babst 1940: 97; Farr 1934: 7). Further, Tydings' actions were not solely a response to the assassination, as he was on the record favoring independence for Puerto Rico as early as December 1933 (Mathews 1960: 107).

system would silence independence advocates¹ (Mathews 1960: 249-258).

If the colonial administrators expected a quieting effect, they got the reverse. Their heavy handed tactics stimulated sympathy for the Nationalists, the formation of a pro-independence united front, and a general increase in

1. There was much public talk at the time of the offer of independence as exemplifying U.S. principles of self-determination (Mathews 1960: 253). This raises the question of whether the U.S. government was serious about letting Puerto Rico become independent if its people so voted--a possibility that had been clearly ruled out of the question in 1917 (Maldonado Denis 1972: 106-107).

Tydings, at least, seemed sincere. Gruening and Ickes are harder to figure. Both made private statements suggesting that they would accept independence, yet both also commented that independence would result in political and economic chaos on the island (Ickes 1953: 547; 1954: 47; Mathews 1960: 253-254). A PRRA study confirmed that under present conditions, independence under the punitive Tydings plan could treble starvation on the island. In an act that can have various interpretations, Gruening ordered every copy of the report to be burned (Mathews 1960: 258-259). Ickes' support of the Tydings bill seems based primarily on "the quieting effect... it might have on Puerto Rican public opinion", and the presumption that if rejected, "then such agitation as has been going on in Puerto Rico recently would be put an end to for probably twenty years" (Ickes 1953: 547). Within a year, after Nationalist activity had instead intensified, Ickes and the administration already were discounting the possibility of a vote on independence (Ickes 1954: 47). Roosevelt's true position on independence is not difficult to infer, if Tugwell's observations are correct. Roosevelt,

had the strong view that the Caribbean was an American lake, its islands a shield for the Panama Canal, and Puerto Rico, with its military and naval establishments, the key to the Canal's defense... Puerto Rico, he felt, was not... likely to make any kind of showing if turned loose and was likely to become one more troublesome independent nation in the Caribbean. (Tugwell 1958: 80, order altered)

However, the most convincing evidence that Washington was less than sincere in the offer of independence were the simultaneous actions taken against independence advocates, described below. At any rate, any window for independence was certainly closed by 1939, as the threat of world war grew.

anti-imperialist agitation (Ickes 1953: 547-548; Mathews 1960: 249-277). Tensions exploded in the 1937 Palm Sunday Massacre in Ponce, but that gets ahead of the story. A more immediate consequence of the Tydings bill, even though it never got out of committee, was a complete shake up of party politics.

Liberal hopes for election victory were shattered. Gruening demanded that Muñoz condemn the killers of Riggs, and rejected Muñoz's insistence on also condemning the police execution of the Nationalists. Soon, Gruening was in league with Winship in seeing Liberals as the enemy, and began to purge Liberal employees in PRRA (Mathews 1960: 270-272). Being cut off from PRRA was more than a loss of prestige, influence, and patronage. A federal investigation showed that 10-15% of salaries in PRRA were kicked back to the Liberal Party, so the purge probably depleted party funds (Mathews 1960: 265). The Liberal Party itself divided in reaction to the Tydings bill (Mathews 1960: 255-261). The Party's traditional association with a pro-independence position, and dramatic responses such as Barcelo's call for independence "even though we may die from hunger" (quoted in Mathews 1960: 257), may have gained support in some quarters, but it probably cut the Party off from many of the poor, who surely must have wondered just whom Barcelo meant by "we". The weakened party broke out in fierce fighting over electoral strategy, pitting Muñoz Marín against Barcelo. In the end, they lost to the Coalition, but despite all by a narrower margin than in 1932 (Mathews 1960: 298-308). A point

worth noting about this election was that the electoral reform eliminated some (not all) fraud and intimidation in the election, so that this election may have been a somewhat more accurate representation of the electorate's true feelings (Mathews 1960: 301-304; cf. Mintz 1974: 150-151).

After the 1936 election, a breakdown in party structure occurred that surpassed that which followed the 1928 elections. (The goal of winning an impending election seemed able to hold together otherwise unmanageable groups, but only temporarily). In the Liberal Party, Muñoz and Barcelo broke openly, with Muñoz squeezed out. He formed an "Authentic" Liberal Party, but without power or patronage, it quickly faded. The main Liberal Party, weakened by fights and defections, remained with Barcelo, who by now had shifted over against immediate independence. His death in 1938 left the party to drift (Mathews 1960: 309; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 94).

The Socialist Party was in decay. Bombarded by criticism from Afirmación Socialista, the newly formed Communist Party, and the Nationalists, its leadership made matters worse by supporting the wrong side (from the workers' view) in a protracted dock workers strike, and the fight over extending the minimum wage to Puerto Rico (Mathews 1960: 300, 306; Silvestrini de Pacheco 1979: 98-99, 103-121, 132-142). Leadership positions had been captured by lawyers and other recent arrivals in the Party, and they were engrossed in a factional struggle for control. After Iglesias Pantín's death

in 1939, that fight led to the defection of the vanquished faction (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 95; Silvestrini de Pacheco 1979: 121, 127).

The Union Republican Party also divided in two, although other than a struggle for control, the background of this split is not clear (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 95).¹ The dissident faction was led by Miguel Garcia Méndez, a lawyer associated with South Porto Rico Sugar (Mathews 1960: 219). Of course, none of these splinters had a chance to win by itself, so for the 1940 elections, the offshoots of the Socialist and the Union Republican parties formed a tripartite coalition with the Liberal Party, which by now had officially endorsed statehood. Also running in 1940 was the original La Coalición of Socialist and Union Republican parties (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 96-98; Wells 1979: 133-135). The image of these two self-serving blocks squaring off in an election illustrates the cul de sac which Puerto Rican party politics had entered. That would change, however, for a fundamentally different kind of party then arrived on the scene.

The Popular Democratic Party was formed in July 1938 by Muñoz Marín and his close associates. Its leadership core at first was younger urban professionals, some of whom had been associated with PRRA. Muñoz also drew support from landowners disaffected with Union Republican and Liberal policies, a

1. Information about many political events becomes much more sketchy after 1938, as that is the last year covered by Mathews excellent study.

linkage facilitated by his being the son of the former spokesman of the hacendados, and his personal association with the leader of the colono association (González Díaz 1980b: 47-48; Tugwell 1958: 82; and above). This nucleus was not in itself a formidable electoral coalition, but they benefited from their recognition of an historical opportunity offered by the present political and economic situation of Puerto Rico. Seeing beyond the internecline partisan squabbles that preoccupied other politicians, Muñoz apparently recognized that the majority of the electorate was enduring dreadful privation, without any effective or responsive political representation. In a reformed electoral system, this created the opportunity for a political party to rise even more rapidly than the Socialists had done twenty years earlier.

The Populars were to avoid the typical pitfalls of local politics, while simultaneously drawing on running currents of other parties' support. They foreswore entering into electoral coalitions (Steward et al. 1956: 81). That had contributed to the ruin of established parties. They sidestepped the issue of independence, which had so entangled the Liberals, by campaigning on economic and social issues. The Populars declared that political status was not an issue in the current election (Wells 1969: 127-128). Nevertheless, Muñoz's strong pro-independence background attracted many pro-independence followers, who were convinced that Muñoz would force the issue when the time was right (see Anderson 1965: 53; Tugwell 1977:

257). The Populares also appealed to the radical critics of the Socialist Party, notably in their adoption of the slogan "bread, land, and liberty", which had earlier been a slogan of the small Communist Party (Campos and Flores 1981: 125 n. 41; see also Quintero Rivera 1971: 80).

The Popular Party's program developed through a process which González Díaz (1980b: 51) calls a "negotiation" with the island poor. Muñoz and other Populares waged a now legendary campaign of visiting even the smallest and most remote corners of the island, speaking informally in poor workers' homes and backyards, and in turn listening to their opinions (Lewis 1963: 146-147; Wells 1979: 127-133). He found them more concerned with issues of physical survival than more abstract issues such as political status. The program which emerged was about bread and butter issues, a kind of modified and expanded Chardón Plan. The Populares promised to enforce the 500 acre law to break up the big corporations, to distribute land for small farms and for house sites, to encourage traditional agriculture, to support a minimum wage, to protect the income of the "middle class" and colonos, to advance a broad range of benefits for the weakest and most in need, and to protect the right to free and open political and union activity (González Díaz 1980b: 51; Mintz: 350-351; Muñoz Marín 1979: 128-129; Steward et al. 1956: 81; Wells 1969: 128-129).

The 1940 campaign is vividly recalled by older people in Jauca. This contrasts with earlier campaigns, which seem less

distinct and which were often recalled, if at all, in terms of personal events, or in relation to the general union-Socialist Party struggle against the sugar corporation, or remembered for the various ways the voting was fixed (as in Mintz 1956: 397; 1974: 146-153). (The greater detail of recollections is partly a consequence of the central significance of this campaign in the Popular Party's political ideology). These elicited memories, combined with the discussions in Mintz (1956: 350; 1974: 130, 185-188), make it possible to discuss this campaign as a point of articulation between local society and the social and political arrangements described above.

Excepting a substantial number of individuals who voted for Liberal or Union Republican candidates for various personal reasons, the Socialist Party had been the Party of the sugar workers--excluding of course those many votes coerced or bought. But by the late 1930s, there was considerable dissatisfaction with the Socialists for their failure to deliver on their promises. Many attribute this failure to their compromising alliance with the Union Republicans, who older informants explicitly connect with "los ricos" and "las capitalistas". (For those informants, the adjective "malo" is so commonly associated with the Republicans, that "Republicano Malo" almost seems like the name of the party). Although disillusioned, there remained considerable residual loyalty to the Socialists, comparable to several lingering political loyalties evident in present day Jauca. But when the Popular

representatives came around, people were curious, and they listened.

The Popular message had at least three dimensions to it, as recalled by jauqueños. One was the substantive program. Muñoz and others spoke of the need to capture political power in order to make economic changes, and of the opposition of "los pobres" to "las capitalistas norteamericanas". As Taso Zayas so eloquently explained:

[The Popular party forecast the laws they would put into operation. They explained to people what was happening, what the government in power was like. They talked to the people in a way that was easy to understand. Before, at political meetings, the leaders would hold forth, and it was truly eloquent oratory, truly lovely. But what we heard we did not understand--orations about the mists, the seas, the fishes, and great things. Then, when Munoz Marin came, he didn't come speaking that way. He came speaking of the rural worker, of the cane, and of things that were easier to understand. And the people could go along with him, understanding and changing. And so they learned to trade the mists and the sea for the plantain trees and for the land they were going to get if they gave the Popular party their votes. (Mintz 1974: 187)

One man summed up the Popular program as "more or less the same as the Socialist program", meaning, in effect, that the Populars had adopted the basic demands forged by the workers themselves.

A second dimension to the Popular message concerned the use of the vote. Electoral fraud and reform have been mentioned. The scope of this fraud, at least up to 1940, stands as a warning to those who would equate formal elections with democratic process. In 1936, more people were registered to vote in Puerto Rico than there were people eligible to vote.

Coamo led the pack, with 14,144 registered voters in a town with only 9,775 eligibles (Mathews 1960: 263). False registrations were only part of the fix. Jauqueños recall well (and see Mintz 1956: 397; 1974: 147-153), how various coercive measures were used to prevent pre-election activity for candidates hostile to established powers. These included blacklisting from work, and eviction from company housing. Intimidation was carried right into the voting places, supplemented by extensive and open vote buying. From what I can tell, selling one's vote was not necessarily perceived as immoral. A widespread sense of the corruption of politics and the unlikelihood of elections leading to any change may have made a pair of shoes the most that one could hope to obtain for a vote.

Informants did not specifically recall legislated electoral reform, but they are very mindful of Muñoz Marín's exhortations on the subject (see also Mintz 1974: 185-189). He explained how the politicians who bought the votes got the money to do so from the rich, and consequently were expected to serve their benefactors' interests. He preached "vergüenza contra dinero", and that the vote was "something sacred". He asked the people to "loan" him their votes: if he did not enact the promised laws in one term, they should take it back and remove him the next election.

A third dimension of the campaign, and perhaps the most brilliant, was the way Muñoz made a virtue of his lack of funds

and extensive organization, and approached the poor as if he were one of them. He came to Jauca I in the 1940 campaign accompanied by only two aids, and addressed a small group in a home. Then he walked to town. Another time he spoke in a backyard to the north of Jauca I. One man who was there recalled Muñoz talking for hours, drinking coffee out of coconut shell cups, and asking for cigarettes from the men around him as he chain smoked. Concluded the informant, "Asking for cigarettes, he won the nation". The Populars also courted the electorate with a newspaper, El Batey, distributed gratis. Although political and regular newspapers had been available for decades in Santa Isabel, from informants' recollections it seems that El Batey constituted a more readily accessible periodical, and so represents a significant step in the informational linkage between the village and the outside world.

Muñoz and the Populars stirred a tremendous response in Jauca I, but there was also skepticism. Informants recall that some people suspected he was still a Liberal in the tradition of his father, and the Liberal Party too was seen as a party of "los ricos". Others doubted that he would be able to deliver on his promises. A standard joke, apparently, was that he would have to make the bread, land, and liberty appear from under his arms. (You had to be there). In the end, the Populars did not win in Santa Isabel in 1940. The incumbent, a local colono (the major colono remaining in Santa Isabel), won

a second term on the Liberal Party ticket. Why the Popular candidate lost seems to involve several considerations. Informants recall that the mayoral candidate chosen by the new Popular organization--candidates being chosen from the top--was not very capable, while the incumbent was a man of great ability (see Mintz 1974: 188-189). Other relevant factors are that even though Santa Isabel was a sugar town, more than 30% of its citizens qualified to vote were not agricultural field workers (above); and that in the 1940 campaign, the Liberal and one faction of the old Socialist Party were allied, and that may have aided the incumbent. The Socialist Party itself, however, did very poorly. Perhaps one reason for that was that among the candidates for various offices that Socialists were expected to support as part of their alliance was Pedro Juan Serralles, of the Ponce sugar family (Estadísticas de las Elecciones 1940).

Wolf (1956) discusses the 1940 campaign in a coffee region in the highlands, where U.S. capital was not as significant or immediate an issue. There, Populars had a different and more diversified appeal:

The party consisted of a coalition. Locally, many landowners supported it because they hoped that it would subsidize the coffee market and stabilize the labor supply. Creditor merchants supported it because it would secure their threatened investments. Small farmers supported it because they hoped to rid themselves of their debts. Agricultural workers hoped for land reform and labor laws which would improve their own conditions and curtail the powers of the landowners. (1956: 246)

In short, the Populars seemed to offer something to everyone

unhappy with the status quo. This broader appeal may not have been possible in a more polarized and divided community, like Santa Isabel. It was in the mountains, the former stronghold of the hacendados, that the PDP ran strongest in 1940 (González Díaz 1980b: 44). By 1944, the Populists would broaden their appeal, sweeping elections across the island. González Díaz (1980b: 43) sees in this phenomenon a transition from class-based to mass-based politics, but that, as well as the details of the 1940 election results, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Muñoz Marín promised sweeping reforms of island political and economic structure. One point that should be clear from all that has gone before is that what an island politician could accomplish was severely circumscribed by what the colonial administrators would allow (even if island politicians could also circumscribe federal actions). What had federal administrators been doing since the 1936 elections?

A very prominent part of federal policy was a crackdown on pro-independence politics. The sedition prosecution of Albizu Campos and his associates turned more obviously political. After one trial ended with a hung jury, a second was begun with a jury of ten North Americans and two Puerto Ricans. Secretary Ickes was reportedly pleased by the guilty verdict and the two to ten year sentences (Mathews 1960: 266-270). The purge of Liberals and other pro-independence individuals spread from PRRA to all branches of government. The situation in PRRA

under Gruening got so bad that even political neutrals resigned (Mathews 1960: 275-277). Earl Hanson, who worked in PRRA, described the situation in a letter to Gruening as follows:

In the PRRA, in the University, in the Insular Government people are afraid to say what they think politically to talk about Independence, to tell you and, through you, the Federal Government what their own attitudes are if those differ from yours. Economic necessity is too powerful. A man is now often faced with starvation if he speaks his mind or acts according to the dictates of his honor. That amounts to an almost complete suspension of civil liberties that your country and mine stands for. (quoted in Mathews 1960: 277)

Elsewhere he commented that federal policies "have by now created in Puerto Rico one of the most tense and hateful situations I have ever seen... a situation that in my opinion must 'blow up' before too long if present policies are continued" (quoted in Mathews 1960: 277). For his comments he was recalled to Washington and censured. The education system was a special target. Roosevelt and Gruening fell back to Gore's position of advocating compulsory teaching of all courses in English, and otherwise inculcating a pro-U.S. attitude (Ickes 1954: 6; Lewis 1963: 139-140; Mathews 1960: 317-320).

Public expression of Nationalist sympathies was suppressed. The confrontationism finally exploded in Ponce in March 1937. The police opened fire on a march of young Nationalists. Seventeen Nationalists and two policemen died, and over a hundred were wounded. Many had been shot in the back. An ACLU investigation placed responsibility for the violence squarely on the authorities. Even Ickes, who had endorsed the hard

line, called it "a cold blooded shooting by the police" (Ickes 1954: 329) after viewing photographs of the scene. Ickes showed the photographs to Roosevelt, and urged a federal investigation. But Gruening and Governor Winship supported the police and opposed an inquiry, and Roosevelt sided with them (Hays 1973; Ickes 1954: 149, 161, 170, 329; Mathews 1960: 310-315; see also Corretjer 1977 and documents in Bothwell 1979 vol. III). Back in Puerto Rico, tensions remained high, with at least two assassination attempts by Nationalists on federal officials in the subsequent year. But with the high Nationalist leadership in the Atlanta penitentiary, the Nationalist force had been weakened for the time being (Mathews 1960: 304, 309).¹

Other than suppressing pro-independence activity, the federal government seems to have run out of initiatives for Puerto Rico. Relief aid continued via the PRRA and other

1. It is difficult to ascertain the degree of sympathy for Nationalists in Jauca during the late 1930s. Informants remember a few individuals were known as Nationalists, but claim that most of them lived in the town, and that their Nationalist activity was not carried out locally, but in the larger cities. No one I asked remembered any overt Nationalist action in the immediate area. Interpretation is cautioned, however, by the tendency to minimize reports of conflicts. The most common opinion of Nationalists elicited from older informants is that they were "muy" or "demasiado bravo". A generally shared opinion is that Albizu Campos was extremely intelligent, and had suffered discrimination in the U.S. because of his dark skin. Beyond that, opinion is divided. Some regard him as a great patriot. Others see him as an evil man. In the latter category, one arch-Popular, whose opinion was clearly influenced by the later struggle between Albizu and Munoz, even maintained that the Ponce Massacre was the result of Albizu having drugged the Nationalist cadets to make them attack

relief agencies, and some small scale land redistribution to small farmers continued in the mountains (Descartes 1972: 198; Koenig 1953: 248; Mathews 1960: 322-325; Ross 1976: 37-40). Efforts to extend the minimum wage to the island continued, finally resulting in a \$.25/hour minimum, extended in steps in 1938 and 1940. This move was viewed with some cynicism on the island, as the federal plan was to cover only those industries that shipped products to the mainland, and so competed with mainland manufacturing. The extension led to substantial flight by needlework workshops, and cutbacks in hours of work in other fields (Mathews 1960: 122-126; Ross 1976: 42-43; Silvestrini de Pacheco 1979: 132-143). Over all, the New Deal was stagnating in Puerto Rico. Gruening was removed in 1937 (Ickes 1954: 160), and Ickes by this time was washing his hands and turning his back (Tugwell 1958: 146-147). Funds for PRRA fell in 1938 and again in 1939, when the agency began to terminate its functions (Mathews 1960: 323-325).

In regard to the island sugar industry, federal signals were mixed, as initiatives begun in the salad days continued sputteringly forward. While the court appeals over enforcement of the 500 acre law continued, the PRRA had entered into lengthy negotiations for the purchase of a large field and mill complex, Central Lafayette, which was owned by a non-resident French family. The sale finally went through, and the government took possession in December 1936. There had been various plans on how to run the complex, first conceived as

kind of a state collective farm, then as a colono oriented complex, and ultimately as implemented, an arrangement that relied heavily on worker cooperatives. The main idea, however, was always to run a socially responsible mill to stand as a yardstick for measuring other sugar operations. But the cooperative mill was in financial trouble from the start, and was declared a failure in 1940 (Gayer et al. 1938: 250-257; Mathews 1960: 283-287, 324).

Various factors were cited in the failure of Central Lafayette: improper preliminary preparations, poor management, greed of various parties involved, insufficient capital funds, and political opposition. Perhaps the most basic cause was failure of political will to see it through after the problems became manifest. The Union Republicans in the legislature had never been receptive to the project, and with the local New Deal come over to Winship's pro-business point of view, they had pull. The island colonos had been a powerful political force within the Liberal Party favoring the project. But the shift to a structure emphasizing worker cooperatives alienated them, converting them into outspoken critics of the project (Mathews 1960: 283-287, 290). The Socialists were so weakened that they were in no position to carry the ball. Within PRRA, the intelligence behind the plan, Carlos Chardon, had been forced out by Gruening in November 1936 (Mathews 1960: 276).

Beyond the PRRA in Puerto Rico, the federal government in general was backing down on radical agricultural reform. The

Roosevelt administration's drift toward a more conservative position became evident early within the Department of Agriculture, which came down firmly on the side of big growers in an issue focusing on cotton cultivation in the southern U.S. In February 1935, Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace purged the Department of liberals (Ickes 1953: 303; Mertz 1978: 34-37, 119-121, 129; Tugwell 1977: 22-24). Then, in January 1936, the over all AAA regulatory program was hit by a Supreme Court ruling that declared tax and other elements of the program to be unconstitutional. Although the general program was continued without major disruption under a modified plan passed by Congress, the ruling had the effect of eliminating the potential source of funds for the original Puerto Rican reconstruction plans at a critical formative period (Bernhardt 1948: 196-201; Mathews 1960: 243, 283).

The U.S. sugar corporations in Puerto Rico were less vulnerable after 1936 than they were in 1934. They had had time to regroup and communicate to the U.S. Congress their view of the "radical threat to free enterprise" contemplated in Puerto Rico (Mathews 1960: 224; Puerto Rico Trade Council 1939). The AAA program had indirectly helped the U.S. sugar corporations in Puerto Rico by ending the sugar production crisis and bringing stability to production and marketing (Dalton 1937: 142-143), ending at least for the moment the open warfare between divisions of the U.S. industry.

Finally, the immediate threat of serious social uprisings

in Puerto Rico had receded. As noted earlier, the Socialist Party had managed to temporarily suppress most radical labor action, and the Nationalists had been weakened by the imprisonment of their leaders. Although Ickes at least was perceptive enough to comment in early 1939 "I still think we are sitting on a powder keg so far as Puerto Rico is concerned" (1954: 628), in the absence of major pressure to take action, and after the frustrating experience of previous efforts, the federal government could and would go back to what it had done so successfully for so many years: ignore the social and economic conditions in Puerto Rico (see Tugwell 1977: 70-71). Yet radical reform would again be federal policy in Puerto Rico within a few years. The battles of the mid 1930s would be fought again in the early 1940s. The structural problems would not go away. And the next time, the results of the struggles would be different. One big reason for the difference was the same type of concern that had led to Spanish colonial reform centuries earlier: increased strategic significance for Puerto Rico in international military confrontations. Before discussing that, there remains one last comment about the New Deal in Puerto Rico and modern perceptions of it.

Current views on the New Deal in Puerto Rico vary widely. One pole sees it as merely an effort to smooth the roughest edges of colonial domination as the situation demanded (e.g. Maldonado Denis 1972); the other as an enlightened crusade,

which failed in some ways due to adverse circumstances, but never for less than the most sincere intentions (e.g. Ross 1976).¹ Missing from recent discussions has been appreciation of two factors stressed here: 1) the linkage between the initiation and shape of the local New Deal and the AAA sugar regulation program; and 2) the linkage of the local AAA program to the sugar crisis and the breakup of the cartel.

The first point is based on Mathews definitive study, and was picked up a few years later by Lewis (1963: 130-131). Since then however, it has faded from discussion, despite the continuing reliance on Mathews as a source (e.g. in Carr 1984; Cristopolus 1974; Morely 1974; Wells 1979). The second point was derived (above) from consideration of documents on the U.S. sugar industry, written at the time. To my knowledge, the input of changes in the U.S. sugar industry has not previously been considered in discussions of insular developments in the 1930s, although they appear to have been crucial. In the next chapter, it will be shown that the state of the sugar industry continued to shape the course of island history after 1940.

1. In Jauca, informants are rather fuzzy about the nature of the New Deal. They remember certain programs, such as road work and drainage projects, and a food distribution program. (Federal surplus food distribution even up to the advent of the Food Stamp program was called "La Prera"). Details of the political battles are not recalled. The dominant impression, however, is that Roosevelt was the ally and even inspiration of Muñoz, which was true before 1936 and after 1941. But the late 1930s rift was not mentioned. One man, to the contrary, told me that Muñoz formed the Popular Party in 1938 at the suggestion of Roosevelt.

Talk of war was high in 1938. Washington strategists worried about pro-Axis sentiment in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and elsewhere in Latin America (Ickes 1954). Ickes does not specifically mention these worries in regard to Puerto Rico, but they probably arose, due to two partially distinct political currents: a pro-Falangist attitude among some of the traditional "Spanish" population (Wolf 1956: 246); and the allegedly pro-Axis orientation of the Nationalists (see Lewis 1963: 81). Then there was the hungry masses. If they did not pose a threat at the moment, neither could they safely be forgotten--as demonstrated by the escalating series of "disturbances" across the British West Indies from 1934 to 1939 (Proctor 1973: 45-49; Tugwell 1977: 65; Williams 1984: 473-474). And while the federal government had shown itself quite willing to meet discontent with repression, that tactic was becoming an embarrassment as the U.S. built itself up as the fortress of democracy. This image problem would grow more serious in the early 1940s.

The security of Puerto Rico was seen as critical. As early as October 1938 there were worries about Germany establishing a beachhead in the Caribbean (Ickes 1954: 484). Roosevelt's view of the Caribbean as an "American lake" (Tugwell 1958: 80) reinforced this fear. (Tugwell [1958: 148-149] attributes this perspective to Roosevelt's Navy background). Besides Puerto Rico's value as a first line of defense for the Panama Canal, Roosevelt reportedly had the theory (by early 1939) that

Germany could launch an air war against the U.S. mainland by controlling bases in West Africa, eastern South America, and the Caribbean (Tugwell 1977: 67-68). To meet these perceived threats, a naval base of gargantuan proportions was planned in eastern Puerto Rico, including the construction of a sea wall from the island of Vieques to Ensenada Honda on the main island. These ambitious plans for Roosevelt Roads base were scaled down after the Navy absorbed the lesson of Pearl Harbor (Tugwell 1977: 67-68 n.). In March 1939, Roosevelt took the additional step of changing his governor from General Winship to Admiral Leahy, even though Leahy was instructed by Ickes to give more attention to civil rather than military matters (Ickes 1954: 628, 635). After 1940, war was even more central in shaping developments in Puerto Rico.

CHAPTER V
1940 to 1960

Puerto Rican Politics I: 1940--ca. 1950

New leaders, new directions. Shortly after the 1940 election, Puerto Rico set off on a remarkable program of radical reform, a cooperative effort involving the federally appointed Governor Rexford Tugwell, and the elected President of the insular Senate, Luis Muñoz Marín. A few years before, this would have seemed a most unlikely possibility. Tugwell had been squeezed out of the AAA programs affecting Puerto Rico, and left federal service in 1936.¹ Muñoz Marín had lost his access to federal policy makers, then lost his base in the Liberal Party. The federal administration was operating in a repressive mode, and local federal posts were packed with conservatives, such as Attorney General Malcom, who appeared determined to thwart the promised land reform (Tugwell 1977: 87, 237, 244-245). The Division of Territories staff in Washington were ignorant about Puerto Rico, exasperated by its politics, and unlikely to generate any new programs on their own (Goodsell 1967: 20 n.14). A few New Deal programs already begun in Puerto Rico moved slowly forward, but major reform efforts seemed to be a thing of the past. Why did Washington suddenly shift to encourage relatively radical efforts to restructure the insular economy?

One answer is that the federal shift rightward in 1936 had

1. Tugwell kept busy as Chairman of the pioneering New York City Planning Commission under La Guardia, writing articles on the necessity of government direction of the economy for the common good, and developing the concept of a planning agency as a fourth branch of government (Tugwell 1974a; 1974b; 1977: 95).

not represented any deep commitment, but rather an expedient hard-line clampdown, a reaction to the apparent failure of earlier reform efforts ensnared by politics; and to the seeming drift toward a potential insurrection, fueled by the extreme poverty and unabated social tension. By 1940, the immediate economic and political crises had eased a bit, but the long-term problems remained. In Ickes's words, Puerto Rico remained "a powder keg". From Tugwell's perspective, "the materials for a class war were all present" (Tugwell 1977: 7).

In the larger international picture, Puerto Rico occupied a key position. Roosevelt recognized the need for a more cooperative approach to hemispheric relations. He had been pushing the Good Neighbor Policy, and had renounced the open interventionism of the past (Aguilar 1968: 69-71). Puerto Rico's openly colonial status was an embarrassment. This was aggravated by the fact that the Caribbean was a center of international contention. For several years, the British colonies had seen intensifying civil disorders, yet the British seemed unwilling to promote or allow reform. From Washington's perspective, the deepening global crisis required the enlistment of the support of the Caribbean masses, even if that implied a confrontation with the entrenched oligarchies (Tugwell 1977: 64-69, 95-97). In 1940, Tugwell worked with Charles Taussig to establish the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission to study these problems, and even advocated that the U.S. take over the British colonies in order to provide a

minimal level of welfare for the inhabitants. The idea was rejected as too costly, but Washington still seemed committed to a post-war restructuring of the Caribbean, free of the traditional oligarchies, and tightly bound to U.S. control (Tugwell 1977: 95-97, 112, 128, 183). Our continued possession of the long-suffering colony of Puerto Rico made it more difficult to maintain a posture of moral superiority over the British and others (Louis 1978: 95, 111). Under these circumstances, any reasonable program of economic and political reform for Puerto Rico would seem very enticing to federal administrators.

In 1941 the Popular Party, led by Muñoz Marín, took control of the insular legislature. Technically, the PPD had not actually won the election. The Republican-Socialist Coalición garnered 7,000 more votes, which gave them and the Socialist leader Bolívar Pagán the island's highest elective office, the post of the Resident Commissioner in Washington. The PPD had a one-vote majority in the upper house, giving Muñoz Marín the office of the President of the Senate. In the lower house, the PPD was tied with the Coalition, and two votes short of a majority. That could have doomed their program, had not the three remaining representatives--Liberals elected under the Unificación Tripartita banner--pledged to vote with the Populists. This gave the PPD control of the legislature (Goodsell 1977: 25-26, 30; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 97-98).

Shortly after the election, Muñoz sent a copy of the PPD

program to President Roosevelt, asking for his support in carrying out a Puerto Rican New Deal (Goodsell 1967: 26). The key plank in this program was the active enforcement of the 500 acre law, including the appropriation and reorganization or distribution of corporate sugar holdings. This would be enforced as a matter of self-evident justice, rather than because of any left-wing ideology or commitment to government control over private enterprise. (Sánchez Vilella 1980: 126; Tugwell 1974c 62-63; 1977: 172). Munoz warned of a popular explosion if these efforts for justice were blocked (Edel 1962: 31). The federal government, having passed and reaffirmed the 500 acre law in 1900 and 1917, and having encouraged implementation in 1935, had been waffling when it came to implementation. Federal administrators including Attorney General Malcom had not pushed forward after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the quo warranto actions against one sugar corporation. At first, Secretary of the Interior Ickes went along with this stalling. When the PPD electoral success became clear, however, he committed himself and the Department to enforcement. He sent Rexford Tugwell to Puerto Rico to determine how it could be done (Edel 1962: 34-35). The story of those hearings and the subsequent land reform will be told later in this chapter.

Shortly after the passage of the Land Law, Governor Swope, a former insular Auditor who had replaced Governor Leahy only seven months before, left his position to become the head of

the federal Division of Territories and Insular Possessions. Tugwell had expressed interest in the post of governor, and Ickes gave him enthusiastic support. (Originally, Tugwell was to simultaneously occupy the position of chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, but fierce local opposition to this dual appointment made him give up the powerful University position) (Goodsell 1967: 31; Ross 1976: 51-54; Tugwell 1977: 76, 121-125, 136-148). Given Tugwell's past record, and his vocal endorsement of land reform for Puerto Rico, there could be no question but that he intended to shake up the island status quo. Certainly, any lingering doubts were dispelled by his inaugural address, in which he attacked the role of the absentee corporations, and pledged to actively fight poverty (Tugwell 1941). Despite all the controversies he would stir up, Tugwell received the strong support of Roosevelt and top administrators in the Interior Department. This steady support must be understood in the context of the war.

Tugwell thought of his efforts in Puerto Rico as his contribution to the war effort (Tugwell 1977: 69, 124, 158-159). Much of his early efforts concentrated on military security and ensuring basic provisions for the island. (German submarines nearly isolated Puerto Rico in the summer and fall of 1942). But these were only the most immediate concerns. At least as important a goal was to secure the loyalty of the population, a task given special urgency because of the openly pro-Axis sentiments of some Puerto Ricans. Tugwell (1977: 137)

claims that Roosevelt knew about the potential for internal disorder, and wanted a governor who would be sympathetic to the masses. He (1977: 158-159, 169) saw his task as to create loyalty to the U.S. by making the ordinary folk believe that they had a stake in the system. He also was trying to lay the foundation for increased self-government to be carried out in the anticipated post-War decolonization, as discussed below.

Tugwell's approach of gaining loyalty by means of major reforms and government planning had powerful enemies, as Tugwell (1977) describes in excruciating detail. There were the representatives of the local oligarchy, particularly the sugar corporations and import merchants; there were the reactionary bureaucrats who had filled the federal posts on the island after the 1937 political polarization; and there were the numerous conservative Washington legislators who opposed Tugwell personally as a symbol of the radical tendencies of the early New Deal. These three divisions worked together, and on a few occasions blocked or threatened to reverse reform. But I believe there was an even more serious threat to reform efforts, which does not receive the same extensive discussion by Tugwell: that was the threat of some form of martial law for the duration of the war.

The U.S. military chiefs in Puerto Rico were grossly insensitive to local concerns. Children of the local elite were among the officer corps, and the army brass seemed to share their disdain for the riffraff (Tugwell 1977: 195-196,

272-273, 366). The military command kept a close watch over Tugwell. They opened his mail and monitored his telephone conversations (Tugwell 1977: 272-273). But as long as Tugwell did not get too extreme, and especially as long as he kept the masses under control, the military was content to let him handle the government. They had their own concerns, including daily U-Boat attacks, and the perceived danger of a carrier task force invasion of the Caribbean (Tugwell 1977: 197-213). Under the circumstances, it does not seem outlandish to speculate that a failure to pacify the population through reform measures would have been followed by a return to repressive controls.

A critical point was reached in January 1942, just as the military situation entered the bleakest period of the war (Tugwell 1977: 239-242). Up to 80,000 sugar workers went on a strike that generated violence, and which seemed to be getting out of even the union's control. Tugwell believed that the military was on the verge of imposing martial law, which certainly would have pleased much of the local elite. He gave Muñoz an ultimatum: either Muñoz get the strikers to return to work, or he, Tugwell, would resign (Tugwell 1977: 222, 232-233). The strikers did return to work, under conditions described below. The crisis passed. If they had not returned to work, Puerto Rican history might have been very different.¹

1. Several alternative consequences of a continued strike can be imagined. One plausible scenario, however, illustrates how this might have been a critical juncture. A hard line

As it was, the general support of the population seemed secured by spring 1942. In the following year, Tugwell succeeded in replacing many of the conservative federal holdovers with more cooperative people (Tugwell 1946: 2; 1977: 505), thus eliminating a major point of leverage for the island power groups. By mid 1943, the reform program was rolling forward and building steam.

The local media kept up a constant barrage of vicious criticism, most of it aimed at the "communist" and/or "fascist" Tugwell, rather than at Muñoz Marín (Goodsell 1967: 36-38). After all, the federal government was the real power in Puerto Rico. Local politicians also conducted an intense lobbying campaign among U.S. legislators, with the aim of reversing the course of the reform. They quite nearly succeeded, with the willing cooperation of various conservative Congressional committees, looking to root out un-American government programs (Goodsell 1967: 41; Lugo Silva 1955: 141-143; Tugwell 1977: 387-388, 467-469, 505-506, 511-513, 525; Subcommittee 1943: parts 1 and 2). Another obstacle to reform was the activities of the multiple federal intelligence agencies that had poured

crackdown by the military authorities could easily have led to substantial violence. The military would probably align with the conservative elite, as had Gruening in the later 1930s. This would have doomed the PPD reform efforts, and probably led to marked political polarization. The consequences of this would have been particularly severe, as 1942 was to be the year of most extreme shortages. A polarized, tense situation, with no progress toward reform or popular self-government as the war drew to an end, would undoubtedly have created different dynamics in the moves toward decolonization, described below.

agents into Puerto Rico. These operatives sought subversives with such zeal that even the military found them irritating. Despite the fact that many of the elite of Puerto Rico were pro-Spanish, intelligence agents neglected the political right and concentrated on "reds", whom they perceived to be everywhere, including within the PPD (Tugwell 1977: 243, 296, 370-371).

Still, Tugwell and reform continued with the support of high federal officials and others (Tugwell 1977: 373-378, 476). Abe Fortas, the new Undersecretary in Interior, "seemed to feel that opposition in the Congress was perhaps preferable to rebellion in Puerto Rico" (Tugwell 1977: 347). The Popular landslide victory in 1944 elections put the reform efforts on firmer ground. But the threat remained that the U.S. Congress could undo the first four years of progress. The fact of this threat was an important factor in developing efforts to modify Puerto Rico's political status.

The push for "decolonization". Roosevelt was committed to the creation of a post-war Caribbean free of explosive tensions related to the entrenched colonial oligarchies. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission had been considering decolonization prospects (Tugwell 1977: 175, 325, 574-578). Puerto Rico was to be included in the plan. In early 1943, the U.S. was claiming that significant progress toward self-government had been made in Puerto Rico, and pledging to Britain that the vestiges of colonialism would be eliminated

"in the near future" (Louis 1978: 236). Of course, the U.S. military bases would not be touched, but they could remain under a variety of political arrangements, even independence (Tugwell 1977: 585). But independence was not what federal strategists had in mind.

Tugwell managed to defuse active pro-independence agitation at his first news conference by praising the idea, and saying that it could be had for the asking--"if Puerto Ricans so much as whisper a wish for separation"--but with sudden and complete termination of all the benefits of the union (Tugwell 1977: 164-165). (At this point, independentistas were willing to bide their time anyway--see below). Tugwell's vision of post-war Puerto Rico was quite different. He saw it as a semi-autonomous centerpiece in a Caribbean completely under the hegemony of the United States (Tugwell 1977: 596-598, 658-659). In March 1942 he wrote to Roosevelt recommending steps to allow for the popular election of governors, to give the elected governor power to make several important appointments then made in Washington, and to call a post-war constitutional convention to consider creation of a new relationship with the U.S., including as one option a form of autonomy between independence and statehood. Ickes supported the recommendations, and Roosevelt asked for the legislation in March 1943 (Committee 1944b; Goodsell 1967: 70; Tugwell 1977: 328). These efforts were complicated, especially by Senator Tydings renewed efforts to push Puerto Rico towards independence (which may have been

related to machinations within the U.S. sugar industry--see below). The initiatives and related measures died in committees (Goodsell 1967: 70-73; Lugo Silva 1955: 53-54; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 99-101; Tugwell 1977: 486, 508-509). Tugwell now was leaning toward the idea of a "commonwealth"--an old idea, resurrected by insular politicians apparently independent of Muñoz Marín (Tugwell 1977: 492-495). At the same time, the military was making clear that it would accept independence only with guarantees that they would have a completely free hand. Their specific demands would severely undercut the sovereignty of an independent Puerto Rico (Wagenheim and Wagenheim 1973: 231-243; see also Louis 1978: 447).

Muñoz Marín seems to have remained apart from these early efforts. The meddling of reactionary U.S. legislators had reactivated the pro-independence forces, including those within the PPD. To support a move for an elected governor would draw independentista fire, as it would reaffirm the island's status as part of the U.S. But the right wing in the U.S. Congress had already made one attempt to legislatively annul most of the island's legislated reforms, and Muñoz believed, like many people, that the Republicans would take control of the U.S. Congress in 1944. Fearing that this would result in a right-wing governor to replace Tugwell, which would terminate the Popular reform program, Muñoz joined in deliberations regarding an elected governor (Tugwell 1977: 536-559, 600-603, 613).

Then the Democrats did unexpectedly well in the 1944 elections. Moreover, developments within the U.S. sugar industry (below) made influential U.S. Congressmen temporarily more friendly to Puerto Rico. At the same time, Muñoz and his advisers were reconsidering long-range strategies, and beginning to back away from the long-advocated ideal of independence (below). Much to the chagrin of independentistas, the PPD under Muñoz supported a call by Tugwell in February 1945 for a plebiscite on political status, which would include the options of statehood, independence, and a intermediate dominion status. Other politicians followed suit. In October, President Truman proposed his own plan for a plebiscite, this time including two forms of intermediate status. Again, political infighting in the U.S. Congress prevented action.

One source of conflict was Tugwell himself. He was the target of continuing maneuvers by those who wanted to kill the New Deal once and for all. By February 1946 he had decided to resign, and stepped down on June 30. His replacement was Jesus Piñero, the last federally appointed governor of Puerto Rico, and the first Puerto Rican to occupy the post. With Tugwell gone and other understandings reached (below), the U.S. Congress acted in August 1947 to authorize local election of the governor, as well as other changes in the direction of greater autonomy. In November 1948, Luis Muñoz Marín won an overwhelming electoral victory to become the first popularly elected governor in the history of Puerto Rico (Fernos Isern

1974: 63-80; Goodsell 1967: 73-74; Lugo Silva 1955: 61-69; Lewis 1963: 159).

Meanwhile, the international pressure to decolonize Puerto Rico had grown stronger. The island was a major sore point in negotiations with the British in 1945 (Luis 1978: 498). In 1946, the island's status was emerging as an issue in the Cold War. Puerto Rico was cited to counter U.S. criticisms of Soviet actions in Finland. Puerto Rico's colonial status seemed to contradict stated U.S. ideals embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the Four Freedoms (Petrullo 1947: 7, 161). Truman was trying to consolidate U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere, and to close off any possible openings to communism. Support for democracy--orthodox North American-style democracy--was equated with the struggle against communism. Poverty in Latin America was to be attacked via development based on U.S. private capital investment, as outlined in Point IV of Truman's 1949 inaugural address (Aguilar 1968: 80-100; Hanson 1960: 15; Navas Davila 1980: 27-28).

In this global political context, Puerto Rico became very important, and its impoverished colonial condition a major embarrassment. A U.S. report on Puerto Rico to the U.N. in 1948 was characterized by no less than Time Magazine as a "shocking admission" of neglect (Perloff 1950: 4-5). One federal administrator who was involved in the process of "decolonization" saw the quest for a new political status for

Puerto Rico as an effort "to maintain some of the old ties and at the same time remove the curse of colonial inferiority--or at least the appearance thereof" (Emerson 1953: 9).

The economic costs-benefits balance of maintaining "some of the old ties" was not clear in the late 1940s, after the sugar industry had been weakened yet before Puerto Rico became so important as a source of labor, a consumer goods market, and a place of high-return manufacturing investment. It could be and was argued that it was either an economic asset or a liability (Chase 1951: 64; Manners 1956: 106-107). In political terms, however, keeping the island in obvious colonial subjugation clearly involved costs out of proportion to any benefits. Yet if the federal administrators had any belief in their own dire predictions about the consequences of independence, independence too would entail unacceptable political costs for the nation that had ruled Puerto Rico for half a century. The third alternative of an intermediate commonwealth status seemed just what was needed for "proving the claims of the Communists to be wrong and showing what a good neighbor the United States actually was" (Tugwell 1958: 65).

The culmination of nearly a decade of federal efforts to modify Puerto Rico's political status was a process carried out from 1950 to 1952. In July 1950, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 600. This called for a referendum by the people of Puerto Rico to authorize a Constitutional Convention to draw up a plan for a new government. The new constitution would be put

into effect after a second vote by the people, and after Congressional and presidential approval. The politics of these votes and the reactions of pro-statehood and pro-independence forces to this Commonwealth-or-nothing approach will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. For now, it is necessary only to note that in both votes, the pro-constitution, pro-Commonwealth position won by landslides. The Constitution was endorsed by the U.S. Congress with only minor debate and modification.¹ The Commonwealth, or Estado Libre Asociado, as Commonwealth is officially translated into Spanish, became the official form of government in 1952 (Fernos Isern 1974: 105 ff.; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 115-127; Wells 1969: 107-108).

The significance of this modified political status is debatable. It did eliminate some rather overtly colonial vestiges which remained after the 1947 changes, such as continued federal appointments of the Auditor (a powerful position) and of the insular Supreme Court justices. But any change in the basic relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. was clearly prohibited to the Constitutional Convention. A House report on the proposed Law 600 made this plain: "It is important that the nature and general scope of S. 3336 be made

1. One reason for the lack of controversy was that Muñoz Marín had, by this time, endeared himself to Congressional conservatives. According to Tugwell (1958: 63): "Republicans in Congress had nothing 'socialistic' to complain of when the Constitution was up for ratification in 1952. They were, indeed, so well satisfied with Muñoz's conservatism that the act was more a Republican than a Democratic measure".

absolutely clear. The bill under consideration would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and economic relationships to the United States". The report goes on to specify that what could be modified were aspects of insular government structure "and other matters of purely local concern" (quoted in Ramos de Santiago 1970: 119).

For the most part, the rules of the relationship embodied in the old Jones Act were preserved intact as the new Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act, although supporters of the change argue that those rules had undergone a fundamental change: the endorsement of the rules by the people of Puerto Rico in the referendum had transformed them, almost magically, from implements of colonial rule to expressions of the popular will (Gutierrez Franqui and Wells 1953: 34).

Other preconditions were placed on the Constitution:

[T]hat it establish a republican form of government, that it contain a bill of rights, and that it be in conformity with the applicable provisions of the United States Constitution and with the provisions of Public Law 600... [and] that it be submitted to Congress for its approval. (Gutierrez Franqui and Wells 1953: 34).

These provisions are consistent with the U.S. program of pushing North American government models in Latin America (above). The result was a Puerto Rican Constitution creating/continuing a government which looked very much like the federal government, notably including a bicameral legislature--of dubious value under the circumstances, but which did have the function of preserving a large number of political offices for party loyalists (see Wells 1969: 217).

All together, the actual changes wrought by the Constitution and Commonwealth status seem less significant than those introduced by the legislation to elect the governor (Gutierrez Franqui and Wells 1953; cf. Fernos Isern 1974; Géigel Polanco 1981).¹ But it was enough of a change for the U.S. to argue before the U.N. that Puerto Rico had become officially self-governing, and so that the U.S. had fulfilled its committment to end its colonial status (Emerson 1953: 15; Fernos Isern 1974: 201-354; Wells 1969: 108). Crucial to this argument was the active support of Muñoz Marín, who regarded this new arrangement as "final" (Tugwell 1953: 146; and see Muñoz Marín 1953). And for Muñoz Marín, making his case in Puerto Rico, the crucial point regarding a change from colonial status was the word "compact" used in Public Law 600. Muñoz interpreted this to mean that the federal government no longer could unilaterally act to change the terms of the basic federal insular relationship. Critics and even some friends disagreed with this interpretation, citing numerous facts which indicated that the federal government retained the right to act unilaterally (Lewis 1963: 413-420; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 120; Wells 1969: 243-244).

1. A contemporary authority on U.S. colonial relationships wrote about the new arrangements:

It is arguable that the status which they now have does not differ greatly in substance from that which they had before; but to press that argument too far would be to ignore the great symbolic effect of entering into a compact with the United States and of governing themselves under an instrument of their own fashioning. (Emerson 1953: 10)

Local politics and power. The changes in federal interests and orientations coincided with and supported a fundamental restructuring of insular power arrangements. Federal backing behind the fragile one-vote Popular legislative majority tipped the scales in favor of progressive forces, and enabled a new, liberal government elite to remold insular politics. Like the political parties of the 1930's, the PPD had to make promises to diverse socioeconomic groups in order to win. But unlike the earlier parties, the Populists succeeded in welding these groups into a solid, unbeatable mass of support.

Who supported the PPD at first? Quintero Rivera (1980:82-89) examines this question, and the often heard suggestion that the PPD was essentially a continuation of the old Liberal Party. In part, he finds that to be true. While the Liberal Party continued as a distinct organization for several years, many Liberals from various backgrounds had gone with Munoz (who had led a major faction within the Liberal Party in the 1930s--above). As the Liberal Party decayed in the early 1940s, more "moderate" Liberals went over to the PPD, moderating it in the process (Tugwell 1977: 370). But even in the 1940 election, the Populists ran strongest in the former Liberal strongholds in the mountains. The PPD had the support of many landowners, once the backbone of the Liberal Party. This support is exemplified by the prominent position within the PPD of Jesus Piñero, head of the Asociación de Colonos. Quintero emphasizes, however, that it was not only the old Liberals who

supported the PPD. He identifies three other bases of support which, although numerically limited at first, provided the Populars with "the difference that made the difference".

One of these consisted of radical workers, most notably the public car drivers. These choferes were influential beyond their numbers because of their on-the-job interaction with so much of the public. They comprised an interconnecting network of information and opinion, running through the island. They had a strong union, one of the founding unions in 1940 of the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT). A more militant alternative to the FLT-Socialist Party, the CGT had initial support also from radical sugar workers, especially mill employees; and from organizations representing the unemployed, who had never been represented within the FLT. Both the choferes union and the CGT as a whole were officially non-partisan, but they supported the PPD platform, which contained specific pledges for public car drivers, and general social welfare and anti-U.S. corporation promises for the others.

There are allegations that the CGT was created as a front for the PPD. It certainly is true that many Populars aided in early CGT organization efforts (Knowles 1966: 320). At any rate, the radical unions quickly became identified with the PPD, and the rapid growth of the CGT for the next three years signified an expansion and solidification of support for the Populars. In this, we see a crucial difference distinguishing

the PPD from previous parties. The Liberals, as the party of local landowners, had opposed organized labor, and for many years the local strength of the hacendados and colonos made them the main enemy of the Socialists. But by 1940, local landowners' dominance of production had been surpassed by the U.S. and Puerto Rican sugar corporations, which were now seen as the major obstacle to the well-being of both workers and landowners. The Populists took advantage of this and brought together groups in common opposition to the corporations, especially the absentee corporations (see Navas Davila 1980 24; Quintero Rivera 1980: 82, 96).

A second important group supporting the PPD, still according to Quintero Rivera, was the supporters of independence. This included many small tobacco growers, who had suffered in recent years; people of diverse backgrounds who were disgusted by the venal politics of existing parties; and some former Nationalists, who assumed (with most people) that Muñoz Marín was just waiting for the right time to move toward independence. By one estimate, as many as 80% of PPD politicians in 1940 were in favor of independence (Tugwell 1977: 257; and see Anderson 1965: 52-55).

The third group identified by Quintero Rivera was the modernized professionals, of a variety of occupational and political backgrounds, who favored the New Deal orientation of Muñoz Marín. Especially noteworthy was a small group of men who rose to positions of power within the government. Tugwell

(1977: 83) had encountered a lack of technical-administrative expertise among the PPD leadership. As one response, he imported many North American administrators (Goodsell 1967: 181). But he also sought out and quickly promoted local people who showed talent (which as it happened included many people trained in North American universities). Tugwell claims credit for discovering, among others, Jaime Benitez, later the Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, and Teodoro Moscoso, who became the mastermind and administrator of the industrial development program (Tugwell 1977: 253, 490). As a group, the rising tecnicos were young, well-educated, and from "upper middle" or higher class background. Most of them rose to prominence within administration, and from that achieved status within the PPD, rather than following the old pattern of obtaining a high government post because of loyal service to the party (Goodsell 1967: 60, 85-100). They stand in contrast to the older generation of leaders, such as Ramos Antonini, Géigel Polanco, and Quiñones, who had their own political power bases.¹

The preceding paragraph took us from the issue of popular support to that of power within the PPD. Standing above the younger tecnicos and the older politicos at the peak of the Popular power structure was Muñoz Marín. Besides the status he

1. Paláu (1980: 158) notes that the socioeconomic background of Géigel and Quinones was not so different from that of the tecnicos. What differed were the times and the avenues to power available to the younger men, as government administration became more of a developed force.

enjoyed as the founder of the Party, and his skillfully nourished personal contacts to the various socioeconomic groups supporting the Populares, Muñoz had at least three other sources of power. First, he enjoyed access to Tugwell. It is repeatedly shown in Tugwell's (1977) book that he would deal with Muñoz and no others as representative of the PPD. Moreover, the two worked well together, despite occasional clashes (see also Mathews 1961: 198-201).

Second, Muñoz had created a huge and intensely loyal public following through his brilliant 1940 campaign, and his subsequent efforts to implement his promised reforms. Tugwell repeatedly encouraged Muñoz to use this power, to go above the established party machinery and appeal directly to the electorate (Tugwell 1977: 342-343, 611-612). Whether Muñoz actually needed this encouragement is not clear. What is clear is that he encouraged or at least allowed the creation of a powerful cult of personality around him (below).

Muñoz's third source of power was his recognized standing as the current leader of the Party. The long established rule in local politics was that a party dictated the legislative votes of its members (Anderson 1963: 201 ff.), and Muñoz was stern and skillful in enforcing strict adherence to the party line (Tugwell 1977: 301). Controlling the Party, and consequently the legislature, he controlled an enormous number of patronage positions, which he manipulated in no less rigorous fashion. In fact, the major source of tension between

Muñoz and Tugwell, as Tugwell (1977: 172, 342-343, 611-612) tells it, was Muñoz's insistence on doling out posts as political rewards. Tugwell tried to persuade him to make appointments on merit only, but Muñoz evidently felt that patronage was crucial to his continuing control. He was probably correct. For one thing, even in 1957, after major civil service reform, it was estimated that 2-5% of public employees salaries were kicked-back to the PPD coffers (Anderson 1965: 153-154). For another, in the early 1940s Muñoz had not yet established his ability to vanquish all rivals, and there were still several Party leaders who could conceivably lead a revolt if the rank and file felt they were not getting their deserved rewards.

The other political parties were in disarray. The Liberal Party, as the dominant partner in the Tripartite Unification Party (also including dissident factions of the Republican and Socialist parties) in 1940 elected three representatives. It was these three whose support gave the PPD its narrow margin of control. After the election, the Unification Party broke apart, with the Liberals going their own way, and the Republican splinter group rejoining the other Republicans in a new Progressive Union Republican Party. Despite some cosmetic changes, this was the same old Republican Party. Its reason for existence was control of patronage, and it continued to seek electoral alliances at the expense of developing any strong program. Their share of the vote fell through the

decade. The Socialist Party had been damaged by internal divisions, their reputation as collaborators with the sugar corporations, and the eroding position of the FLT (below). But since La Coalición (Socialists and Republicans) had obtained a plurality of the vote in 1940, the Socialist Bolívar Pagán became the Resident Commissioner. This gave the Socialists a voice in Washington, but what they said with that voice would weaken their credibility in Puerto Rico even more (below). They too lost votes through the 1940s. All three of these once mighty parties--Liberals, Republicans and Socialists--joined in an electoral alliance in 1944 and again 1948. On both occasions, they were thoroughly trounced by the PPD (Anderson 1965: 32-44, 82-84, 89-90; Quintero Rivera 1980: 85-86; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 100-107).

Despite its rapidly declining public support, La Coalición in the early 1940's still had the post of Resident Commissioner, many elected insular legislators, control of major island newspapers, and powerful friends in Washington. They were far from helpless. Much of Tugwell's (1977) narrative is a description of their efforts to block or turn back his or the PPD's reforms. Tugwell claims that they even refused to cooperate with war preparations after the attack on Pearl Harbor, unless Tugwell switched over to side with them instead of sticking with the PPD in making government appointments (Tugwell 1977: 191-192). Since he would not (still according to Tugwell), they opened up a relentless campaign

against the governor, both in the island media and in Washington, where conservative, anti-New Deal Congressmen were very willing to lend an ear. The Coalition's main argument was that Puerto Rico was edging closer and closer to major public disorders, at the same time that Tugwell and Co. were attempting to create a supercentralized Fascist and/or Communist state (Tugwell 1977: 464-471). The situation reached such an extreme that Commissioner Pagán, of the Socialist party, in a U.S. House hearing levelled the charge that the PPD program was "socialistic" (Tugwell 1977: 432). On another occasion, he charged that Tugwell was a "sworn foe of free enterprise" who wanted "government management of industry, business, and agriculture", while he (Pagán) and his associates "believe in free enterprise" (Anderson 1965: 35).

As mentioned earlier, the Coalition forces in combination with Washington allies quite nearly succeeded in reversing the trend of reform, and probably would have, had it not been for the solid support from Roosevelt and the higher officials in Interior. But their obstructionist efforts cost the Coalitionists dearly back in Puerto Rico. In July 1942, when the submarine related food shortages were becoming critical, Pagan helped to block federal legislation that would have paid island sugar growers to grow food crops, because this would have hurt the importers who were so powerful in La Coalición (Tugwell 1977: 352-353). As the 1944 elections approached, the Coalition seemed to become desperate. They tried to block new

federal relief funds for the island, to disqualify 85,000 new voters, and even to suspend the election (Tugwell 1977: 623-629). As the Coalition's public standing fell, that of Tugwell and Muñoz continued to grow, until their position seemed secure (by 1943) (Tugwell 1977: 343, 371, 373, 592). A dispute over political appointments in 1942 had cost the PPD the Liberal Party swing votes (Tugwell 1977: 341-342), and so limited the PPD's ability to pass new laws. But most of its promised reform legislation had been passed in the 1941 and 1942 legislative sessions (below), and so this did not represent a major setback. Muñoz and the PPD had kept their promises.

In 1944, Muñoz conducted another vigorous campaign, although this time he relied more on the radio than on personal visits. He castigated those who opposed the Popular program, and repeatedly urged a straight party-line vote (Anderson 1965: 181; Wells 1955: 38). The result was a PPD landslide, 383,280 votes compared to 208,516 for the other three parties combined. The Populares gained complete control of both houses and the post of Resident Commissioner, which went to Muñoz's old ally and the spokesman for the colonos, Jesus Piñero. Combined with the Democratic victory in the U.S. Congressional elections, this meant that the reform could go on (Goodsell 1967: 41; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 101; Tugwell 1977: 674).

With the opposition parties fading fast, the main challenges to Muñoz Marín's political supremacy within Puerto

Rico came from two non-party structures: the unions, and a growing pro-independence faction within the Popular organization. The unions will be considered first.

The context of union activity was the economic crunch that accompanied the beginning of World War II. The year 1940 had been comparatively prosperous, with accelerated construction of military bases and the like pouring cash into the island economy. That did not last. By the beginning of 1942, the situation was becoming very difficult. Sudden major price increases on imports from the mainland made the stable wages worth less. The tightening noose of German submarines cut all shipping, which combined with the preparations against the possibility of an actual invasion, meant that many consumer goods became scarce. A lack of needed inputs made local businesses shut down, with a consequent explosion of unemployment (Goodsell 1967: 32; Perloff 1950: 145; Tugwell 1977; Annual Report of the Governor 1941: 10; 1942: 21-22; and below).

The FLT by this time was discredited in the eyes of many workers. Union organization in general in 1940 was weak and fragmented. But new movements were growing. The January 1942 sugar workers strike began with a repudiation of an FLT negotiated contract by militant rank and file. Since 1941, they had been deserting the FLT in numbers to sign up with the more radical CGT. By 1943, the CGT was the dominant union among sugar workers (Quintero Rivera 1980: 85). The new wave

of union militancy went beyond manual workers. Radical unionists were turning up in the newly created Public Corporations (below), and even "middle class" groups such as teachers threatened job actions over lagging pay scales (Tugwell 1977: 568-570, 579). The militants were heard in government, as would be expected given the CGT links to the PPD. Radical labor leaders were employed in the Department of Labor (Tugwell 1977: 167-168). The striking sugar workers in 1942 were supported by the government in their right to strike, even as Muñoz convinced the CGT membership to return to work in exchange for a pledge of government action on wages (Edel 1962: 46-47; Tugwell 1977: 221-222, 232-234).

Although it was not realized at the time, this closeness with the PPD controlled government spelled doom for militant independent unionism. The Party would co-opt labor organizations by establishing itself as the representative of the workers. Party men were encouraged to move into unions, and union officials were given lucrative posts in government (Sáez Corales 1971: 131-132). Although this co-optation would not be obvious until after 1945, from its inception the CGT was losing independence.

The pro-independence forces within the PPD, in contrast, were becoming less controllable. As described earlier, the issue of political status had been given a brief rest in the early 1940s, although the expectation remained that Muñoz and the PPD would push for independence when the time was right.

But maneuvering in Washington revived the issue. The support the Coalition was getting raised fears that Washington would return to its earlier reactionary and repressive policies. Efforts by Tugwell and others seemed directed toward a new but permanent arrangement within the U.S. system. In 1943, Senator Tydings turned up the heat by introducing a bill that would give Puerto Ricans the option to vote for independence. The PPD hierarchy reacted cautiously, as all the initiatives sank in Congressional committee quagmires.

These developments stimulated the establishment and growth of a Congreso Pro-Independencia (CPI) to promote efforts toward independence. Nominally non-partisan, the CPI consisted almost entirely of Populars. Muñoz remained distant but not hostile to this new body, although he certainly must have recognized the potential challenge it represented--Muñoz having organized a similar faction within the Liberal Party less than a decade before (Anderson 1965: 56; Tugwell 1977: 540-543, 567-568).

In 1944, some independentistas noisily abandoned the Popular Party because of its support for an elected governor (Anderson 1965: 99). The same year, Muñoz nearly lost control of the PPD convention to pro-independence delegates, and he feared even stronger challenges in the future (Tugwell 1977: 593, 664). And although the 1944 PPD campaign was premised on the idea that political status was not an issue (Anderson 1965: 56-57), the landslide victory stimulated pro-independence

forces to greater efforts (Petrullo 1947: 108). In May 1945, in response to the continued efforts of Senator Tydings to force the status issue, Muñoz endorsed inclusion of an intermediate "dominion" arrangement as an alternative to independence and statehood. The CPI openly criticized this move, and there was talk of restricting Muñoz's executive power within the PPD (Anderson 1965: 58-59). By September, the rift between Muñoz and the head of the CPI, Concepción de Gracias, was wide and getting wider (Anderson 1965: 98-101).

The showdown came in February 1946. Muñoz mustered his forces and expelled active CPI members from the Popular Party, although many pro-independence people remained in the PPD. In a series of newspaper articles, he accused the CPI of trying to "sabotage" his reform efforts, rejected their insistence on independence, and spoke of the need to find new ways of dealing with the economic plight of the island and its people (Anderson 1965: 60, 66-67, 101-104).¹ In July 1946, the first steps were taken toward the founding of the Partido Independentista

1. Muñoz Marín (1953: 4-5) later claimed that he gave up the ideal of independence when confronted with the inescapable conclusion that it would bring economic devastation to the island. He asserts that this conclusion was forced upon him by consideration of the terms of the Philippines independence legislation. Although this explanation has been widely accepted, it is questionable. The idea that Puerto Rico could not have negotiated much better terms for independence than the Philippines is suspect since Puerto Rico had much stronger claims for special treatment, e.g. Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens while Philippines' residents were not. But more decisively, Muñoz claimed to have come to this conclusion during his visit to Washington, in April 1946. His move against the independence forces took place two months earlier, in February.

Puertorriqueno (PIP) (Anderson 1965: 103). Along with the Nationalists, whose activities grew more extreme as Puerto Rico moved toward the Commonwealth, PIP would be a major focus of opposition to the PPD in coming years.

This brings us back to opposition by radical unions. Despite the general support the CGT gave to the PPD, the Popular leadership still had labor problems in the early 1940s. Those which involve union militancy within government-run enterprises will be discussed later. A more general problem was the existence of a radical pro-independence wing within the CGT, which opposed the more moderate leaders who were linked to the PPD. The factions within the CGT polarized in 1945, and the pro-independence group was vanquished as a power within the CGT by the expulsion of CPI members from the Popular Party. Other challenges by radical unionists would continue for years, but with less danger of their seizing control of a major union organization (Anderson 1965: 213-215; Knowles 1966: 320; and below).

The continuation of the battles between the Populars and their opponents are described at the end of this chapter. At no time after 1946 was Popular dominance seriously threatened. The PPD, and the forces to which it responded, would remain firmly in control of government, and of government policy regarding the economy. But the direction of that policy changed sharply after 1946. The political fights just described were part of a broad and decisive shift in the course

of Puerto Rico's development. The expulsion of the militant unionists and independentistas was accompanied by a corresponding shift of the PPD economic policy to the right. This shift was felt all the more as a result of the resignation of Tugwell in 1946. Where Tugwell was more radical than Muñoz, Piñero, representing the colonos, was more conservative (Goodsell 1967: 219; Lewis 1963: 159). Another important change conditioning development policy was the reform of government organization initiated in 1942. These changes enabled Muñoz and his associates to implement their plans.

Government reform, 1940--ca. 1950. The PPD came to power in 1941 committed to several major reform measures. Their initial legislation on these reforms created new government agencies, notably the Minimum Wage Board and the Land Authority (below). but government reform and reorganization was not in itself a major item on the Popular agenda. It was for Tugwell. With his long experience in activist government agencies, Tugwell quickly realized that the existing organization of government in Puerto Rico was woefully inadequate for the tasks that both he and Muñoz envisioned. It lacked the necessary financial resources, quality personnel, and executive structures. Most of all, it would be necessary to eliminate the perpetual deadlock between the legislative and executive branches (Goodsell 1967: 43-45).

Tugwell pushed government reform in the 1942 legislative session. Financial arrangements were improved quickly. A new

Office of the Budget and related agencies brought sound cost accountability to government (Goodsell 1967: 150; Tugwell 1977: 64-68). It was providential that this occurred when it did, since lax accounting would have been disastrous in the next few years. Some tax reform was passed in the 1941 session, and local tax revenues would climb through the decade (Curet Cuevas 1979: 66, 314-315). That was accompanied by a tremendous windfall in returned federal excise tax on rum shipped to the U.S. (A provision of federal-insular relations had always been that excise taxes on Puerto Rican products would be returned to the insular treasury). As mainland alcohol supplies were diverted to the production of synthetic rubber, Puerto Rico rum came into strong demand. In four years, this generated \$160,000,000 for the island government. The well-administered use of these funds paid for many of the reforms to come (Goodsell 1967: 158; Tugwell 1977: 424).

Civil service reform was more difficult. Tugwell wanted to replace political loyalty with merit as the criterion for hiring and firing of government employees (Tugwell 1977: 45). To do that, he would need the cooperation of Muñoz. Muñoz supported Tugwell's government reform efforts in general, but he had the power to obstruct those efforts if he felt it necessary, and he felt it necessary in this case (Goodsell 1967: 59, 69). The reform bill submitted by Tugwell in 1942 was modified so as to retain political control over personnel, leading Tugwell to veto the legislation. This incident stands

as the major exception to Tugwell's record of legislative successes that year (Goodsell 1967: 115-119). By 1944, Muñoz was more receptive, perhaps because by that time the replacement of old government personnel by Populists was more complete. New reform measures were introduced and passed in 1944, 1946, and 1949, establishing a merit system and a civil service commission (Goodsell 1967 121-130; Wells 1969: 195-197). This was a big improvement, but many government positions were still exempted from civil service regulation, and remained subject to political manipulation (Lewis 1963: 328-335).

Structural reform of government was rapid and dramatic. The first Popular dominated legislature (1941) created several major new government bodies in order to carry out promised reform. They were the Land Authority, the Minimum Wage Board, and the Water Authority (Autoridad de Fuentes Fluviales) (Goodsell 1967: 30), the activities of which are discussed below. The 1942 session, Tugwell's first, was even more creative. In the midst of an economic and military crisis, and in circumvention of legal restrictions in Puerto Rico's colonial charter, seven major agencies were created, including the Office of the Budget, the Development Company, the Development Bank, the Planning Board, the Sugar Board, and the Communication and Transportation Authorities (Goodsell 1967: 33-35; Tugwell 1977: 343-344).

Another side to the structural reform was increased

centralization of political control. Tugwell believed centralization was a good thing. He pushed it in several ways. The expanded scope of government agencies and programs was one. Tugwell also created departments of statistics, budgets, and information within the Office of the Governor, giving the governor greater ability to make decisions and to act (Goodsell 1967: 64-68). He pushed centralization of public services, including health care (to be concentrated in major district hospitals), fire departments, sewer services, park administration, and water supply (Tugwell 1977: 260, 262). Simultaneously, several federal agencies were reaching directly into island municipios, such as those dealing with soil conservation, AAA payments, housing, and unemployment compensation (Wolf 1956: 247-248).

These developments added up to a decided strengthening of higher level government centers relative to the powers of municipal government (which remained still a stronghold of local landowner and merchant power [Lewis 1963: 353]). Tugwell tried to attack municipal government power directly in his proposal for the Planning Board. The original legislation for the Board was drawn up by the acknowledged U.S. expert in the field. Tugwell rejected his plan because it made the municipalities the basic unit for planning. He wanted a centralized board, with authority for all the island. He also wanted to expand the duties of the Planning Board from just land use, to cover also capital and operating expenditures of

the government (Goodsell 1967: 165-166; Tugwell 1977: 258-261).

All these efforts were fuel for La Coalición's claims that Tugwell was trying to establish a super-government, one that would control so much of the island's political and economic life that it would be almost impossible to defeat in an election (Tugwell 1977: 470-471, 516). Tugwell of course dismissed these arguments, but even his former aid (and later governor) Sánchez Vilella (1980: 124) admits that the fears had some justification. Certainly, the sheer size of government grew dramatically under Tugwell: with 41 new agencies, personnel rising from 15,579 to 21,000 and annual income going from \$47 million to \$112.9 million (Goodsell 1967: 221-222). Yet there were countervailing trends and conditions as well.

Tugwell's support for centralization was actually less than that advocated by then-influential organization theorists (Goodsell 1967: 58). (Federal agencies on the island were being centralized at the same time, independent of Tugwell [Annual Report of the Governor 1946: 2]). Tugwell allowed, even demanded a great deal of authority for and initiative from the heads of major government divisions (Goodsell 1967: 100-102). As described above, he wanted to remove civil service from political control. He was adamant about political independence for the Planning Board, which in his view would come to be a fourth basic division of government, along with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Tugwell 1977: 517).

Tugwell's plans for centralization depended, like all his legislative initiatives, on the cooperation of Muñoz Marín. Muñoz went along with Tugwell to the extent of eliminating a number of built-in checks by the legislature over the governor. Tugwell, after all, was an important ally, and too much obstruction of his efforts might have led to a less congenial replacement. Perhaps also Muñoz was already beginning to think that he himself could be governor in a few years. But Muñoz never lost his ability to check Tugwell via iron control over the legislature (Goodsell 1967: 49-69), and he used this ability to check the independence of the Planning Board. Popular legislators modified the bill to create the Board in order to reassert legislative oversight; and to mollify local politicians by exempting all rural areas from its control of land utilization, and by expressing an intent to establish municipal planning boards in the future (Goodsell 1967: 169-176; Tugwell 1974a: 62-72; 1977: 261).¹

The legislative check on gubernatorial power ceased with the election of Muñoz Marín as governor in 1948. The Popular Party controlled the legislature, and he controlled the Popular

1. In practice, the Planning Board would promote centralization in other, less obvious ways. Its four capital project areas were to be the development of district hospitals, and the facilitation of transportation by upgrading San Juan roads, rural highways, and island airports (Goodsell 1967: 176-177). Facilitating movement was an important infrastructural contribution to development, but was also a precondition for effective centralized administration (Tugwell 1977: 260). I will discuss the centralizing consequences of improved highways in the chapter to come on 1960-1982.

Party. His main opponents within the Party had been expelled, he had the fierce loyalty of an overwhelming majority of the electorate, and his skillful use of the perquisites and resources of power reached even to the level of the barrío (Lewis 1963: 353; Manners 1956: 123; Wolf 1956: 251; and below). After 1948, the legislature had little independent power. It would receive little attention in island media, eclipsed by the actions of heads of important government agencies, and of course, of Muñoz himself (Lewis 1963: 352, 357).

Muñoz used his first term as governor to further consolidate his control, even while creating the appearance of separate and independent government powers. He promoted needed reform of the judiciary, but loyal Populars continued to be named to the courts. He appointed an aggressive controller, but the controller kept away from the legislature and its pool of perquisites (Wells 1969: 206-218). The Commonwealth Constitution guaranteed representation to minor parties, but procedural rules were established that severely limited minor parties' abilities to act as effective opposition (Lewis 1963: 358-360, 373). Similar institutional restrictions virtually eliminated the possibility of revolt from within the ranks of the PPD (Lewis 1963: 354). For instance, through the 1950s the Party hierarchy actually kept its by-laws secret from the membership (Anderson 1965: 120-121), so that even if a rebellion did form, its leaders would not know how to take

control.

Within the executive branch, a separate process of centralization took place. In 1947 and 1949, largely out of the public eye, steps were taken to reorganize: consolidating old agencies, subsuming new ones within established structures, and streamlining the effective control of the governor and a few powerful administrators. The Planning Board, as one important example, lost any vestige of independence. This move to greater control was made possible by the development of statistical reports and other administrative tools begun under Tugwell; and it was given support by the emphasis on greater integration of functions and centralization of authority expounded by contemporary organization theorists. In fact, the new Puerto Rican executive branch was held up as the most developed example anywhere of formal organization theory put into practice (Goodsell 1967: 182-185, 213; Tugwell 1974a: 62-72; Wells 1956: 484-485; 1969: 199-203). Even sympathetic observers, however, noted that this was a very authoritarian structure, which stifled initiative from the ranks and which had the potential for serious abuse (Goodsell 1967: 234; Wells 1956: 490). Muñoz Marín's political enemies charged that the abuse was not potential, but actual, and embodied in the repression of radical critics that began in the late 1940s. But that will be discussed later in this chapter.

Through all the measures described above, Muñoz Marín had in only a decade achieved complete political control of the

insular government. He did not, however, rule according to his whims. He had to avoid alienating any large block of voters or sizable numbers of party activists. He relied heavily on the judgement and expertise of a small group of expert advisers, who themselves were responding to various aspects of contemporary social arrangements. He had to cope with economic trends and powerful interests at and above the insular level, which could make or break his legislative programs. Each of these factors constrained his actions, as will be seen in subsequent discussions.

Muñoz also had to keep Washington happy. For all the talk of a "compact", the federal government had never relinquished its authority as the ultimate arbiter of government policies in Puerto Rico. Muñoz sought to minimize the degree of active federal interference. He fought Tugwell tenaciously over the latter's insistence (and Roosevelt's) on a "Coordinator" of all federal programs on the island (Tugwell 1977: 544-556). The post of Coordinator was included in the elected governor legislation (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 106), but apparently was eliminated somewhere in the move to the Commonwealth. Muñoz's repeated emphasis on the significance of the "compact" as the key to Puerto Rico's alleged decolonization perhaps also minimized federal meddling in insular affairs. Even if Washington had not ceded authority as Muñoz claimed, it was expedient to avoid any demonstration of that fact. As long as Muñoz was doing good things as far as federal legislators and

administrators were concerned, there was no reason to interfere.¹

Economic Change and Power Shifts in Puerto Rico

In the 1950s, Puerto Rico became world-famous for its program of economic development. But what became a program of development began in the 1940s as a program of distributive justice. That program has several aspects. Those involving direct assistance to the needy will be discussed later. This section will begin with discussion of a distributive initiative which would have a direct impact on the basic insular structure of production: the land reform.

Land reform. This chapter began by describing Secretary of the Interior Ickes's decision to support the Popular's key pledge of enforcement of the 500 acre law, and his decision to send Tugwell to see about implementation. Tugwell held hearings in Puerto Rico in early 1941 (described in Descartes 1972: 192-194; Lugo Silva 1955: 119; Tugwell 1942: 49 ff.).

1. The government developed under Muñoz Marín may be characterized as populist, with authoritarian tendencies. It differs, however, from the structure of contemporary authoritarian populist governments in Latin America. They have been called "corporatist", characterized by the channeling of broad sectors of the populace into official mass organizations, capable of being controlled from above (see Malloy 1977). Corporatist tendencies can be seen, especially regarding unions, but not with the same emphasis on institutional embodiment found in the government of Mexico. (Mexico is taken as an illustration of corporatism because of the similarities between the PPD and Mexico's PIR, described in Anderson [1965: 222-223]). Many factors undoubtedly contribute to this difference, such as Puerto Rico's lack of a national army. Another element may be that corporatist organization was incompatible with the structures of government and administration favored by the dominant colonial power.

Muñoz and the Populares were determined to push the reform. Their political victory was based in large part of their promise of house sites to landless laborers, aid to colonos victimized by the corporation mills, and land for small farmers (Goodsell 1967: 24). Muñoz had identified the corporations, and especially the absentee North American corporations, as the main cause of the island's ills (Navas Davilla 1980: 24).

It became clear in the hearings that some of the corporations themselves, and many of their local employees, were not irreconcilably opposed to the reform. Many felt the future of sugar production in Puerto Rico to be uncertain, and were willing to sell out to the government--if the price was right (Lord in Tugwell 1977: 91; Tugwell 1942: 49). Tugwell's position was clearly in favor of reform (Tugwell 1977: 76), but he was concerned about the emphasis on creating small farms in the PPD platform. Tugwell wanted to preserve the efficiencies he saw linked to large scale operations, and so he emphasized a lesser known part of the PPD platform, which called for the creation of large scale proportional profit farms (Tugwell 1942; 1977: 86-88).

Perhaps the most divisive aspect of the hearings was the controversy between representatives of workers and colonos. Both groups were important constituencies of the PPD. The colonos had been spared any blame in Muñoz's concentrated attack on the corporations. Now the colonos wanted the land taken from corporations to be distributed among colonos. This

put them in direct opposition to representatives of labor (with whom they had never been willing to negotiate a contract), in regard to the extent of the land reform and the nature of the new farms to be created.

The Land Law was a compromise between the two interests. The new farms would be workers' cooperatives, not handed over to colonos. But the latter had their own holdings protected. All private (i.e. non-corporation) land holdings would be exempt from government action, even those exceeding 500 acres. This latter provision nearly led Tugwell to recommend that the law be vetoed, since it was evident that the colonos were among the worst of the employers. Eventually, he acquiesced to the possible (Tugwell 1942: 43, 49-55; 1977: 101-104).¹ That did not prevent the colonos from later becoming some of the most bitter of Tugwell's many critics (see Subcommittee 1943: 985-1019).

Tugwell had reason to support the basic orientation of the Land Law as passed. It deemphasized distribution of land for small farms (of 5 to 25 acres). By 1958, only 1,116 such farms had been created, and no ancillary support services had been established to make them viable (Edel 1962: 40; 1963: 47; Sánchez Vilella 1980: 125). Federal programs created more small farms, but in similar numbers (Edel 1963: 47). The total number of small farms in Puerto Rico actually declined slightly

1. A relevant general discussion of different treatment in land reform of absentee-owned corporation plantations and native-owned haciendas is found in Mintz (1963).

from 1940 to 1950, and substantially from 1950 to 1960 (U.S. Census reports in Curet Cuevas 1979: 146-147). This small farm program had little impact in Puerto Rico, and none so far as I can tell in the south coast sugar areas. This apparent failure to follow through on a campaign promise was compensated for by an emphasis on the distribution of smaller plots for house sites, as described later in this chapter.

The proportional profit farms, secondary in pre-election campaigning, became the centerpiece of the land program. After some initial modifications, the outlines of operations and land acquisition procedures were established. The Land Authority was empowered to buy lands being held in receivership after successful prosecutions of corporations in violation of the 500 acre law. In 1942, this was modified to allow corporations to sign consent decrees for a sell-out to the government, thus avoiding litigation and enabling the corporations to bargain for sale prices. Land acquired by the Land Authority was to be divided into farms of 100 to 500 cuerdas, to be rented by the farm cooperative from the government at a rate sufficient to pay back the original purchase price over twenty years (Edel 1962: 39). (Critics of the plan said from the start that the requirement of amortization of the purchase price would eat up all the profits [Edel 1962: 41], and they were proven nearly correct).

The cooperatives were to be run by managers hired by the government, usually formers mayordomos, who would be paid a

salary plus 15% of the farm's net profits. Workers were to receive the prevailing wage plus a division of net profits. Those residing on the farms also would receive 1 to 3-cuerda plots for growing subsistence crops. Workers would not, however, have any say in the management of the farm, in this sense being no better off than workers for private corporations (Edel 1962: 39-40).

The Land Authority was allocated \$24 million, the largest single grant for any of the new government agencies. Its first acquisition was the land of the Puerto Rican corporation-owned Cambalache landholdings, in August 1943. These were divided into six cooperative farms. The taking of title was made into a major event, and symbolic fulfillment of all the promises of the Populists, who claimed on the occasion that "la tierra es pan y libertad" (the land is bread and liberty). A second farm (Toa) was acquired shortly thereafter. Then the defection of the Liberal legislators resulted in a brief interruption of funding, and so of new acquisitions (Edel 1962: 44-45, 50-52; Lugo Silva 1955: 177; Annual Report of the Governor, various years).

In 1944, with assured promises of more funds, efforts were pressed in regard to the U.S. corporations. All four had been sued to divest (along with eight Puerto Rican corporations). In 1944, Fajardo and South Porto Rico signed consent forms agreeing to sell their lands. Aguirre and Eastern fought the suits with a variety of appeals and procedural maneuvers, which

ultimately proved successful in preventing their takeover.¹ Early 1945 saw another \$18 million allocated to the Land Authority, and a resumption of purchases and takeovers, including the Cambalache mill--the first mill the Land Authority acquired. In retrospect, 1945 was the high point of the acquisition drive. Although the Land Authority continued acquiring land up to 1949 in fulfillment of contractual agreements already signed or litigation already begun, after 1945 there were no new actions begun by the government to acquire any of the extensive holdings still in violation of the Land Law (Edel 1962: 50-52; Farr 1948; Annual Report of the Governor, various years).² Possible explanations for this

1. The different tactics adopted by Aguirre and South Porto Rico are understandable in light of their recent operations. South Porto Rico had always grown a small part of its own cane (about one-third around 1940), being the most reliant on colono production of the U.S. mills. Since the 1920s, it had been expanding into the Dominican Republic, and was known to be planning more expansion there, and to start operations in Florida (Farr 1943: 91-92; Subcommittee 1943: 593). Its earnings were down dramatically after 1940. Aguirre, on the other hand, was the most reliant on self-administered cane, it had no reported major interests outside of Puerto Rico, and it was still making a healthy, if somewhat reduced, profit (Farr, various years). The logic behind Fajardo's agreement to sell, while Eastern fought the suit, is not clear to this author, although the Land Authority did later claim that Fajardo had significantly overvalued its land for the sale (Edel 1963: 38).

2. The job was far from complete when the acquisitions stopped. Around 1950, the Land Authority had taken 7 of the 33 holdings judged to be in violation of the Land Law in 1941, and 5 others had sold-off holdings to colonos. The Authority had acquired over 70,000 acres, but this was less than half of what it set out to nationalize. The Authority at this time was operating 48 proportional profit farms, and two mills (Edel 1963: 48; Koenig 1953: 253; Padilla 1956: 266; Subcommittee 1943: 701-702; Wells 1969: 148).

change in policy are discussed below.

The operation of the proportional profit farms went about as planned. That in itself created problems for the government. Padilla (1956), in her study of a proportional profit farm community in 1948-49, shows that workers conceived of the unit as just like a private corporate enterprise. Management was still "el patrón", even if they were public employees. Although active opposition was rendered unlikely by the firm political control of local unions, the structured hostility of workers and management under prevailing conditions would pose a problem for a government presenting itself as the champion of the workers, especially as the profits being distributed annually to the workers were nothing great (from an average of \$12.44 per worker in 1944 to a high of \$26.20 per worker in 1950 [Koenig 1953: 255]). One response by the government was a willingness to agree to pay relatively high wages, to limit mechanization, to intensify production and expand acreage, and generally to create work and spread it around to as many people as possible. These practices raised the labor costs of proportional profit farm sugar, even though partly offset by higher yields. But even these practices could not keep up with the demand for work. As a finite amount of work was divided among a growing pool of workers, individual earnings declined (Edel 1963: 39, 43; Koenig 1953: 253-257; Padilla 1956: 266-269, 278-289, 295-299). The situation began to turn ugly during the early 1950s. The government was

attacked for the apparent lack of improvement in the workers' lot (Lugo Silva 1955: 124-125), and for siding with management against increasingly vocal workers' demands (Edel 1963: 39). In political terms, the proportional profit farms were becoming a liability.

They also became a financial liability. Individual proportional profit farms had occasionally run in the red almost from the start of the program. The government was required by the Land Law to make up these losses, with their payments deductible from future earnings. This was not a problem while the farms generally made money. After 1951, the upward trend in profits reversed. From 1953, many farms were routinely operating with deficits. By the late 1950s, most of the farms were losing money. The government's accumulated costs for making up operating losses reached \$8,447,985 by 1959 (Edel 1963: 35-36).

The 1950s were hard times for Puerto Rico's sugar producers, with declining profits all around (below). The Land Authority losses were due only in part to their higher labor costs. As Edel (1963: 36-39, 43-44) makes clear, a great part of the loss is attributable to political decisions. One of these was a decision in 1950 by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, that the total proportional profit farm system, rather than the separate farm units, would henceforth be used in calculating AAA conditional payments. Since these payments were calculated in a way that gave higher compensation to

smaller producers, this resulted in a substantial loss of income.¹ Another decision has already been mentioned, that the proportional profit farms were to repay the government for the original purchase price of the land. In 1959, when the program suffered a total loss of \$1,140,701, some \$1,300,000 of its outlays went in rent to the government. The farms also had to pay the government for several services, for interest on crop loans, and to contribute to a reserve fund which many considered excessively large. Taking these payments into account, it is not at all clear that the farms represented a net loss for the government.

Seda's description of Land Authority operations in 1959 indicates another political factor affecting costs, that the Authority was used as an employment agency for people with political connections, and the resulting incompetence in management led to needless losses (Seda 1973: 25-26, 154-156). Finally, to focus exclusively on the operating losses and the inefficient use of labor is to ignore the probable costs to the government of some 15,000 employees--one estimate of "excess" workers in a total Land Authority employment of 32,703 in the 1949-50 harvest (Koenig 1953: 256-257)--if they were suddenly thrown out of work. So the operating losses of the

1. The first attempt to so reclassify the proportional profit farms occurred in 1948. Gov. Piñero did not object. (Piñero, it will be recalled, had been the head of the colonos organization, which had always opposed the proportional profit farms). But the Land Authority and Muñoz strongly protested the reclassification, obtaining a temporary reversal (Edel 1963: 36).

proportional profit farms were not simple facts. They depended on how the accounts were added up, and that was determined by politics.

Nevertheless, the reported losses and the souring of the grand social experiment led to widespread and extreme dissatisfaction with the farms in the late 1950s. They began to be subdivided, losing acreage but growing in number (Stead 1958: 64). Numerous ideas were floated for disposing of or revitalizing the farms, each idea responding to some particular interest group, but none commanding wide support (Edel 1963: 39-41; Mathews 1960: 119-121). The program was dying, not from any fatal blow, but, as Lewis (1963: 225) put it, "from legislative apathy". The beginning of that apathy can be dated to the watershed year of 1945. What happened then? Why did the enthusiasm for enforcing the 500 acre law crest and then recede?

At least three answers have been suggested. Hanson (1960: 169-170) claims that the popular demand for continued takeovers fell-off as corporations became more responsive to their workers, and more house parcels were distributed. This is not convincing, since worker-management conflicts were still strong at least to the late 1940s, since creation of the proportional profits farms had never been a key demand of labor, and since the popular Party had, by the mid 1940s, already established substantial control over what was to be defined as a public issue. Lewis (1955: 625) suggests "that nationalization was

abandoned in order to gain the confidence of continental investors suspicious of anything smacking of socialism". That undoubtedly was a consideration in later years, but in 1945, continental investors were nothing more than a highly uncertain prospect on a distant horizon.

Edel (1962: 53; 1963: 49; also see Wells 1969: 148) suggests that the land reform had never been about land at all, but about the power of the corporate land owners, and that this power was conclusively broken by the early land takeovers and the landslide electoral victory of 1944. This is more plausible. The sugar corporations had suffered major political defeats. Besides their loss at the polls and the nationalizations, two other major steps were taken against them in early 1942. The strike of sugar workers in 1942 led to the establishment of the right of the insular Minimum Wage Board to set wages in the sugar industry. Although it did not have to exercise this right for the next few years, its use in later years led Edel (1962: 47) to call it "a PPD victory which probably has since had as great an effect as their land programs" (and see Minimum Wage Board 1942: 11-12).

Shortly after settling the strike, Muñoz responded to producers' threats to abandon Puerto Rico by having the sugar industry declared a public utility (leading some sugar producers to secretly lobby for the imposition of martial law). Although colonos were unhappy with some aspects of this new government regulation, it served to protect them from the

mills, especially in matters such as preferential transport and grinding of corporation vs. colono cane (Koenig 1953: 236-238; Lugo Silva 1955: 129-130; Subcommittee 1943: 614). The public utility legislation also established the principle of a ceiling on mill profits, a ceiling which was pegged in one court case at 7% of assets (Farr 1945: 22). (In 1951, regulation of the sugar industry was placed under the Junta Azucarera [Lugo Silva 1955: 129-130]). So it is true, the sugar corporations had lost several battles.

Despite these setbacks, the sugar corporations were far from powerless. As will be shown below, they were regaining influence and powerful friends in the U.S. Congress. This increase in political clout explains the end of the land reform. Edel was correct in attributing the change in land policy to a change in power relationships, but mistaken about the nature of that political change. To understand what happened, we must examine the alignments within the U.S. sugar industry.

The United States sugar industry I: 1940--1948. A brief review of events described in Chapter IV is in order. The cooperative relations between major suppliers of the tariff-protected U.S. market in the early 1920s were subverted by growing excess production capacity and supplies. Cuban sugar was gradually tariffed out of competition, and the future of Philippine production was limited by granting it independence. Still there was too much sugar. In 1934, Hawaii and Puerto Rico were forced to cut back production by the imposition of quotas, as Cuba was guaranteed a share of the U.S. market in order to avoid anarchy on that island. This established division of the U.S. market remained stable until the beginning of the War, with the exception of a brief tightening of supplies relative to demand felt world-wide in 1939. That event led to temporary suspension of U.S. quotas, which were quickly reimposed as the heightened demand drew out reserves (Wilson n.d.: 9).

With the outbreak of hostilities, increased federal regulation of the sugar industry was begun (see Bernhardt 1948; Farr 1945; Wilson n.d.). The goals of regulation were to ensure equitable distribution of sugar within the U.S. and to our allies, to keep prices down, and to promote production. The distributional aspects were acceptable to most sugar producers, but the price ceilings quickly became an area of sharp contention, as representatives of each producing region argued that they deserved either a higher purchase price or increased

support payments (Subcommittee 1943; Wilson n.d.). This issue pitted producers against government administrators; they involved disputes between producing areas only in making cases for preferential treatment. The issue of increasing production, on the other hand, revived the old antagonisms between producers.

In 1942, the problem in the U.S. sugar industry shifted quickly from too much to too little sugar. The Philippine shipments were cut off completely in 1942 (Wilson n.d.: 10). Hawaiian sugar production dipped as defense activities competed for land and labor, but it soon stabilized at about 15% below pre-war levels (Wilson n.d.: 82). Mainland cane producers maintained or even increased production, but beet sugar production--the largest of all domestic production sectors--dropped by 40% in 1943, and stayed low until 1947. Beet growers were shifting to other crops, such as beans, which could be grown on the same land, but which received stronger price support and required less of the increasingly scarce commodity of manpower. Only when price support for sugar was raised substantially did production of beet sugar increase (Wilson n.d.: 114-115, 125). Puerto Rican sugar production also was down, but that will be discussed below. Taking up all this slack in production was Cuban cane sugar production. The effective tariff on Cuban raw sugar was lowered from \$.009 per pound to \$.0075 in January 1942 (USDL 1944: 24). The percentage of U.S. sugar provided by Cuba climbed steadily from 24.84% in

1939 to 54.85% in 1944 (Farr 1960: 265).

Since U.S. domestic sugar production remained below pre-war levels for the duration of the war, the expansion of Cuban imports did no domestic division any direct harm. But as the war's end approached, and the post-war division of the U.S. market became a question, Cuba loomed as a threat to all domestic producers. Representatives of Cuban producers and government were forcefully negotiating for a guaranteed share of the U.S. market, and for favorable rates of compensation from federal sugar purchasers (Wilson n.d.: 24 ff, 45-48, 53). They were in a strong position to bargain. Cuba could claim to have done all it could for the war effort, even if the North American financial corporations that still dominated much of Cuban production had made substantial profits in the process (Committee 1945: 138; Wilson n.d.: 52-62). Cuba was an important regional ally, and an important market for U.S. manufactures (Committee 1947: 51-52; United States Cuban Sugar Council 1948). And the U.S., would still need substantial deliveries of Cuban sugar for the immediate post-war period. So domestic producers had reason to fear the deal Cuba might cut.

A less immediate but potentially greater threat was related to the plans for decolonizing the Caribbean. Some feared that these efforts might result in opening the U.S. market to super-low cost producers. Congressional friends of U.S. sugar producers, such as Fred Crawford (a self-identified "beet man"

from Michigan), and Domengeaux of Louisiana saw the Anglo-American Commission as a barely concealed subversive plot, to cede our sovereignty over Puerto Rico and to somehow put all the islands, including Cuba and perhaps Haiti and the Dominican Republic, into one unified and federally supervised sugar system (Committee 1945: 87; Subcommittee 1943: 260, 1157). A related fear was that the executive branch would try to run all U.S. sugar production as a public utility after the war.¹ The stated fear that the executive branch would sacrifice U.S. sugar production for international ends² was quite probably exaggerated for public consumption, but the fear

1. Witness the exchange between Representative Crawford of Michigan and Secretary of the Interior Ickes, on the topic of public regulation of Puerto Rican sugar mills, beginning with Crawford.

In other words, it seems to me that putting the Puerto Rican sugar mills under the law which now exists and which some consider as public utility control, that we put them in a noncompetitive or unfavorable position with our domestic mills here on the continent, in the United States.

SECRETARY ICKES. Well, I would like to make a general answer to that and that is, that as a matter of principle, I think that Puerto Rico is a part of the United States and the same regulations ought to obtain there as here, and here as there.

MR. CRAWFORD. But you go so far as to say, or would you, that you think the mills of continental United States should be put under similar control?

SECRETARY ICKES. Congressman, you know more about those things than I do. (Subcommittee 1944: 1650)

2. This fear was expressed by Representative Clevenger, of Ohio:

I come from a sugar-producing area and we produce it in spite of the opposition of Agriculture Department in the last few [pre-war] years. It has been stated before this committee, no lesser person than Mr. Wallace [Secretary of Agriculture] himself said that continental sugar industry ought to be destroyed; we should not raise sugar. (Subcommittee 1947: 17)

was not entirely unfounded. The geographic scope of the Commission had expanded, after 1945 encompassing French and Dutch possessions. (Its name was then changed from the Anglo-American to the Caribbean Commission) (Caribbean Commission 1946: 111). The eight objectives of the Commission's land tenure policy (see Harris 1946) would certainly have caused a major disruption of existing agricultural arrangements if extended to the continental United States. The danger of "socialistic" regulation was not as real as the danger of old fashioned economic liberalism, of too much capitalism. If decolonization of the Caribbean led to elimination of coercive non-wage controls over labor, and to free trade between all the islands and the U.S., mainland sugar producers would quite likely be destroyed.

This combination of dangers led to a regrouping of domestic sugar producers into a unified front which included the Puerto Rico corporations. The Puerto Rican sugar industry as a whole began the decade out in the cold in Washington. Its internal divisions, and the corporations' noisy media campaign against federal regulations (e.g. Puerto Rico Trade Council 1939), had earned the active hostility of officials in both the Department of the Interior and Agriculture (Wilson n.d.: 71-72). This hostility had material consequences. In the fall of 1944, according to Earl Wilson (one of the chief wartime regulators, and himself a critic of Puerto Rican producers), a carefully determined production support payment of \$.50 per hundred

weight for Puerto Rican raw sugar "was reduced to 40 cents by the policy group of the Department of Agriculture by one of the most capricious decisions that I experienced in my entire Government service" (Wilson n.d.: 77; also see Committee 1945: 2 ff.).

Besides government officials, other sugar producers had been hostile to Puerto Rico. Tugwell (1977: 314) writes that in 1942, continental cane and beet sugar lobbyists were "joyful" about Puerto Rico's production problems (below), which they claimed proved Puerto Rico to be a unreliable supplier upon which the U.S. dare not depend in the future. Congressman Crawford refers to colleagues among the U.S. beet sugar producers who, in the Spring of 1943, were for discriminatory treatment that could lead to the "losing" of Puerto Rican and even Louisiana cane production (Subcommittee 1943: 259-260). Louisiana Congressman Domingeaux, for his part, was against any favorable treatment for Puerto Rico unless Louisiana received the same (Subcommittee 1943: 509).

In the same hearings in 1943, however, Crawford suggests a plan which would gain support through subsequent Congressional hearings: that all domestic sectors be allowed to produce sugar without limit up until the market was satisfied, without any area permanently relinquishing its historical (quota) share of the U.S. market, and with domestic producers having preference over Cuban or other foreign sources (Committee 1945: 5-7;

Subcommittee 1943; 259-260, 509, 512; 1947: 32-37, 39).1

A cooperative attitude had time to grow, as continuing low production levels meant that no domestic producer posed a

1. The plan is most clearly stated in the following exchanges between Crawford, Everett Wilson of the Puerto Rican Trade Council (not to be confused with Earl Wilson, the federal regulator), Representative Farrington of Hawaii, and Subcommittee Chairman Fell:

[Mr. Crawford] I would certainly favor a program which removes all restrictions of production and shipment to the full extent of the capacity to produce in Hawaii and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and based upon our gross and net needs, and so long as that removal of restriction does not interfere with the historical background rights of continental cane and beet, and the moment it begins to interfere, at that point the entire domestic family will be called into the picture to devise ways and means.

Do I make myself clear?

MR. WILSON. Yes; and Puerto Rico certainly would agree with that.

MR. CRAWFORD. Furthermore, that the treatment be given preference to Cuba's position in the picture.

Do I make that clear?

MR. WILSON. Yes.

MR. CRAWFORD. Do you understand that?

MR. FARRINGTON. Yes.

MR. CRAWFORD. Do you disagree?

MR. FARRINGTON. I would not pass judgement on a matter as far reaching as that on such short notice.

THE CHAIRMAN. For the purpose of the record I want to ask a question as a sort of innocent bystander. We don't grow any sugar in Missouri.

In view of world conditions what, in your judgement and estimation, will be the situation in case that should take place? How long is it going to be before the sugar market is glutted and the domestic sugar producers are going to be screaming for protection?

MR. CRAWFORD. Under the mutual-aid agreements--I was looking over some 14 of them this morning--which we have effectuated with other countries, and their relation to the operations of B.E.W. and post-war food planning, there is nobody, in my opinion, inside the sugar industry now who is smart enough to reasonably forecast a satisfactory answer to your question. It is in the hands of high officials, involving the highest policy of government of all of these nations with which we are now involved. (Subcommittee 1943: 1160-1161)

threat to any other. In fact, the worst scarcities were in 1945 and 1946. Hawaiian sugar decreased because of a long strike (Anonymous 1949: 74-81), and the full impact of the destruction of European beet crops was felt, drawing stocks from the U.S. to Europe (Committee 1947: 47-48; Subcommittee 1947: 9; Wilson n.d.: 4). A test of the domestic producers' solidarity was approaching, however. The 1937 Sugar Act was due to expire in 1947. Hearings would be in 1946, and they would involve a decision on the division of the U.S. market, and Cuba's future in it. A one-year extension of the Act postponed the decision, but in 1947, hearings began on the new bill. The domestic producers put up a solid front. They worked together with the Department of Agriculture experts to draft the legislation (Committee 1947: 59), and sent one spokesman to the open hearings to endorse the drafted bill in the name of all the major domestic producer divisions.¹

The domestic producers did not, however, have to test their clout against Cuba and its supporters. The continuing scarcities allowed a plan with something for everybody, even

1. As the spokesman, Mr. Frank Kemp, put it: I appear as a single witness on the bill before you on behalf of five of the great domestic sugar producing and refining groups: Sugarcane growers and processors of the mainland sugarcane States of Louisiana and Florida; the sugar beet growers and processors in the States from Michigan and Ohio to the Pacific coast; the Porto [sic] Rican Sugar Producers Association; the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association; and the United States Cane Sugar Refiners Association, comprising the majority of the refiners of cane sugar in the coastal cities from Massachusetts to Texas. (Committee 1947: 28)

Cuba (Committee 1947: 11-18; Farr 1955: 238). Cuba was allocated almost all of the future increase in the U.S. market (although this provision was later changed); and for the near term, it was given the right to fulfill the Philippine allotment until the latter's production returned to normal, which was expected to take several years. (Some thought the Philippines might never return to be a major U.S. supplier, that instead Philippine sugar would be diverted into expanding Asian markets [Committee 1947: 34]). The various U.S. sugar divisions got fixed quotas in roughly pre-war proportions, although absolute levels were raised to meet increased demand from nearly a decade of population growth. The conditions to be met in order to receive AAA payments were eliminated save for one (discussed below), and no acreage allocations would be enforced unless it was deemed necessary in the future. This last provision meant that a sector would be allowed to exceed its quota without penalty, at least until an industry-wide sugar surplus developed. It was hoped that such a development was a long way off. So all the difficult decisions had been avoided for the time being. Sugar producers could hardly have asked for more, especially considering the juicy subsidy they continued to receive.¹

1. The role of the powerful sugar refiners in all these machinations is not entirely clear. They did not share the same worries over who would supply raw sugar to the U.S., so long as they retained control of refining. In that goal, they did face a challenge from Puerto Rico. Several Puerto Rican mills had established small refineries during the war, to supply the insular market and the small quota for refined sugar for the

The Puerto Rican sugar industry I: 1940--1948. Puerto

Rican sugar production was effected by changes in the structure of the U.S. industry mainly in the later 1940s. In the first half of the decade, industry trends were determined more by local conditions. Production had risen somewhat after the severe cutbacks of 1934. Surpluses above quotas had been accumulating for five years, and were dumped during the suspension of quotas in 1939. Production was above quota again for 1940 and 1941 (Bernhardt 1948: 229; Puerto Rico Trade Council 1939; Subcommittee 1943: 510). Despite this evident champing at the bit, island sugar production rose for only one year when the quota was lifted (for 1942). Then it dropped, hitting a level in 1944 that had not been seen since the 1920s.

Several factors contributed to the decline (see Committee 1945: 15-26). A scarcity of fertilizer delivered in 1942 hurt the 1944 crop. There was a shortage of shipping space for delivering sugar to the mainland. For three years, there was a

mainland. Representatives of these operations wanted greater access to the U.S. market (Committee 1941: 81-85; Farr 1943: 39). Some refiners, notably American Sugar Refining, also had very extensive holdings in Cuban cane lands and mills (Farr 1945: 14-15); and so presumably opposed Crawford's plan to restrict Cuba's access to the U.S. market. American also, it will be recalled, had major operations in Maryland, home of Senator Tydings, and that might be related to Tydings renewed efforts to push Puerto Rico toward independence between 1943 and 1946 (Lugo Silva 1955: 61-67), as Tugwell seems to imply (1977: 557-559). But the refiners were back with the other domestic divisions in drafting the 1948 Sugar Act. The Act maintained the old limits on Puerto Rican refined sugar, and when Fernós Isern protested this to the Department of Agriculture representative at the hearings, Fernós was curtly informed that "the industry groups" had agreed on this point, and it was not open to discussion (Committee 1947: 80-81).

requirement to plant a given percentage of cane cropland in food crops.¹ There was a drought. There was a strike in 1945, which some observers believed was provoked and prolonged by the corporations to exert pressure for higher federal price supports (see Committee 1945: 225-226; Wilson n.d.: 77). The low price of raw sugar relative to production costs was another factor discouraging expanded production. Perhaps uncertainty over the government's land policy also restrained some producers, but there is no clear evidence of that separable from the other factors already mentioned. Not until after 1946 would production begin major, sustained expansion. By 1949, production would far exceed the official quota (below).

We come now to the structure of the Puerto Rican industry, and the related issue of power. The corporations had lost substantial land and two mills. Nevertheless, much cane growing and most milling remained under private corporations' control, both local and U.S. owned. (There is no indication of any change in the balance of raw sugar production shares

1. The shipping and fertilizer scarcities, and the requirement to plant food crops, were attributed by some to the subterranean conspiracies of the Anglo-American Commission (Committee 1945: 87-88; Subcommittee 1943: 1000). Tugwell (1977) spends a great deal of time explaining them as necessary war-time measures. The biggest controversy was over the food crop requirements. The sugar producers bitterly complained that the requirements were both costly and ineffective (Subcommittee 1943: 509-511). These protests are not very convincing. Tugwell (1977: 314) claims that the producers were afraid that local food production would be shown to be feasible and cost-efficient, a possibility which the sugar producers had long denied. The recollections of jauqueños (below) also portray these as very successful and welcome measures on the local level.

between local and U.S. corporations for this time). Several reforms, already described, had circumscribed the corporations' power and freedom of action. But their leverage in Washington increased greatly as Puerto Rican sugar producers (i.e. the corporations) were welcomed back to "the domestic family". The Puerto Rico Sugar Producers Association, which participated in the 1947 Sugar Act negotiations, was a lobby for the corporate mills. The bill they helped draft eliminated, as federally supervised conditions for receiving AAA subsidies, the stipulations for fair compensation to colonos and payment of a set minimum wage. (The Act also dropped soil conservation requirements. Prohibition of child labor was the only condition retained [Committee 1947: 19, 21]). A representative of the Puerto Rican government sugar program forcefully protested these changes, and the way that the government had been kept in the dark about the bill (Committee 1947: 77-78). (North American labor leaders also protested the changes, fearing a post-war drop in agricultural wages [Committee 1947: 89 ff.]).

The Puerto Rico sugar corporations had regained the influence in Washington that they lost in the early 1930s. It seems very likely that this was a major factor contributing to the scaling down of land reform plans, especially when other circumstances of the mid 1940s are considered. The expectation in 1945 was that in the next year (later postponed to 1947), U.S. Congressional committees would review the operations of

all divisions of the U.S. sugar industry, and renew, repeal, or modify the basic regulations which would affect production and profit for years to come. Puerto Rico's experience in the mid 1930s made clear just how critical these regulations could be. Congressional hostility to the government proportional profit farms was intense, as illustrated in hearings of the House Committee on Agriculture in June 1947,¹ (although I believe that by this date there had already been an agreement to halt future acquisitions of land by the government) (Committee 1947: 38-40).² The prospect of facing these hearings may have been enough by itself to make local government officials rethink their commitment to land reform. But the danger was much greater than just discriminatory treatment against Puerto Rican sugar.

Congressman Crawford, in the Committee on Insular Affairs, had long been hostile to land reform in Puerto Rico. He opposed the late 1930s experiment of Central Lafayette as "a

1. When Resident Commissioner Fernós Isern explained how the proportional profit farm program worked to Representative Poage of Texas, the latter commented: "That is the way it is done in the Volga Valley... That is the way it is done in the U.S.S.R." (Committee 1947: 39)

2. I suspect that the Committee members' hostile questioning on the farms was less a concern about future expansion of the program, than a way of avoiding the issue of discrimination against colonos in the 1948 Sugar Act, which issue had just been raised in the hearing by a representative of the Puerto Rican government (Committee 1947: 38).

communistic, socialistic approach" (Subcommittee 1943: 1198).¹ He attacked Tugwell's report in favor of enforcing the 500 acre law, claiming that it portended a threat of federal government takeover of mainland producers (Tugwell 1977: 269-270). He opposed Tugwell's confirmation as governor (Tugwell 1977: 136). He and Domengeaux of Louisiana were very hostile in their questioning of Puerto Rican government officials about the land reform in 1943 (Committee 1943: 291-298, 344-348).

Crawford was, according to Tugwell (1977: 388, 463) one of the two major opponents of reform in Puerto Rico in general. He and Domengeaux, along with others on the Bell Committee who opposed Puerto Rico reform efforts for other reasons, were responsible for blocking the 1944 legislation to establish an elected governor in Puerto Rico, in large part on the basis of their complaint about the insular government's attempts "to control every avenue of business life" (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 99-101). Crawford attacked the PPD's public welfare programs, claiming that they created loafers, and insinuating that they were undermining the war effort (Committee 1945: 80). Worse,

1. In the previous chapter, I argued that the animosity of beet producers and other mainland sugar lobbies had weakened the Puerto Rican corporations' influence in Washington, and so made them vulnerable to attack by reformers from the Department of the Interior. It is not a contradiction that friends of the beet producers, such as Crawford, should at the same time oppose the efforts of those reformers. This is very similar to the positions taken in regard to Cuba in the 1920s (above)-- Cuba was being squeezed out of the U.S. market, but U.S. industry representatives such as Earl Babst vociferously denounced the Cuban government's attempts to deal with the ensuing chaos by regulating local sugar producers.

he and others were actively pushing for Congressional action to overturn the basic reform laws passed by the insular legislature in 1941 and 1942 (Committee 1945: 88; Lugo Silva 1955: 142-144; Subcommittee 1943: 291-298; Tugwell 1977: 388, 463, 514).¹

The efforts to roll back progress in Puerto Rico were defeated in the spring of 1945 because of, according to Tugwell (1977: 524-525) the overwhelming public support enjoyed by President Roosevelt after a series of military victories. If not for that fortuitous circumstance, Tugwell (1977: 536) concludes, the Bell Committee might have "destroyed all that Muñoz and I had built". It had been a close call, and there was absolutely nothing to guarantee that Crawford and Co. would not succeed in the future, especially as the federal government seemed to be inexorably drifting rightward.

In this context, a visit by Muñoz Marín to Washington in the early summer of 1945 takes on special significance.

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1. Representative McGehee of Mississippi put it this way: Well, Congress can settle this question previous to making our report from the investigation of several months ago and, if action is not taken by the insular government in the repeal of 8 or 10 acts they have passed, and if Congress does not repeal them themselves and assume their rightful place in the handling of Puerto Rico's affairs, why, we need not expect anything but chaos from now on.

Because those who are down there know that they are doing everything in this world to destroy private industry there and they are destroying it every day; they have taken over every industry, and they want these sugar lands.

They want to destroy the sugar industry so they can distribute these lands. (Committee 1945: 88)

Tugwell's comments on the trip are worth quoting at length, for they suggest that some rapprochement had been reached with the Congressional enemies.

Muñoz, coming home from Washington in time for a 4 July speech, was more optimistic [about Congressional approval for increased local government autonomy]. Perhaps there was reason in his analysis. He said that he had talked with many Senators and Representatives, and although they were not to be deeply stirred, still they were generally sympathetic. The point about this was that for once economic pressures seemed to be relieved. Representatives from the beet-sugar states were not apprehensive for the moment about surpluses, for instance, and the farm lobbyists in general were satiated and quiescent. Since Congressmen were not harried in this way they were free to consider political questions on their merits. Muñoz thought it might be possible to accomplish some real gain while the mood lasted. (Tugwell 1977: 688)

The idea that some accomodation had been reached is suggested by two other facts. First, Crawford seems to have changed his position dramatically in regard to the rule of the Populars. It was Crawford who sponsored the elective governor bill in the house in 1947, despite its similarity to the bill he helped block in 1944, and who assiduously sheperded it through to passage (Fernós Isern 1974: 73-78). Second, the issue of the proportional profit farms was avoided in the 1948 Sugar Act and the preceding hearings, (except when it served to distract attention from other issues). It is extremely unlikely that they would have been so ignored if the now influential corporations did not have some reassurance that they would be allowed to continue with their operations, and if the other U.S. producers had not also been reassured that the reform effort would not be pushed in the future. So it seems

that changes in the U.S. sugar industry and Puerto Rico's place within it, (plus coincident changes in insular development policy--below), must be considered to understand the withering of land reform.

The U.S. sugar industry II: 1948--1960. The harmony embodied in the 1948 Sugar Act was premised on the anticipation of a strong sugar market for years to come. This premise held true until 1952. With the end of wartime controls and production subsidies, the price of sugar in the U.S. returned to stabilize at its pre-war level, measured in constant dollars, or to \$.053-.056 per pound at current prices (Candelas 1959: 29-32). With prosperity and an increased population, U.S. demand was significantly greater than in the late 1930s, roughly 8,000,000 short tons around 1950, compared to about 7,000,000 in 1940 (Hawaiian Sugar Planters 1978: 31). Yet production still lagged. For reasons which need not detain us here, beet sugar production leveled off after its 1947 rebound, to about pre-war amounts, and then even fell considerably for the 1952 crop. Louisiana cane production remained steady, as it had through the war. Florida sugar production expanded, as it had through the war, but it still constituted a small fraction of the U.S. supply through the 1950s. As it had been in the early 1930s, the off-shore production areas responded most quickly to the strong market. Philippine production rebounded, although it would not reach pre-war levels until about 1954. Its recovery resulted in some reductions of Cuban

shipments to the U.S. Hawaii quickly recovered from the war and from its labor problems, surpassing pre-war levels in 1950. Puerto Rico showed the strongest growth of all, passing pre-war levels by 1948, and continuing to climb (Candelas 1959: 35; Farr 1960: 265; Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association 1979: 10, 21, 24-27; USDA 1958: 14). Hostilities in Korea led to fears of coming scarcities in sugar, which drove world sugar prices so high in late 1950 and most of 1951 that they actually surpassed the protected U.S. market price. A revision and extension of the 1948 Sugar Act at this point in time raised Puerto Rico's quota, although it still remained below current production levels; and slightly cut back on Cuba's share of the expanding U.S. market (Farr 1955: 238; USDA 1962: 24-25). But the anticipated scarcities of sugar did not materialize, in part because the high prices stimulated production. The price of sugar returned to normal in 1953 (USDA 1958: 12; 1961: 22). In retrospect, the crest of the Korean War boom marked the end of the good times for the U.S. sugar industry for several years. World sugar production was rising quickly, as war-devastated production areas returned to normal, and as developing nations found that foreign currency could be conserved by starting their own domestic sugar industries (Grisa 1976: 1, 6). World production was given another boost in 1957 by a temporary surge in sugar prices (Marino Pérez 1957: 83-92).

The impact of expanded world production was limited by the

U.S. tariff wall, but the developments were worrisome for domestic producers. All that cheap foreign sugar was tempting for the industrial users of sugar (soft drinks, prepared foods), which were accounting for a steadily growing share of the U.S. sugar consumption. The Dominican Republic was being cut out of its traditional market in the United Kingdom as Britain stimulated Commonwealth sugar production, and the Dominicans were lobbying for access to the U.S. market (Committee on Agriculture 1955: 11-12). Even with the tariff wall, foreign sugar was beginning to seep into the U.S. market, reaching 3.31% of U.S. supplies in 1959 (Farr 1960: 265). A distinct but potentially more dangerous threat was the slowly growing use of corn and non-caloric sweeteners, which already accounted for 14% (by weight) of U.S. sweetener use in 1961 (Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association 1978: 23).

All these developments compounded the problem posed by increasing production within the United States' traditional suppliers. Philippine production had returned to its pre-war level, and its share of the U.S. market was guaranteed for a time by the treaty granting the Philippines independence (Farr 1955: 238). Puerto Rican sugar production had run so far above even its augmented quota level that federal regulators imposed acreage restrictions for the 1953 crop (below). Beet sugar acreage and total production accelerated after 1952, exceeding quotas in 1953 and 1954, and resulting in forced acreage reductions in 1955 and 1956. Other supply areas were showing

flat production levels after 1952, and the market proved incapable of absorbing even existing supplies (Candelas 1959: 35; Farr 1956: 260; 1960: 265; Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association 1979: 10, 21, 24-27).

Under these circumstances, the consensus embodied in the 1948 Sugar Act broke apart. Efforts to revise the Act, begun in 1955 and made into law in 1956, reassigned most (55%) of the future growth of the U.S. market to domestic producers, instead of giving nearly all of it to Cuba. The entirety of the initial reassignment of the market was to be divided between mainland cane and beet sugar producers, with Puerto Rico and Hawaii receiving only a share of later increases in the market (Farr 1956: 244).

The effect of these raised production ceilings was to add, in the late 1950s, to the temporary reallocation of quotas due to major shortfalls in Puerto Rican and Hawaiian production (Farr 1960: 270)--in Hawaii due to prolonged strikes (Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association 1978: 16), and in Puerto Rico due to reasons explained below. Florida cane and U.S. beet sugar production rose dramatically from 1957 (Hawaiian Cane Planters Association 1978: 21, 25). Puerto Rican producers complained loudly that they and other offshore producers were forced to keep production down while politically powerful mainland producers expanded, and while refiners were allowed to take a greater fraction of the stagnant retail price for sugar (Smith and Requa 1960: 13-14). Every thing seemed headed for another

major struggle when the Sugar Act came up for revision in 1961--that is, until the Cuban revolution scrambled the game.

But for Puerto Rico, the issue had become moot. Although its industry representatives did not realize or acknowledge it yet, price competition had replaced quotas as the factor limiting island sugar production. Increases in the price of sugar lagged behind increases in other food crops both during and after the war. Except for the brief rise in 1957, prices remained about level, even declining slightly in constant dollars through the 1950s (Candelas 1959: 29, 32; Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association 1978: 32). Were it not for the continuing AAA subsidy payments--running about \$75 million per year in the late 1950s--much of the U.S. industry would have collapsed (USDA 1961: 8, 20-23). Even with the subsidy, profitability was threatened by increasing costs of labor throughout the U.S. system.

As wages rose, all industry sectors tried to cut labor costs by increased mechanization of production. Louisiana and Florida achieved major reductions in labor needs by the mid 1950s. Hawaii started off at an already high level of mechanization, but the strongly unionized Hawaiian sugar workers commanded the highest wages in the industry, and so Hawaiian producers made even greater efforts to cut labor requirements (Hagelberg 1974: 93; Mollett 1966: 46, 52; Perloff 1950: 283; USDA 1961: 48). The biggest jumps in mechanization were in beet sugar production. As the center of sugar beet

growing moved westward, into newly irrigated areas, and as average beet farm size increased, production underwent what some call a "revolution". Harvesting beets went from 2.5% mechanized in 1944 to 84% mechanized in 1954 (Perloff 1950: 283 n. 5; USDA 1958: 14-15). Puerto Rico too made efforts to mechanize, but they were too little and too late, as will be shown in the next section.

The Puerto Rico sugar industry II: 1948--1960. Puerto Rican sugar production and acreage planted in cane reached an all-time high in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the pinnacle in 1952 (see sugar production charts). As described above, the U.S. was still short on sugar and so no actions were taken when insular production exceeded the AAA quota, from 1948 onward. In 1951, Puerto Rico even was able to sell some sugar to Europe under the Martial Plan (Annual Report of the Governor 1951: 31-33), probably the only time that the island's sugar was sold outside of the U.S. market since the invasion. In 1951, however, the market was already tightening. Puerto Rican warehouse stocks of sugar expanded. In 1952, harvestable cane was left standing in the fields. The U.S. Department of Agriculture mandated acreage cuts for the 1953 crop, with the destruction of much planted cane being a result (Anonymous 1966: 47; Koenig 1953: 42; Turner 1965: 258).

The fact that the industry was again chafing against production ceilings might suggest that it was in a robust condition, at least for the time being. Closer examination

proves that not to be true. The insular industry was badly divided, and the actions taken by different divisions which contributed to the peak in output, were actually weakening the long-run viability of Puerto Rican sugar.

One high growth division was the small producer, especially those growing less than 5 acres of cane. This growth was fostered by federal regulations. In 1941, when the AAA was trying to promote sugar production, the rate for conditional (subsidy) payments to the smallest growers had been raised, from \$.60 per hundredweight to \$.80. Compensation for larger growers remained unchanged, at a lower rate. This \$.80 figure was kept in the 1948 Sugar Act (Turner 1965: 88-90). A study of local small and medium farmers for 1941 shows how vital these AAA payments were, amounting to \$1.25 of a total profit of \$1.65 per ton of cane (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 79). The U.S. Farm Security Programs also encouraged start-ups of small cane farming operations (Turner 1965: 244). As described above, circumstances during the war were otherwise unfavorable for sugar production.

When conditions became more favorable after the war, small farmers found that sugarcane could provide a slim but relatively secure income, which made it more attractive than any other crop (Imus 1950: 175; Koenig 1953: 53). A study of small highland producers in 1948 found them making a profit of \$1.18 per ton of cane, with all but \$.02 of that accounted for by AAA payments (Hoernel 1977: 301). Although growers of less

than 5 acres accounted for only 4.93% of total cane acreage, and 3.65% of all sugar produced in 1948 (USDA 1950: 9), their rapid growth and then equally rapid decline after 1953 helped to produce the sharp peak in island production around 1952 (USDA 1961: 51).¹

The decline of these small units may have been inevitable, given prevailing soil conditions. Much of the over-all expansion of cane lands was into marginal areas, at least for the growing of cane. For instance, 6,900 acres of scrubland mixed with coffee were put into cane during this period (Hoernel 1977: 299). One expert noted with alarm that an estimated 50,000 acres of hill land had been planted with cane in 1950-51 (Koenig 1953: 51-53). This expansion led to an increase in erosion in an island already plagued by heavily eroded hill country (Imus 1950: 175, 180, 183; Koenig 1953: 45). (The elimination of soil conservation measures as a condition for receiving government subsidy payments obviously did not help the situation). Besides the literal decay of the land, the extreme marginality of many small highland producers²

1. From 1948 to 1951, cane harvests in units of 5 acres or less rose from a total of 16,189 to 20,124 acres. The number of farm units under 5 acres went from 7,692 in 1948, to 9,692 in 1951, to 12,568 in 1953 (Hoernel 1977: 300, 313).

2. It is worth reiterating a point made in the previous chapter, that despite common assumptions to the contrary, it is not evident that the smallness of these farms itself was a cause of inefficiency or marginality of profits. On the contrary, studies from the time show that other things being equal, well-managed small farms could be more productive than large operations (Imus 1950: 177). The low yields and profits of small operations are more reasonably attributed to

meant that any increase in production costs, or any bettering of alternative income opportunities, would lead to a quick shift away from sugar. Both things happened in the 1950s, and this contributed to the relative depopulation of the highlands (below).

Another Puerto Rico industry division contributing to the production peak was the Land Authority proportional profit farms, which made up a major part of insular cane production. As explained above, these farms were intensifying production in order to provide more work, even though that led to higher unit costs for their product. When increased production costs led the farm operators to fall into the red repeatedly, that, combined with fall-offs in political support after 1945 (above) and 1952 (below), made a decline of their production inevitable through the 1950s (Koenig 1953: 256; Smith and Regua 1960: 28).

Even though the decline of these two divisions was predictable, that still did not necessarily bode ill for insular sugar production. The small marginal producers represented a small part of total production. Their elimination might even have lead to a stronger industry, with the quota left to larger and more efficient production units. Cutting back in the proportional profit farms would not be too serious if the private producers expanded production to fill the gap, as past experience suggested they would.

The industry did not seem as if it was in serious trouble.

unfavorable ecological conditions.

Production remained right at quota levels until 1956, when a hurricane followed by severe drought pushed output to below the quota (Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture 1968: x; Smith and Regua 1960: 35). Producers' representatives were still complaining about the existence of the quotas in 1960 (Smith and Regua 1960), apparently not realizing that Puerto Rico would never again come close to reaching its allocated quota limits. Although some analysts were warning of the weakening condition of the industry and of the need for major efforts to modernize it, the industry was not given the kind of support needed to make a real recovery (Barton 1959: 47; Lewis 1963: 179-180; Perloff 1950: 284; Anonymous 1966: 54; Wells 1969: 148).

The University of Puerto Rico developed and released a new higher yielding variety of cane (USDL 1957: 3); and the legislature initiated a program of incentives for replacing old cane varieties with newer ones, and for using more fertilizer. But the incentives were available only for small growers (Anonymous 1966: 47, 97). The insular government also removed a local tax on raw sugar and molasses in 1957, apparently as a response to the obviously debilitated state of the industry after the hurricane of 1956 and subsequent drought (USDL 1957: 2-3). These measures were far from what was needed. Looking back, it can be seen that virtually all divisions of the local industry had gone into a decline in the mid-1950s, one that never would be reversed (Hagelberg 1974: 80).

Why had the industry lost its ability to snap back? The standard, obvious answer is that it was losing its profit margin--the price of sugar had remained roughly constant while the costs of production had risen (e.g. Hagelberg 1974: 31, 64). Beneath this obvious fact, however, are several less obvious considerations that explain why Puerto Rican sugar was costing so much, when other domestic areas found production still profitable.

One factor is the declining yields of sugar obtained from cane. Yields began to decline after 1950, and the fall accelerated after 1955 (Anonymous 1966: 41). The cause of this decline is not entirely clear (see Anonymous 1966: 42), but seems generally attributable to continued use of antiquated varieties of cane combined with less than optimum cultivation practices.

Even in 1950, before the declining yields were established, it was estimated that use of improved varieties and cultivation techniques could increase productivity of sugar per acre by about one sixth (Perloff 1950: 279). In 1953, another study noted that only 5% of cane plantings were in improved varieties, and estimated a 15-30% potential increase with upgraded field operations (Koenig 1953: 196). But changes were slow in coming. In 1960, about one half of Puerto Rico's growing cane was of varieties which had been in use in 1943. In other areas of the United States, no cane of such antiquity was still in use (Smith and Regua 1960: 22). Cultivation

techniques, however, did change from the end of the war onwards. These changes will be discussed later, as witnessed in Jauca I. For now it is sufficient to note Mintz's observation from 1949 (1956: 354), that in advanced private operations such as Aguirre, management already was implementing a policy to cut labor inputs, even if that meant a decline in production.¹ The emphasis on labor replacement was in part a result of rising wages for sugar workers (below).

It is the rising price of labor which is most commonly cited as the cost factor that led to the elimination of profits in sugar production (Carr 1984: 214; Hagelberg 1974: 64; Samuels n.d.: 5-6; Smith and Requa 1960: 20; cf. Herrero n.d.: 77). Intentionally or not, this suggests that it was labor's demand for minimal living standards and working conditions which destroyed the industry. That is a distortion of what actually occurred.

Wages for sugar workers rose throughout the 1950s, although the rise tapered off later in the decade (Anonymous 1966: 55; and below). Yet by the end of the decade, field laborers' wages were only about one third of those being paid in Hawaii, where the industry remained strong (USDA 1961: 48).

1. Production of tons of sugar cane per acre fluctuated within a relatively stable range through this period (see sugar production charts in appendix). But the aggregate data may conceal significant trends, e.g. the rapid elimination of the most inefficient producers would cancel out some decline in tonnage among the more efficient producers. Still, the production curves suggest that changes in field cultivation methods had a greater impact on the sucrose content of cane than on the bulk growth of cane itself.

Furthermore, labor productivity had risen strongly (Curet Cuevas 1979: 156-157; and below), so that unit labor costs had increased only slightly. Labor costs did represent a higher fraction of producers' income, especially when sugar prices were weak. But when calculated as a percentage of total production costs, labor costs were less in 1960 than they had been in 1940 (Smith and Regua 1960: 20).

What were the other costs of production? Capital costs, for one thing (below). Taxes, for another (although they might not be entered as production costs in a corporation ledger). Insular and federal unemployment compensation taxes were applied to the sugar industry between 1948 and 1952 (Cochran 1959: 56; Farr 1952: 23). (It is not clear if these taxes were included in estimates of labor costs for the industry). Other taxes also were raised and collection efforts were intensified in the 1940s, as mentioned earlier. Effective property taxes were raised in 1951, which struck particularly hard at holders of valuable sugar lands (Koenig 1953: 264; Wells 1969: 165, 166). Also by the early 1950s, a growing trend of real estate speculation was driving up the cost of land, with the result that much land was being removed from agriculture (Koenig 1953: 265).

Additional problems faced the sugar mills. Puerto Rico had excess mill capacity even during the high production period of the late 1940s (Perloff 1950: 102). As production declined, this excess capacity began to weigh more heavily as expensive

overhead. The situation was made worse since many of the colonos who went out of production during this period failed to repay production advances from the mills (Anonymous 1966: 49-50). One result of these trends was the closing of many mills, especially after 1958 (Curet Cuevas 1979: 150-151).

It could still be argued that labor costs were the culprit in the decline of the Puerto Rican industry. Other divisions within the U.S. had also experienced increased overhead costs, but had offset them via substantial reductions in labor costs. Puerto Rico had also increased labor productivity, but less than the other areas. At the end of the decade, Puerto Rico was still using from two to five times the labor input of other U.S. divisions (USDA 1961: 48). In terms of labor costs per ton of raw sugar, Puerto Rico was \$2 to \$12 above other domestic producers in 1946-50. In 1956-60, this had increased to \$9 to \$24 (Hagelberg 1974: 120). So labor cost was a major element in the declining profitability of Puerto Rican sugar. But to identify this as the primary cause of that decline is to sidestep the key issue of why other divisions were able to increase labor productivity so much more than Puerto Rico.

It has often been claimed that insular producers held back from mechanization in order to avoid putting people out of work (Committee 1945: 142-143; Koenig 1953: 177-178; USDA 1950: 5, 42). This may have been true for proportional profit farms, and perhaps for some other instances where unions were particularly strong, but it is doubtful that this concern

played a major role over all. As described in Chapter IV, concern about displacing workers was hardly evident in the 1930s. During World War II, mechanization was prohibited by the scarcity of machinery. It was still difficult to get simple replacement parts even into 1947 (Subcommittee 1947: 56). In the following years, mechanization efforts were carried through quite in spite of labor's objections, as will be seen for Jauca I.

By the end of the decade, from about 1957, there developed an actual scarcity of field labor. The number of sugar field laborers fell from a peak of 78,000 in 1951-52, to 39,000 in 1959-60 (Hagelberg 1974: 123; and below). Pay for field workers had declined in comparison to other employment. Some field workers left in mid-harvest for better paying work in the U.S., leading to a slowdown in the harvest, which was thus sometimes prolonged into the rainy season (Anonymous 1966: 42; Samuels n.d.: 5; Smith and Requa 1960: 32-33). Younger men shied away from field labor. The field work force was aging, and output declined in some tasks, such as hand cutting of cane (Hoernel 1977: 314-315). This later labor scarcity was the most severe labor problem faced by the industry, and it was not because wages were too high, but because they were too low.

Puerto Rico did not mechanize to the same degree as other U.S. producers after World War II because the local industry's managers did not push the effort enough. Full mechanization of sugar canefield operations is a long and expensive process

under any circumstances (Hagelberg 1974: 92 ff.; also see Edquist 1983). Puerto Rico confronted this prospect as an especially backward area, technologically, after many decades of limited interest in innovation (Koenig 1953: 177; USDA 1950: 10-11; and see Chapter 4). Moreover, the future of Puerto Rico's place in the U.S. market remained uncertain. So rather than plunge into major capital investments, producers were inclined to just sit tight (Perloff 1950: 278-284).

Even if the producers had been inclined to gamble, the capital market was not conducive to a major rebuilding program. Herrero (n.d.: 67) argues that the most negative condition at this time was the scarcity and high cost of capital, which was being diverted to new manufacturing enterprises with greater potential for profit. Around 1951, there was still substantial credit available for sugarcane production--much more than for other crops--but this was for ongoing operations (Koenig 1953: 160-164). A Government Development Bank report supports Herrero by noting a scarcity of investment capital for sugar, which the bank claims it could not remedy because its efforts were oriented to financing new industries (Government Development Bank 1949: 10). Data in Archer (1976: 285-286) indicate a fall-off in capital investment in the sugar industry after 1956-57.

The lack of support from the Development Bank typified the posture of the Commonwealth government. Its role in regard to sugar, especially through the Land Authority, was becoming a

progressively more burdensome liability. Perhaps the government's lack of concern about sugar production was reinforced because the local producers' lobby had lost its power in Washington. At any rate, the government would make no major effort to revive the industry until the 1960s, when it was too late. In fact, government planners and technocrats were turning their backs on all agriculture, as they pinned all their hopes on expanding manufacturing. This shift in development orientation is discussed in the next section. The declining viability of sugar will be discussed again later, from a more "micro" perspective, as it was witnessed in Jauca I under Aguirre.

Planning and the changing economy. Federal appointees and Popular officials alike recognized from the first that economic growth was essential for combating poverty in Puerto Rico. During the 1940s, however, no master plan unified government efforts to this goal. Muñoz Marín and the Populists had risen to power on a pledge of distributive justice. They lacked a blueprint for growth, and made a virtue of their pragmatism (Hanson 1960: 143, 154; Sánchez Vilella 1980: 126). Implicitly, they endorsed the assumption that underdevelopment was an illness that could be cured by dealing with its symptoms. Specific development concepts discussed below can be linked to this assumption.

Tugwell had a more defined image of the role of government (see Padilla 1974): its proper role was to identify and correct

gaps and shortfalls in production and distribution patterns that develop by the operation of free market forces, thus creating a coherent, self-reinforcing economy that can generate its own growth. This was a more radical and activist view of the government's role than that held by Muñoz (Tugwell 1977: 172). It was the basis of Tugwell's emphasis on reforming the governmental apparatus first, as a precondition for other actions. It led him into conflict with younger "pragmatists" over how to encourage manufacturing growth. And although he agreed with them that manufacturing was the key to long term prosperity (Tugwell 1977: 253), he differed from them in his strong commitment to agricultural modernization as a vital part of over-all development (Goodsell 1967: 207; Palau de Lopez 1980: 148; Ross 1976: 80-81).

Tugwell emphasized upgrading agriculture and other primary production from the beginning of his term, first as a way to meet local consumption needs during the war, and then as a way of raising insular employment and total production. He supported the efforts of the island Agricultural Experiment Station and helped to create an Institute of Tropical Agriculture (Lugo Silva 1955: 127-128; also see Annual Reports of the Governor, 1941-1946). It was Tugwell's idea that the Puerto Rico Development Corporation, created by the legislature in 1942, would include in its mandate the development of primary product production and processing, along with its better-known objective of developing local manufacturing. But

in practice, PRDCO virtually ignored agriculture and related fields. Consequently, in April 1945 Tugwell, in one of his last major initiatives as governor, pushed through legislation creating the Agricultural Company, with an allocation of \$12 million. At the same time, PRDCO was officially restricted more to manufacturing promotion, with its name being changed to the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Corporation (PRIDCO). PRIDCO became more generally known as Fomento.

The over-all goal of the Agricultural Company was to diversify primary production away from sugar, by developing and promoting technological advances and improved production techniques in farming, animal husbandry, forest management, and fishing; by modernizing existing marketing patterns and institutions, from the retail sales level up to the disposition of entire crops; and by developing new uses for local products. Projects of the next few years included major research and development efforts, with particular hopes attached to partial substitution of pineapples for sugarcane; helping to start-up local manufacturers of candy and jelly, cigars, and canned fruits; establishing several retail supermarkets in the San Juan area; and obtaining a modern fishing boat (Goodsell 1967: 207-209; Lugo Silva 1955: 131-132; Manners 1956: 106; Ross 1976: 80-81; Sánchez Vilella 1980: 127).

None of these projects was judged successful. Outputs were below expectations, costs were higher and returns lower than anticipated, and a variety of more specific problems plagued

the Company. It had run up a deficit of nearly \$9 million in 1953, at which time it was dissolved, and its few remaining functions transferred to PRIDCO and the Land Authority (Curet Cuevas 1979: 166-167; Goodsell 1967: 208-209; Lugo Silva 1955: 133). These and other insular agencies were little interested in active pursuit of the Agricultural Company's original objectives, although work begun in developing pineapple production and processing did continue (Hanson 1960: 179-180). The general disinterest was complicated by a protracted personal dispute that Muñoz allowed to fester in the upper echelons of government agricultural administration (Wells 1959: 88). With the major exception of egg and milk production (pasture lands increased as agricultural land was taken out of crop production), the different branches of local agriculture stagnated or declined through the 1950s, as recommendations to revitalize agriculture (e.g. Koenig 1953) were ignored (Curet Cuevas 1979: 141-167, 382; . Wish and Harrison 1969: 108 ff.).¹

In retrospect, this turn away from agriculture was something of a disaster for Puerto Rico (as will be discussed in work to come on 1960-1982). To explain it as a rational cost-benefit decision is not very illuminating. That is the same "explanation" offered for the turn away from sugar (above)

1. As with the sugar industry, there was some recognition of the need for government action at the end of the decade. One government measure was related to the growing cattle industry, and involved construction of a government slaughterhouse (Hanson 1960: 181).

and the sell-off of government-run manufacturing plants (below), and in both of those instances, the negative bottom line was a consequence of political pressures and decisions. Unfortunately, little information is available about the Agricultural Company, at least in the sources at my disposal. But there are indications that it too died a political death.

Efforts to modernize agriculture had weak local support, at best. No strong local constituency was advocating decisive government action. The major support for the programs came from Tugwell and his associates, and Tugwell was gone after 1946. Tugwell's choice as the first director of the Agricultural Company was Thomas Fennel, the ex-director of a Haitian-American agricultural development agency which had been funded by the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Goodsell 1967: 207; Tugwell 1977: 684). It can be imagined that he was operating at an extreme disadvantage, being an outsider in the political jungle of Puerto Rico. Another strong advocate of the agriculture program was Harvey Perloff (1950), who continued to support the Tugwellian approach to development even after the battle had clearly been lost (Perloff 1953). Perloff (1950; also see Koenig 1953: 215-218, 273 ff.) advocated using the Land Authority's proportional profit farms as large experimental bases for developing viable crop substitutes for cane.

The Land Authority, however, made only tepid efforts to develop profitable new endeavours (Koenig 1953: 257), and as

already described, other development agencies were not interested in agriculture. In the 1950s, planners who supported Operation Bootstrap displayed a lack of concern with agriculture that bordered on open hostility (e.g. Chase 1951: 5; Jaffe 1959: 7-18; Ross 1976: 125). Why? Perhaps cultural biases were at work, a disdain for rural society among the status-conscious urban professionals. But more than this, agricultural development was, to a degree, competing against manufacturing for the attention of planners, for government assistance, and for private investment capital. On occasion, promoting agricultural development could actually contradict goals in manufacturing development, as in the case in 1946 when local cotton growers protested against the proposed importation of cheaper Haitian cotton included in planning for a local textile mill (Paláu de López 1980: 147). But the most compelling explanation for the abandonment of the Agricultural Company program was that it in itself was a threat to diverse local interests.

Tugwell's call for an Agricultural Company was greeted with vitriolic criticism in the newspaper El Mundo, long a forum for established economic powers. (Around the same time, the newspaper was very supportive of Moscoso's efforts at industrial promotion) (Paláu de López 1980: 148). Years later, Perloff (1953: 54) commented that progress in agriculture had been obstructed by traditional elements and vested interests. This opposition is not difficult to understand. Despite

Tugwell's (1977: 684) pledge that the Company would not compete with any going enterprise, but would rather assist private farmers by opening new vistas, the Company was still a danger.

For those involved in sugar in the mid to late 1940s, the very demonstration of a viable crop alternative would undercut their argument that sugar was the best crop Puerto Rico could grow (e.g. Requa 1948), and that would weaken their bargaining position with the federal government in the struggle for the U.S. market. Even if economic viability of other crops could be demonstrated, they would likely remain less attractive than sugar cane since they would lack the federal price support that minimized risk in cane growing--a fact which would be especially significant for the thousands of small, marginal producers. Non-agriculturalists also would have had reason to oppose the Company's projects. Fishermen would likely have opposed the competition represented by the government's modern fishing boat. Wholesalers and retailers probably opposed at least some of the efforts to modernize marketing. Certainly, the thousands of small store owners could not have been happy when the government began to sponsor a chain of supermarkets.

It seems likely that this total constellation of interests led to an absence of political support for the Company, and that this lack of interest in its success helped create the conditions by which it failed. As a final point, the government's disinterest in agriculture may represent the killing blow against the proportional profit farms. Perhaps

they could have been saved by new crops, as Perloff suggested, but that was not a political possibility.

Another area of government effort was in development of the island infrastructure, with infrastructure taken in the wide sense of all local conditions constituting a base for economic growth (see Curet Cuevas 1979: 186-187 for relevant statistics). Much was done to elevate the social characteristics required by modern production organization ("human capital"). These are discussed in a later section. Modernizing the government itself, as described earlier, was an important precondition for growth. One creation of the modernization, the Planning Board, played a crucial role in upgrading transportation infrastructure. Another, the Government Development Bank, quickly outgrew its rather nebulous initial purpose, to assume the dual functions of an investment bank--making long term industrial loans--and those of a central bank--a clearing house for checks, a depository for government funds, and a negotiator for the sale of government bonds (Goodsell 1967: 202-203). The last service would grow increasingly important in the 1950s, as the government began to rely more on borrowed money to finance its activities (Curet Cuevas 1979: 285).¹

That leaves water, power, and communication services. The insular government had been the major supplier of the first two

1. In future work, I hope to explore the causes and consequences of changes in the Puerto Rican financial sector, which seem to assume greater historical significance after 1960.

since its promotion of irrigation works early in the century, which had expanded hydroelectric generating capacity as well. These early efforts were augmented by PRRA programs in the 1930s (Hibben and Pico 1948: 14, 120-121). The government did not own the entire electrical distribution system, however. Power distribution in San Juan, Mayaguez, and some other areas was privately controlled, and that raised power costs substantially. It was a priority of both the Populists and Tugwell (and even Roosevelt, who had no love for the utilities), to acquire the rest of the distribution network. After a brief but nasty fight, this was done in the spring of 1942 (Annual Report of the Governor 1942: 44-46; Goodsell 1967: 198; Tugwell 1977: 181, 345-346). Power generation increased tenfold in the next twenty years (Wells 1969: 172).

When the takeover of the power network was upheld in court, Tugwell and the Populists prepared to take over the telephone system. The local division of ITT was one of its oldest, but it was notoriously bad in the services delivered. The stage was set to acquire it in 1944, when a thirty year operating concession was to expire. However, the defection of the liberal swing votes around this time interrupted the Populist's control of the legislature, and the opportunity passed. When operating concessions came up for renewal again in the 1950s and 1960s, the PPD was no longer interested in government acquisition of enterprises (Goodsell 1967: 199-201; Lewis 1963:

201, 345; Tugwell 1977: 623).¹

By far the most widely-known aspect of Puerto Rico's development process was in regard to new manufacturing enterprises. In the 1950s and 1960s, "Operation Bootstrap" would be touted world-wide as a dramatic success story of capitalist, free enterprise, manufacturing development. But this process of development began in the 1940s with a very different orientation, one that emphasized government intervention directly in the processes of production.

In 1940, manufacturing capacity in Puerto Rico was extremely limited. About one sixth of the labor force was classified as in manufacturing, but the great majority of those jobs were in sugar refining, food processing, home needlework, and tobacco processing. There was, however, also a substantial core of factory textile operations. Beyond that, the remaining 7,000 or so manufacturing workers in the island were distributed among a large number of small operations producing a variety of goods for local consumption (Hibben and Pico 1948: 149-150).

Local wealth was rarely invested in new manufacturing enterprises (Sánchez Vilella 1980: 127), a fact which sometimes has been attributed to cultural factors which led to a distaste for entrepreneurial attitudes. Such a conclusion is questionable. Local investors were very willing to sink money

1. The government eventually did acquire the telephone network, after it reached the brink of collapse in 1974. Insular telephone service still leaves much to be desired today.

into the first manufacturing enterprises established by the government in 1942 (Subcommittee 1943: 841-842). From the start of the later Fomento program of encouraging private investment, local businessmen complained loudly and long that the government promotion favored foreign capital and blocked local investors from starting new firms (Paláu de López 1980: 154-155). By the late 1940s, some \$2 million in local capital had been invested in projects to be run by U.S. corporations (Perloff 1950: 181 n.14). Rather than disinterest in manufacturing, a more plausible explanation is that local businessmen were reluctant to risk their money in new manufacturing operations because in the past, local efforts had been ruined when mainland competitors and/or shipping lines cut their prices (Hanson 1960: 190; Hibben and Picó 1948: 19-20).

Mainland capitalists were not interested in local manufacturing investment either. Efforts to attract them to Puerto Rico had been tried since at least 1919, with these efforts including the offer of a local tax holiday (Hibben and Picó 1948: Perloff 1950: 108 n.5). Young Muñoz Marín had even been sent to New York in 1928 to seek out potential investors (Hanson 1960: 87). Since efforts to entice private investment seemed to have failed, the government was ready for a more direct approach.

Circumstances similar to those of Puerto Rico at this time led many governments around the world to create a central development agency, with the goal of promoting manufacturing

growth (Caribbean Commission 1952: 155-160; Lewis 1949: 153; Ross 1976: 80). In Puerto Rico in the 1930s, the federal P.R. Reconstruction Administration had that as one primary goal, although its limited financing restricted it largely to hydroelectric projects and the construction and operation of the cement plant (above). In 1942, the Puerto Rico Development Company (later PRIDCO) was created with wide power to encourage manufacturing growth.

Fomento took over operation of the cement plant, and prepared to start new plants. Two mainland consulting firms were engaged to identify critical areas for investment. Both reports pointed to glass and bottle manufacture--the raw material existed on the island, and the need for bottles grew along with the expansion of rum sales on the mainland. Construction of the plant was approved, and begun in 1943 (Ross 1976: 62; Subcommittee 1943: 840). By 1946, three other plants had been constructed: one manufacturing paperboard, for boxes for shipping rum; another, ceramic material for construction and sanitary facilities; the third, shoes. Several additional products were identified for future action, including several to be developed by the ill-fated Agricultural Company (Annual Report of the Governor 1947: 46-47; Lugo Silva 1955: 89; Ross 1976: 64-65; Tugwell 1977 685 n.6).

For Tugwell, all these steps fell within the proper role of government. But even conservatives realized the need for these actions under existing circumstances (Paláu de López 1980:

148). The island economy was suffering from numerous bottlenecks, aggravated to a critical point by the cut-off of trade and other war-related conditions. The significance of these conditions is indicated by the fact that very similar processes of government activism and economic diversification were observed throughout Latin America during the depression and the war, also as a result of the cut-off of trade and other economic links to the developed world (Aguilar 1968: 77; Frank 1972: 75-91).¹

After 1946, the government turned against direct ownership and operation of manufacturing plants, for reasons to be discussed shortly. The second phase of development efforts--from 1946 or 1947 to 1950--was transitional in character. It involved both the continued operation of government operations already begun, and the development of the package of incentives for foreign investors that would dominate

1. Aguilar's description of this period raises so many parallels to the Puerto Rican experience that it merits quoting:

The Second World War had a contradictory effect on the countries of Latin America. The closing of foreign markets momentarily increased their supply problems but as the conflict dragged on, endowed with extensive resources and favored by other circumstances, they began to make progress toward the diversification of their economies... After the conflict began, the panorama started to change and Latin America was soon able to accumulate considerable foreign exchange reserves. For the first time in a very long while, Latin American countries also found themselves having a certain freedom of action vis-a-vis the big trusts. Furthermore, the inability of the industrial countries to supply the world market enabled the Latin American countries to produce goods which they had previously imported and they were even able to export merchandise traditionally supplied them by the industrialized countries. (Aguilar 1968: 76-77)

Fomento's approach in the 1950s. In addition, there were three specific development initiatives in this period, which also show its transitional status. In each of these, the government assumed most or all of the construction and start-up costs of a targeted enterprise, but then turned over the enterprise's management to a private corporation (Moscoso 1953: 62-63).

The best-known of the three projects was the construction of a luxury hotel in San Juan, at a total cost of around \$7 million, with the hotel operated by the Hilton chain. Poor local hotel accommodations had been one of the obstacles confronting Fomento in its efforts to sell mainland investors on Puerto Rico. More importantly, one first-class hotel could be a foundation for expanded tourism. The opening of the Hilton was accompanied by Fomento's promotion of Puerto Rico as a vacation spot in U.S. media. (Fomento also began a U.S. media campaign to promote Puerto Rican rum around the same time). These efforts showed results, and Puerto Rico's tourist industry began to grow rapidly (Hibben and Picó 1948: 169-174; Ross 1976: 100-104; Wells 1969: 150-151).¹

The other two initiatives were new manufacturing operations: Crane China, for insitutional chinaware, and Textron, for textiles. I found little information about Crane China. The Textron deal was a nightmare for Fomento, creating

1. Since tourism has had much less impact in Santa Isabel than in other parts of Puerto Rico--it is unusual to see a "gringo" even in the town--it will not receive special attention in this thesis. For an illuminating discussion of tourism in Puerto Rico, see Vaughan (1974).

problems certainly equal to any experienced with the direct government operation of plants. The need for a local textile mill was identified at the start of PRDCO. (Bags for sugar was the prime need identified at first). For the next few years, the government proceeded with plans to establish a plant, which, it was estimated in 1945, would cost them about \$2,250,000. They got as far as ordering machinery in 1947. Just at this time, however, mainland textile producers were moving out of the industrial northeast, in search of a less expensive labor force. After a complicated sequence of contacts and negotiations, one of those big-name manufacturers, Textron, agreed to locate some operations in Puerto Rico. But to clinch the deal, the government had to agree to invest \$4,300,000 in construction and other start-up costs, and to offer Textron extremely generous terms to buy the operations if it chose to. Textron representatives talked of expanding insular operations rapidly, mentioning the possibility of a total of six local factories. At the same time, they avoided making any guarantees. Government officials, for their part, hoped that this big-name operation would convince other investors to look more seriously at Puerto Rico. Unfortunately, Textron officials began loudly criticizing Puerto Rico as an operating location almost immediately, as early as 1950. Textron shut down its Puerto Rican operations in 1954 and 1957. The reasons for Textron's failure are arguable (see Ross 1976: 120-123).

The third and most famous phase of Fomento's efforts aimed at attracting foreign capital to invest in manufacturing plants in Puerto Rico. A variety of incentives were offered, the most important of which was tax exemption. As noted above, the idea of attracting investors with tax breaks was not new. Moscoso explained and endorsed the idea to an apparently sympathetic Congressman Crawford in 1943, but Moscoso noted that he expected opposition to the idea back in Puerto Rico (Subcommittee 1943: 850-852). One source of opposition was Tugwell, who believed that industries attracted by special advantages such as tax breaks would never form a solid base for economic growth. In 1944 Tugwell vetoed legislation for a local tax holiday for new manufacturers (Paláu de López 1980: 152; Ross 1976: 79-80). Other incentives were not so controversial. In 1945, half a million of the total appropriation of \$17.5 million for Fomento was earmarked for construction of general purpose industrial buildings (Ross 1976: 84-85). (The lack of vacant industrial space was recognized as one of the major disincentives affecting new manufacturing investment [Caribbean Commission 1952: 9]).

Moscoso envisioned a much more substantial incentive package, and Moscoso had a reputation for getting what he wanted (Curet Cuevas 1979: 221). Ross (1976: 85-93) describes the low-key, almost covert way that Moscoso tried to enlarge the incentives to be offered to outside capital; and how he and PRIDCOs conservative directors quietly prepared an advertising

campaign to interest mainland investors. The first advertisement ran in Fortune in February 1946, without the fact being publicized in Puerto Rico. (At this point, it will be recalled, Tugwell had announced his intention to resign, and Muñoz was just opening his attack against pro-independence forces). The U.S. media campaign expanded later that year. In 1947 and 1948, Moscoso got the tax holiday legislation he wanted, and additional incentives were being developed. Reportedly "Muñoz was reluctantly persuaded by Moscoso and Guillermo Rodríguez" and others to sign the tax law (Puerto Rican Development Group 1976: 4).

The Fomento approach that took shape by the early 1950s has been described many times (Caribbean Commission 1952: 34-38; Lewis 1949: 158-163; Ross 1976: 84-100; Stead 1958). The goal was to encourage investment in any manufacturing operations which made goods not already being produced locally in 1947, regardless of whether the prospective operation involved local raw materials or supplied goods to local markets. The role of government was to make investors aware of the advantages of investment in Puerto Rico, to construct and maintain a ready stock of industrial buildings, to assist in recruitment and training of workers, and to provide a variety of additional aids to help plants through their start-up period.

Besides this government cooperation, the advantages of investing in Puerto Rico included its relatively inexpensive

and politically docile workers, the security of remaining within the U.S. system, and of course, tax exemption. After 1948, eligible manufacturing firms were granted full local tax exemption until 1959, followed by a three year phase-in of local taxes. Operations which derived most of their income from plants in Puerto Rico (or other U.S. territorial possessions) were also exempt from federal income tax, with several restrictions (Hibben and Picó 1948: 92-94; Lewis 1949: 162-163; U.S. Department of the Treasury 1978: 8-12).¹ This amounted to nearly total tax exemption. Combined with the other advantages already mentioned, it meant that some mainland firms could quadruple their after-tax profit by relocating to Puerto Rico, or at least that was the claim of Fomento officials (Goodsell 1967: 206).

Fomento publicized these advantages, and its efforts received a warm verbal endorsement from U.S. business representatives (Paláu de López 1980: 152-153; Perloff 1950:

1. The federal tax exemption was established in a 1921 law intended to benefit U.S. firms operating in the Philippines, which found themselves at a competitive disadvantage against tax-exempt overseas British firms. The main requirements for eligibility under this law are that at least 80% of gross income be derived from sources in U.S. possessions; and that at least 50% of gross income be from active conduct of a business in the possessions (as opposed to income from other investments in the possessions). There are several other technical points. One worth noting is that a U.S. parent corporation has to pay taxes at regular federal rates when profits from a "possessions corporation" are paid into it, unless those profits are taken as part of the liquidation of the subsidiary (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1978: 11). In effect, this represents an incentive to terminate overseas operations after a period of time, in order to repatriate profits tax free.

108 n.7). The incentive package came at a time when U.S. business and government were pushing hard to open up Latin American economies, as in the Point Four Program (above) and the Clayton Plan of trade liberalization (Aguilar 1968: 81); and in the activities of the recently created World Bank and IMF. Yet the actual investment in Puerto Rico proved disappointing at first. Two years passed without Fomento signing a single contract with a major U.S. corporation (Ross 1976: 93-95). Puerto Rico was not exceptional in this, however. Recession in the U.S. led to a general decline in U.S. investment in Latin America in the late 1940s (Aguilar 1968: 106). The manufacturing operations that did arrive in Puerto Rico initially were mainly small textile shops, of the type then gaining notoriety as "runaways" from rising wages in the old U.S. textile centers (Ross 1976: 124-125).

The number of new jobs created by these small operations was somewhat more impressive, especially when compared to the number of jobs in the government run factories. In 1947, the five PRIDCO plants employed 845 workers; while the still limited aid-to-private-industry program could already claim credit for 596 new jobs,¹ with some 4,000 more promised in approved plans for additional operations (Hibben and Picó 1948: 151). At the time of the sale of the PRIDCO plants in 1950, they had 1,275 employees; while promoted private investment had

1. Employment figures such as these are subject to wide fluctuation and, I suspect, error. They should be considered approximations.

created about 6,000 jobs, at far less cost to the government (Caribbean Commission 1952: 10, 13; Ross 1976: 83).

This record of job creation figured into one of the most controversial events of the later 1940s, the sale of the five government plants to private buyers. Fomento was sounding-out potential buyers by early 1948, even though no announcement had been made of intent to sell. In fact, the Popular platform of 1948 made much of the virtues of the government-run operations (Ross 1976: 111-114). Efforts to sell intensified in 1949. The shoe factory was bought by a mainland corporation (Joyce Shoes) in December 1949 (Ross 1976: 109; Stead 1958: 14). The other four plants were offered as a package, and acquired by Luis Ferré, a leader of the insular Republican Party, in 1950 after attempted deals with mainland purchasers fell through (Chase 1951: 46; Ross 1976: 111-117).

The sale of these factories meant that Fomento's development efforts after 1950 would be confined almost exclusively to the promotion of private investment, in stark contrast to the much more active role in production assumed by the government prior to 1946. The shift in development orientation between 1945 and 1950 is often noted (e.g. Carr 1984: 203; Maldonado Denis 1972: 161; Wagenheim 1975: 108), but there is no agreement as to why it happened, or what it actually meant. In a recent debate, different observers argued that the change was part of an ideological transformation of the Popular Party (Navas Davila 1980: 26), a logical evolution

from the Party's original position (Paláu de López 1980: 157), and simply a practical response to changed circumstances (Sánchez Vilella 1980: 128). In the following discussion, it will be shown that each view could be true. I will argue that the PPD did change its ideology regarding economic policy, but that it did so in response to changed circumstances of power, and responding to power is a primary and constant principle of any political party.

In one sense, the sale of the PRIDCO factories did not represent any major change in principles, because the government never had an ideological commitment to government ownership or operation of manufacturing operations. True, the act establishing PRIDCO in 1942 gave priority to government and cooperative association ownership, over private ownership (Ross 1976: 62-63), but this "commitment" had little force. This is illustrated by the circumstances involved with PRIDCO's first new plant, the glass and bottle factory. PRIDCO administrators undertook its construction only after two major U.S. corporations had refused invitations to set up a local plant. When the government finally began to proceed on its own, it courted investment by local rum distillers (Subcommittee 1943: 840-842). Most telling, however, are Moscoso's comments to a Congressional hearing in April 1943. Moscoso was asked what the government would do if it found a private buyer for the plant.

MR. MOSCOSO. We can sell it tomorrow.
THE CHAIRMAN. Would you sell it?

MR. MOSCOSO. Absolutely. What we want to do is establish industry. Who does it, if it is the devil himself, I do not care. (Subcommittee 1943: 845)

Moscoso (1980: 164) and Sánchez Vilella (1980: 128) agree that both the early period of government intervention in production, and the change away from government ownership, were each pragmatic responses to the conditions of the times. I see no reason to dispute that.

What had changed in the relevant conditions is another matter. The sale of the Fomento plants cannot be explained simply as a rational adjustment, allocating scarce government resources in the best way for all, as is often suggested. It is not true that the government operations were "economic failures", as Carr (1984: 203) most recently has claimed (cf. Navas Davila 1980: 26). In 1947, the five firms together operated in the black, as consistent profits from the cement plant made up for losses sustained in the newer operations (Ross 1976: 112-113). Those losses were associated with typical start-up problems--aggravated to a degree by the colonial circumstances, but solvable (Lewis 1949: 154-155; Ross 1976: 61-73). Even people who endorsed the sale of the plants, including Luis Ferre, agreed that they all had good prospects for becoming profitable very soon (Barton 1959: 30; Chase 1951: 46; Ross 1976: 82).

A more compelling argument might be that Fomento needed immediate cash (Caribbean Commission 1952: 10). The collapse of the rum boom and the temporarily weak political support for

Fomento (below) meant that the agency had almost all its funds tied up in fixed capital, and it lacked money to continue even the construction of industrial buildings (Lewis 1949: 156). Still, this factor alone seems insufficient. It was not stressed as a reason for sale. Moreover, the sale did not generate much immediate cash. The government seemed anxious to dispose of the factories, and courted buyers with extremely generous sale prices, payment terms, and financing assistance (Goodsell 1969: 206; Ross 1976: 107, 116).

The most common "rational" explanation for the sale was that promotion of private investment was a much more efficient use of government funds to create jobs (Moscoso in Stead 1958: 14; Ross 1976: 82; Wells 1969: 149-150). Estimates of jobs created per expenditure, comparing promoted and government run firms, favored the former by as much as 10 to 1 (Moscoso 1953: 62, 65; Perloff 1950: 105-107). However, this comparison requires qualification. Consideration of relative multiplier effects for the two types of plants would surely narrow the gap, as would consideration of expectable fiscal linkages when all five of the government plants began to generate income for the government. Also, it was recognized by 1949 that the first Fomento plants were unnecessarily capitalized. The bottle factory especially incorporated too much labor-saving machinery, given prevailing wage rates. The high costs of creating jobs in these plants was also in part a consequence of the priority which had been given to processing of local raw

materials, which called for a relatively heavy investment in machinery (A. Lewis 1949: 155). Finally, the record of job creation in agriculture was much better, with 1,952 employees in the Agricultural Company at the end of 1947, but that fact did not spare the Company from attack as a money loser (Hibben and Picó 1948: 151).

The record of job creation by government-run operations, then, was better than is sometimes claimed, and it could have been better still in the future. Moreover, the job creation potential of promoted private investment was far from established in early 1948, when Fomento apparently had decided to sell (Hibben and Picó 1948: 116). In 1950, when the sale went through, Fomento officials had even reached the conclusion that promotion could not create jobs at a rate sufficient to even keep up with the growth of the labor force (Moscoso 1953: 62; Ross 1976: 125; and see below). Under these circumstances, the economically rational thing to do would be to both promote private industry and expanded government run operations. The reasons why this did not happen, in my estimate, are more political than economic.

One set of political problems centered on the basic contradiction of a government acting as both industrial employer and the representative of the workers (Moscoso 1953: 61). Union conflicts delayed the opening of the bottle factory in 1945. Government and CGT officials traded accusations (Committee 1945: 51-52; Paláu de López 1980: 137; Sánchez

Vilella 1980: 127). The sharpening of the conflict with radical CGT members in 1945 and 1946 has already been described. Another problem for the government were the accusations of favoritism in doling out jobs in the plants. This tarnished the image of a Party which had made much of its opponents' corruption (Quintero Rivera 1980: 98-99). However, the political hegemony of the PPD, and its control of the unions, were so firmly established by 1948 that I doubt that either of these concerns were critical.

Another type of problem would seem to be, at first glance, a purely impersonal economic concern. The problem was Puerto Rico's small internal market. Planners realized that the consumption levels on the island restricted the range of products that could be manufactured cost-efficiently for local use (Moscoso 1980: 16). Further, they discovered that some items, for which there existed a sizable local demand, were uneconomical because consumption patterns called for a variety of styles, and there was not sufficient demand to make production of these varieties efficient. This is claimed to have been the problem regarding the shoe factory (Hanson 1960: 196; A. Lewis 1949: 166), and it is true that as soon as the factory was purchased by Joyce Shoes, it reoriented to produce a limited range of styles for sale on the mainland. But this lesson has its ambiguities. The new sales strategy did not work well either. In a few years, the company shifted again, this time to produce one simple type of shoe for island use.

(This was a time when many children still had no shoes). Although the company soon folded, the reason apparently was not a lack of sales, which had improved and helped the company into profitable operations (Ross 1976: 108-110). In any case, it cannot seriously be claimed that Fomento had exhausted the possibilities of profitable production for the local market.

More serious market problems were the result of "imperfections" in the market. Fomento officials must have always considered the possibility that in the post-war situation, mainland manufacturers of goods consumed in Puerto Rico would deal with government run competitors the same way they had dealt with private competition in the past, by unfairly cutting prices. Appreciation of this deadly threat was inescapable after October 1948, when a mainland firm introduced shoes aimed at the same market as those of the Fomento plant, but at a lower price. The Fomento plant had just begun to make a profit, but as a result of this competition it had to cut prices, and consequently went back to losing money (Ross 1976: 108). (It cannot be established from the information at my disposal if this was fair competition or involved price cutting). Protection against price cutting would require some type of trade barrier around Puerto Rico, which importers and sugar producers would oppose, and would involve movement in the direction of independence, which was not likely to occur.

A second imperfection in the market which is better

documented concerns "difficulties in establishing market connections" for PRIDCO industries (A. Lewis 1949: 156). The most serious instance of this involved the paperboard plant. Its product was refused by the local carton manufacturer in 1948, for reasons which are not entirely clear. This meant that the PRIDCO plant had to cut back to about one third of its capacity, and consequently was losing money. The government considered buying the manufacturer, the Container Corporation, but that option was precluded by the greatly inflated sale price set by the owners. The government had to choose between starting its own carton plant, in open competition with the private firm, or shutting down or selling out (Ross 1976: 113-114). Moscoso reportedly favored the former course, but Munoz Marin ruled that out in June 1949, thus firmly establishing the government's commitment to the principle that "no government enterprise was to compete with a private enterprise" (Ross 1976: 114).

The conflict with the Container Corporation was just one point of antagonism. In 1946, "private capital" was "up in arms" over the government's activist posture.

Business men are alarmed over the possibility that all industry may be socialized; that taxes will be greatly increased; that controls upon private business and industry may be legislated; and they are wondering what kinds of industrial activity the government means to get into. They suspect that existing wage and hour laws will be rewritten to give workers a greater share of the income. (Petrullo 1947: 123).

Mainland investors were further intimidated by the island's

still uncertain political status (Petrullo 1947: 123).¹ One Fomento administrator mentions (Stead 1958: 15) that this strong mainland business opposition "practically forced" the sale of the government owned plants. Wagenheim (1975: 108) notes also that there was U.S. Congressional opposition to the "crazy socialistic experiment" perceived to be represented by these plants. I have not been able to get other information about this, but expect that this opposition was substantial and potentially disastrous for the PPD and its rule.

The sale of Fomento's plants was less a consequence of rational efficiency considerations, than of opposition by the private sector, which could express its disapproval through control of flows of investment capital, access to markets, and probably through federal legislation. The sale was part of the general reorientation of politics and development strategy carried out from 1945 to 1950. It did not imply a major change on the philosophy of ownership per se, as explained above. But reliance on private enterprise did bring with it very significant implications for the course of industrialization.

Government ownership had been used in order to establish certain kinds of local manufacturing, those estimated to have a major long term impact on development, with development

1. Petrullo's comments reflect public views in 1946. As described throughout this chapter, behind the scenes dealings to arrange a more favorable business climate were already underway at this time. By 1948, businessmen had been considerably reassured about the PPD's intentions (Scheele 1956: 446).

measured in both social and economic terms. The profit or loss of a particular plant was not the only, or even primary consideration. No businessman in his right mind would start an enterprise with this orientation. The Textron debacle demonstrated clearly how public and private interests could differ, even when united in one enterprise. Business had triumphed decisively in the struggle over paperboard boxes. From 1948 on, the PPD sported an ostentatious commitment to free enterprise (Annual Report of the Governor 1948: 1), and to the "philosophical belief" that government should not operate industries (A. Lewis 1949: 154), unless as a demonstration of feasibility, and then the government should withdraw as soon as private industry becomes interested (Chase 1951: 46; Hanson 1960: 198). And in practice, the government did little feasibility demonstration.

The continued verbal commitment to starting demonstration projects may have been a defense against those who still advocated the integrated industry approach to development. Tugwell's presence still hovered over the scene, and his views had resident advocates (e.g. Caribbean Commission 1952: 6-7; Hibben and Picó 1948: 167; Perloff 1950). In fact both Tugwell (1953: 148-150) and Perloff (1953: 53-55) criticized Fomento in 1953--not over the issue of ownership itself, but over the industrial mix being created by Fomento's reliance on private investors: its "hopelessly miscellaneous nature", the inherent impermanence of investment lured by special temporary

advantages, and the failure of the promoted industries to link up with each other or to the local market. Tugwell had a specific alternative in mind. He suggested that the insular government help create centers to manufacture, among other things, industrial computers and related devices, and that it promote agriculture by supporting research and development in techniques for hydroponic cultivation of high protein plants (Tugwell 1953: 149). It is worth pausing a moment to speculate on what the history of Puerto Rico might have been had the island become a pioneer in such areas.

The new goal of government development efforts was, instead, summed up in one word: production. Muñoz had spoken of the need to increase aggregate production in 1946, in contrast to the distribution emphasis of his earlier speeches. In 1948, he was hammering on the theme (Anderson 1965: 66-67, 72; Muñoz Marín 1953: 7). By 1950, increasing production was given priority in allocating government funds, followed by infrastructure and human capital improvement and then, by filling other human needs (Wells 1969: 167-168). Moscoso made the priorities even more clear, ruling out welfare programs that might hold down production by driving up the local tax rate (Moscoso 1953: 66-67). With the emphasis on production, the old concern with supplying local markets was abandoned, by degrees, since the U.S. market offered so much greater potential for absorbing manufactures (A. Lewis 1949: 166-167). Other old goals--using local raw materials and establishing

mutually reinforcing industries--were still endorsed (Caribbean Commission 1952: 6-7; A. Lewis 1949: 166-170). But a government wedded to the concept of free enterprise could do little to help reach those goals.

In 1950, the full range of investment incentives were in place (Stead 1958: 16), and the various development agencies of insular government were consolidated under Moscoso and the new umbrella Economic Development Administration (Caribbean Commission 1952: 12; Ross 1976: 127-128). Yet within this sleek new framework, the role of planning in steering the course of the economy had become quite restricted. The Planning Board still came up with goals (metas) for the economy, but these were merely projections of current trends (Curet Cuevas 1979: 245-246; Picó 1953: 73). Planners in the 1950s minimized theory, "the big idea", and instead chased after "hot prospect" investors, while congratulating themselves for their pragmatism. That is how planners were seen by one of their friends (Ross 1976: 167-168). A critic wrote that the Fomento bureaucrats were promoters instead of planners, who saw their role as being to smooth the entry of capital, and then to smooth out the roughest edges of free enterprise. The same critic contends that (around 1960), it bordered on heresy to suggest that there were dangers in the island's growing "dependency" (Lewis 1959: 194; 1963: 184-185, 198). The bureaucrats measured their success by simple quantitative standards. First it was the number of new jobs created, and

then the number of new Fomento plants, the latter becoming almost a fetish (Ross 1976: 125). After it became clear that island employment was remaining relatively stable despite Fomento's efforts (below), the new standard became the creation of high-paying jobs (Ross 1976: 162). Significantly absent in the pro-Fomento literature are statistics related to the Administration's stated goals of using local raw materials and establishing inter-industry linkages.

In the early 1950s, any criticism or doubt was overwhelmed by what was claimed to be the smashing success of the promotional efforts. New manufacturing plants opened with gratifying regularity, rising from 16 starts in 1948 to 83 in 1953 (Ross 1976: 129). Although the most rapid growth was in textile-related plants, a wide variety of other light, labor-intensive industries were represented in the apparent boom (Curet Cuevas 1979: 121; Wells 1969: 152). Employment in Fomento promoted plants reached 28,000 at the end of 1958, or nearly 5% of the insular labor force (Ross 1976: 130). Moreover, promotion had been held up in 1951 and 1952 by a lack of vacant industrial buildings, which was due to a lack of funds for Fomento. Both were rectified, with a construction boom from 1952 to 1954 (Ross 1976: 135, 143). The target set in 1950 for 1960 was to have unemployment below 5%, and achieve a minimum family income of \$2,000 per year (Stead 1958: 25). In 1952, the year islanders were first allowed to vote on the political status of Puerto Rico, planners predicted that

"severe, year-long unemployment for men... may shortly be almost eliminated" (quoted in Ross 1976: 13).

As we have seen in several other instances, Puerto Rico actually was involved in a process of much grander scale. In this case, it was the tremendous expansion of U.S. overseas investment and international trade in manufactured goods which began around 1950 (Curet Cuevas 1979: 29; Furtado 1976: 53-54; Navas Davila 1979: 157-158). Fomento's program of industrial promotion would work when its predecessors had failed in large part because capital was now ready to invest in new lands. Even supporters of Fomento acknowledge this, although one claims, justly, that Moscoso and his associates deserve credit for seizing the opportunity and attracting so much of the overseas investment to Puerto Rico (Wells 1969: 163). (But Puerto Rico also stood apart from this larger trend in that much of the investment in other nations was less for wage-scale and tax advantages, than to hop the tariff walls of sovereign nations, and so get access to their domestic markets for manufactured goods [Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 157-158]).¹

Fomento's successes came more slowly after 1954. A recession in 1953-54 put a damper on new contracts to establish local plants. Planners came to see how vulnerable they had

1. Another related difference, which became more prominent in the 1960s, was that Puerto Rico would not develop the balance of payments deficit that characterized most Latin American nations as one consequence of U.S. investment. Federal transfer payments maintained a rough equilibrium in Puerto Rico, as discussed below.

become to the vagaries of the U.S business cycle (Barton 1959: 28). But this decline was not temporary. The growth rate of PRIDCO-promoted factory employment hit 46% in 1954-55, but then averaged 12% from 1955 to 1959 (Ross 1976: 165-166).

Additionally, Fomento planners had projected a multiplier effect of 2 for the promoted jobs (i.e. two other jobs would be created in the island economy for every new job in promoted manufacturing). Instead, because of the extreme openness of the economy, the multiplier was close to zero (Ross 1976: 156-157).

Several other factors contributed to the slowdown in promotions. There were typical problems associated with operating on the "industrial frontier" (Rottenberg 1953: 88). While Puerto Rican workers adapted quite readily to factory production (Gregory 1958; Rottenberg 1953), the closings of Joyce shoes and Textron made it seem that it was difficult to run a business on the island (Ross 1976: 110, 121-123). Wages in Puerto Rico were rising. Although the absolute gap between U.S. and Puerto Rico average wages widened through the 1950s, as a ratio Puerto Rican wages were gaining on those of the mainland (Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 10; Petras 1978: 258-259). Shipping costs rose substantially from 1956 to 1959 (Lewis 1963: 205), leading the Wall Street Journal to claim in 1959 that increased shipping costs had wiped out any advantage the island held in terms of cheap labor (Lewis 1963: 195).

None of these factors could be controlled by the Puerto

Rican government, and since the Fomento package already offered so much to investors, there was little more they could add. One major step that remained was taken in 1954 when the ten-year local tax exemption was changed, from a one-time, set holiday expiring in 1959, to a permanent incentive of 10 years exemption beginning with the start of any newly promoted plant (Moscoso 1953: 62; Ross 1976: 172; Stead 1958: 100).¹ The extension of the tax benefits seemed to stimulate new investment, and investment of a more capital-intensive nature (below), but not enough to reverse the declining rate of job creation.

One might object that a 12% annual rate of new job creation is still formidable. The problem was that other jobs were disappearing at an even faster rate, as agriculture and needlework cut production, and as (alleged) massive hidden underemployment was squeezed out of commerce and services. From 1950 to 1960, total employment on the island actually declined, from 596,000 to 543,000 (Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 8). There was little the government could do about these problems without betraying its loudly proclaimed philosophy of commitment to free enterprise. The result of all these trends was that unemployment remained about the same, and was kept from rising only because of the massive outmigration to the

1. Planners still operated on the assumption that factories enticed to Puerto Rico by the tax break would stay once the holiday expired (Stead 1958: 100). In the 1960s, that assumption would be shown to be false.

continent (below) (Ross 1976: 156-156).

This gloomy realization was concealed from the public, according to Ross (1976: 158), who worked in the planning agencies in the later 1950s. The targets of full employment and a \$2000 minimum family income by 1960, was never renounced, but specific target dates gradually dropped from public pronouncements. In 1959, Fomento officials were still talking about "abolishing poverty", but they did not say when (Barton 1959: 13). One in-house study of the time even seemed to argue that unemployment was not such a bad thing after all.¹

At the same time, running Fomento had become very costly. PRIDCO received additional grants totaling more than \$10 million in 1950 and 1951, and was lobbying hard for a commitment of an additional \$10 million per year for the rest of the decade (Ross 1976: 142). But many people were skeptical

1. This 1959 study, "Employment, Family Income, and Level of Living", by the Committee on Human Resources, is summarized by Barton and Mayne (1981: 13) as follows:

The study demonstrated conclusively that unemployment was not the major cause of low family income; that families with the lowest money income had a real income that was not much below the average because of income redistribution by government programs and the extended family; that unemployment is an unavoidable by-product of rapid economic development in a free society; that the problem of extreme poverty should be treated as a social program with a minimum of government "make work" effort; and that economic development policy should continue to give top priority to increasing the number of productive jobs as rapidly as the educational system is capable of producing workers qualified to fill them.

I find it difficult to interpret this as anything other than a proposal to write off the majority of the unemployed. Perhaps others at the time shared this interpretation. Barton and Mayne go on to note that "this report was not fully appreciated and implemented at the time of its issuance".

about the importance of Fomento. Relatively few people had been directly effected by Fomento programs, and the vast majority of them lived in and around San Juan (Ross 1976: 143). To acknowledge at this point the inattainability of the proclaimed goals for revitalizing the economy might have spelled disaster for Fomento, and perhaps even caused serious problems for Muñoz Marín, who would have been left standing without any vision for the future.

Instead of acknowledging its limits, the Fomento response was to improve public relations. It had begun a local publicity campaign in 1951--big signs in front of promoted factories, etc.--and this was intensified. Two other elements were emphasized. One was an increased effort to promote local enterprises, i.e. native capitalists. No special advantages were made available to them, but Fomento promoters stepped-up efforts to locate prospects who could take advantage of the existing promotion package (Ross 1976: 145-147).

The other element was to encourage the decentralization of industry, to spread Fomento's accomplishments through the island. Ross (1976: 146) credits this more to a concern with public relations than with the problems attendant on the explosive growth of San Juan. The metropolitan slums, especially La Perla and El Fanguito, were recognized as representing major social problems even in the 1940 PPD platform (Lugo Silva 1955: 37), and the urban housing crisis had grown considerably worse due to wartime limits on

construction (Tugwell 1977: 615, 620). But provision of housing was the task of the Puerto Rico Housing Authority (below) and the municipal governments (Wells 1969: 173-175). It was not Fomento's problem. Migration of rural folk to the city was viewed with mixed feelings by planners: on the one hand, it seemed to result in a lower birth rate, which was good (Jaffe 1959: 12); on the other, it led to higher economic expectations, which was bad (Moscoso 1953: 67). When it became clear at the end of the 1950s that the explosive urban growth was creating a demand for government services that was draining the treasury, the government became more concerned with slowing its rate (Adams et al. 1962: 32-33; and see table 5.1).

Fomento had provided some minor assistance for firms seeking to establish plants in more remote areas, since 1951. More substantial assistance was available from 1954. The major new Fomento incentive was to build and have ready industrial space outside of San Juan, and to rent them at lower rates (Aponte Hernández 1972: 43-44; Friedrich Adams 1962: 4; Ross 1976: 146). A more important stimulus to decentralization did not come from Fomento, but was provided by the Planning Board's work of highway construction. Access to shipping facilities was one reason why promoted firms in the past had concentrated in the major coastal port cities (Aponte Hernández 1972: 37). The completion of the highway linking San Juan to Caguas made the latter and its surroundings "a de facto part of the San Juan Metropolitan Area" (Economic Development Administration

Table 5.1

Rural and urban population of Puerto Rico

	Total population	Rural population	% of total	Urban* population	% of total	Total, San Juan, Ponce, Mayaguez	% of total
1930	1,543,913	1,116,692	72.3	427,221	27.7	205,205	13.3
1940	1,869,255	1,302,898	69.7	566,357	30.3	284,805	15.2
1950	2,210,703	1,315,890	59.5	894,813	40.5	515,641	23.3
1960	2,349,544	1,398,959	59.5	950,585	40.5	596,810	25.4

* 2500 or more inhabitants

Source: U.S. Census of Population 1963: 53-9, 53-11

1960: 13-14).

Fomento's goal, set in 1954, was at least one factory in every municipality (Ross 1976: 146). By 1960, they still had a long way to go, although only three municipalities were still without a Fomento building (Aponte Hernández 1972: 77). The concentration of Fomento plants in Metropolitan San Juan was reduced, from 48% in 1953 to 36% in 1960. But the dispersal had still been largely limited to the other major port cities (Ponce and Mayaguez), and the region surrounding San Juan and tied to it by good roads. More remote rural areas remained without manufacturing (Adams et al 1962: 14; Economic Development Administration 1960: 6). In terms of public relations, though, the program had the desired effect, forging bonds of mutual interest between Fomento administrators and municipal leaders who could claim credit for the new jobs created or anticipated (Ross 1976: 147). Even if still only a small percentage of the population could get work in the new plants, Fomento had captured the support of important politicos.

One last twist in the development program in the 1950s really seemed to suggest that Puerto Rico was entering a stage of economic take-off, a transition to a new and more dynamic period of growth. This was the shift to heavy industry, accompanied by an increasing capital/labor ratio. The goal of capital intensive investment sprang to prominence in Fomento literature around the beginning of 1955 (Barton 1957: 13),

simultaneous with a surge in capital investment (below). One interpretation of this coincidence is that Fomento had decided on the desirability of attracting capital intensive industry, and had proceeded to do so (e.g. Curet Cuevas 1979: 244), which would imply that Fomento retained significant influence over private investment. Actually, the order of occurrences appears to be the reverse.

The goal of attracting capital intensive industry was not new. It had been stated by 1951, when it was reasoned that greater capital investment per worker would lead to higher productivity, better wages, and greater prosperity (Chase 1951: 27; Puerto Rico Planning Board 1951: 58-59). The early Fomento promotions did have a higher capital-worker ratio than most previously established manufacturing (Moscoso 1953: 65). But investment remained roughly constant at about \$3,500 per job created from 1950 to 1953 (Ross 1976: 165). Capital investment per worker began to climb in 1954, before Fomento's new enthusiasm. It reached \$10,400 per new job in 1958, with the result that even though the number of new jobs being created declined, the rate of capital investment increased substantially (Barton 1959: 25; Ross 1976: 165). However, nearly three quarters of this new capital was invested in five major projects. Without these, the rate of capital investment in Puerto Rico would have declined to about one third of the 1950-54 rate, which would be commensurate with the actual declines in total number of new factory start-ups and new

manufacturing jobs (Ross 1976: 164-167). In fact, examination of aggregate data on manufacturing employment, output, and income for labor- and capital-intensive industries through the 1950s (Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 13), calls into question the reality of the shift to capital intensive production, so highly touted at the time. (A more substantial change to capital intensive industries occurred in the 1960s).

One of the five big projects manufactured ammonia for fertilizer. This involved local investors, and was the shining star in the local promotion campaign. Another, a papermill owned by W.R. Grace, followed up early efforts by Fomento to turn sugar cane bagasse (a fibrous byproduct of milling) into paper. The three others were a Union Carbide ethylene glycol plant, and two petroleum refineries (Ross 1976: 164-167). The reason for Union Carbide's choice of Puerto Rico is not clear, but the two petroleum refineries do not seem to be a consequence of Fomento's new emphasis on heavy capital investment. According to a planner at the time (Barton 1957: 8-9), they came because of the recently extended tax exemption within the U.S. tariff walls (which was not specifically directed to capital intensive industries); and because the different consumption patterns of petroleum products in the U.S. and Europe (more fuel oil in Europe, more motor fuels in the U.S.) made Puerto Rico's eastern location advantageous for shipping refinery's products to both markets. In sum, Fomento's endorsement of greater capital investment in 1955

seems to be an accomodation to an industry trend, rather than its cause.

In fact, it was never clear that this turn to heavy industry was for Puerto Rico's good. Planners were effusive in describing prospects for several more refineries, plus a swarm of downstream industries using petroleum products (Barton 1957: 6-19). It was claimed that this new trend "may result in our approaching full employment by 1965" (Barton 1957: 19). Needless to say, that did not happen. Puerto Rico government experts had issued one exceedingly optimistic set of predictions about economic growth in 1950. Okun (1961: 223-224) attributes the large error in those predictions to a series of politically innocent technical errors, the most serious of which was a major overestimation of the rate at which new capital would contribute to GNP growth. To make this same type of error again in 1957 seems less excusable, and raises the question of political manipulation.

Other analysts, benefiting perhaps from hindsight, argued that more labor intensive manufacturing was the better way to employ capital in a situation of high unemployment (Okun 1961: 247). The major heavy industry projects actually worked against creation of more light manufacturing. Even their enthusiastic supporter Barton (1957: 16-17) recognized that high wages in the refineries (\$1.20/hour in 1957) were putting upwards pressure on insular wages: "the impact of these rates on our entire wage structure may be substantial. The strongest

effect will probably be on male labor in agriculture, construction, and industry". He continues to predict slower growth in "non-integrated, labor intensive industries". What about local investors, with their limited capital resources? They would just have to try harder, he admitted. This blow to local promotion was compounded by "the dangerous readiness of Puerto Rican merchants and entrepreneurs to sell out their businesses to the extravagant offers of the big American concerns" (Lewis 1963: 210), offers fueled no doubt by the latter's accumulating profits, kept on the island by tax provisions (above). But to call attention to these problems in the late 1950s, was, as already mentioned, considered nearly treasonous by the political and media powers (Lewis 1963: 184).

It was in this atmosphere that the government began to view massive unemployment as an acceptable social problem, to be handled with welfare measures (Barton and Mayne 1981: 13). Those measures will be described below. The government's ability to provide minimal assistance, and the public's acceptance of the situation, were both contingent on one other prime factor in planner's calculations, the "escape valve" of migration to the U.S.

In earlier chapters, I described how "the overpopulation problem" came to be accepted as a major cause of the island's ills. Various, sometimes exotic plans had been floated for dealing with overpopulation, without much impact. In the 1940s, it seemed that something could be done. The government

of Puerto Rico helped pave the way for a massive exodus to the U.S. mainland. From 1943, Muñoz and others lobbied for a lowering of the air fares on the federally regulated San Juan routes. (This was also intended to stimulate tourism). In 1946, with fares still high, military surplus planes operating as "nonscheduled carriers" began to offer cut-rate fares. In 1948, the government initiated official proceedings with the Civil Aeronautics Board to break Pan American's monopoly on scheduled flights. Greater competition and substantially reduced fares followed (Lewis 1963: 203; Hamilton 1953: 80).

A second measure dates to March 1944, when the insular government, working with federal agencies, recruited and sent nearly 2,000 workers to four mainland war-related industries. This program was discontinued almost immediately (Annual Report of the Governor 1945: 70-71; 1946: 70; 1949: 31-32), apparently because Puerto Rican workers, as citizens, could not be required to return home when they were no longer needed, as could foreign workers (History Task Force 1979: 124).

A third measure would have major direct impact on life in Jauca I. In March 1946, the island government cooperated in sending 1,000 agricultural workers for one season of work on the mainland (Páláu de López 1980: 15)). In 1947, it passed legislation allowing insular agencies to cooperate with U.S. and state agencies in signing seasonal labor contracts, recruiting workers, and ensuring satisfactory work and living conditions (Hanson 1960: 41; Senior 1953: 131-132, 135). In

that year, about 3,000 workers went north under the program. In 1952, the number had reached 12,500, and thousands more were going outside of government channels (Senior 1953: 131-133). By the late 1950s, the total seasonal flow was about 30,000, and growing numbers of these seasonal workers were electing to stay on the mainland (Wakefield 1973: 295).

The latter joined the major current of permanent migration to the main land. The great majority of those who went to live in the U.S. cities came from San Juan and other island urban centers. They had more education and higher paying jobs than the insular norm. About 145,000 left in the 1940s, most of them after the war. Another half a million went in the 1950s (Senior 1953: 133; History Task Force 1979: 187). Their departure, combined with a long-term downturn in the birth rate after 1947 (after a brief local baby boom) (Departamento de Salud 1977: 1), depressed the island's rate of population growth (see Table 5.1).

The official government policy was to provide services to assist Puerto Ricans seeking to move to the U.S., but otherwise, not to actually encourage the move (Annual Report of the Governor 1949: 31-32). A recent study of the migration (Earnhardt 1978) concludes that the government did not have to encourage migration, since many people were eager to go. But the government did plan on migration, in making economic projections (Chase 1951: 8; Earnhardt 1978). Much of planners' optimism in the early 1950s was because out-migration had

exceeded their expectations, which resulted in higher per capita gains for the economy (Okun 1961: 235). That acceleration was due to the tight labor market in the U.S. from 1950 to 1953, related to the Korean War (Barton 1959: 28; Senior 1953: 136). When recession struck the U.S. in 1954, migration fell off, causing a minor panic among planners (Jaffe 1959: 66). A second decline in migration accompanied the recession of 1957 (Wakefield 1973: 294). Migration, like investment, was strongly tied to fluctuations in the U.S. economy.

The Puerto Rican diaspora is a major field of research (see Bonilla and Campos 1982; Cordasco and Bucchioni 1973; Friedlander 1965; History Task Force 1979; López and Petras 1974; Mills et al 1950; Padilla 1958; Senior 1953; 1965). I will not discuss that literature here, although I will focus later on the causes and consequences of migration from Jauca I. Only one further point regarding migration will be made here: for once, I am in complete agreement with planners and others, who saw in it a safety valve relieving the political pressure related to continuing unemployment and poverty. If migration had not been possible, it seems extremely unlikely that Fomento would have been left in peace to pursue its program.

The changing structure of the Puerto Rican economy. The discussion of economic change and power shifts focused on two pivotal areas, the sugar industry and the government sponsored development program. Changes in these two areas led to structural reorganization of the Puerto Rican economy as a

whole, and major modification of its place within the U.S. economy. Aspects of this reorganization had direct impact on life in Jauca I, and so economic performance provides a bridge to the section on Jauca I. The following section will describe the major changes in the insular economy from 1940 to 1960.

The relative isolation of Puerto Rico from the U.S. during the war years, especially 1942, led to massive disruptions of island life. There were critical shortages of food and fuel, local business shutdowns, and a major burst of unemployment. The period of crisis, however, passed quickly (Goodsell 1967: 32; Lugo Silva 1955: 75-76; Perloff 1950: 145; Tugwell 1977: 486, 573). The remainder of the war saw a more gradual movement in the direction of greater economic autonomy. Government efforts to stimulate locally oriented agriculture and manufacturing have already been described. Trade data shows the results of these efforts. Even in 1944 and 1945, after the submarine threat had been eliminated, the volume of external trade represented the smallest fraction of total insular income since the Depression (1934), even though dollar values had risen due to inflation (Perloff 1950: 132, 174). Production of local food staples rose 61% from 1940 to 1945, although this still represented only about 58% (by bulk) of locally consumed food (Perloff 1950: 174, 317; also see Hanson and Pérez 1947: 15).

This tendency toward greater economic autonomy should not be exaggerated, or misconstrued to imply a break with the U.S.

system. Fundamental bases of economic union remained unchanged, such as the common tariffs and currency, and the requirement of using U.S. registry ships for all shipments to the U.S. Also, the tendency toward autonomy was itself financed through the island's linkage to the U.S. The returned excise taxes on rum constituted the insular government's main capital fund (above). A variety of federal programs pumped operating funds into the island (Regua 1943: 8), as well as providing direct food and work relief (Goodsell 1967: 180; Tugwell 1977: 591). Military construction and other spending provided a major stimulus to the local economy (Tugwell 1977: 607). All together, federal government expenditures in Puerto Rico from July 1939 to June 1947 totaled \$656 million, with \$532 million of that in military spending (Jaffe 1959: 43-47). Federal spending made up about one quarter of island income from 1942 to 1945 (Perloff 1950: 113-117). Still, one consequence of all this spending was greater self-sufficiency in production and consumption.

That tendency was reversed after 1945. Policy changes promoting greater openness of the insular economy have already been described, and again trade data shows the prevailing trends. Imports from the U.S. climbed dramatically (Perloff 1950: 132). Exports also rose, not quite as rapidly, but with an even greater concentration (over 90%) in the U.S. market (Junta de Planificación 1978: 3). Table 5.2 shows this trend, and the island's increasing trade deficit. That was

counterbalanced by an influx of investment capital and continuing federal expenditures. (Military spending was greatly reduced except during the Korea years [Jaffe 1959: 43-47], but non-military federal expenditures rose to \$150-\$175 million annually by 1960 [Lewis 1963: 183]).¹ This financial dependency on the U.S. was accompanied by growing dominance of mainland financial corporations. In 1950, about half of local banking resources were held by insular branches of mainland banks, and almost all of the insurance industry was controlled by mainland firms (Perloff 1950: 111).

In sum, an economy that was already strongly tied to the U.S. became much more so by 1960 (see Lewis 1963: 189 ff.). Island economic trends were losing any independence, becoming almost direct functions of mainland trends. This has already been described for investment and migration. Inflation also followed mainland trends, led by the steep rise in price of imported food (Perloff 1950: 177). Minimum wage rates and consumption preferences are other derived patterns (below). The economy of Puerto Rico in the 1950s, as Curet Cuevas (1979: 290) concludes, was becoming less intelligible as a national

1. In regard to trade balances, post-war Puerto Rico had become more similar than previously to Latin American states. After World War I, the island had escaped the general world trend of declining terms of trade, because most of its imports from the U.S. were food, rather than manufactured goods; and because its major export, sugar, was price-supported. But after World War II, sugar prices dropped relative to other commodities, Puerto Rico began to import more manufactured goods, and the prices of imported foods rose sharply (Perloff 1950: 133). The flow of federal funds enabled Puerto Rico to avoid some of the adverse consequences of the trade imbalance.

economy, and more as a regional economy of the U.S. If disruption of the Puerto Rico-U.S. linkage in 1942 created havoc, the potential chaos from disruption was far greater in 1960. The significance of this fact for the debate on the island's political status is obvious.

Another important characteristic of economic change from 1940 to 1960 is the marked divergence of performance in regard to investment, production, and employment. Gross national product grew by 195% in constant dollars (see Table 5.3), while total employment grew by only 1%. The increase in production was the result of increased productivity. Productivity grew at an annual rate of 4.7% in the 1940s, and 6.3% in the 1950s (although most of the latter came from growth at 7.75% from 1949 to 1953, with a rate of 2.75% thereafter). The growth in productivity is related to major growth in fixed capital investment--678% over the two decades, in constant dollars (Curet Cuevas 1979: 91, 97-103). Fixed capital investment rose from \$23 million in 1940, to \$354.9 million in 1960, with \$127.9 million of that in machinery and equipment (Curet Cuevas 1979: 95; Junta de Planificación 1983: A-1). A bit over half (55%) of the total capital invested in Puerto Rico was "foreign" (mainly U.S.), but this was probably more dominant in machinery and equipment, since Puerto Rican capital still exhibited a marked preference for real estate (Cochran 1959:

Table 5.2

Foreign Trade, 1940-1960

	Exports	Imports
1940	\$92,000,000	\$107,000,000
1950	235,000,000	345,000,000
1960	622,000,000	915,000,000

Source: Junta de Planificación 1978: 3

Table 5.3

Gross National Product, 1940-1950

	Current dollars	Constant 1954 dollars	Per Employee, 1954 dollars
1940	\$286,700,000	\$499,300,000	\$932
1950	754,500,000	878,700,000	1,474
1960	1,676,400,000	1,473,200,000	2,721

Source: Curet Cuevas 1979: 98; Junta de Planificación 1983: A-1

Table 5.4

Income and Employment, Manufacturing and Agriculture, 1940-1960

	Percent of National Income		Percent of Employment	
	Manufacturing*	Agriculture**	Manufacturing*	Agriculture**
1940	12.0%	31.1%	10.9%	44.7%
1950	14.5%	24.3%	9.2%	36.3%
1960	21.4%	13.3%	14.9%	23.0%

* Except needlework in the home

** Includes forestry and fishing

Source: Curet Cuevas 1979: 111, 115

81-82).1

The main story in the economy, as far as Fomento boosters were concerned, was the growing percentage of insular net income generated by manufacturing. The manufacturing sector was diversifying. Even though there was a steep decline in home needlework (below), and the factories being established were still mainly small operations (with an average of 35 employees through the 1950s [Curet Cuevas 1979: 120, 127]), manufacturing income passed agricultural income in fiscal 1955-56 (Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 9). Carr (1984: 230) is only the most recent to see this point as a "critical" benchmark. Yet the significance of this event for island society is open to question. Employment was changing far more slowly (see Table 5.4). Manufacturing employment did not pass agricultural until 1965, and that was due as much to the collapse of agriculture as the rise of manufacturing (Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 10).

The value of agricultural production remained stable, actually declining if inflation is considered. Except during the sugar boom around 1952, agricultural employment continued its historic trend of decline, although Puerto Rican government

1. It is often stated that foreign capital was required because local capital generation was insufficient, due in part to a lack of a propensity to save. But despite the low incomes and other very substantial obstacles to saving, described below for Jauca I, people in fact did save. The problem was a lack of institutions to receive savings and channel them into local productive investment. U.S. Post Office savings accounts had an average balance of \$455 in 1953, and were increasing at an annual rate above 6% (Ruml 1953: 93).

figures show a much sharper decrease in the later 1950s than do U.S. census figures (see Table 5.5)--a fact which calls attention to the "softness" of seemingly hard statistics. Coffee, tobacco, fruits and other non-sugar agriculture each had its own dynamic, but with the exception of the thriving cattle and poultry industries, all were either declining or just staying even in terms of employment and value of production (Curet Cuevas 1979: 121, 159-163; Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 6). Especially noteworthy is the virtual collapse of employment as independent farmers and unpaid family-farms workers (see Table 5.7). Sugar production levels have already been discussed. Employment on sugar cane farms has been estimated at widely divergent levels (compare Archer 1976: 259; Curet Cuevas 1979: 155; U.S.D.L. 1961: 6; and various U.S. census reports). The U.S. census shows the least decline, about 12% from 1940 to 1960. Puerto Rico government figures (e.g. in Curet Cuevas) show a drop of 64% for the same period. The general pattern seems to have been a gradual decline through the 1940s, reversing for a temporary increase from 1948 to 1952, followed by renewed decline, accelerating after 1955.

Changes within manufacturing employment are substantial, even if aggregate figures are relatively constant. Needlework at home is one category of manufacturing employment. This field had seemed headed for extinction after minimum wage legislation in the late 1930s. But the elimination of gloves

Table 5.5

Employment, 1940-1960

	All Manufacturing*			All Agriculture			Sugar Cane Farming		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1940	100,693	37,285	63,408	228,811	222,730	6,081	123,886	122,865	1021
1950	92,539	40,932	51,607	214,605	210,726	3,879	128,033	126,873	1,160
1960	91,208	56,524	34,684	201,576	199,880	1,696	76,480	75,840	640

* Includes needlework at home and sugar mills

Source: U.S. Census of Population, various years.

Table 5.6

Manufacturing Employment, by Type of Industry and Sex, 1960

	Light Industry	Semi-Heavy Industry	Heavy Industry
Men	6,264	5,552	3,294
Women	35,855	6,795	3,844

Source: Áponte Hernández 1972: 89

Table 5.7
Employment, by Type of Occupation and Sex, 1940-1960

	Total			Male			Change 1940-1960	Female			Change 1940-1960
	1940	1950	1960	1940	1950	1960		1940	1950	1960	
Professional/Technical	15,786	26,918	23,116	7,999	14,091	22,768	185%	7,787	12,827	20,348	161%
Farmers/Farm Managers	47,761	36,230	17,852	44,691	35,408	17,496	-61%	3,070	822	356	-88%
Managers (non-farm)	24,266	33,161	40,472	22,196	29,746	35,288	59%	2,070	3,415	5,184	60%
Clerical	15,604	27,485	42,768	10,325	15,245	20,524	99%	5,279	12,240	22,244	322%
Sales	25,329	29,179	34,888	22,587	25,517	28,620	27%	2,742	3,662	6,268	129%
Craftsman	27,739	42,187	60,748	27,508	41,625	58,832	113%	231	562	1,916	729%
Operatives	91,393	92,644	99,196	27,655	40,880	60,552	119%	63,738	51,764	38,644	-39%
Private Household Workers	39,335	32,649	18,988	4,042	3,218	1,064	-74%	35,293	29,431	17,294	-49%
Services (non-household)	15,151	29,859	42,508	10,782	19,124	26,496	146%	4,369	10,735	16,012	266%
Farms, unpaid family	13,890	13,690	n.a.	13,307	13,218	2,184	-84%	583	472	1,804	-43%
Farm laborers	164,414	159,529	n.a.	162,047	156,963	105,540	-34%	2,566	2,367		
Laborers (non-farm)	26,274	31,160	34,244	25,924	30,345	33,664	30%	350	815	580	66%
Not Reported	1,616	5,580	7,416	1,195	3,554	3,784	217%	421	2,026	3,632	763%

Source: U.S. Census of Population 1953: 53-39; 1963: 53-126

from Czeckoslovakia with the advent of the war led to a resurgence of Puerto Rican production. When the world economy returned to normal after the war, the earlier trend reasserted itself. Needlework employment fell from 61,000 in 1950 to 4,000 in 1957 (Lewis 1963: 222; Perloff 1950: 99). Needlework was an exclusively female operation. Combined with declines in tobacco processing and domestic services, also female jobs, this depressed the over-all rate of female employment (Silvistrini 1980: 69-71).

Manufacturing employment except home needlework went from 56,000 in 1940, to 55,000 in 1950, to 81,000 in 1960 (Curet Cuevas 1979: 112). Most of the new manufacturing jobs went to women. A study of manufacturing employment in 1960 produced the distribution shown in Table 5.6. Since the lighter industries were more dispersed, the female dominance of manufacturing employment was more pronounced in the more remote areas (Aponte Hernández 1972: 91).

The major growth of employment was in various non-manual categories. Professional and technical workers, non-farm administrators, office workers, and non-domestic service workers together grew from 14.0% of total employment in 1940, to 20.9% in 1950, to 30.9% in 1960; while "operatives" (including factory and transport workers) actually registered a relative decline, from 17.9% in 1940 to 17.2% in 1960 (Curet Cuevas 1979: 193; and see Table 5.7).

By economic sector, the growth leader for the economy was

government employment, which went from 13,000 in 1940 to 62,000 in 1960, or from 2.5% to 11.4% of total employment. That is more than three times the rate of growth of manufacturing (Curet Cuevas 1979: 112-115). In terms of employment, the great manufacturing boom of the 1950s was a chimera. Rather than in manufacturing, the big expansion of jobs was in non-manual fields. (This pattern characterized the post-war U.S. economy as a whole [Bell 1973]).

Combination of these employment trends led to a marked transformation of over-all female employment. The low pay and low status jobs of home needlework and domestic service declined, but this was counterbalanced by growth in new employment, which often paid more than male work in agriculture. Manufacturing has already been discussed. In clerical occupations, female employment grew at 325% the male rate; in non-domestic service work, it grew by 182% of the male rate (Silvistrini 1980: 70-71; and Table 5.7). The new movement of women into better paying jobs was perceived at least by 1948 (Annual Report of the Governor 1949: 31), and by 1960 it was recognized as a major trend that would probably change the status of women in Puerto Rican society (Hanson 1960: 201).

Another important aspect of the economy from 1940 to 1960 is the persistence of unemployment. The 1940-42 roller coaster of high employment crashing into unprecedented unemployment was soon stabilized by War Emergency Program employment, funded by

the federal government. An average of 31,612 people were so employed in fiscal 1944-45, and 13,166 in 1945-46. This program continued, although at a greatly reduced level and under a different administrative structure, into the 1950s (Annual Report of the Governor 1946: 55; 1947: 62; Tugwell 1977: 591; Wells 1969: 481). Migration to the U.S. also kept unemployment down. The participation rate, or the percentage of the working age population at or actively seeking work, began a long term decline. As a result of these last two factors, the island labor force grew by slightly less than 4% in twenty years (see Table 5.8). Despite that, unemployment still grew 21% over the same period.

Moving from employment to wages and earning, other trends are apparent. All wages were rising, but at different rates. The federal government in the late 1930s established minimums for industries producing for interstate commerce, including those located in Puerto Rico. These minimums were reinforced and sometimes surpassed by an insular Minimum Wage Board (Hanson 1960: 216-220). The minimums were still below mainland minimums, but they were rising. The highest industry minimum in Puerto Rico reached \$.75 per hour in 1950, and \$1 per hour in 1956, even though home needlework could still pay as little as \$.26 per hour in 1956 (Echenique and Vélez Ortiz 1984: 15; Hanson 1960: 221). However, prevailing wages in Puerto Rico remained, and still remain, closer to the minimums than on the

mainland (Rottenberg 1953: 87).¹

Wage rate and earnings differences between economic sectors and occupational types became more pronounced, and showed a significant geographical pattern. Family income in the coffee farm areas was reported at around \$2.50-\$5.00 per week during the war, while urban manufacturing and construction workers earned about \$12-\$15 per week. (U.S. manufacturing wages in 1945 averaged \$47.50). Sugar cane work paid the most within agriculture, pushed up by union and political action. By 1947, cane wages approached the bottom end of prevailing wages in manufacturing (Hanson and Pérez 1947: 8; Perloff 1950: 153-155). These differences in earnings were major factors shaping internal migration. Archer (1976) shows that the greatest movement was from coffee municipios to the major cities, with other rural areas showing no single prominent pattern. Even within sugar cane production, wages paid by colonos remained, as they had been in the 1930s, well below

1. It would take too long to examine the struggles over the minimum wage. Some claim the island government tried to keep it low, to continue to attract investment. In public, however, the PPD was strongly committed to gradual but steady increases, and Gordon Lewis, who hardly goes easy on the government, says the commitment seemed genuine. Party support for increases seems plausible, since the high capital industries at the center of their efforts are the least affected by minimum wage regulations. Also, pro-statehood politicians were making hay out of the higher minimums prevailing throughout the U.S. Paradoxically, some mainland unions operating in the island were among those urging restraint. By the late 1950s, the reality of manufacturers flight to Asia made the union men worry about losing local union jobs, and about the possibility of a flood of job-seeking Puerto Ricans on the mainland (Hanson 1960: 216-222; Lewis 1963: 216-217).

those paid by the corporations. By 1960, localities where colonos dominated had lost much of their work force (Lewis 1963: 180).

From 1947 to 1957, wages continued their uneven rise. Agricultural wages on the whole rose by 51%, while white collar pay rose 72%, and manufacturing and crafts work (mostly construction) pay rose by 80% (Andic in Wells 1969: 157). Agriculture also showed the least growth in family income, 42% for 1953 to 1963, vs. 82% for all non-agricultural work (Wells 1969: 158). Wages in the government sector are noteworthy because this accounted for so much of the growth in employment. These wages started out relatively high, the second highest sector in 1950, with average yearly compensation at \$1,578 (vs. \$308 in agriculture).¹ But the growth rate of government wages was kept relatively low, especially in the late 1950s (Curet Cuevas 1979: 343, 346). This led to a growing wage gap for comparable work between public and private sectors (Lewis 1963: 347). The resentment over this gap provided one base for defections from the Popular Party in the 1960s.

Appreciation of the differences in wages must include recognition of inflation, which is reported at exactly 100% from 1940 to 1960 (Curet Cuevas 1979: 375). At that rate, the lucky few in the best of the new jobs were still doing very well. But the unemployed, the non-sugar agricultural workers,

1. This wage differential gives one clue as to why so many agricultural labor leaders could be lured by offers of government posts.

and others left behind were still struggling just to survive. Even Muñoz Marín reportedly acknowledged (in the mid-1950s) that the more remote rural poor "were little better off than they had been before" (Roberts 1963: v--Roberts documents that continuing poverty). In fact, if the only benefits accruing to the people were the changed wages, the PPD would probably have lost much of its electoral base by 1960.

One reason that the insular government and the PPD remained popular was because of its spending on social programs, which was supplemented by substantial federal spending for similar social aims. The insular government had two explicit goals: to build the island's human capital, i.e. those socioeconomic characteristics of the population conducive to increased investment and production; and to ameliorate the most pressing human needs, not otherwise being met by the development of the economy. Of course, the latter goals would win votes for the Populares, and it may be safely assumed that this was another, unstated goal of social spending. It was the human capital formation, however, that was explicitly given priority over any kind of relief spending (Wells 1969: 167-168). Two areas that fell within "productive" social spending were education and health.

Education is of special interest for this thesis, because other writers (Brameld 1966; Tumin and Feldman 1971) have portrayed it as the key to the island's system of social stratification. Their views will be addressed in later

discussions. For now, I am concerned with the expenditures themselves, and how they may relate to other concerns, already discussed.

Even the consistently skeptical Lewis (1963: 446) notes the "impressive consistency" in budget allocations for education. These ran at about one quarter of insular government expenditures through the 1950s, or over one third of expenditures if spending for the University of Puerto Rico is included. Educational gains were equally impressive. Public day school enrollment doubled over twenty years, UPR enrollment more than tripled, and adult illiteracy was cut in half (see Table 5.9). Several special education initiatives were developed, the most substantial of which was to expand vocational and technical training in new and needed job skills. In 1960, nearly 120,000 people received some form of vocational-technical instruction, many of them in special vocational schools. Of course, major problems remained. There was still a relatively low per student expenditure compared to the U.S. Lack of sufficient school buildings led to double and even triple shifts of classes. A high turnover and persistent scarcity of teachers resulted in large classes and less competent instruction. Still, it would be difficult to expect the government to do more than it did under the circumstances (Annual Report of the Governor various years; Hanson 1960: 254-260; Lewis 1963: 446-448; Wells 1969: 168). Why did the government make such an effort?

Table 5.8

Unemployment and Related Statistics, 1940-1960						
	Civil Population, 14 Years of Age or Older.	Labor Force	As % of Civil Population (Participation Rate)	Employed	Unemployed	Unemployed as % of Labor Force
1940	1,154,000	602,000	52.1%	536,000	66,000	10.9%
1950	1,289,000	684,000	53.0%	596,000	88,000	12.9%
1960	1,383,000	625,000	45.2%	543,000	82,000	13.2%

Source: Curet Cuevas 1979: 337

Table 5.9

Education Trends, 1940-1960						
	Expenditures, Dept. Public Instruction	Expenditures, University of Puerto Rico	Number of Teachers	Public Day School Enrollment	University of P.R. Enrollment	Adult Literacy
1940	\$6,200,000	\$1,600,000	6,294	286,113	4,987	68.5%
1950	30,000,000	5,400,000	8,727	408,128	11,348	75.3%
1960	64,300,000	17,400,000	13,233	573,440	18,223	83.0%

Source: Junta de Planificación 1978: 13; 1980: 175

Table 5.10

Sources of Personal Income, 1940-1960				
	Total	Employment Compensation	Income from Property	Transfers
1940	\$219,200,000	\$127,200,000	\$88,300,000	\$5,900,000
1950	653,400,000	388,900,000	201,000,000	78,100,000
1960	1,373,600,000	928,900,000	352,900,000	177,100,000

Source: Junta de Planificación 1982: A-8

Formal education is one way of raising the quality of a work force, probably the most important human capital investment. The relative merits of allocating scarce resources to such social development, as opposed to direct investment in production, has been debated since Adam Smith. The weight of current opinion seems to be that the social investments are well worth it because of their contribution to increased productivity (Forde 1979: 141-147). That conclusion seems to never have been in doubt in Puerto Rico. Prevailing opinion was systematized and analytically supported by a 1957 study ("Puerto Rico's Manpower Needs and Supply"), which identified education as the key to creating more and better jobs. That stimulated a renewed commitment to upgrading educational facilities (Barton and Mayne 1981: 11-12). In earlier discussions, however, I suggested that development strategies tended to conform to circumstances already in place. The same can be said about the government support for education.

Investors wanted to hire people with more education. This was a clear pattern around Jauca I, with very significant consequences. To understand this preference, one must consider more than the academic and vocational and technical skills acquired in school, as important as these are. Formal education is also important in "industrial frontier" areas such as Puerto Rico ca. 1950 because of the social and personal characteristics it promotes. Machlup (in Forde 1979: 148) has discussed this, how those who pass through an extended formal

education learn to handle details, evaluate information, and adjust rapidly to changing system demands. They would also learn the other implicit lessons of North American style schooling, as discussed by Henry (1965: 283-321):

individualism, competitiveness, fear of failure. These are not characteristics well-suited to strong unionism, and indeed Lewis comments (1963: 448) that the cream of the educational process, those who went on to become teachers themselves, were excessively preoccupied with personal status and unsympathetic to the idea of a teachers' union (and see Brameld 1966: 80-81). Henry shows how formal education in one sense constitutes a prolonged drill in enthusiastic response to the dictates of authorities. And Lewis and Brameld both also note the strong authoritarian pattern in the practice of education, despite the theoretical adulation of democratic principles. So the experience of prolonged schooling constituted a screening and training mechanism for individuals adaptable to manufacturing and clerical routines, which would work in conjunction with a more overt form of screening carried out by the government, discussed later in this chapter.

The school curricula, particularly what was taught about Puerto Rican history and contemporary society, constitute one of the public's main sources of information about the way the world works, especially that world beyond the limits of immediate observation. I cannot attempt a study of instructional material here. One example at my disposal, an

adult education text first published in 1958, contains expectable descriptions of Fomento's struggle to win "the Battle of Production" via industrialization, and to overcome the "principle problem" of overpopulation (Departamento de Instrucción Pública 1967: 59). Education offered policy makers an opportunity to shape public consciousness in accordance with the government's own priorities.

Expansion of educational facilities had other benefits for the government. Education was seen as a good thing by the public, especially when schooling seemed to offer an avenue to occupational mobility. Educational expansion was partially self-driving in this regard. The chronic scarcity of teachers led to hiring of graduates right out of high school. In 1946, it seems that about one in four high school seniors could expect to obtain a job as a teacher (Annual Report of the Governor 1947: 11, table 20). The poor also liked the educational system because of the free school lunches and the program to provide shoes to poor school children (described for Jauca I). Educational opportunities keyed into federally funded veterans programs after 1945. In 1947-48, 37,310 veterans are reported as receiving some instruction under V.A. programs (Annual Report of the Governor 1948: 21, 125). By encouraging veterans and teenagers to remain in school, the government also reduced unemployment, because people in school full-time are not counted as part of the labor force.

The University of Puerto Rico also received new attention

(see Table 5.9). A major reform of the University began in 1942, which included increased centralization of power under Chancellor Benitez. The expanding enrollment included many children of the poor. But by the end of the 1950s, a new trend was established, toward the domination of UPR enrollment by offspring of urban and "middle class" parents. More affluent families were sending their children to private schools and colleges (Lewis 1963: 452-453, 463-464).

The University of Puerto Rico assumed another role, that of promoter of descriptive and analytic research about Puerto Rico (Hanson 1953; Lewis 1963: 453). Many leading North American social scientists worked with the University in launching major research efforts. The results pepper the bibliography of this thesis. The People of Puerto Rico project is one of the earlier of these investigations, begun at the suggestion of Clarence Senior of the UPR Center of Social Science Investigation (Steward et al. 1956: v). Anthony Lauria is currently investigating the circumstances surrounding the project, and his work should tell us more about the relationship between this particular quest for information and the political and economic trends of the time.

The other area where government social spending was deemed vital in order to raise human capital was in public health. Puerto Rico in 1940 was an unhealthful place, with contaminated drinking water as the most basic problem. Again, the government spending was substantial: \$16.5 million in 1951,

\$29.6 million in 1960 (Wells 1969: 168). The money was spent on water purification systems and a variety of public health delivery programs which reached directly into local communities (Hanson 1960: 235-247). Statistics show the success of these efforts. Comparing the years 1940, 1950, and 1960, death rates per 1000 went from 18.4, to 9.9, to 6.7; infant mortality per 1000 live births from 109.1, to 65.6, to 42.1; and average life expectancy from 46 years, to 61, to 69 (Junta de Planificación 1978: 11). Substantial gains were made against the top four causes of death in 1940, diarrhea-enteritis, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and malaria (Davis 1953: 117).

Obviously, investors would prefer physically sound workers to sickly ones, and they would be concerned also about their own health. Just as obviously, the public would be very enthusiastic about these health initiatives. Expanding health services also created more jobs. So in public health, as in education, what was good for capital was good for the public. Government expenditures made everybody happy. The same was true for investment in physical infrastructure--roads, electricity, etc. (above). Investment in all of these areas, in fact, represents a continuation and intensification of efforts that date back to the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion. The Populars were not the first to realize the benefits of some social spending (Davis 1953: 117-188; Hanson 1960: 231-235, 248-251; Lewis 1963: 441-445). Other pressing social needs did not receive the same attention.

Housing is one area where very pressing human needs did not dovetail with the interests of capital. In 1940, 80% of Puerto Rico's housing was classified as inadequate (Wells 1969: 173). Physical conditions were coupled with the social and political ramifications of agregado status. 125,000 landless rural families (Edel 1963: 32) had to live at the sufferance of hacendados or plantation administrators. The insular government's response to all these conditions begins with the 1942 Land Law.

Title V of the Land Law made provision for acquiring land to be distributed for living sites. House plots would vary from 1/4 to 3 cuerdas, and would be distributed by lottery to agregados or other families that could demonstrate need. Recipients would have perpetual usufruct rights, but not clear title to the land.¹ Locations for plot divisions were chosen on the basis of local need, and accessibility to employment sites. Despite talk of promoting subsistence garden plots (Chase 1951: 19-20), soil fertility was not generally considered. In fact landowners took the opportunity to dispose of useless land at inflated prices.

Drawing lots for housesites was an event of great ceremony, with local Populists calling it the fulfillment of the Party's pledge of land. In practice, it was the centerpiece of the land reform after first the small private farm and then the

1. The reason for not giving title of ownership was to prevent resale of the plots. That happened anyway.

proportional profit farm were deemphasized. In 1944, a new village of parcelas was created every ten days. By 1959, 52,287 families had been resettled in 304 new rural communities. Combined with migration, this reduced the number of agregago families to 10-40,000 by 1959 (Edel 1962: 40, 48-50; 1963: 32).

The problem of housesites was relatively easy, and cheap, to solve. Decent housing and other living conditions were more problematical. There was virtually no site preparation or follow-up support attendant on parcelas distribution. People were given a piece of land, nothing more. Distribution of plots was halted temporarily in 1946 because of criticism of improper use of resources, and that the government was just creating new rural slums (Edel 1962: 50, 57).

In 1948, the parcelas program was moved to its own Social Programs Administration, and this agency experimented with a variety of ways to mobilize community self-help efforts. Not much had been accomplished by the late 1950s (when the self-help strategy would receive renewed backing [Roberts 1963]), except in the area of housing. A PRRA program from the 1930s was revived, which advanced concrete house building materials to families in parcelas communities. The communities would provide the labor, in government supervised cooperative work brigades. Participating families had to repay the government for the materials (about \$300 at first) over a ten year period. This program took several years to get up to

speed, but by 1959, 8,831 low cost homes had been built. Another advance for rural communities was the continuing extension of public utilities. By about 1960, most rural communities had electricity. Indoor plumbing had still not reached most villages, but most did have new public fountains to replace the old wells. According to a 1960 Planning Board survey, there was a generally high level of satisfaction with the government's performance in the rural communities (Curet Cuevas 1979: 377-378; Edel 1963: 30-33). As we will see, that was not the case in Jauca's parcelas .

Federal funds backed efforts to upgrade urban housing via the Puerto Rico Housing Authority. From its establishment in 1938 to 1964, it funneled nearly \$500 million into urban projects, about 80% of that going to public housing. Most public housing was built in the major cities, but smaller projects were scattered through towns across the island. From 1940 to 1956, nearly 8000 units were built this way (Anuario Estadístico 1959: 188-190; Wells 1969: 173-174).

Insular efforts, by contrast, were on the cheap. "Housing and land reservation" accounted for only \$800,000 in 1951, \$1,700,000 in 1955, and \$5,000,000 in 1960 (Wells 1969: 168). In actual house construction, as mentioned, materials had to be paid for, and labor provided by the people themselves. The major cost to the government, then, was in acquiring the land. This was a small price to pay for the political dividends, especially since the purchases often benefited local

landowners, who themselves were often active politicians. Progress had been substantial even so, with inadequate housing down to 40% by 1960 (Wells 1969: 175). Progress might have been truly phenomenal if housing had not been relegated to the third level of priority by the government.

The same pattern held for direct relief expenditures. According to Wells (1969: 180), despite peoples' obvious needs, "the Puerto Rican government strictly adhered to the Munoz policy of according the lowest priority to expenditures on purely ameliorative services". From 1945 to 1964, the government devoted around 5-6% of its expenditures to relief, about \$5 million in 1947-48, and \$21 million in 1963-64. This money was spread over typical public welfare programs, e.g. financial aid to the indigent, blind, and disabled; maternal and child welfare services; etc. Cash subsistence payments were minimal, \$7.50 per family per month ca. 1950, and \$60 maximum in the 1960s, with an average then of only \$11.67.1 Moreover, part of the insular spending was financed by federal grants. These went from \$800,000 in 1948, to \$3.4 million in 1952, to \$11.8 million in 1964, so that the insular funds directed toward relief actually declined. A separate major relief contribution from the federal government was surplus

1. These low welfare payments were not out of line with the national pattern, which was to adjust payment rates to regional wage scales so that "welfare grants can be kept from becoming competitive with wages, no matter how low the wages". Mississippi was paying \$10 per month in the 1960s (Piven and Cloward 1971: 131).

food, channeled through the free school lunch program and a general program of food distribution to the poor. In 1963, 99 million pounds of food, valued at \$22 million, was given away (Wells 1969: 180-181).

Other transfer payments to non-indigent people also emphasized the federal connection. Veterans benefits were substantial. 66,034 Puerto Ricans served during World War II, and 43,434 in Korea (Veteran's Administration Center n.d.: 1-2).¹ Veterans assistance, including payments to servicemen's families and later stipends while in school, amounted to \$49.7 million in 1950, and \$39.5 million in 1960 (Junta de Planificación 1983: A-19). (Veterans will be seen to be the point men of social change in Jauca I.) Social Security coverage was extended to Puerto Rico in 1951, and payments reached \$36.9 million in 1960 (Junta de Planificación 1983: A-19). State unemployment compensation for cane workers began in 1948, and was extended to all industries in 1959 (Cochran 1959: 56; Economic Development Administration 1975). These two programs added an important measure of security to life on the island. Around 1960, V.A. and Social Security payments, together with federal welfare grants and food transfers, easily surpassed \$100 million in direct transfers to individuals. Added to that were remittances from permanent and seasonal

1. Tugwell fought for extension of the draft to Puerto Rico. He saw the exclusion of the island people from the draft as an indication of prejudice (Tugwell 1977: 322, 365; Subcommittee 1944: 1725-1726).

migrants to the U.S. In 1951, migrant workers alone were estimated to mail home \$2-2.5 million of the total of \$6.3 million they earned (Senior 1953: 134). All together, transfers of all types accounted for 12% of all personal income in 1950, and 13% in 1960. (USDC 1979 I: 69).

Taking all income together, Puerto Rico was experiencing undeniable prosperity, compared to what it had known in the past. Total income nearly tripled (constant dollars) between 1940 and 1960. Net per capita income, which is the measure used in Table 4.2 to show the impact of the Depression, rose from \$121 in 1940, to \$278 in 1950, to \$576 in 1960 (current dollars) (Junta de Planificación 1982: A-1). But the distribution of the sources of income was changing (see Table 5.10). There was a relative shift away from earnings on property to other sources, mainly wages and transfers (Wells 1969: 157).

Studies of over-all income distribution (recipients) are controversial (see Cao Garcia 1979), but a few general tendencies seem to be accepted. There was an equalizing trend in the 1941-53 period, with the top 20% of the population losing and the bottom 20% gaining the most. That period, of course, encompasses the insular government's redistributive phase. The period from 1953 to 1963 shows a different trend. The bottom 20% of the population receives less, dropping from 5% to 4% of insular money income. The bottom 45% drops from 18.2% to 16%. The top 10% also declines slightly, from 35% to

Table 5.11

Annual Family Income, by Percentage of All Families

	Puerto Rico 1946 - 1947		Puerto Rico 1960	Doña Elena Sample ca. 1959 *
Less than \$500	38.34%		25.0%	51%
\$500-1,999	50.74%		41.3%	43%
\$2,000-3,999	7.64%		20.0%	5%
\$4,000-7,499	2.58%	\$4,000-5,999	7.0%	1%
\$7,500-9,999	.35%	\$6,000-9,999	4.6%	--
\$10,000 or more	.47%		2.1%	--

* See text for explanation

Source: Junta de Planificación 1980: 31; Perloff 1950: 166; Roberts 1963:14.

34.5%. The big gain is registered for the middle 45% of the population, whose share of the income rises from 46.8% to 49.5% (Cao Garcia 1979: 324; Wells 1969: 157-158). The expanding income share of middle families is shown also in Table 5.11, as is the persistence of many families at very low income levels. In general terms then, the situation regarding income distribution changed from a dynamic involving the richest and the poorest, with the poor gaining, to one involving the poor and the middle income group, with the poor losing.

The geographic pattern mentioned for job distribution and wages reappears in family income. Urban areas do much better than rural. Median family income for Puerto Rico in 1960 was \$1,268, but urban families averaged \$1,959 and rural families \$839 (U.S.D.C. 1963: 53-129). Roberts (1963) studied a remote rural community around 1960. Income data for 100 families is shown also in Table 5.11, demonstrating a strong concentration at the bottom of the scale. Another pattern described for job distribution merits recall here, that is the surge of women into the newly created jobs. Although I found little data on this point, the historical experience of Jauca I and observation of contemporary island life leaves little room for doubt that the majority of women going into the new jobs had working husbands, many of whom had relatively high paying jobs themselves. The rising income of middle income families would be the result, in part, of two spouses working. The contrast of some families having two wage earners, while others had

none, makes the competition between poor and middle income groups more tangible. (A similar pattern has been described for the post-war U.S. [Harris 1982]).

Total personal consumption expenditures in Puerto Rico rose over this same period. All consumption items showed major gains, but some more than others. Proportionately, spending on food and housing dropped, while spending on transportation, recreation, and foreign travel showed the strongest gains (Curet Cuevas 1979: 369, 371; Junta de Planificación 1978: 1). Marketing patterns also changed. A study conducted in 1950 (Galbraith and Holton 1954) showed Puerto Rican retailing to be dominated by a large number of small and inefficient outlets, concentrating on food sales.

The year that report was published was something of a benchmark: the insular government created an office to help modernize existing stores (e.g. to show how to convert to self-service operations); and the first mainland supermarket chainstores arrived. The latter had shown no interest in the island in 1950, but by 1960 were doing a very good local business. Their growth signalled a proportionate decline in the amount of business going to the traditional family-type stores, and a concomitant change to cash over credit purchases. Non-food retailing also grew strongly in the later 1950s, with newer and larger outlets springing up in major urban centers (Forde 1979: 199-204, 207-208, 211-215). The counterbalancing trends of increased sales and more efficient

use of labor in marketing meant that there was only moderate growth of employment in the sector (see Table 5.7).

Aggregate consumption figures tell only part of the story. Income of the island's poor remained little improved from 1940. They would continue to spend most of their income on food. Roberts (1963) study of "Dona Elena" around 1959-60 shows not only a dearth of new consumer durables (pgs. 40-43), but a continuing inadequacy of basic diet, and accompanying symptoms of malnutrition (pgs. 31-39). If one could factor-out the purchase of staples by the poor, the trend to spending on luxury or high-status items by middle income groups would be even more pronounced. Several purchasing fads are noted for those beneficiaries of the new economic order. Just after the war, it was cars, home furnishings, and electrical appliances (Curet Cuevas 1979: 371; Puerto Rico Planning Board 1951: 23). Those continued into the 1950s, but were joined by television sets, outdoor home equipment, imported luxury foods, and other conspicuous expenditures such as elaborate wedding ceremonies--all of this egged on by island media (Lewis 1963: 181, 242-243).

This conspicuous consumption, this striving to obtain high-status consumer items, overlapped with a broader process of accelerated "Americanization" of Puerto Rico (see Lewis 1963: 291-317), which accompanied the increase of tourism and the return of veterans and migrants. For many, North American consumption patterns became the standard. The unbridled

acquisitiveness distressed even Muñoz Marín, who Lewis (1963: 309) characterizes as more and more "a puritan in Babylon" (also see Reimer 1960: 22). The theme of cultural imperialism is very prominent in more recent critical social commentary (e.g. Lewis 1974; Méndez 1980), yet the actual process of development of the consumption pattern remains little studied and poorly understood.¹

Another consequence of increased consumer spending was to make Puerto Rico an even more important market for U.S. manufactures. That is one way in which Puerto Rico was becoming more valuable from the point of view of the U.S. business community. Another way was as a site of high profit operations. Profits paid to non-resident investors fluctuated from \$8.5 million to \$12 million from 1942 to 1948. That is less than the pre-Depression rate in current dollars, and much

1. Some aspects of the growing interest in high-status consumption items will be explored as manifested in Jauca I. But an adequate understanding of this process would require a separate and intensive study, particularly of promotional material in insular media. A key question would concern how it was that certain consumer items acquired such high value. Many have little relation to the previously existing structure of needs. Whatever the utility of an item, the concept of a "status symbol" implies that it is valued at more than its utilitarian worth. Moreover, to acquire these high status items, people had to lose other things, and not just time and money. One clear fact in contemporary Jauca, which can be traced back to developments in the 1950s (below), is that when both spouses work, traditional family structures and sex roles come under great strain. Often, men have been forced to give up traditional male prerogatives. How were they convinced that it was worth it, so as to have two incomes? Undoubtedly, a major factor in the change was advertising by businesses pushing their products. But were there other interest groups also promoting status-oriented consumption?

less in constant terms. External profits payments amounted to only 1.8% of island GNP in 1948. Profits from sugar production accounted for a declining share of these payments, only \$1,041,000 of \$8,553,000 in 1946 (Perloff 1950: 112, 185). The old method of extracting profit from Puerto Rico, centering on sugar production, was apparently exhausted.¹

In 1950, however, profits paid to external investment jumped to \$22 million. They hit \$44 million in 1955, and then accelerated, reaching \$115 million in 1960, or 6.8% of the island GNP. (This spectacular growth of foreign profits would continue through the 1960s). Largely as a result of this increasing payment of profits, 1960 is a benchmark year in that island gross domestic product (GDP) caught up with gross national product (GNP), and afterwards pulled ahead of it (Curet Cuevas 1979: 293-294). The significance of this statistic is explained in a recent U.S. Commerce Department study.

The GDP measures the value of the production carried on within the confines of the island in contrast to the GNP which measures the product value available to Puerto Ricans for consumption. As a result, the continuously widening excess of the GDP over the GNP measures the net outflow of factor income from the economy. The outflow goes mostly to the U.S. mainland as the economies [sic] return on the large capital investments made in the island. In the years preceeding the intensification policies in the early sixties, a net inflow of factor income had occurred. However, the inversion of the GNP-GDP relationship

1. Ca. 1948 might stand as a low point in the over-all economic advantages offered by Puerto Rico to the U.S. and U.S. business. Manners (1956: 107) seems to have perceived this, but did not foresee that a major increase in Puerto Rico's value was in the works.

transformed Puerto Rico from a net recipient of factor income from abroad to a net payer of income to foreigners (USDC 1979: 61-62).

In the 1950s, rapidly increasing profits joined with Puerto Rico's importance as a market and as a source of cheap migrant labor, to make the island a valuable asset for U.S. business. Federal transfer payments were, in a sense, making up for the outflow of profits. It was worth it to the federal government, however. Even excluding the role of business influence within the federal government, Puerto Rico was valuable as a military outpost, and as a major propaganda asset in the cold war (as discussed in the final section of this chapter). Federal transfers smoothed the roughest edges, enabling U.S. business to operate without disturbance, but at the same time creating greater dependency by the people and government on federal "generosity".

Summary of insular trends. The years from 1940 to 1960 span a reorientation of the insular economy as great or greater than that which followed the U.S. invasion. The reorientation was not simple or sudden. Many trends were involved, some of which began in earlier periods, and some which did not "peak" until more recent times. In the latter category would be the collapse of sugar production and the flowering and subsequent withering of Fomento's economic program. Still, in retrospect, this period clearly encompasses the eclipsing of the old agriculturally based economy by a new system based on services, manufacturing, and transfer payments. Leaving aside political

matters, the transformation was from a fairly typical colonial economy to a particularly impoverished, yet profitable, regional economy within the U.S. system.

The key years are 1945 and 1946. That is when the balance tipped. The Popular victory of 1940 represented a major defeat for conservative forces. The weakened political condition of the dominant sugar corporations, massive public discontent expressed in radical labor and nationalist actions, and the extraordinary circumstances of the war, all combined to create an opportunity for radical reform. For a few years, both federal and local government economic policy were directed toward increasing local autonomy and redistributing wealth. By 1945, pressure was mounting to abandon that course. Corporate sugar interests were coming back to political life in Washington, adding their renewed clout to the other island business interests which had persistently opposed the local government's reform activism. The federal government was itself moving to a more right-wing and interventionist foreign policy, as U.S. capitalists sought to secure overseas markets and investment opportunities. These were formidable opponents. Direct economic pressure was applied to make government reform initiatives more costly. Direct political pressure by local interests remained at a feverish intensity. Actions taken or contemplated by a variety of federal bodies not only discouraged reform, but threatened to reverse it completely.

The post-War period was one of unchallengeable U.S. hegemony

in this hemisphere. For Puerto Rico, more intimately bound to the U.S. than any independent Latin nation, to have resisted this conservative tide and maintained the course of radical reform would have been extremely difficult. Instead, the Popular administration opted for conciliation and cooperation. It changed course, even though the extent of the change was never made public.

Recent scholarship has focused mainly on the political changes of this period: the decision to go along with federal "decolonization" efforts and Muñoz Marín's break with independence activists; and the political repression and/or cooptation of Nationalists and radical labor forces after 1946 (described in the last section of this chapter). Less attention has been given to the economic policy changes that began in 1945, and were worked out over the next few years. Yet these were extremely important in the future development of Puerto Rican society. Land reform was allowed to grind to a halt, and the remaining sugar corporations were given a new lease on life. Proportional profit farms and agricultural modernization efforts kept going, but without the political support needed to make them viable. In regard to manufacturing, the insular government backed-off from ownership of factories and its commitment to self-sustaining autonomous development, in favor of private and generally foreign ownership, increased dependency on the U.S. economy, and a loudly proclaimed faith in the benefits of untrammelled free

enterprise. In return for this new stance of cooperation, the U.S. government and capital holders bestowed on the island the blessings they had to offer--federal funds and investment. By 1950, the new pattern was set. Economic changes of the 1950s were, in the main, a spinning out of the implications of the new pattern, combined with the local consequences of turns and bumps in the larger U.S. economy.

The economic policy changes of the later 1940s were explained as rational decisions for allocating limited resources for the greatest benefit to society. Those explanations do not stand up to scrutiny. A more accurate generalization is that the changes were in accordance with the interests of capital and conservative politicians. What they wanted, they got, however much their apologists today may try to disown the Puerto Rico model. Benefits for the people of Puerto Rico were uneven. Very substantial numbers did come to enjoy relative prosperity. But the mass of the poor received hardly any direct benefits from private investment, and only limited assistance from the government. The lot of the poor would improve significantly in the 1960s, but by then, hundreds of thousands of them had abandoned the island.

The emphasis on determining forces imposed from above the island level does not imply that local sociopolitical arrangements had no impact on events. The federal government and U.S. business community could punish or prohibit certain actions by the insular government, and permit or reward other

actions. But the local political response to this structure of sanctions was a result of insular patterns of interests and power. The decision to cooperate with rather than resist the conservative tide, after 1945 was as much a result of internal political struggles as were the thrusts for reform in the mid-1930s and early 1940s. Island history is shaped by an interaction of insular and national systems. A major change in insular sociopolitical arrangements would have resulted in a different dialectic with supra-insular forces. The balance of insular forces, and the political battles they fought, are described in the closing section of this chapter. In the following section describing the impact of change in Jauca I, we will see that the order of village society reacted to and influenced island political patterns.

Economic and Social Change in Jauca I, 1940-1960

This part follows the pattern set in Chapter IV, first describing the local economy as it changed along with developments in the island; then, the evolving social ties and divisions that structured life in Jauca, and the place of the individual within that shifting structure; and finally, the role of jauqueños as actors in island-wide political dramas. That last section leads into the discussion of island politics from the later 1940s to ca. 1960, which will conclude the chapter. Two procedural points must be clarified before proceeding.

More than in previous chapters, the topics which will be discussed for Jauca I can be compared to contemporary ethnographic investigations of other Puerto Rican communities. The most important of these are the four community studies by Mintz's colleagues in The People of Puerto Rico, the 1959 follow-up study of the north coast proportional profit farm by Seda (1973), the work begun in 1959 among San Juan's poor by Safa (1974), and the study of a rural tobacco-based community around 1961 by Torres Zayas (1963). To attempt systematic comparison of Jauca I and these other communities would take far too much time, so reference to those other studies will be made primarily under two conditions: when discussion by one of those authors illuminates parallel developments in Jauca I; and in relation to those local trends and conditions that affect the communities' roles in insular political dramas.

Information about Jauca I from 1940 to 1960 is much more abundant than for previous periods. Detailed government statistics and archival information become more available. We have all the published data from Mintz's field research in 1948-49, plus briefer field observations from short return visits in 1953, 1956, and 1965. Two other social scientists visited and report on Jauca in the 1950s, Brameld (1966) for around 1957, and Hernández Álvarez (1964) for 1959. Data from my own fieldwork is much more extensive. The semi-structured local history interviews with individuals in my fifteen family sample provide the most information, but that is supplemented by material from informal conversations and other techniques. With all these sources, it would be cumbersome to specify the basis of every observation in what is to follow. I will do it when specification seems appropriate.

Aquirre and sugar production. In the mid 1940s, U.S. corporations were still fat enough to continue paying dividends from their accumulated earnings (Perloff 1950: 111). But by the late 1950s, their poor running earnings were causing problems. Eastern made only \$50,000 in 1955, prompting it to merge with Fajardo, which had already been dispossessed of its lands by the Land Authority. The combined operations could not rebound, losing \$700,000 from 1958 to 1960 (USDL 1961: 42), before selling out to Hawaiian interests (Edel 1963: 48). South Porto Rico was still making money (USDL 1961: 44), but having lost its local lands and expanded its operations in the

Dominican Republic (Farr 1960: 115-116, 338-339) it was by 1960 more a Dominican than a Puerto Rican operation. Compared to insular (non-U.S.) raw sugar corporations in the late 1950s, Aguirre was ahead of all and far ahead of most in terms of total revenues and net after-tax profits as percent of total revenues (USDL 1961: 38-44). Aguirre remained the most vital of all Puerto Rico raw sugar producers. Measured against its own past performance, however, Aguirre was not doing well.

Aguirre's production record paralleled island trends throughout this time period. Raw sugar produced by its three mills stayed around the 1930s post-cutback level of 100,000 tons, give or take 10,000, through 1943. The capacity of its three mills so far exceeded the cane it received that Central Cortada in Santa Isabel was closed for much of the 1940-45 grinding seasons. 1944 through 1946 were especially bad years. Then a strong recovery began, which peaked at 133,000 tons in 1950. This exceeded the Corporation's individual quota allotment (105,817 tons), as did output in 1951 and 1952. Federal regulators required a cut back in production for 1953 through 1955, and sugar production for those years was 107-112,000 tons. With the exception of one unusually strong year, production remained in this range for the remainder of the decade. Looking back, only 1949 through 1952 can be considered really good years for Aguirre in terms of production (see appendix).

Profits followed production trends, and the general trend

was not good for Aguirre. 1951 was the best year, with net income at \$2,489,059. This was less than several strong pre-war years, and far less if one considers the reduced value of the dollar and the substantially greater value of Aguirre's total assets (at \$24,582,385 in 1951, vs. \$19,585,469 in 1940). And this peak year was exceptional. Aguirre also endured five years when its net income fell below any year since 1924 (excepting 1929).

In the last chapter, the consolidation of Aguirre's control of agriculture in the area was described. That control remained strong. Central Aguirre, the main mill complex, is remembered as the focal point of life along the coast. Santa Isabel was firmly within its domain. As late as 1962, an insular politician referred to the municipio as the Corporation's estate (Maldonado Denis 1972: 159). Aguirre's total landholdings changed, but not much. They stood at 25,144 acres owned and 17,407 leased in 1940, then dropped in a few steps to 22,500 acres owned and 13,000 leased by 1951, and thereafter remained steady through the decade (Farr, various years). Holdings in Santa Isabel also remained fairly steady. Tax records on land holdings could not be obtained for 1960, but 1950 records indicate only minor transactions since 1940, with a net loss of under 20 acres.¹ If anything, Aguirre's

1. Hoernel (1977: 320) discusses what seem to be larger sales, but his arithmetic is wrong, and so it is difficult to interpret what his figures mean. At the most, his suggestions indicate only a minor reduction of Aguirre's local holdings.

control within Santa Isabel appears to have become more complete. In 1940, there were at least two local colonos who continued to cultivate their own cane, although harvesting was left to Aguirre. Around 1948, cultivation of these fields was turned over to Aguirre--a result of too much "union trouble", according to a retired mayordomo.

In terms of land use, Santa Isabel remained a sugar town. A 1950 insular land use survey indicates 12,460 cuerdas in cane of 12,924 cuerdas total cropland. Another 8,473 cuerdas was in pasture (Hoernel 1977: 321). U.S. census data on production shows a similar dominance of cane, rising with the late 1940s boom (see Table 5.12). Aerial photographs of Jauca 1 in 1937, 1951, and 1963, do not suggest any major changes in land use, at least to an untrained eye. Mintz (1956: 327) records the Destino operations of Aguirre in 1949 as including 1,297 cuerdas in cane, and about 700 cuerdas of pasture. The only change in land use that informants recall for the period just after Mintz's work was a temporary conversion of some 200 cuerdas of somewhat saline pasture land to cane around the early 1950s. But there were major changes under way in how Aguirre ran its field operations.

Mechanization was the order of the day. Aguirre's long-standing interest in reducing its labor needs, and its intensification of mechanization efforts in the 1930s, were described in the previous chapter. Earlier in this chapter, I noted that local sugar industry spokesmen expressed a

Table 5.12

Santa Isabel Sugar Cane Production, 1939 - 1959

	Acres of Sugar Cane Harvested	Tons of Sugar Cane Produced
1939	6,031	299,248
1949	8,276	338,733
1959	8,395	434,676

Source: U.S. Census of Agriculture, various years.

Table 5.13

Pay Scales for Public Construction and Other Public Works,
Per 8 Hour Day, Santa Isabel

	Unskilled	Skilled	Foremen
1940	\$1.20	n.a.	\$1.50
1946	2.56	3.60-4.80	3.00
1956	3.50	6.00	6.25

Source: Calculated from data in Libros de Asamblea Municipal, Libro 10: 220; Libro 12: 22; Libro 14: 140.

continuing interest in mechanization in the early 1940s, but that interest was thwarted through 1946 by war-related shortages of machinery. After the war, the gloves came off. In 1947, Aguirre sold 1194 animals, replacing them with tractors and trucks (Farr 1949: 22). Although both oxen and horses continued to be used for some time, their functions were becoming more restricted, and most animal tending jobs were eliminated. Things got worse in 1948, "the first year of the terror" as it was called by the mayor-union president (Mintz 1956: 399). The new innovations, some of which represent extensions of previous efforts, include various mechanical devices aimed at reducing labor needs in field preparation and weeding, including the use of herbicides.

Another trend noted by Mintz (1956: 354) was "the growing emphasis on lower per acre costs, especially in labor, even if this means a drop in the per acre production of cane". This led to less intense care for growing cane (e.g. fewer applications of fertilizer), an increased reliance on ratoons over newly seeded cane, and extension of the growth time of gran cultura cane beyond the optimum. In the early 1950s, mechanization made serious inroads in jobs involving the seeding of cane, weed control, irrigation, and cane transport. The single most important change was the introduction of a mechanical cane loader around 1953, dubbed "the spider" (arana) because of its appearance. With this machine, a loading team of some 60 men was reduced to three operatives, followed along

by a larger number of (often temporary) workers who picked up what the spider missed. Informants who have spent their lives in the fields can explain various ways these labor saving practices resulted in diminished cane production and lower sucrose yields from cane. The latter shows up as a marked pattern in Aguirre's production statistics beginning in 1951.

The innovation that most frightened the cane workers was a single mechanical harvester--a Thompson, purchased by Aguirre for \$26,000 around 1953. The first tests of the machine in Jauca I took place a few years later. Brameld (1966: 145) describes the hostility of workers watching the machine in operation. As serious as past mechanization had been, the massive outmigration of workers (below) kept unemployment within limits. But cane cutting was the last major task not mechanized, and the ability of the mechanical harvester to bunch cut cane would also reduce the number of workers needed to follow the spider. Workers feared that Aguirre would not stop until it had eliminated all work opportunities. Some threw rocks at the harvester, and the police had to guard it on a 24 hour basis. The union negotiated guarantees supposedly protecting the workers, but no one was sure that they would hold. Luckily for jauqueños, the Thompson machine was still more costly to use than hand cutters, at least during Brameld's visit (1966: 145). It had major difficulties operating over the corrugated field water-delivery system, and could not handle thick or blown-down stands of cane. The large-scale use

of mechanical cutters in later years would require major changes in basic field cultivation methods. That, and the machines themselves, represented a major investment, which as I explain above, was not likely to occur in the mid to late 1950s.

At the same time, there were some new jobs in the cane. Many people worked spraying herbicides and pesticides, especially the newly introduced and massively applied toxin Aldrin. It was work, but bad work. Aldrin was applied with shocking disregard for health.¹ Other new jobs were welcome. Mechanics and tractor operator positions were sought both for their higher pay and better working conditions, but neither approached in number the jobs that the machines eliminated. In the mid 1950s, jauqueños sometimes had trouble getting work even at the peak of the harvest.

The dead time between harvest expanded. Aguirre and other mills had been trying to compress the harvest period at least since the 1930s. (The excess mill capacity exerted a constant pressure in this direction). This trend continued in the 1940s. The harvest lasted only about four months around 1950.

1. Workers had a back-mounted spraying device, with only a cotton mask for protection. They absorbed so much of the pesticide that they reeked of it even after showering and changing clothes. Several deaths and other illnesses are attributed to over-exposure. Aldrin use began in the 1950s (Samuels n.d.: 14) and continued until its banning by the federal government in the mid 1970s. Aldrin decomposes to the substance Dieldrin, which is also very toxic, and completely non-biodegradable (Rudd 1964: 163-166). I strongly suspect that Dieldrin still in Jauca's soil is responsible for continuing health problems in the area.

Later efforts to compress it even more included the introduction of double shifts in the fields. But the harvest appears to not have contracted much further in the 1950s (USDL 1957: 17), perhaps because of the scarcity of harvest workers that developed by the end of the decade (below). Since mechanization had proceeded the furthest in dead time tasks, there was very little work available between harvests. A field laborer might receive only two days of work per week for several months. This situation is the major force impelling the seasonal and permanent migration from Jauca I in the 1950s. By the end of that decade, the outflow had been so massive that there were occasional scarcities of field laborers.

Another factor behind these later labor shortages was that some people were rejecting work in the cane. More educated young men tended to see cane work as for "brutes", except perhaps as a temporary source of cash. Some experienced agricultural workers stayed away from the cane because its pay was too low compared to the wages they earned as seasonal workers in the U.S., and/or because their receipt of unemployment benefits from U.S. jobs encouraged them to sit out the local harvest. (U.S. seasonal farm work, with overtime, paid more than twice local field wages. Unemployment benefits from better U.S. jobs could easily surpass going wages in the cane). Local work was so much less remunerative than that in the U.S. that many men would work a harvest just long enough to accumulate an air fare, and then leave for a season. The

labor scarcities generated by these and other factors were island-wide (USDL 1961: 2). They would become even more acute in the 1960s, adding another reason in the argument for even more effort to mechanize. This avoidance of cane work by some, at the same time that older men with few alternatives feared the total elimination of their jobs, was one big factor generating a crisis in values in the 1950s (below).

Santa Isabel, integrated within the most advanced, efficient, and productive sugar enterprise on the island, was atypical in the persistence of large scale sugar cane production even into the 1980s. But it also was in the forefront of labor-replacing mechanization. In the north coast Land Authority operations in 1949, mechanization was still limited for political reasons, and was not seen as a threat by the workers (Padilla 1956: 281). The araña loader, which dramatically reduced hand loading of cane in Santa Isabel in the mid 1950s, was still not used for about three-quarters of the island's cane in 1960 (Archer 1976: 261). Because of this, Santa Isabel was probably similar to other cane-growing areas in terms of the decline in employment opportunities in the cane.

Wage rates for local field workers rose very substantially between 1940 and 1960. At the beginning of this period, field workers received \$.75 to \$.90 per day, with \$.85 the most common wage during harvests, and \$.75 the regular day rate in dead time. There were variations. Some skilled workers could

double their earnings with piece work. On the other hand, workers would sometimes make less than the base pay because weather or other problems prevented them from working a full day. Insular minimums for field workers rose through the 1940s, due to a combination of union and legislative action. In 1952, minimums for different field tasks in coastal operations (the interior colonos had lower minimums) were between \$1.91 and \$2.11 per day, plus double pay for overtime and a built-in bonus activated by high sugar prices (Turner 1965: 251-254, 270-271). Actual harvest wages are reported at \$2.90 to \$3.40 per day (Koenig 1953: 18). This is consistent with local informants recollections of pay, which they put at about \$18 per week around 1950, with pieceworkers, again, sometimes doubling that. Around 1957, Brameld (1966: 146) notes Santa Isabel cane workers receiving "a little more than \$5 per eight-hour day", at the time-and-a-half rate paid for working in burned cane. (In the 1950s, Aguirre began to burn cane fields just before harvesting, in order to reduce cane trash transported to the mills). Wages rose more rapidly later in the decade, as labor became more scarce. It was not unusual for men to earn \$50 per week in harvests around 1960.

These are major improvements, but appreciation of their significance requires consideration of three factors. First, the 1940 pay scale was well below a minimal subsistence wage, and workers were actually undernourished. Second, increases in wage rates were partly offset by reduction in the availability

of work over the course of a year. Third, increases in wages were offset also by the rising cost of living, which had been felt particularly intensely in food costs (see USDL 1950: 7; 1956: 33).

For agricultural workers, local alternatives to the cane remained very limited. Informants recall various attempts at other crops, such as castor beans, but these were of minor importance. The only new enterprise with staying power came right at the end of the period under consideration. In 1958, the Libby corporation established an experimental tomato processing operation, working in conjunction with Aguirre, which grew the tomatoes. But this employed only about 12 workers the first year. In 1960, it began commercial operation and expanded. That is probably responsible for most of the jump in non-sugar agricultural workers listed for 1960 in Table 5.14. The development and local impact of this type of work will be discussed in the chapter to come covering 1960 to 1982.

As employment in the cane fields declined, so did the importance of the incidental work that cane laborers used to supplement their income, especially in the dead time (see Mintz 1956: 361-364). Fishing had never occupied more than about six jauqueños as year-round work, but some forty cane workers tried fishing during the dead time. One local fisherman told me that all fishing fell-off in the 1950s, a fact he attributed to the movement of beach residents to the new parcelas development (below); and to a change in the sea bottom, perhaps caused by

changing currents, which made the water too dirty for some fish. (Pollution from nearby petrochemical operations did not become a problem until later). Other efforts at food production in the 1940s included gathering land crabs, lobsters, shellfish, and wild growing fruits; tending small gardens; and raising chickens, pigs, and goats.¹ Most of these remained common activities through the 1950s, although declining in the number of practitioners and/or the significance of the produce. An exception, however, is gardening, which informants recall as fading to almost nothing when the seasonal migration pattern developed. The final sources of additional income described by Mintz were the selling of illegal rum and lottery tickets. The latter was made illegal around 1948, and enforcement of that law was pressed (below). I have no data indicating whether this made a dent in local practices.

Construction and other public works provided a growing amount of employment. During the war, federal funds were provided to create emergency employment in public works, but building projects continued even after the war. Minutes of the town council record budget allocations for numerous projects over the years, such as for expanding school and hospital

1. Conversations with informants who grew up outside of Jauca I indicate that gathering wild foods and tending gardens was considerably more important elsewhere, even in other barrios of Santa Isabel. This difference is reported even in regard to Aguirre colonias. Their virtual elimination locally seems more a consequence of the value of Jauca I land, than any deliberate policy of Aguirre.

facilities, for improving the town square and town cemetery, and for constructing or improving roads. Pay scales for municipal projects were substantially above cane field wages in the early 1940s, but seem roughly comparable to cane wages by the later 1950s (see Table 5.13). In 1959, municipal sanitation workers complained to the town council that their pay (\$3.75 per day) was below the local prevailing rate for unskilled labor (\$4.96 per day) (Asamblea Municipal, Libro 15: 220). This is consistent with the insular trend for the late 1950s, of government wages falling behind pay scales for comparable work in the private sector.

The allocation of government funds to a particular project does not necessarily reflect actual spending on public works. One informant told me of being hired for a major project around 1960, only to be dismissed shortly thereafter without being paid for work done. All of the allocated funds had "disappeared". Moreover the practice in public works was to hire people for work in their own barrios, so most of the employment was for brief duration, rather than a regular occupational alternative. Permanent employment in construction on the south coast in the late 1950s appears to have been controlled by labor contractors, who gave the available work to people they knew. The men of one barrio of Salinas, for instance are reported to have specialized in construction, and regularly traveled around the island on contract jobs. The few jauqueños who went elsewhere for

construction work in this period usually went as individuals. So although there was much more local construction and related work than before, it provided steady work for relatively few.

Among those were a few craftsman--carpenters and plumbers--who had acquired skills either in the army, or in vocational schools after army service. Some of the short term, less skilled construction work was also related to the military, especially the construction or modification of bases during World War II and the Korean War. The military provided direct employment, of a sort, to those who served within it. *Birth records* show several jauqueños listing "soldier" as principle occupation in 1945. Other prominent occupations listed for other years include "veteran" and "veteran-student". Veterans' educational benefits (below) were such that most could have a greater income by remaining in school than by taking locally available jobs. I have no way to estimate how many local people served in the two wars, but in 1960, 128 World War II veterans and 184 Korea veterans are reported residing in all of Santa Isabel (USDC 1963: 53-176). Despite their limited numbers, the veterans constituted a significant social group, whose characteristics will be discussed below.

One characteristic of the veteran group was its overlap with the occupation of public car driver. Driving was one of the skills acquired in the army, and army pay and veterans' assistance was sometimes put toward buying a car. In Jauca in 1949, four of the five public cars were owned by veterans, with

the fifth belonging to the son of a storekeeper (Mintz 1956: 375). However, the business available for public cars was limited. By the late 1950s, the number of publicos had stabilized, and those who had managed to buy cars for this purpose found they could make only an average income, by local standards.¹

Retail sales developed only a few new jobs from 1940 to 1950, and actually declined by nearly one quarter by 1960 (see Table 5.14). There were major changes in retailing patterns over this period (below), but these followed the insular pattern already described: the increase in sales was counterbalanced by consolidation of sales in larger and more efficient units, so that employment did not rise.

Retail sales included jobs for both men and women, but the other fields discussed so far were nearly exclusively male domains. Women made up about 12% of the employed population of Santa Isabel in 1940. Roughly 70% of employed women worked in two areas: domestic service and needlework in the home. I have little information on changes in domestic service. From what I could ascertain, few women from Jauca I were engaged as servants, although many took in laundry and sewing for servicement during the war periods.

As for needlework, it was noted in the previous chapter that

1. In Santa Isabel in 1940, there were no more than 18 publico drivers (USDC 1942: 64). There were 52 public cars in 1950, and 56 in 1960 (information provided by the Planning Board). Hernández Álvarez (1964: 147, 150) describes the difficulties of being a publico driver in the later 1950s.

Table 5.14

Employed Workers in Santa Isabel, 1940 - 1960

Male													
	Sugar Farms	Other Agric.	Con-struct.	Sugar Manuf.	Other Manuf.	Trans-port.	Public Utilit.	Retail Sales	Personal Servant	Educa-tion	Hospital Oth. Serv.	Public Admin.	All Other
1940	2,192	33	21	386	30	27	23	190	52	13		35	40
1950	2,015	44	41	131	58	72	55	198	20	15	27	55	43
1960	1,364*	152*	104	392	60	48	72	156	12	36	44	48	80

Female										
	All Agricult.	All Manufact.	Retail Sales	Personal Servant	Educa-tion	Hospital & Oth. Serv.	Public Admin.	All Other	Unemployed Both sexes	
1940	15	178	29	133	50		3	9	272	
1950	18	66	31	52	68	32	22	23	53	
1960	20	56	60	100	164	56	8	28	144	

* These two categories include 20 women, not broken down by type of agriculture, and so not separable.

Source: U.S. Census of Population, various years

there was less of it in Santa Isabel than in other parts of Puerto Rico. But Santa Isabel did participate in the expansion of needlework attendant on the cut-off of European suppliers. Census data indicates that 160 of 178 women in manufacturing in 1940 worked in home embroidery, although I could not ascertain who provided this work. A glove embroidery workshop was begun in Santa Isabel pueblo in the mid 1940s, which later expanded. At least one other workshop was attempted but failed, and there may have been others. A big workshop was begun in Salinas around 1950 by businessmen from a nearby highland town. About six women from Jauca I were employed in that shop, and many more worked for it at home, embroidering dress and work gloves on a piece rate basis. A skilled seamstress could make \$4-5 per day this way. Other women in Jauca I made individual arrangements with embroidery contractors in Ponce and Coamo. But the needlework expansion did not last any longer in Santa Isabel than in Puerto Rico as a whole. The embroidery workshop in Santa Isabel closed in 1955, putting a reported 300 women out of work, and prompting the municipal council to call on Moscoso to replace the shop with some new enterprise. The Salinas workshop closed around the same time, according to informants because it could not compete with the higher pay offered by another factory that came to town. Census and other data indicate that home needlework had virtually disappeared by 1960.

The other factory in Salinas represented something new in

the local structure of employment. The Paper-Mate corporation began a pen-point operation there in 1952. Many women from Jauca I got a job in the new plant, mostly testing the points to see if they worked. Starting pay in 1952 is remembered at \$.45 per hour, with frequent raises. One local woman who worked there in 1956 was making \$.95 per hour. Brameld (1966: 30), visiting Jauca I around 1957, noted that several women who worked in a nearby factory (almost certainly Paper-Mate) were earning more than elementary school teachers. It is no wonder then, that "everybody wanted to work at Paper-Mate".

But the Paper-Mate plant closed in 1960, officially because of communications problems with the corporate headquarters in California (Lewis 1963: 195), although locals believe that it was really because the ten-year tax exemption was about to end. By 1960, however, Fomento's decentralization efforts were showing local effects. By 1961, several factories had been established in surrounding municipios of Salinas, Coamo, and Juana Díaz (Adams et al. 1962: 14, 35). The first Fomento promotion for Santa Isabel--a shoe factory--was announced around 1959, but figures provided to me by the Planning Board indicate that it had not created any new jobs by 1960. Factories would become a big part of local employment in the next decade.

The last categories of jobs are professional workers in health services and education, and governmental employees, including police. These showed substantial growth, from a

total of under 3% of local employment to just under 12%, 1940 to 1960. The only information on pay I obtained regarding these types of work is Mintz's (1965: 46) note that a local teacher at the high school started work in 1958 with a salary of \$158 per month. That starting salary could be surpassed by factory work, skilled construction work, and even some labor in the cane fields. But teaching was steadier work than all those, and offered more opportunity for advancement. Census data shows that teaching and health care, which accounted for most of the growth, were dominated by women, while men received most of the new jobs in clerical occupations. The growing number of high pay and status positions available for women would have an important effect on a variety of social patterns (below).

Over-all employment trends are shown in Table 5.14. U.S. census data indicates a decline in total employment. Compared to 1940, total employment for both sexes was down by 10.8% in 1950, and 12.2% in 1960. Much of the 1950 drop, however, was due to the reported dip in 1950 sugar manufacturing employment (i.e. work at Central Cortada), which I am at a loss to explain, but which seems atypical. Eliminating sugar manufacturing from the data shows a more representative trend: down by 3.8% in 1950, and 13.8% in 1960. The major loss of jobs, of course, was in the cane fields. Compared to 1940, field labor dropped by 9.2% in 1950, and 37.8% in 1960. Like Puerto Rico, Santa Isabel was losing jobs.

Changing employment opportunities affected the sexes differently. For males, the loss of cane jobs was partially balanced by gains in other areas. Cane field labor accounted for 72.1% of all employment in 1940, but only 53.5% in 1960. (For all sugar work, including manufacturing, the drop was from 84.7% to 68.9%). But women experienced even greater change. Their main opportunities in domestic service and home needlework faded from the scene, but the increase in professional work for women registered a proportionately much greater gain for women than for men. All in all, Santa Isabel was very much in the mainstream of job trends affecting all of Puerto Rico.

Data from Santa Isabel birth records reinforce this conclusion, and show also how the changes affected different parts of the municipio. In 1955 and in 1940, the greatest concentration of non-sugar workers was in the town itself. Other barrios varied in their occupational profiles. Paso Seco remained a bastion of cane worker dominance. Jauca I shows a different pattern. In 1940, it too was inhabited almost entirely by cane workers. In 1945 and 1950, their majority had diminished, largely because of the presence of a number of veterans. In 1955, a major shift is registered, showing a substantial decline in the percentage of agricultural workers among parents of children born that year, from 80% in 1950 to 46%. This is a more dramatic change than is indicated for Santa Isabel's other rural barrios. Given the small size of the

sample, it is possible that the actual changes in occupation are exaggerated by these figures. But the trend is real. By the mid 1960s at least, local now people recognize that of all the barrios, with the possible exception of La Playa, Jauca I had the largest number of people making a living in the newer, non-sugar-related lines of work. Understanding how and why this happened is a key point for understanding changes in local class relations. It will be examined in some detail below. Before that, I will sketch out other aspects of the changing pattern of economic opportunities.

Without question, the single most significant change in Jauca I and perhaps all of Puerto Rico during this period was the explosive increase in migration to the U.S. after 1948. Jauqueños had always been a mobile people. Through the 1930s and early 1940s, the most prominent flow was the continuing arrival of would-be settlers from the highlands. Their move to Jauca I was made easier after the Popular victory because the courts supported squatters' rights to the empty beach area. This movement was soon eclipsed by the new migration from Puerto Rico to the continent.

Until the late 1940s, transportation costs kept all but a very few jauqueños from moving "pa' norte". Even in 1949, according to Mintz (1956: 354), emigration was economically impossible for most. The situation was changing fast, however, just as Mintz was terminating his fieldwork. The change began around 1947, with radio advertisements and auto loudspeakers

announcing work opportunities in U.S. harvests. The work coincided with dead time on the south coast. The insular government was supervising the recruitment to guard against abuses, so workers who were interested had to apply through Labor Department offices in Ponce or Guayama. The few who went the first year were joined by many more the next. By the early 1950s, experienced seasonal migrants were making their own arrangements with U.S. farmers, and bypassing the sometimes bothersome government administrators (even though individual experiences indicate that abuses of migrant workers in unregulated situations was not rare). I have no way to put a number on the seasonal workers who left from Jauca I. Informants claim that most of the sugar workers would go north each year. It is not unusual to find individuals who made five or six trips in the 1950s. Late in the decade, some men would work a cane harvest just long enough to make the plane fare, then head north looking for better paying field labor.

Very soon after the seasonal pattern was established, younger men began to move to the U.S., permanently. Their main motivation was that unskilled jobs in the U.S. could pay three times or more the going rate in the cane. The problem was that finding a regular job and otherwise getting established was much easier with a personal contact in the city--even then it could take months--and at first there were few contacts for jauqueños in New York. Permanent migration remained limited until these contacts grew in number. The pioneers themselves

entered U.S. cities by various routes. Several local people went directly to New York after being discharged from the army. Others wound up in cities after fleeing terrible conditions in migrant worker camps. One informant recalled that occasionally several family members would go north for a harvest, and while they were there, support one who went into a city looking for permanent work. If successful, that one would bring in others.

Once the contacts were numerous, the floodgates were open. Hernández Álvarez (1964: 150-154) in 1959 found that for most of the young poor in Jauca I's parcelas (below), permanent migration was seen as the only realistic option for improving one's life. 68% of unmarried people from 14 to 21 years old expressed an interest in moving permanently to the U.S.¹ Even more impressive is the number of young people who had already left: 76% of children of parents aged 39 to 46 years. A total of 226 children of parcelas parents had gone.

1. It is probable that many of those expressing an interest in permanent migration had something less than forever in mind. Several individuals who left Jauca I around this time, and returned after a couple of decades in the U.S., told me that they always intended to return to Puerto Rico after they had accumulated enough money to build a house and start a store or business. Then they got "stuck"--a steady job, new friends, a family...

Despite these recent return migrants, conversations with jauqueños today will lead to much more talk about the seasonal migration than permanent migration. The reason is obvious. Most people who left permanently are not there to talk about it. If it were not for Hernández Álvarez's eyewitness report and figures, it is quite possible that I would have underestimated the scope and significance of the permanent migration. This illustrates a basic problem in reconstructing local history from the memories of current residents.

Enthusiasm for permanent relocation diminished with marriage and increasing age. Older and married people were reluctant to abandon established local ties, and instead favored the seasonal pattern of migration.

Earnings of seasonal migrants varied considerably, and savings varied still more. Bad weather could substantially reduce pay, and the contractor's expenses were collected off the top. Money that was earned not uncommonly was squandered, especially by unmarried workers. Most sent money home to their families, for whom it could be the major source of income for the dead time. Many also saved one lump sum. A common goal was to put away enough to build or improve a house. One man, for instance, recalled that his father saved \$1000 from nine months work in northern fields in 1956, enough to build a home. But Hernández Álvarez (1964: 149-150) observed that the more typical pattern was for the seasonal migrant to return home with little saved. The migrant work helped to get the family through the dead time, but usually little more than that. Never did it produce enough savings to represent a capital fund sufficient to change one's life situation. Permanent migration, on the other hand, could mean a major improvement in type of work and (some) living standards for those who left, but this had only limited impact on living conditions back in Jauca I. The most regular assistance to home-folks rendered by permanent migrants, other than as contacts for newer migrants, was the packages of clothing and

other goods they would send home, usually around Christmas. The arrival of these paquetes were very happy moments.

Money and goods sent back by migrants was an aid to families in Jauca I, both in purely material terms and in mitigating the interpersonal problems that may accompany chronic poverty. But migration also caused great stress for many families. Permanent migrants sometimes cut their ties with family back home. The wailing at departures is often compared to that of funerals. Even those instances where relations were maintained over the long distances, the departure of so many young had the immediate effect of reducing the size of many families; and it stood as an affront to the key value of family integrity.

Even seasonal migration hurt some families. Given the central role of the father as decision maker and disciplinarian, his absence for four months or longer inevitably caused some problems. Added to this was the possibility of complications from infidelities by either spouse. Informants recall that usually all this was manageable. Fathers' brothers often stepped in to look after things. But they also remember a number of cases where families broke up, and where unsupervised youth became rather wild. Returning migrants also were one source of new ideas about how families should be set up and run. This topic will be discussed again later, along with other factors producing changes in family organization.

There were changes in other migration patterns as well. Migration of highlanders to Jauca I ended at the time the U.S. migration began. Some workers would still come down for the sugar harvest, staying with relatives or being transported daily by truck. But for permanent relocation, Jauca I was no longer the chosen site. One man, part of a large family from the highlands that had been moving to Jauca I through the early 1940s, confirmed that around the end of that decade, his highland relatives became more interested in moving to the U.S. The fall-off in in-migration shows up in Santa Isabel's demographic records. Where 25% of Jauca I parents in 1940 were themselves born in Santa Isabel, by 1955 it was 44%.

A final migration trend did not have nearly as great an impact in Jauca I as it did elsewhere in Puerto Rico. Few jauqueños moved to the island's cities. Some informants recall that some young women went to San Juan as domestic servants, but I could learn few details about them. Otherwise, only a relative handful joined the tide of urbanization, and a select handful at that. This group will be discussed in a later context. Informants explanation of this "non-trend" is straightforward: there was no agricultural work in the island cities, which was what they knew how to do; and if one was going to go through all the problems of a complete change in occupation and life style, New York offered more rewards than San Juan. (It will be recalled that pay scales in sugar were comparable to urban wages, while pay was much lower in the

highland areas which provided most of the migrants to the island's cities).

Remittances from seasonal and permanent migrants to the U.S. provided substantial income for jauqueños in the 1950s. Other transfer payments also grew in importance. These were of several kinds.

One important type of income was the variety of health benefits provided by the government and union. Health, along with education, was one of the government's human capital investment areas, and local efforts were impressive. Nearly \$10,000 of the \$79,000 municipal budget for 1940-41 was for poor relief, and most of that went to medicine and other medical assistance (Asamblea Municipal, Libro 10). The same records show the magnitude of the needs. A \$3000 emergency request was made for medicine against infectious diseases, malaria having registered 1512 cases and 47 deaths in the municipio in 1939.

Mintz's (1956: 399) record shows major improvements had been made. Jauca I had its own dispensary, one of three in outlying barrios. The union had wrested health care for workers away from Aguirre Corporation, and medical attention could now be claimed as a right, rather than asked as a favor. In the 1950s, the union owned a major pharmacy in town, with prescriptions filled without charge for workers. In the mid 1950s, more serious medical problems were increasingly being transferred to the expanded district hospital facilities in

Ponce, where advanced treatments were available. There was still a lot to be done, and municipal assembly records repeatedly return to the topic of needed improvements in health care. But much had been accomplished. Informants recall the improvements in medical services as being one of the major advances of this era.

Another kind of transfer provided food. Government surplus food was distributed free throughout the period under consideration, in programs which continued to be called locally "La Prera" (from PRERA, the 1930s relief agency). The food included crackers, meat, powdered milk, butter, and a variety of other foods. Some foods (e.g. powdered eggs) were considered inedible, but could be sold by the poor for pig feed. La Prera is remembered as virtually life saving on the colonias during dead time in the early 1940s. People with year-round work could get along without it. Other food programs affected everyone in the barrio: a school lunch program (below) and a milk station for children established during the war. Some informants recall distributions of free clothing as well, but I could not obtain other details about this.

Other benefits involved cash. The insular unemployment compensation program for cane workers was operating by the time of Mintz's fieldwork, but its payments were very small (Mintz 1956: 354). Public assistance with federal funds continued, having been initiated in the late 1930s, but also at very low

rates (described above). One informant recalled that his widowed grandmother received \$4.50 per month around 1950. Much more substantial sums arrived as support for soldiers' families and as veterans payments (below). During World War II and the Korean War, many homes were improved with this money. Another substantial and more permanent source of income began when the Social Security program was extended to Puerto Rico in 1950. People who retired after 1951 had income security unknown before. (Aguirre provided no retirement benefits). One informant received \$35 per month starting in the early 1950s. Survivors' benefits were also very important. An aged woman related how after her husband died and she and her children were evicted from an Aguirre colonia (described below), it was the Social Security payment that enabled her to put together a house for her family. The importance of Social Security benefits increased through the decade, as more eligible workers retired.

Mintz (1965: 90) observes that all transfer payments had been relatively unimportant in 1953, but by 1965 they had become very significant sources of income. Transfers, he notes, added a measure of security to local existence. Looking back now, the 1950s can be seen as an important watershed for Jauca I's poor. Transfers did not eliminate poverty. They did moderate it. After the 1950s, both poverty and the poor would be regulated by federal agencies (see Piven and Cloward 1972). This fact will be an important consideration in later

discussions of local political attitudes. The importance for local people, of having a secure even if small income can be better appreciated by recalling the general living conditions around 1940, as described in the following section on income and consumption patterns.

Life was very tough in 1940. How tough is indicated by an island-wide study of sugar cane workers (Minimum Wage Board 1942: 121, 125, 180-184, 288). It calculated \$455 as the minimum income needed for an agricultural worker's family. Actual annual family income averaged \$301.77. Minimum necessary expenditures on food alone were estimated to be \$234. Actual spending was \$199.19. It will be recalled from earlier discussions that agricultural workers' earnings in 1940 had not yet recovered to pre-Depression levels. In sum, in 1940 sugar workers were not being paid enough to survive, and high death and infant mortality rates are a reflection of this.

If things were generally bad, they were the worst in the dead time. People remember getting through some days on sugar cane and coconut water. The cooking hearths (fogones) grew cold--the subject of many ruefully remembered sayings. Men wandered in the countryside of northern Santa Isabel, hoping to find breadfruit or green papaya. Public assistance, meager as it was, may have been all that prevented some literal starvation. One informant recalled subsisting on big, tasteless crackers provided by La Prera--"hunger killers" they were called. Those who had year-round jobs, and/or who had

established strong credit with local storekeepers, suffered much less. They helped others, sending plates of cooked food to houses with none.

The outbreak of war made things even worse. The interruption of shipping was most extreme in the fall of 1942, coincident with the dead time. People had to cope with inflated prices, scarcities, and sometimes the complete absence of rice, beans, codfish, lard, and coffee. The cooking oil that was available was of very poor quality. People survived on plantains and wheat flour. Those who had pigs killed them for their fat. One positive development was that Aguirre was compelled by law to let workers plant food crops. Beans were advanced to workers to be planted in recently harvested cane fields. The beans would improve the soil, and be harvested before the new cane grew tall. The initial advance had to be repaid in kind. One worker recalled bringing home several hundred pounds of beans this way, despite heavy rains that caused some loss.¹

This acute crisis passed quickly. Construction and other war-related work, aid to soldiers' families, and wage increases won by unions, brought comparative prosperity to Jauca I. By

1. It will be recalled that sugar producers bitterly opposed the requirement to plant food crops, complaining that it seriously hurt cane output and did not produce significant amounts of food. If Jauca I is any indicator, the real danger to the producers was that this program 1) showed that Puerto Rico could easily become more self-sufficient in food production, and 2) that workers might become less dependent on wage earnings for survival.

around 1950, people had "enough" during the harvest, and even the dead time was less difficult, especially with the income sent back by migrants. People recall that still some went to bed hungry in the dead time around 1950, but it was an occasional thing. Besides food, consumption patterns for most jauqueños had not changed much by 1950. Most people still had but one set of good, unpatched clothes, and home furnishings were much like 1940. But some jauqueños were buying new clothes, and other things as well. Some bought radios, and iron beds, and paid to have their houses hooked up to the electrical system. Winning the lottery was one way to finance these expenditures. But by 1950, some Jauca I families had begun to increase their family incomes more rapidly than most people, and these families set new consumption standards.

In the 1950s, consumption levels and expectations rose for all. Mintz (1965: 24) noted a big change in food habits, comparing 1949 to 1965. One family that could afford meat once a week in 1949, had it every day by 1965. Informants recall eating less of the traditional foods, like funche and sopas, over this time, and eating more chicken and "American" foods, such as sandwiches. New durable goods became more common: televisions, store-bought furniture, refrigerators, even manufactured children's toys. For Santa Isabel, the number of registered privately owned cars increased from 48 in 1950 to 245 in 1960 (information provided by the P.R. Planning Board). Again, these new purchasing trends were led by a minority

within the population. But even the poorest were doing better by 1960, especially in the dead time, than they had been even in 1950.

Planning Board figures show an increase in the adjusted internal income reported for Santa Isabel, from \$5,300,000 in 1950 to \$7,900,000 in 1960 (1940 data not available). The U.S. census shows a comparable increase, and also a change in the distribution of individual yearly earnings (see Chart 5.1). From 1949 to 1959, there is a dramatic reduction of the hump in the low end of the income scale, and a much longer tail stretching into higher income brackets. (1939 data was not compiled by municipios, but the shape of that curve was probably very similar to that of 1949). Family incomes, not provided before the 1960 census, show an even more pronounced trend in the same directions. The greater number of families than individuals in the top income brackets reflects the growing number of families with both spouses working. That pattern, along with the growing differences in consumption, will be discussed below. For now it is enough to observe that some people in Santa Isabel were benefiting very much more than others from the changes in Puerto Rico's economy.

With all the increased income, one might expect that more people would be employed in small store ownership, the traditional avenue of mobility. That expectation might be heightened by the early Popular legislation prohibiting corporations from operating their own stores, since Aguirre's

retail stores had long dominated local sales. But as mentioned already, employment in retailing in Santa Isabel remained level to 1950, and then declined.

One reason for this is that the legislation against corporation stores was ineffective. Aguirre simply reincorporated the stores as a separate corporation, and distributed the new stock to all its old stockholders (Farr 1945: 21-22). The legislation was more effective in prohibiting some old abuses of single ownership, such as the payment of workers in company store tokens. This was a significant change, for in the old system, some workers seldom saw much cash. (One informant observed that under the old system, much of Aguirre's wage payments never left its own internal circuits). But Aguirre continued to dominate retail trade of colonia residents. The stores were convenient, they often offered lower prices than other small stores, and they were very liberal in granting credit. Around 1945, there were seven Aguirre retail outlets in Santa Isabel, and together they accounted for nearly half the municipio's retail sales. Trade carried on outside the colonias in Jauca I supported ten small stores, specializing in prepared foods and food supplies. This information, from municipal license records, is supported by Mintz's description for 1949 (1956: 368-371). More expensive or durable goods, if they were bought at all, were purchased in the town or even further away. (Coamo had a reputation for clothing at lower prices).

Despite Aguirre's dominance of retailing, there were changes in retail patterns in Santa Isabel from 1945 to 1950, which reflect the growing importance of Puerto Rico as a market for U.S. manufactures. Municipal license records show the following new kinds of store in the town: an electrical appliance outlet and two furniture stores in 1946-47; a radio shop and a construction materials outlet in 1947-48; a gasoline station in 1948-49; and a dry goods store, bicycle shop, and billiards hall in 1950-51. Even in Jauca I, the number of retail outlets climbed to fourteen in 1950, including two "bazaars" selling clothing and miscellaneous items. Other changes came in the 1950s, including the first listing of any U.S. chain outlets: an Esso station and a branch of International General Electric. There are also a few expanding family operations, cases where one individual is listed as owning a few stores. None of these show up in Jauca I prior to 1960, but at least two Jauca I merchants are recalled as expanding their single stores in the 1950s, who would branch out to multiple stores in the next decade.

The Aguirre store operations remained stable into the mid-1950s, at least in terms of reported sales. A major blow to them was the move of agregados off the colonias after 1956 (below). Brameld (1966: 356) reports the stores facing sharp competition from pueblo merchants in 1957. License records show a big drop in the Destino store's business after 1957-58, and it closed in 1959-60. By 1960, the four remaining Aguirre

stores had a reported sales totaling \$116,000, while eleven other Santa Isabel stores, each with reported trade exceeding \$10,000 per year, had total sales of \$366,000. Some of the Aguirre store managers tried to establish their own "supermarkets" after Aguirre operations closed. (Supermarkets were self-service outlets then being encouraged by the government to increase marketing efficiency). They were reportedly then driven out of business by the arrival of larger chain supermarkets. The first of those in the area opened in Salinas around 1960. One small, non-chain supermarket begun in the Jauca I parcelas in the 1950s was still in business during my fieldwork. But in general, Jauca's retail operations were not much changed in 1960, although their total number had reached seventeen. The expanding and changing patterns of retail sales in Santa Isabel were being consolidated in new town stores, and even these were not creating many jobs.

Social patterns and job selection. Migration, transfer payments, income, consumption, and retailing were all important aspects of the economic changes of 1940 to 1960. But the most basic and influential change was in employment opportunities. Traditional lines of employment were in decline, and newer, non-traditional work was increasing, if still in relatively small numbers. These new jobs were perceived as much more desirable than cane work in terms of pay, working conditions, and stability. Many more people wanted the jobs than there were positions available.

Who got the new jobs, and how? How was the relatively homogenous rural proletariat sorted out in the changing job market? Answering these questions will require examination of new supralocal inputs interacting with established local social arrangements, to produce a new dynamic.

To understand who got the new jobs requires consideration of two kinds of social patterning. One, which is discussed later in this section, consists of personal linkages, or networks. The other involves what I refer to as "social characteristics"--ascribed or achieved social diagnostics, which take on new or altered significance in the changing job market. Three social characteristics stand out as most important in this context: educational achievement, veteran status, and gender. The significance of these and a few less important characteristics is discussed in the following section.

For workers in the cane, two or three years of elementary school was all the education one needed. The same was certainly true for traditional women's jobs, as in needlework and domestic service. Even those unusual children who had gone on to higher grades obtained no better jobs as a reward. But the old types of work were decreasing, and the new jobs coming to Santa Isabel did put a premium on secondary schooling. Some jobs obviously required at least a high school degree, such as those in teaching, health care, and many administrative posts. Clerical jobs in government and business usually had a high

school degree as a prerequisite. Jobs in Paper-Mate and the coming shoe factory in Santa Isabel also went mostly to high school graduates, as would work in all factories in the future. This last preferential hiring does not have the same obvious logic as in the white collar work. It did not require advanced academic skills to write the word "Johnson" ten times, which was the task given to pen point inspectors, or even to operate leather working equipment. But the preference is intelligible if one considers the non-academic aspects of higher education, discussed earlier. People who finished twelve years of school were pre-adapted to the discipline of a factory. Those who could not stick it out in school sometimes had trouble adjusting even if they did land a job in a factory. And besides, a high school diploma was a convenient screening device for cutting down the excessive number of applicants for each job opening.

The growing significance of a high school degree was realized by everyone. Prior to 1940, parents' attitudes toward education was favorable, but tempered by the by the understanding that it did not represent a realistic avenue for advancement. By 1950, parents kept children in school longer, encouraged by the child labor law and the hope that "something will come along". Even though the job market still offered few new opportunities, Mintz (1956: 402-403) found that schoolchildren expressed a disdain for cane work, and hoped instead to become teachers, publico drivers, nurses or

policemen. (Although, contrary to Mintz, a few informants who were in school at that time maintain today that they always wanted to work in the cane). In the 1950s, better jobs grew into a more realistic possibility. Parents tried to frighten their children into studying by warning "la cana te espera" ("the cane awaits you"). Students of the time now remember feeling confident that someone with a high school degree could secure clean and well-paying work. By 1960, many were already thinking of college.

The government certainly encouraged the retention of children in school. Its commitment to human capital improvement via education affected Santa Isabel as it did all the island. In the mid 1940s, the insular government took over funding and management of the local schools (below). Labor legislation restricting child labor had the intent of keeping children in school longer, and as already noted, Mintz confirms that in many instances it had that effect. But informants told me of several ways that the law was circumvented: mayordomos could be persuaded to hire underage workers, children worked with their fathers to help increase piece-rate output, and boys could pick up some cash by bringing lunches or otherwise helping workers in the fields.

The reasons for circumventing the law were primarily economic. Families still needed the extra income young working people could provide. Sending a child to school, especially above sixth grade--which meant going into town--still entailed

costs that poor families could not afford. Other insular measures were aimed at helping with these costs. Free school lunches were an important step. So were free shoes to poor children. (The municipal council allotted \$300 for this purpose in 1955 and 1957). A few times, relief agencies distributed clothing for school children. In the later 1950s, the government began providing scholarships, beginning at \$30 per semester, for poor children with demonstrated academic ability. These could continue from fourth grade through high school. There were only a few of these, however. Municipal records show the awarding of three in 1958, and these seem to have been the only scholarships that year. Even when the program expanded, they would distribute only 10 or 15 new scholarships per year. An earlier and more extensive direct subsidy was provided by veterans payments (below). But of course, these created no opportunities for most of the population.

For most people, graduating from high school still was a struggle. First, it often represented doing without a still needed income for the family. Even with government aid, costs were still considerable. Clothing in particular was a problem. Patched or otherwise rustic looking clothes (called quayucos) would invite ridicule in school in town, and the standards for acceptable clothes were raised considerably by locals returning from a stay in the U.S. There are suggestions that in some families, resources were husbanded to put one child all the way through, as is the case for some Puerto Rican families in New

York City (J. Scharf, personal communication), (although most people will insist, if asked, that all children in their family were treated equally). For many young people, it just could not be managed. For them, migrating to the U.S. or joining the army stood as the remaining options. Opportunities were improving, no doubt about it. But a commonplace rule still applied: it was easier to go farther with more money. The difficulties of staying in school are reflected in high numbers of drop-outs.

All these problems affected ability to go on to college. One does encounter children of cane workers who were at this time heading toward college, with the help of a scholarship. Their stories are testaments to the difficulties involved.¹

1. The mobility via education of one man born in 1939 merits description because it so well illustrates what efforts were involved. It spans two generations. His father had been kept out of school by the grandfather, who felt that school was useless. The father began to work very young, and learned the trade of guincher (railroad loading crane operator) by bringing lunches to older men on that job. (This is similar to the way Taso Zayas got his job as palero [Mintz 1974: 68-69]). At the time my informant was in elementary school, the father believed that he could have moved up to the elevated position of listero (bookkeeper) if only he had had more schooling. The father was therefore very insistent about his eldest son, my informant, getting all the education he could manage. Furthermore, the father would be in a position to support his child through school because his own fortunes improved as Aguirre's mechanization program put a premium on mechanical skills.

The father actively supported his son in school, regularly reviewing homework assignments. The father also dressed the boy well, so that people could even mistake him for the son of a mayordomo. By the boy's second year in school, he remembers, teachers commented that he was heading for college. In a few more years, he began to receive a scholarship. Later, he worked in the cane part time and during vacations. One harvest, he was promoted to romanero (weigher), an initial step

Significantly, the first Jauca I student to go on to college is remembered as being the son of one of the barrio's most successful store owners. (This man went on to a very successful career in business and politics).

The increased emphasis on education appears to have had a direct impact on birth rates. Up to Mintz's time in the field, the birth of another child usually represented only a slight additional expense for a family. Any expense was outweighed by the labor, cash income, and security children could provide, and by the great affection felt for children. Children were called "the capital of the poor" (Mintz 1951: XIII 11). Today, people of about 40 years of age or younger do not know this saying. Older people remember it, and explain that this attitude changed rapidly once people realized the need to keep children in school. Having too many children meant that none would be able to afford the education needed for a better job.

Some observers of Puerto Rico in the 1950s saw education as

in the ladder to becoming a mayordomo. He considered that option, but rejected it because he already had "a higher standard". With a continuing scholarship, he was able to go on for two years of college. More he could not afford. He obtained a job teaching in a local elementary school right away.

Taso Zayas's eldest son also went to college and became a teacher, using veterans benefits. Even so, at one time Don Taso had to borrow money to support him from a local userer when a government check was delayed.

These two cases illustrate what I believe to be a general rule: cane workers' children were going on to college, but these were sons of those with the better jobs in the cane, and even then there was great difficulty putting the children through. I know of no case where the child of a simple laborer or cutter went on to college.

a means of overcoming the rigid class divisions of the old order (Brameld 1966; Tumin and Feldman 1971). Education was very important in developments of the 1950s, but these authors misconstrue or exaggerate its significance for shaking up existing socioeconomic divisions. Brameld (1966: 78), based in part on his brief visit to Santa Isabel, concluded that "the lowest classes" had the opportunity "to climb at least one or two rungs up the social ladder". I do not believe that to have been true in Jauca I. There was some movement in jobs, but as I will argue below, most of those who obtained the new positions came from a distinguishable subgroup within the rural population, a subgroup which had controlled the more desirable jobs even under the old productive arrangements.

Tumin and Feldman (1971: 459) are even more enthusiastic about the role of education. They describe the fourth grade level as a social watershed. Parents with a fourth grade or higher education tended strongly to keep their own children in school for several more grades than did parents with less than four years of school, and this meant that their children had better job opportunities later in life. They explain this pattern of parental behavior as a consequence of the expanded horizons and more dynamic personalities they developed by staying in school longer. I will argue instead that the parents with more education were, largely, from the aforementioned subgroup within the rural poor, and that the educational level of these parents is only one of several

factors explaining their children's success.

Veteran status was another social characteristic with new importance in the job market. The veterans of World War II and Korea formed a distinctive social grouping. Returning from the service, few men wanted to return to cane work. Most went instead to school. Manners (1956: 138-139) reports the living allowance for veterans in school as \$75 to \$125 per month, which is about what teachers were paid at the time. The limited previous education of these new students after World War II, however, made it difficult for most to go on and get a high school degree. Most settled for a few years of school, and then went back to work. They were given preference in hiring for new jobs, but at this time there were still few new jobs available. Some World War II vets had to return to the cane. Those who did not became public car operators, carpenters, policemen, and more rarely, small store owners; or they migrated.

A greater number of local people served during the Korean War. Payments to families during this period of service was, once again, invested in home improvements. The returning veterans again went to school instead of the fields. With a stipend of \$110 per month for a single man, and \$132 if married, some went more for current income than to further aspirations of mobility. The Korea veterans usually began their second education at a higher grade level than their World War II counterparts, having had the benefit of the educational

improvements of the 1940s.¹ Like World War II vets, they were given preference in hiring, but by the mid 1950s, there were more new job openings. The Korea vets were strongly represented in these new positions, and today they are very prominent in mid and high level positions in government and business.

One of the biggest changes associated with the new jobs was the radically different significance of gender. In 1940 there were very few job opportunities for women. Even the needlework boom was transitory. With the exception of a few positions in teaching, retailing, etc., women's jobs were low paying, even by local standards, and in undesirable conditions. As described above, this began to change after the war. Some new clerical and government jobs went to women, and teaching and health fields showed strong growth in work for women. The factories--Paper-Mate, Wilson Shoe, and others to follow--hired mostly women for line operatives. (The pattern of hiring women for light factory work characterizes much of transnational expansion in the underdeveloped world [Nash 1981: 422]). I

1. One Korea vet recalled that literacy and achievement on intelligence and/or educational tests were very important in screening people for the army, much more than for World War II. I suspect that the educational levels of these entering servicemen were higher than the local average. It would be interesting to obtain information on this point, for if true, it would indicate that veterans were chosen from that part of the population already making greater use of expanded educational opportunities, and so the veterans benefits would reinforce rather than dilute the control of that better educated group over new job opportunities (see below).

will not attempt to explain the pro-female bias in hirings in this chapter. That will be done in the chapter to come on 1960 to 1982, for which period the trend is more pronounced and the data more substantial.¹

Two other potentially significant social characteristics can be discussed more quickly. Race or color had not been an important distinction in cane work. It did have some impact regarding some of the new, expanding job fields. One instance is recalled from just after World War II, in which a dark individual from Jauca I was rejected by the police force, allegedly because of his color. (The police had a reputation for considering physical appearance in hiring). Mintz (1956: 368) also notes a case where a mayordomo segundo was kept from reaching the top mayordomo position, again because of color. But members of another dark-skinned family were successful in acquiring good jobs in the 1950s. Despite reports of

1. For now I can mention various factors which may have been involved. Several reasons for preferring to hire women are volunteered by informants today. One is that women are better at some jobs. They are more adept at detail work, and they are more reliable for showing up every day. Another is that jobs get stereotyped. Some work, such as sewing brassieres, were typed as "women's jobs" from the start. Others acquired that reputation because the majority of employees happened to be women. A third explanation offered is that women are relatively easy to intimidate by male supervisors, and are less likely to form strong unions. Another factor that was not suggested by informants, but which I will argue in the 1960-82 chapter to be significant, is that traditional sex role training gave females an advantage in the expanded educational system. They replaced males as the majority in the higher grades, and more education was an edge in hiring. A final consideration was that many of the women had advantages in terms of personal contacts, as will be discussed below.

increasing racial prejudice in Puerto Rico after World War II (Lewis 1963: 286-287; Petrullo 1947: 21), racism remained of limited significance in local hiring practices. Other things were more important.

Affiliation with different political parties is, in present day Santa Isabel, one of the most important social characteristics in the job market. In the 1950s, too, politics played an important role in hiring government employees, and mayor's offices in Salinas and Santa Isabel also made some recommendations for hirings by factories. But under prevailing conditions, this political input is better understood as a function of personal contacts of individuals, rather than a categorical screening (see Quintero Rivera 1980: 98-99). In Jauca I before 1960, just about everyone was Popular, so party affiliation was not a basis for discrimination. The situation was probably very different in more politically heterogenous towns, especially given the insular government's ongoing purge of pro-independence employees (below). Any political prejudice would of course be one of the factors contributing to the continuing Popular dominance.

In addition to social characteristics, the other social pattern determining who got the new jobs was networks of personal contacts. In the previous chapter, I described how personal contacts were very important for changing jobs even in the cane, and especially so when the change involved some improvement in pay, conditions, or permanency. This pattern

continued in strength when it came to filling new jobs, except in those cases where there was a scarcity of qualified personnel, such as teaching.¹ Elsewhere, in factories and offices, it quickly became the rule that to get a job, one had to have an "in". All informants without exception agree that this was the general pattern. Many sayings reflect it, such as "if there is no godfather, there will be no baptism". The pattern finds clear substantiation in life histories collected from the fifteen sample families: in the majority of cases where an individual changes jobs for the better, the move is made possible or at least facilitated by some personal contact. Relatives are the most frequent contacts used. Friends and compadres also interceded, but apparently with much less frequency.

Another type of contact involved vertical rather than horizontal ties. Politicians rewarded their personal followers with jobs, and foremen moving from one job to another often brought along favored workers. Construction contractors who gave work to "their people" would be another illustration, although of limited significance in Jauca I in the 1950s.

1. One big exception to this pattern was the initial hiring of workers for the Paper-Mate plant. According to a woman who was there, they opened the gate and took people on a first come basis. This exception is understandable. Being the first hiring of factory workers, no inside contacts yet existed. I suspect that this initial group of applicants nevertheless was screened by educational level. My informant did not recall such screening, but did remember that most of the women who ended up working at Paper-Mate had at least some high school education.

(These non-kin ties are discussed further below).

In this section, we have seen how a limited number of new and desirable jobs were filled by individuals with certain characteristics and contacts. In the following section, we will see that these new job holders also were distinguished from the rest of the rural population in other ways.

Ties and divisions in local society. In the previous chapter, I concurred with Mintz in emphasizing the relative homogeneity of the people of Juaca I. There did remain differences among them in the desirability of the jobs they held and in consumption standards. But these were minor in comparison to the over all similarity of living conditions and other circumstances which prevailed through the World War II period. They proved to be very significant, however, when local economic conditions began to improve in the late 1940s. A closer examination of the nature and consequences of those differences follows.

Genealogies collected from the heads of the fifteen families of my sample indicate that the population of Jauca I was actually divided into two groups, distinguishable by type of employment.¹ There are intermediate cases, but the

1. In collecting genealogies, I asked several questions about each individual named. The most significant one for current purposes is "principal occupation". No information was collected on when these jobs were obtained. That introduces some ambiguity, but by considering relative ages, I can approximately designate those who were in the job market in the 1940-60 years. Because of the strength of the pattern that appears in the genealogies, this ambiguity is not of major significance.

distinction is clear. Looking at siblings, parents, spouses, and collateral lines shows that some families are specialized in unskilled field labor. Other families include few or no field laborers. Instead, these individuals worked in a variety of the more desirable traditional jobs, and the new jobs that began to increase in the late 1940s.

Ten informants providing usable genealogical information fall into the field laborer group. The great majority of males appearing in these genealogies, who would have been actively employed in the geographic area from the later 1930s to around 1960, are identified as "obreros" or "braceros" in the cane. Individual genealogies vary greatly in the number of qualifying male relatives who appear. The most extensive single case includes 42 men, 36 of whom are field laborers. The other 6 include a small farmer, a union employee, a construction worker, a plasterer, a driver, and a small store operator. Some other genealogies, although much less extensive, show only field laborers without exception. Most people from these ten cases resided on area colonias or the beach in Jauca I, suggesting that those sites were populated nearly entirely by laborers (excepting the fishermen on the beach and the colonia staffs).

Five informants providing usable information fall into the upper employment group.¹ Very few field laborers appear in

1. The number of genealogical lines falling into each classification does not represent the true proportions of each type, either now or in the past. As noted in the

these lists, but nearly every other local occupation does. These include one or more small farmers, storekeepers, barbers, carpenters, mechanics, welders, drivers, fishermen, government workers, policemen, nurses, and teachers. There are also several people involved in the cane, but these include several capataces and other more skilled or responsible jobs. The best single case of this type includes 13 qualifying males, not one of whom is a field laborer. People in these genealogical networks lived mostly in Poblada Jauca and other non-colonia sites. It must be emphasized that these families were within the rural labor force that was the subject of Mintz's analysis.

Seven genealogies must be classified as intermediate. There are three patterns which fall between the "lower" and "upper" types already described. Sometimes more than one of these patterns is found in tracing through a single family tree. One pattern occurs when males in a family or a branch of a family are employed in work which itself is intermediate. One group of brothers, for instance, were all irrigation men--a job similar to other cane work except that it provided more work in the dead time, and consequently was considered a good job. Another pattern is when the two families linked by a marriage involve one upper and one lower line. These are unusual but not rare. In fact, marriage seems to have been one way to enter into the upper network of connections (below).

Introduction, the sample of 15 families was weighted toward the "upper" families.

The third pattern is when there are marked inconsistencies within groups of siblings, some in the cane, and others in non-cane jobs. This is the only circumstance where closely related men vary considerably from each other in occupation. It may represent actual cases of individual mobility, upward or downward. Residence among these intermediate cases varied.

This suggestion of two groups within the rural proletariat violates neither the letter or spirit of Mintz's discussions on class. He certainly discusses occupational variation within the rural population, and the differences in lifestyles and consumption levels associated with the occupationally differentiated residence sites (e.g. Mintz 1956: 371-374, 392). What is not extractable from Mintz's work is the idea of similarities of occupations within families, and that this tendency toward similarity was preserving historic social divisions present in Jauca I since early in the century. Yet nothing in Mintz contradicts these observations.

Mintz was interested in what made the people of Jauca I similar, as I discussed in the Introduction. I am interested in what kept or drew them apart. For most of the 1940s, the social divisions described here made little difference in distinguishing peoples' lives. Most everyone, even many small store owners, were essentially similar in their poverty and oppression by Aguirre. The large number of intermediate cases also blurred any sense of distinctiveness of the two groups. In the late 1940s, however, these occupational differences were

key in moving people into the newly opened jobs. Upper families, often socially prominent people in their neighborhoods, would more likely have contact with politicians. As described in the previous chapter, they would include people prominent in local unions. Being slightly more secure economically, they could keep their children in school a little longer,¹ and they may have been disproportionately represented among the veterans. Many would have job skills coming into increasing demand, as with mechanics, machine operators, and skilled construction workers. All these factors would give the holders of traditional desirable jobs access to the newer jobs. Once some got in those, they could bring in others.

Whereas the long growth of Aguirre's control had progressively reduced the surface social distinctions associated with different types of work, the changing economy tended to multiply and dramatize such distinctions. In Jauca I and Santa Isabel, as elsewhere through Puerto Rico, the holders of the new jobs were becoming more distinctive from the mass of the poor.

1. Placing higher educational achievement within this broader social constellation of factors makes more sense than treating it as a separate and decisive variable, as Tumin and Feldman do. The Jauca I genealogies support their observation that children of parents with more education go farther in school than children of parents with less. Reported education of upper individuals is most commonly 5 or 6 years of school. Lowerers are more commonly in the 0 to 4 years range. Uppers were more able to afford another year or two for their children, even in the bad old days. But to treat education as the only factor determining the higher achievement in jobs would be to overlook, among other things, the crucial role of personal contacts in getting jobs.

The new "middle class", as these jobholders were often called, put great emphasis on education for their children. Brameld (1966: 69) makes this observation based in part on Santa Isabel, but the pattern is quite widely noted (Lewis 1963: 463-464; Padilla 1956: 290; Tumin and Feldman 1971: 465; Wolf 1956: 254-255). This probably made the difference in educational levels characterizing the two groups grow wider at first.

Marriage patterns exhibited some closure, and that reinforced the existing differences. Women with good jobs were expected to marry men with similar or better work. A woman teacher would not marry a common cane laborer. Men, with the exception perhaps of a few very traditional individuals, saw as a blessing an extra income brought in by their wives. Men with good jobs wanted to marry a woman with good job prospects. The consequence of all this shows up very clearly in the genealogies. It is rare to see a cane worker with any occupation listed for his wife, other than "ama de casa". A strong majority of men with better jobs, however, are married to women who also have some listed paying occupation. Mintz (1956: 379) describes marriage as an essentially pragmatic arrangement to meet immediate needs. Without minimizing the role of infatuation, I suspect that choosing a spouse was sometimes a calculated effort to better one's job

opportunities.¹ Shortly, I will describe how the pattern of both spouses working was associated with other changes within families, that further distinguished the two groups.

Incomes of lowers and uppers grew increasingly apart, accented by the upper pattern of both spouses working. In one case with firm information from around 1958, a high school teacher husband and his factory working wife earned together about \$320 per month, steadily. A cane worker's family around the same time would normally make under \$200 per month for 4-5 months, and much less for the rest of the year unless the husband migrated. In terms of consumption, the higher standards of Poblado Jauca over Destino and especially over the beach had persisted through the 1940s. In 1949, Poblado Jauca led the others in house size and quality, water and electricity hookups, latrines, and possession of radios (Mintz 1956:

1. Some of the mixed cases could be instances where a person, male or female, "married up", and there are suggestions that in these cases, the marrier was able to open up new job opportunities for other relatives. Seeing marriage as a means to family mobility might explain a puzzling aspect of local courtship patterns. One of the most commonly recalled aspects of life "antes" is the vigilance with which many parents guarded their daughters against unworthy suitors. Prospective ability as a provider was one of the parents' main concerns. Many of these parents seemed to reject almost every male as unworthy--a puzzling thing if all men in the community were more or less equal in their work. Consideration of these familial differences in employment make this attitude understandable. For daughters of the upper group, there would be a need to guard against young men from the lower group, who could see the girl as an opportunity for advancement into the upper network. For daughters of the lower group, a truly welcome son-in-law would be one who could provide more income and security than a cane worker, that is, a boy from the upper group. Admittedly, this is speculation.

373-374). By the late 1950s, the disparities were more pronounced. Hernández Álvarez (1964: 149) reports on consumption standards in the new parcelas in 1959. (As will be described shortly, the parcelas were settled almost entirely by landless laborers from Destino and other colonias, and the beach). Most of the people in the parcelas then worked in the cane. Some 90% of the parceleros thought that "the economic transformation had been illusory", with gains in wage rates offset by rising prices and decreasing opportunities for work. Some older cane workers today recall this sentiment for the time, adding that whatever progress they had experienced was mostly attributable to military service and migration.

In stark contrast to the majority, about 9% of parceleros' families had materially benefited from changing conditions. They had much more substantial homes, and it was they who were buying the new consumer durables described earlier. Hernández Álvarez (1964: 148) mentions sewing machines, television sets, refrigerators, and dining room furniture, all of which were nearly entirely absent from the majority's homes.¹ Hernández also comments on the occupational distinctiveness of this group. It included a store owner, a machine operator, a school lunch program worker, and a public works forman. He does not discuss living standards in Poblado Jauca, but several cases

1. Informants recall that some poor families were able to improve their houses and/or buy new durable goods with lottery winnings. But this would not greatly modify the general pattern described by Hernández Álvarez.

with which I am familiar indicate that the higher living standards of the parcelas minority were much more common there. Probably, a strong majority of Poblada homes were of this type, consistent with the better occupations long associated with Poblada residents. Brameld (1966: 69) comments that the "booming middle group... is demanding and getting... a higher standard of living than ever before".

Hernández Álvarez (1964: 153) also identifies a big difference in the minority's and majority's relation to insular migration patterns. The upper minority stood apart from both the seasonal and permanent migration to the U.S. Informants today support that observation. Several comment that few local people with permanent and better paying jobs were disposed to join the flow northward. Some who did try it apparently had a lower tolerance for the problems they encountered in the U.S., and returned. The situation was reversed in regard to migration to Puerto Rico's cities. Only 19 young people from the parcelas had gone to island cities (vs. 226 who had gone to the U.S., and 16 of that 19 were from the upper 9% of families. Informants today explain that young people in the late 1950s, moving up through the educational system, still found a shortage of local job opportunities and so went to the cities where the better work was concentrated.

In sum, the uppers of Jauca I were soon distinguished from the lowers not just by occupation, but by education, income, consumption, and migration patterns. Still other distinctions

will be discussed below. Hernández Álvarez (1964: 155) found the emergence of this recognizable new group as "unexpected" and "without precedent" among the poor. In my view, the group itself was not new. What was new was its growing distinctiveness.

In one sense, Jauca I and Santa Isabel were now catching up to other areas in the island. In The People of Puerto Rico, San Jose, Tabara, and Nocorá all are described as having a growing "middle class", made up of store owners, teachers, publico drivers, government workers, veterans, and others. Each place had its own particular pattern, but they all show an obvious similarity to what has just been described for Jauca I (see Manners 1956: 137-139; Padilla 1956: 290-291; Wolf 1956: 239-240, 255, 259-261). Jauca I at the same time is contrasted to these other communities as being more of a class isolate (Mintz 1951: XIII, 12; 1953b: 140). Even though there are people in middle level jobs, they remained relatively insignificant because of the continued domination of Aguirre and sugar cane production (Mintz 1956: 392-393).

Descriptions of other parts of Puerto Rico in the mid 1950s and around 1960 show even more clearly that what was happening in Jauca I was paralleled by local developments elsewhere. Gregory (1958: 448-451) administered surveys to manufacturing employees in three industrial areas. Manufacturing employees, he found, had twice the schooling of the population at large. Only one quarter of them had worked in agriculture before

getting the manufacturing job; and of those, two-thirds had steady, year-round employment. 75% of the male workers, and 60% of the female, obtained the manufacturing job through some personal contact. Another 4% and 11%, male and female, got them through a government placement agency. A survey of poor and "middle class" areas in San Juan in 1958 found that 95% of the middle class women were either working or seeking work, while only 25% of the poor women were (Torres Zayas 1963: 5). Torres Zayas (1963: 111-117, 146) studied a mixed tobacco and sugar community, apparently around 1960. Here, women with manufacturing jobs also had twice the average amount of education. Working women's husbands earned more money than the husbands of non-working women, and they also tended to work in the town, while husbands of non-working women worked in the fields. Families with both spouses working had an average weekly income over twice that of families where only the husband worked.

These and other studies also shed light on further changes in the family when both spouses worked. The phenomenon of working wives was still relatively new, and their numbers limited in Jauca I around 1960. It was difficult to elicit with confidence attendant changes in family organization prior to that date. But changes described for other areas where women worked around or before 1960 are so similar to patterns that I can document for Jauca I during the 1960s, that it seems fair to assume that they were being felt in the barrio even

earlier, as the first women left home for non-traditional work in offices and factories. These authors (Brameld 1966: 45; Reimer 1960: 6-7; Torres Zayas 1963: 131-132, 138-142, 157-158; Wolf 1956: 261) describe a fairly consistent pattern, as follows.


Behavior changed before values. Women broke traditional standards of behavior by going out into the world, often mixing with men at work. They also demonstrated signs of independence in the home, retaining their own pay and going out to shop. The idea of the husband as the authority within within the family remained unchallenged, even though men feared the erosion of their position. Working women felt more keenly the traditional perquisites and limitations of gender, and they felt guilt over spending less time with their families and otherwise not acting as a wife was expected to act. So behavior patterns of spouses may be identified as another likely distinguishing characteristic of the uppers. Changing sex roles within the family will be discussed again below in relation to other local developments.

Jauca I, like Puerto Rico, was growing a "middle class". What did jauqueños think about this? It is not possible to reconstruct their views in any detail. But a few general features are apparent.

In the old view of things, all of Puerto Rico was divided, essentially, into two groups, "ricos" and "pobres" (Mintz 1951: XIII 11-14 provides illustrations paralleling images I elicited

Chart 5.1 Personal and Family Income, Santa Isabel

Source: U.S. Census of Population 1963: 53-83



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from older informants). In Santa Isabel, only a few ricos remained locally resident. The one family most commonly identified as ricos, the Riveras, was in the late 1930s and 1940s still operating a large cane growing operation. They also owned a large wholesale store, and the town's mayor from 1936 to 1944 was a Rivera. A few wealthy families from Coamo had cattle ranches in Santa Isabel's northern hillier reaches, but these people appear to have exerted their presence elsewhere. Locally, the main manifestation of the ricos was Aguirre, and the shadowy capitalistas known to be behind it. A less shadowy figure was Marcelo Oben, the hated Aguirre chief field administrator (later murdered by an Aguirre worker-- apparently a case of a vengeful husband). During his tenure with Aguirre, Oben acquired and administered his own cane farm, just east of Jauca I.

Pobres included all the common field laborers and also most of the jauquenos I have categorized as uppers--those with somewhat more lucrative or more permanent jobs, represented in Mintz's (1956: 392) diagram of social divisions of Santa Isabel by the two levels above the cane workers. I think it fair to interpret that these fall under his concept of the rural proletariat, since Taso Zayas, his main informant about the group, would fall on the first of those levels, and his wife Elí Villaronga, on the second.

Santa Isabel had always had also a small "middle class". For the 1940s, these are represented by Mintz's next two

levels, the "officeholders, retailers, suppliers or service", and then, ascending, the "professionals and officials". These people tended to live in the town. Of them, the teachers, store owners, and Aguirre administrative personnel had the most direct contact with jauqueños. The teachers and administrators tended to be aloof, and contemptuous of the rural life. Small merchants could not be, bound as they were in mutual dependency with the rural workers. This difference in attitude is just one of numerous distinctions separating the various occupational groups within the "middle class". There was little possibility of them joining for some group interest. To what end would action be directed? But they did have a sense of similarity, and perhaps a feeling that their relative standing in the social hierarchy was being challenged by marginally increased social mobility, as suggested by their interest in forming an exclusive association (see Mintz 1951: XIII 3; 1956: 392).

After 1950, informants recall steady development of "la clase media" (although there is great disagreement today, and probably was then, as to the exact nature of la clase media). Brameld (1966: 69) notes uniform agreement that the "middle groups" were growing relatively faster than any other social division. For the island as a whole, Tumin and Feldman (1971: 458) note the growing perception that the old two-class structure was being replaced by one with three levels. This view seems quite standard for the period (e.g. Lewis 1963:

241-243; Reimer 1960: 15, 24). In Jauca I itself the process was so far along that in 1962, that a social club was formed consisting mainly of "middle class" men.

The development of the "middle class" involved a drawing together of the old middle occupations, with people from the upper part of the rural work force.¹ This represented an erosion of the elevated status of the older occupations, some of which were associated with weakening fields, e.g. cane cultivation supervisors. Aguirre mayordomos show this clearly. For 1940, they are remembered as "like kings". In the 1950s, their discretionary power was curtailed by the Corporation; and one major symbol of their status, their houses, were becoming less distinctive as more people built more elaborate homes.

One difference between the old and new "middle class" during the 1950s was their attitude toward the rural poor. In contrast to the aloofness noted above, the upper 9% resident in the parcelas are described as very sympathetic to the condition of the poor (Hernández Álvarez 1966: 148). A parallel observation is made by Gregory (1958: 462) on the basis of his survey of manufacturing workers. They still considered themselves of los pobres, largely, as he explains, because most of them still lived in poor neighborhoods.

1. My sample of 15 families includes only one individual from the old "middle class", an ex-mayordomo. His children's present occupations and other social data indicate that the mixing of old and new components of the "middle class" was quite thorough. If there remained some distinction, it was too subtle for me to detect.

In Jauca today, some who have improved their economic position tend to put on airs. Jauqueños are extremely sensitive to this, and some refer to such people as comemierdas (shit eaters). Mintz (1956: 367) notes this sensitivity in regard to certain consumption practices; and I have already described the high-status-goods purchases of the 1950s. However, nothing suggests that the new "middle class" people still residing in Jauca I were generally attempting to cut themselves off from the rural poor in the way described for the "middle class" of San Juan (see Lewis 1963: 186, 249). (It may be that those so inclined would move away from their home towns to the cities). There appears to have been no clear rupturing of relations between poor and "middle class" in Jauca even to the present. How the poor saw their newly prosperous neighbors in the 1950s cannot be ascertained. I found no direct mention of that in sources from the period; and this is an area where informants provide very little information, due in part, I believe, to their tendency to minimize any conflict within the community.

The growth of a recognized "middle class" in the 1950s was the major development affecting the social coherence of the people of Jauca I. It was not, however, the only factor affecting their unity. In Chapter 4, I described aspects of work in the cane which continued to divide jauqueños through the 1930s: piecework, and strikebreaking. These will be discussed next.

Informants report working at piece rates throughout the 1940-1960 period. The union, it seems, could not outlaw it; although the mechanization of tasks appears to have reduced its scope, so that by 1960, only cane cutting remained as a major task with many piece rate workers. Better hourly wages at standard rates undoubtedly took some of the bitterness out of differences over piecework. The development of a labor scarcity in the late 1950s must have done the same. Piecework remained divisive at least to 1949 (Mintz 1956: 358, 398) but I found nothing to indicate it remained of major concern long into the next decade. In the 1950s, the overwhelming labor issue was mechanization, especially of cane cutting. And all cane workers, whether pro- or anti-piecework, were united against this threat.

Strikebreaking also diminished as a major point of division. Under the Populares, the union won rights to organize and operate inside the colonias, taking away Aguirre's ability to physically lock out strikers. The issue of strikebreaking was reduced in significance by the Popular government backing labor demands with legislation. Around 1948, the sugar workers union won the right to a union shop, thus laying the issue to rest.

A third type of division involving cane workers was control of the union itself. By the mid 1940s, the Santa Isabel local was torn apart by factional struggle. That division, too, healed over in the 1950s. (Both the division and

reunification are discussed below). On all three counts then, cane workers were less divided in the 1950s than in the 1940s. Yet, as the following discussions will show, factors promoting their active solidarity also declined, as did the over-all importance of the sugar workers within the total Puerto Rican society.

In the previous chapter, the increased nucleation of residential sites within Jauca I, and the daily interaction of residents within those sites, was described as fostering a sense of community identity and solidarity. Major changes in residential sites began shortly after the Popular victory. These changes were seen locally as major advances. But they also affected the identity and solidarity of villagers, as well as political attitudes and other aspects of village life. There are two issues to be considered. One is the availability of house sites. This issue was related to the fact of Aguirre's control of almost all of the land in the barrio, and so to the PPD's pledge to redistribute land. The other issue is residential conditions, including the quality of the house itself, and the utilities supporting it. In regard to both issues, the situation was terrible in 1940.

The first new housesites for Jauca I were subdivided from one cuerda in Poblada Jauca, which was purchased for that purpose by the municipal government in the early 1940s. Small housesites were given to people who could show need, and who may also have been politically connected. (There may have been

other housesites distributed like this later in the decade. Reports are not clear). More significant for more people was a change in the court's positions in the mid 1940s in regard to squatters' rights. With new legal protection, the beach in Jauca I was opened for settlement. Previously, plantation watchmen would destroy any squatter shack. But by 1949, the number of homes on the beach surpassed Poblada Jauca.¹ Most of the people who went to the beach were new arrivals from the highlands. Living conditions on the beach were the worst in the barrio. Houses were exposed to storms, without electricity, and many were made of grass and soft mangrove wood. These conditions were enough to discourage anyone from Destino to move there, even though it was the great ambition of people in the colonias to move off the plantation (Mintz 1956: 372-373). The bad conditions on both the beach and the colonia created major local support for the Popular's pledge of land distribution.

Jauqueños were so far removed from subsistence farming that, unlike mountain people, they were not greatly interested in land for farms (compare Mintz 1956: 372 to Manners 1956: 160-161; Wolf 1956: 203-204). Nor were they particularly interested in having Aguirre taken over and run as a

1. In 1949, about 75 families lived on the beach, and 60 in Poblado Jauca. 80 agregado families were in Destino, with about 85 other families in the rest of the barrio (Mintz 1956: 328-329). Most of the latter would be in Texidor, Boca Chica, and Cayures (see discussions of community boundaries in Chapter IV).

proportional profit farm, especially after politicians and union officials had worked out a modus vivendi with the Corporation. Jauqueños were very interested in the other aspect of the land reform, the distribution of house sites. An early distribution in Salinas must have whetted local appetites, but land distribution was a long time in reaching Jauca I.

In 1954, the government acquired land from Aguirre. The land was a mix of bad soils (USDA 1979: sheet 41) that had never been used by Aguirre for anything besides pasture (see aerial photographs). If the government was trying to encourage home gardening, as it claimed, it could not have picked worse land for it. Mintz (1965: 6) later made a "cynical" suggestion that the site was chosen to anchor Aguirre's labor force where it was. No cynicism is implied. As mentioned earlier, it was policy to locate parcelas divisions near jobs sites. By 1956, three other parcelas divisions had been created in Santa Isabel, and another was in planning (Ríos and Icken 1956: 41-47). Land reform had come to town.

In the Jauca I division, 168 plots were distributed. Applicants for a parcel were asked only one question: where do you live? The main areas feeding "parcelas Jauca" were the beach, Destino, and to a lesser degree, other local colonias. Distribution was accomplished via a public drawing. The early divisions were perceived as by and large honest and fair,

despite some suggestions of political favoritism.¹ Those who were selected received usufruct rights for themselves and their descendants, but not clear title. Although the idea behind this provision was to prevent resale of plots, sites were traded and sold from the very first, apparently without any serious attempt to stop the practice.

Poblado residents could apply for a parcel, but only one family used the chance to relocate. The parcelas were not enticing to people who already had a housesite. In fact, the parcelas were not very enticing, period. There had been no preparation of the site. First residents had to clear and burn the brush. Electricity and water services were still in the future. Then there was the problem of putting together enough money to construct a house. Mintz (1956: 366) observed that it took \$250 to build a "fair quality" house, and the only people who had wood houses had inherited them, or built them with lottery winnings or veterans payments (Mintz 1956: 381). In the mid 1950s, it cost still more. One consequence was that the parcelas were occupied only gradually, one shack here and another there. Those who moved in sometimes did it with lottery winnings, others with lump-sum back pay awards won by

1. I recorded one instance of a fix in the drawing for parcels, although for a cause which few would challenge. It was a case alluded to earlier, in which a woman and her many children were evicted from a local colonia when her husband died. She begged the mayor to get her a plot in the upcoming drawing, and he agreed to do so. She provided me with details on how it was done. So the drawings could be rigged, but I know of no other instance when it is clear that they were.

the union (below), and still others, from the beach, by selling their beach sites to non-jauqueños for weekend homes. As the parcelas filled in, it came to be a settlement of field laborers, continuing the spatial separation of lower and upper groups that had existed for years.

In the next few years, significant improvements were made in parcelas conditions. Electrical lines were extended, water fountains installed, and the parcelas streets were constructed. The biggest change involved the colonia houses. Insular legislation imposed a tax on these, and also required the Corporation to bring them up to acceptable sanitary conditions. The Corporation's housing was so deteriorated at the time, infested with vermin, and lacking in basic necessities that this represented a major expense. Instead, Aguirre decided to get rid of its houses. For \$10, it would tow a casita to a worker's parcel. Even the wooden barracks were divided up and distributed to workers. This happened in both Destino and colonia Boca Chica. These houses represented an improvement over many of the shacks then predominant in the parcelas. But in 1960, the picture remained (as described by Hernández Álvarez 1964) a few substantial concrete or good wooden homes, standing out amidst a much greater number of dilapidated small wood houses.

The beach began to empty quickly. A few who liked the ambiance stayed there, but most sold their sites to outsiders. In the 1960s, some wealthy and powerful people maintained

weekend homes on Playa Jauca. The colonia too emptied out. Apparently the only ones remaining there were administrative personnel.¹

The creation of the parcelas represented a major increase in the consolidation of the community. Paradoxically, the social impact seems to have been the reverse. The parcelas was a long, narrow settlement. Its 168 families were more than twice as many as had lived together in any earlier site. The parcelas brought in some strangers from outside the previously recognized community, and their numbers increased as many of the original parceleros migrated to the U.S. and sold their sites. The result, people remember, was some decrease in the family-like quality of life in the more cramped quarters. One illustration concerns the custom of sending around plates of cooked food (cambiar platos), so common in the small settlements where the distance between friends and family could not be more than a few yards. When the distances stretched out to a quarter mile or more in the parcelas, the practice began to fade.

A loosening of inter-personal ties cannot be attributed solely to new housing arrangements. In fact, even the decline in exchanging food is linked by informants to an additional factor: general living conditions had improved enough by 1960

1. Throughout this period, the municipal government, working in conjunction with insular and federal housing agencies, had been developing housing sites within the pueblo. Since this apparently had no direct impact on people from Jauca I, it will not be discussed here.

that people rarely lacked a plate of food. People no longer needed each other to survive, and mutual reliance had become less of a necessity. Besides need, another unifying factor identified in the previous chapter was the daily face-to-face interaction in the cane fields of most of the men of Jauca I. The decline in cane work and rise in more differentiated employment situations, combined with the increase in permanent and seasonal migration, dealt a tremendous blow to the solidarity of the male cohort. Play, too, was losing its unifying influence. The relatively small and very tight band of Jauca I children that existed into the 1940s, by 1960 was breaking into more diverse groupings. One important aspect of this change was the growing use of store-bought toys in child's play. Often advertised on television, often expensive, these new toys quickly became a basis for invidious comparison and competition among children. Adult recreation changed. In the 1930s and earlier, weekend dances given in homes or the back of one store had attracted most of the community, and others from as far away as Coamo. These dances are remembered as conflict-free affairs, lasting all night and ending with an especially fast dance number at daybreak. From 1940 to 1960 (perhaps starting earlier), these faded to a shadow of their former intensity. Taken all together, these trends indicate that the people of Jauca I were becoming "unglued", the day-to-day interaction of community members was greatly attenuated.

Distinct yet closely related to this attenuation was a

combination of circumstances that reoriented people's attention away from the village and toward a variety of broader social fields. Migration and military service were the most prominent of these, but there were others. Daily movement along the coast was still limited, but in the late 1950s, some people at least were going further to work and to shop. Media contact with the outside increased greatly. Radios and newspapers were rare in the barrio in 1940. Informants recall not knowing much about World War II. By Mintz's time, both were fairly common. In the mid 1950s, television came to Jauca I. There were only a few sets at first, but children would cram into those houses, and peak through the windows to watch. (In some barrios, but not Jauca I, owners of TV sets charged the children for admission). Television viewing was a topic in a survey taken in Santa Isabel around 1957. It is not clear who was included in this survey, but the results are surprising in any case. These children were already spending three to five hours per day watching TV (Brameld 1966: 374, 433). This sustained exposure to insular media would eventually eat away the distinctiveness of the rural subcultures documented in The People of Puerto Rico.

Those subcultures were never internally uniform. Even the relatively homogenous subculture of the rural proletariat contained its own culturally distinctive subgroups. This internal variation is another area of change from 1940 to 1960. The most distinctive local sub-subcultural type in the 1930s

had been the migrants from the highlands, who maintained many of their jibaro ways. This distinctiveness may have grown more pronounced in the 1940s, as the beach area turned into something of a separate highlander settlement (see Mintz 1956: 357-358). But it probably began to fade as soon as the flow of migrants from the highlands ceased, which was quickly followed by the incorporation of beach dwellers in the parcelas. The local fishermen were another distinctive type, whose presence as a group faded with the decline of fishing and movement away from the beach. But the loss of these distinctive sub-groups was matched by the growth of new occupations with their own lifestyle correlates, such as teaching; and more generally by the growth of the local "middle class". These and other developments from 1940 to 1960 led to a marked increase in the heterogeneity of the people of Jauca I.

One "other development" concerns religion. Mintz (1956: 407-409; 1974: 246-247) emphasized the strongly secular character of jauqueños. with the exception of a small group of Pentecostals. I disagree with Mintz. Most jauqueños were not interested in institutional religion. The Catholic Church was perceived as a church of the rich, who would sit in the front pews every Sunday, and then behave wickedly all week long. Nevertheless, most people still thought of themselves as Catholic. Mintz acknowledges all of this, but seems to equate the lack of institutional participation with being non-religious. In contrast, I found many people who today express

deep religious convictions, yet who never go to Church. One expression of this religious feeling is though spiritism, which mixes Catholic, African, and other beliefs, and which can grade into witchcraft.

Mintz (1956: 408) downplays the existence of witchcraft and related practices or beliefs. A collective summary statement by the staff claims that they had "largely vanished" (Steward et al 1956: 476) in Jauca I. Informants' recollections of this period lead to a very different conclusion. I obtained numerous first-hand reports of individuals both practicing spiritism and/or witchcraft, or claiming to have been affected by it. In one well-known case from the 1940s, a man on a local colonia was supposedly killed by witchcraft. I also obtained many reports from this period of other supernatural manifestations: visions, the evil eye, ghosts, glowing lights explained as wandering souls, etc. To be sure, one does find individuals who reject all of this as superstition, but they are a minority. And even the most secular of individuals seemed capable of becoming strongly religious under the right circumstances, as illustrated by the sudden conversion to Pentecostalism of Taso Zayas and several of his family (Mintz 1974: 246-252). For the purposes of this thesis, however, the issue of over-all religiosity is secondary to the question of how religion affected the community organization. Unfortunately, answers are hard to come by.

Pentecostalism was the fastest growing religious movement

in Jauca I in the 1940s (see Mintz 1952: 415-416; 1974: 246-248; K. Wolf 1952: 415-416). In 1949, it had about 60 regular churchgoers in the barrio. In some ways, Pentecostalism was very conservative, emphasizing traditional patterns such as the male-dominated family. But it condemned other traditional ways, such as consensual unions, and those favorite pastimes of men, gambling, drinking, swearing, smoking, and fornicating. The exuberant church services of Pentecostals put-off many jauqueños, but local people were simultaneously attracted by the prominent role of pobres among church officials. In short, the majority had mixed feelings about this new, growing cult.

The number of active Pentecostals, however, appears to never have risen much above the total for the late 1940s. Perhaps this stabilization is related to increased efforts by the Catholic Church to reach out to rural communities. Active priests in Santa Isabel in the late 1940s and early 1950s celebrated masses in some colonias, and performed group weddings, in which several consensually married couples would receive the Catholic sacrament at once. Besides these priests, an order of proselytizing monks, known as "Hermano Cheo", were very active in the area. Despite all the efforts, nothing suggests that they succeeded in getting even a majority of jauqueños to regularly participate in Church activities. There also may have been an increase in spiritist activity in the 1950s, judged from the fact that two spiritist centers opened

in Jauca I during the decade.

It is difficult to judge the impact of these diverging religious trends. People do not like to admit or discuss religious disagreements even now. It seems likely that there was some conflict. Even today, some Catholics are resentful over the rejection of Catholicism implicit in Pentecostalism, and both faiths condemn spiritism as satanic. Yet I found no indication of open rifts along religious lines, with the notable exception of the rule that Pentecostals were to marry only those of other fundamentalist sects, and not "non-Christians", such as Catholics. (The Catholic strictures on marrying within the faith would carry no weight with most jauqueños).

Perhaps the avoidance of an open breach is because religious preferences exhibit no clear association with any other salient social differences within the rural population. Rather than actively dividing the community, the main impact of religion seems to have been to lessen the sense of identity and solidarity. People who became deeply involved in their religion were less involved in the secular activities of their community. Taso Zayas stands as a clear illustration of this. For devout Catholics and Pentecostals, this withdrawal was counterbalanced by increased interaction with co-religionists. Spiritists, in contrast, could become more individually isolated. But in all cases, religion was against the solidarity of jauqueños.

The two other subgroups that added to local heterogeneity have already been mentioned in other contexts, the veterans and the returning migrants. The veterans were described earlier as having better jobs, better houses, better education, and as leading the migration to U.S. cities. They were distinctive in other ways, as Mintz's discussions of World War II vets shows (Mintz 1956: 376, 396-397, 381, 413; 1965: 330-331). They had shared bad experiences in the army (see Manners 1956: 139), and this made them lean toward the independence option. They formed their own social club. They favored legal marriages over consensual unions, and they were more open to the use of contraceptives than most males, although both tendencies may be as much related to the movement of many vets into the expanding "middle class". Veterans rejected the brutish work in the fields and the life of a cane worker, even if some vets were forced to return to both. As Mintz (1956: 413) observed, the veterans were a standing challenge to the subculture of the rural proletariat. (Mintz's colleagues report similar distinctiveness of veterans in their areas [Manners 1956: 138-139; Padilla 1956: 290; Wolf 1956: 260]).

Returned migrants are the fourth distinguishable local subgroup developing over this period. Seda (1973: 37-45) emphasizes the distinctiveness of returnees in his ca. 1959 restudy of the north coast community previously studied by he and Padilla. Seda paints an unremittingly negative picture of them, as alienated, emotionally deadened, and prone to

violence; and as rejecting local lifeways just as the community rejected their "cool" existence. For Jauca I, neither informants today nor writings by observers at the time suggest such a major gap. Returnees were bearers of new ideas, and in the later 1950s, rock and roll, "American" clothes, and hair straighteners (!) were all the rage among local youth. Other new ideas of the returnees, having to do with work, fit into a broader clash of values that will be described below. But nothing I found suggests that the return migrants to Jauca I were particularly violent, or prone to delinquency. (And informants do recall such things: increased interpersonal violence is remembered for the 1930s, and increased delinquency and crime for the 1960s). In Jauca I, returning migrants contributed to the growing heterogeneity, but apparently did not cause massive disruption of village life.

In Chapter IV, I argue that one of the factors contributing to the solidarity of the rural population was the homogeneity and distinctiveness of its subculture. Now we have seen that in the late 1940s and especially the 1950s, the homogeneity was reduced by developing subgroups based on religion, military service, migration, and of course, occupation and income. At the same time, the distinctiveness of local lifestyles faded. In a process identified by Mintz as beginning early in the century, the relatively isolated and self-contained character of south coast communities was constantly eroding. Folkways associated with the rural community waned, and sometimes were

replaced by patterns directly controlled by insular or even higher level institutions.

The best illustration of this concerns marriage. As discussed in Chapter IV, consensual unions were the dominant form of marriage. Mintz surveyed Poblado Jauca and found 70% of current unions to be consensual (i.e. without any civil or religious ceremony). It was the people themselves, in effect, who decided who was married, and they did not need or apparently want the legitimation granted by any higher authority.

By 1950, several distinct influences were pushing for legal marriage. Some returned migrants may have been more inclined to legal marriage as a result of exposure to North American norms, but I doubt that this was a major influence.¹ Military service was more consequential. Inductees got a more intensive exposure to North Americans and their attitudes. One ex-U.S. Army instructor who trained Puerto Ricans during the Korea period told me that he repeatedly encouraged his men to make their marriages official in order to fully qualify for all family benefits. Even after leaving the service, veterans would be exposed to the encouragements of local "middle class" educators, who also stressed legal marriage (Mintz 1956: 376).

1. It is not likely that many jauqueños who had been to the U.S. and returned prior to 1960 had much direct exposure to North American family patterns. In fact informants today laughingly recall prevalent misconceptions brought back by early returnees: that North American men did not mind if their wives had affairs, that North American women could retain their virginity throughout a marriage, etc.

All this encouragement had its effect. Of 19 marriages of people with Jauca I residences listed in Santa Isabel's marriage registry for 1955, 5 were veterans or active soldiers. The urgings of local educators, just mentioned, would of course reach beyond the group of veterans; and as mentioned above, the Pentecostal and Catholic churches were also actively encouraging marriages. Then, after 1951, older couples found that they had to wed legally if the wife was to receive social security benefits. Mintz (1956: 378) also observed that some younger women were beginning to look more to legal unions as protection in a time of increasing strains upon young couples.

These pressures led to a major change in marriage patterns. Catholic Church records of marriages for Santa Isabel show an average of 11.2 weddings per year for the five years preceding World War II (1935-39), and an average of 64.2 weddings per year for the five years after the war (1945-49). I do not have data on total number of marriages in Santa Isabel before 1940. Data on all marriages for after 1940 show the same general trends as all of Puerto Rico (Ines de Hernández Álvarez 1971: 24, 44, 91). That pattern indicates a strong post-war increase in marriages, especially when compared to the decline in local marriages through the Depression. Consensual unions in Santa Isabel decreased, from 51.6% of all unions in 1930 to 43.8% in 1950 (no information for 1940), and to 20.8% in 1960 (Ines de Hernández Álvarez 1971: 145). Correspondingly, legitimate births increased, as listed in Santa Isabel's birth

records, from 30% of all births in 1940, to 48% in 1950, to 65% in 1960. Ines de Hernández Álvarez (1971: 66, 76) also provides data on an insular trend which I believe applied to Santa Isabel and Jauca I, that legally married individuals averaged substantially higher in education and income than consensually married people. More poor people were getting legally married than before, but for the newly semi-affluent, legal marriage became quite nearly a requisite.¹

Consensual marriage was a local event, but not a ceremonial one. Other life cycle changes did have ritual aspects, as discussed in the previous chapter. The velorios given after death continue today, although reduced in length and elaboration from the 1930s and 1940s. Some of that shrinkage undoubtedly occurred in the 1950s. Birth rituals can be discussed in more specific terms. The variety of proscribed behaviors associated with birth seems to have been the most

1. If the speculation above is correct, on the relationship between parents' concern about their daughters' suitors, and marriage as an entry to job opportunities, then one further consequence may follow. I suggested that in cane workers' families, parents might hope for a son-in-law with a slightly better job, and so reject many young men. In the families with better jobs, parents would be on guard against an obrero possibly looking to move up, and so would also reject many suitors. A result was that most people were married by elopement without any ceremony. But if the suitor of an upper family girl was from one of those families himself, there would be no parental objection on occupational grounds, and so no need to elope. The association of legal marriage with the "middle class" might then be as much a result of a decrease of old pressure to elope, as of the adoption of new values.

complicated ritual complex common in old Jauca I.1

Virtually all of that ritual was either eliminated with the replacement of midwives by hospital births, or dismissed by physicians as superstition. In-hospital births in Santa Isabel accounted for 15.2% of all births in 1945, 39.3% in 1950, 54.2% in 1955, and 80.6% in 1960, according to municipal birth records. In this case, the integration of rural people into the insular network of technical expertise confronted and demolished what may have been the most salient folk tradition left in Jauca I.

Another local life cycle ceremony was the home baptism (echar agua). It is not clear to what degree Pentecostal and Catholic efforts diminished this custom. It is certainly far less common today. But its decline seems related to a more

1. The association of birth with the self-image of the rural poor is suggested in a story reported by Mintz in his dissertation:

One of the most charming tales reflecting an awareness of class differences concerns the child Jesus. It is said that Mary had no milk for the child, and went seeking a mother to feed him. She asked a wealthy woman whom she met in the street to give the child milk, and the woman answered, "What? Feed your bastard child? Certainly I won't!" Mary drew back and said to the woman, "From now on, women like you will have trouble when you bear your young." She walked on, still looking for some mother to help her. Finally, she asked a poor woman who walked by, carrying her own child. "Certainly," said the poor woman, and she took the child Jesus and fed Him. "From now on," said Mary, "women like you will bear your children with no suffering at all." And with this, the story teller turned to her audience and said, "And you see, those rich women in the big cities run to their hospital and need doctors and medicine and have a terrible time when they have their children. We women here just go to bed when our time comes and have our children as easy as can be." (Mintz 1953: xiii 12-13)

recent (post-1960) decline in the significance of compadrazgo. It was compadrazgo, the relationships established between parents and godparents, that was the most important thing about baptism. (Compadre relationships could also be established in other ways, as discussed in the preceeding chapter).

Compadrazgo implies a heightened respect between partners, reinforcing correct behaviors (see Mintz 1956: 389-391). This is a useful and flexible social institution. The relationships it reinforces can vary, as they did for the communities studied by Mintz's colleagues (Steward et al 1956: 475). In Jauca I, it made more obligatory the provisioning of mutual assistance, largely between peers. It supported exchanges of labor, the sharing of windfalls, and no-interest loans of money or property. As Mintz observes, it exists in interaction. Permanent migration of one partner robs the relationship of meaning, and Mintz never heard of a case when one compadre loaned another money to emigrate. The bonds between compadres, in general terms, were less strong or broad as those between kin. The latter, for instance, did lend money to migrate. Compadrazgo could add to kin ties by formalizing the obligations of kinship, and of course it had the great advantage of being expandable by decision. Between and the kin and compadres, the established residents of Jauca I were knit together like one big family. The basic compadrazgo pattern persisted well past 1960 as a major factor unifying the community. But permanent migration had delivered a shock to

the whole system (Brameld 1966: 41).

Mintz emphasizes that compadrazgo among jauqueños primarily created horizontal linkages between equals, involving people of the same socioeconomic group rather than crossing those lines in a more patron-client type of relation. I believe that assessment to be accurate. Now it can be refined. Compadrazgo was more complex in its relationship to socioeconomic divisions--it was related to the internal division of the rural proletariat described above.

The heads of 5 of the 15 families were actively establishing their compadrazgo ties prior to 1960. Table 5.15 supports Mintz's description of predominantly horizontal linkages, but also shows the "II" category, which includes occupations I refer to above as intermediate between lower and upper levels, clearly favor people with similar jobs for compadres. The Table also indicates that there is substantial crossing the upper-lower divide. Table 5.16 indicates that if compadrazgo was a relationship between peers, it still had a pronounced "upwards" bias. Using the same categories and classifications as in Table 5.15, this table shows the relative position, in job category, of the person requested to be the godfather, compared to the child's parents. In 29 of 51 cases, the godparent was equal to the parent. Among the remaining 22 cases, higher occupation godparents predominate over lower by

Table 5.15

		<u>Compadres</u> and Occupational Type			
		<u>Compadres</u>			
		I	II	III	IV
Informants*	I	18	6	4	2
	II	3	5	6	1
	III	-	-	-	-
	IV	-	-	1	5

* A total of 5: two from category I, two from category II, and one from category IV.

Explanation: Occupations at time of establishing compadre relationship, excluding occupations of housewife and midwife. Only compadre relationships established prior to 1960 are included. Category I: sugar cane field workers. Category II: better cane jobs (mechanic, irrigation worker, etc.--those described as intermediate types of work in the text). Category III: more advanced jobs (storeowner, fisherman, driver, small farm proprietor, capataz, welder). Category IV: teacher, mayordomo.

Table 5.16

Occupational Rank of those Asked to be <u>Compadres</u>					
2 Lower	1 Lower	The Same	1 Higher	2 Higher	3 Higher
4	4	29	10	2	2

Explanation: Occupational category of godparent compared to parent. Based on informants and compadres as classified in Table 5.11.

nearly 2 to 1.1

In his discussion of the reorientation of compadrazgo away from vertical "cross-class" ties under Aguirre's rule, Mintz (1956: 389) notes that on three of the four colonias with which he was familiar, no cane worker had the chief mayordomo as a compadre. Nothing leads me to question this as a generalization. However, field laborers, especially those with somewhat better jobs, did have capataces and lesser mayordomos as compadres. Brameld describes what seems to be a patron-client relationship involving a Santa Isabel field worker and some type of mayordomo, around 1957.² Beyond the limits of compadrazgo, workers still sought to establish and preserve a heightened sense of mutual respect and attentiveness with influential friends. I encountered several instances

1. Two instances recorded in Table 5.18 as "1 Lower", and two scored as "2 Lower", involved instances where the compadres were also relatives. The other two "2 Lower" were initiated at a time in the informant's life when he shared their line of work. Taking these facts into consideration makes the upward bias in establishing compadre relationships even more pronounced.

2. Brameld's descriptions regarding Santa Isabel are interesting, even if far from comprehensive. [While the feeling of suspicion if not hostility by workers toward managers, and vice versa, was quite apparent in our visits to the harvest fields, yet we must recall that one of our young respondents, himself an agregado, spoke with real affection of a mayordomo who was honored as a compadre in his family and often helped the sick by driving them to the hospital or in other ways. (1966: 357) Presumably, the same individual is the subject of this other statement:
A young respondent of a sugar worker's family, incidentally, had never been inside the home of any mayordomo; yet one was his compadre. (1966: 63)

where a harshly negative general opinion among jauqueños about specific old-time administrators, was taken exception to by individuals who had established a good working relationship with the administrator (and see Mintz 1974: 139).

Compadrazgo and kinship provided bonds that still unified rural workers in 1960, even though both had experienced some shocks. These personal, dyadic ties, however, were less important in 1960 than they were around 1940 because they had lost the reinforcement of other conditions, which had contributed to a sense of group identity and solidarity among rural workers. The continuous daily interaction of villagers had been greatly reduced, the homogenous community had been disrupted by the emergence of new subgroups, and distinctive elements of the local subculture were being swamped by more standardized insular patterns.¹

At this point, certain aspects and implications of kin and compadrazgo ties may be summarized. Both types of linkage, along with other strong interpersonal bonds, usually joined individuals of comparable socioeconomic position. These horizontal linkages reveal an internal layering within the rural proletariat, into two groups, with intermediate cases.

1. Mintz (1956: 352), commenting on the impact of the limited number of veterans and migrants in 1949, notes their contribution to "the growing deterioration of the noneconomic institutions based on continuous face-to-face contact", but he expressed doubt that there would be opportunities for much increase of their numbers in the future (cf. Mintz 1956: 413). As we have seen, Mintz saw only the earliest steps of an accelerating process of change.

Less frequent but still important personal ties joined individuals of unlike socioeconomic position. A major part of the content of these linkages was that the personal ties were the primary means of getting more desirable work, and employment was a key to many other social patterns. This situation, then, provides an illustration of the interaction of local and supra-local conditions. Insular trends created a changing structure of opportunities. They established that certain social characteristics would affect an individual's ability to share in the limited benefits of the changing structure. But it was local social organization that determined specifically who within the social categories would end up in what job. True, "knowing somebody" was not the only way to advance. There were cases when some jobs were waiting for the first person to show up with the proper qualifications. But those were limited in number, and qualification requirements tended to favor the same type of person who had good contacts. Perhaps it was different in the roaring 1960s, but in the 1950s around Jauca I, it appears to this author that it was a rare instance when the child of a common field laborer was able to move up into one of the desired jobs of the new economy.

It is commonly observed that extensive horizontal linkages of kinship or fictive kinship (such as compadrazgo) act as a limitation on individual or nuclear family mobility, since any gains one might make will be dissipated in outward reaching

networks. I learned of many cases when this observation applied, and so would not dispute it. But there is more to it than that. The extensive horizontal ties in Jauca I do more than hold people back, they also block people off from above. Social mobility is limited because advanced positions are controlled by another network. This is the more important obstacle to mobility. The draining effect of extensive networks among the poor applies primarily to petty capital accumulation--saving is difficult, lottery winnings disappear, etc. The blockage effect prevents access to more significant long-term advances, i.e. better jobs. However, personal ties at the same time may provide an avenue for mobility for a lucky or cunning few, who can establish a strong tie to influential people. These few can often bring themselves up, and even some of their family as well.¹

These observations may clarify points made by other authors. Tumin and Feldman (1971: 249) claim that their study bears out the widely held notion "that the family is the unit of status and fate", and they go on to argue that this implies that the internal organization of the family is key to determining class or status position. My argument would support the first point, but not the second. It is the broader

1. The discussion of horizontal ties and mobility may suggest to the reader other topics linked to such patterns in many development situations: the cutting of familial ties by upwardly mobile individuals, and the increasing social and economic separateness of the nuclear family. Both trends became prominent in Puerto Rico and Jauca in the 1960s. They will be discussed in future work.

ties of families, including compadrazgo ties, rather than internal characteristics that are critical in determining socioeconomic position.

Brameld (1966: 46) in regard to government employment, discusses "kinship solidarity", commenting that "one immediate and chronic result of which is a form of 'nepotism', of bureaucratic job-passing among members of extended families, including compadres". Other references abound regarding this type of favoritism in government and business (e.g. Quintero Rivera 1980: 98-99; Seda 1973: 25). What seems to be lacking in these commentaries is any sense that this pattern may be an integral part of local class structure. The old solidarity of the family, one's primary responsibility to assist one's kin, is a cherished ideal, often discussed by older informants in Jauca recalling "la familia unida" of yesteryear. It was this loyalty, supplemented by other personal ties, that reinforced and perpetuated the limited socioeconomic distinctions of the 1940s, and which facilitated the rapid magnification of the differences in the 1950s.

The individual and local society. In Chapter IV, I reported that the goal of improving individual or family circumstances ("mejorarse") was emphasized by older informants. Repeatedly, I was told that people here had always been looking to advance ("siempre busquando progreso"). But, as described, under prevailing conditions, major improvements could only be obtained by advancing the interests of cane

workers as a group. This situation was basically unchanged in 1949.

Mintz describes the limited individual aspirations of adult cane workers. In one place, he (1956: 355) says that their greatest hope was to obtain a year-round job. In another discussion, he (1951: xiii 2) observes that hopes were aimed at moving off colonia land and owning one's house, and, "on a grander level, to get out of the cane, to start a small store, or to migrate". (Although not noted by Mintz, these two sets of aspirations reflect the distinction of lowers and uppers within Jauca I, remembering that migration up to that point was a very selective process). But even these modest hopes were relatively unattainable. The year-round and non-cane jobs were, I have argued, closed off to most cane workers. The other goals needed some capital, and that was extremely hard to generate.

Saving cash was virtually impossible for the rural worker bound up in a web of mutual assistance. This is not because they did not know how to handle money. On the contrary, Mintz (1956: 403) observes that men with only two or three years of school kept detailed account books covering their dealings with Aguirre. But in dealings with family, compadres, and even other members of the community, a mercenary attitude was despised. The emphasis on sharing created a situation which might be labelled "generalized reciprocity" within the personal networks (Mintz 1951: xiii 8; 1956: 412-413). With these

values, cash accumulation was out of the question, since there always existed a general cash scarcity, and minor emergencies were routine. (Jauqueños would appreciate the comment of one of Oscar Lewis's [1963: 171] Mexico City informants: "Sometimes I even think that savings bring on illness"). Raising a pig in the back yard was a more feasible way to save--at least it could not be frittered away--but one with obvious limits. The best hope for acquiring a lump sum of cash was by winning the lottery, as described earlier. Informants were well aware that they would always end up with less money than if they had saved their gambling money, but they knew that saving was a very limited possibility (Mintz 1956: 364-366; 1974: 180-184).

Mintz recognized that migration and army service had raised local peoples' goals. Fourth and fifth grade students all told him that they wanted to avoid cane work, and hoped to become publico drivers, nurses, policemen, or teachers. But Mintz thought that even the army and the U.S. job market open to migrants would provide only minor new opportunities for local people. His conclusion was that most sales still faced "an inescapable future in the cane fields" (Mintz 1956: 352, 355, 403, 413).

As described above, the 1950s actually did see the creation of new job opportunities, but these opportunities had very different significance for upper and lower groups. For the uppers, there was a real possibility of obtaining the scarce,

desired new jobs, and of thereby greatly improving living conditions. Doing this involved using horizontal ties to other upper group people, and also establishing/using when possible personal ties to individuals in a higher socioeconomic position. For the lowers, as Hernández Álvarez (1964: 150) described for the bottom 90% of parcelas families, there was still no viable means of substantially improving one's circumstances except by permanent migration, which tended to rupture or weaken ties of kinship and compadrazgo. By 1960, seeking to improve oneself did not lead to open conflict, as it had in earlier times in regard to piecework and strikebreaking, but the general impact was to divide and weaken local solidarity, where 10 to 15 years earlier it had had the effect of producing stronger group identification.

The idea that old values change in their social implications under new conditions can be pushed further. Starting with the value of mejorarse, and working through its connections with other values, we can see the genesis of further disruption and conflict. The value system described by Mintz (especially in 1951, chapter xiii) was well integrated. Values applied to different aspects of behavior fit together in a mutually reinforcing way. That would not be the case after local socioeconomic conditions began to change.

The underpinnings of the value system were the intertwined concepts of dignidad and respeto. Both are important values throughout the island, and have been the subject of many

commentaries. Dignidad in particular has been criticized as a great social problem. As perceptive and sympathetic an observer as Lewis (1963: 480) describes "the Puerto Rico pathology of dignidad" as "obsessive pride and its overweening sensitivity to even the mildest criticism". Ross (1976: 90) calls it "a frighteningly real disease" and "a genuine psychosis" (also see Cochran 1959: 83; Tugwell 1977: 487-489; Wells 1955: 36-37). I discussed these opinions with my older informants, and they emphatically took issue. One told me that he did not know about the ricos in San Juan, but it sounded to him as if they were hiding behind dignidad rather than possessing it. For the poor, he explained, nothing was more important than conserving one's dignidad. (The excellent discussion of dignidad, respeto, and related concepts in Lauria [1964: 55-56], based on fieldwork between 1958 and 1962, mirrors precisely what my older informants explained to me).

Dignidad refers to the internal worth of a person, regardless of more superficial considerations such as wealth or education. The idea is inseparable from that of respeto. As explained in Chapter IV, respeto implies proper behavior in all circumstances. Proper, respectful behavior in dealing with another implies recognition of their dignidad. One respects in order to be respected. One who respects possesses dignity. One who does not respect and behave as others expect, who does not correct his own behavior because he acutely feels others' disapproval, is a sin verquenza (one without shame). To

seriously call someone a sin verquenza is a terrible insult. Dignidad and respeto are internal and external aspects of the same thing, or as one informant put it, "dignity is the basis for mutual respect".

Another concept closely related to respeto, perhaps subsumable within it, is cumplidor, one who fulfills one's obligations. This highly valued characteristic is integral to the compadrazgo complex. Sometimes young men would become voluntary compadres ("de voluntad") with the words "vamos a respetarnos mas". Respect and fulfillment of these obligations was also valued in relations with non-compadres. These values must be understood as part of the general situation where group solidarity was recognized as essential, yet was continually being undermined by strains (e.g. over money) and conflicts (e.g. over strikebreaking). One could not control others' behavior, but one controlled what one could. A worker would show himself as determined to preserve his own reputation by acting seriously and honorably, and by aggressive action against any who malign him. And, he would choose to interact with others who had a similar reputation. Persons such as these, bound together in relations of mutual respect, could count on each other to make every effort to do the right thing.

In addition to reinforcing dyadic personal ties, adherence to the ideal of respeto reinforced the whole subcultural system. The content of the dyadic relations were local norms of proper behavior. In backing up these norms, respeto was the

superorganic conscience of the system. These norms were oriented to acceptance of the local cane-centered life style. As Mintz (1951: xiii 3) put it, "the prevailing cultural standards motivate the school child to accept, rather than reject, his parents' culture, take a machete and go into the cane, marry, have children, and live out his life in the barrio", even though these standards were perceptibly coming under new scrutiny and stress. Mintz (1956: 352; and see Wolf 1971: 172) argues that this value system was narrowly adjusted to a relatively uniform and stable lifestyle. A consequence of this is that changes in living patterns would often be seen in terms of a decline in respeto and in morality in general. As noted in Chapter IV, this is a complaint one often hears from older informants today.

From ca. 1950 onwards, changing behaviors increasingly contrasted with norms, inducing a crisis in the value system. Exposure to North American standards was one source of change, with two major results. Most of those local people who were the most attracted to U.S. ways, migrated. Those who remained were generally more committed to local cultural patterns (Hernández Álvarez 1966: 153-154). (Torres Zayas [1963: 75, 101-102] makes the interesting observation for another rural community, that people who migrated or wanted to migrate were perceived by others as immoral). Migration thus helped to moderate the conflict over different values which it itself helped generate. Even so, migration was a slap against family

and compadrazgo ties, both of which provided arenas for acting with respect, and so for validating one's own dignity. And even if those most influenced by U.S. standards left, exposure to these standards helped trigger rising expectations in consumption. This last trend is not attributable solely to the influence of returnees from the U.S., but as Wolf (in Mintz 1965: 334) observes, the growing absorption of Puerto Rico into the U.S. economy, where self-worth was measured by possession of goods.

Exposure to U.S. standards was not the only source of value strain. Even greater tensions were related to changes in local work patterns. I have already discussed how women working led to conflict between behavior and traditional norms within the household. Another more public problem was that such women openly contradicted the standard that women should remain in the home. Going about in the world of men carried a hint of sexual immorality. The new jobs for women were eagerly sought as a way of bettering family living standards. But they also created tensions between existing values.

In the families of agricultural workers, other challenges to prevailing norms developed. In and before the 1940s, an essential aspect of adult male identity was working. "Maturity, in the case of boy children, is largely a matter of wage earning capacity" (Mintz 1951: xiv 79).¹ This same

1. Although this view has greatly changed today, it is not absent. One man told me that old people were reluctant to retire, even if economically secure, because without work

standard is noted for other rural communities (Buitrago Ortiz 1973: 86-88; Torres Zayas 1963: 43, 63). Consequently, it was rewarded as very disturbing, even shocking, when in the later 1950s some local men chose to sit home during the harvest, because unemployment payments from U.S. jobs made cane work less attractive.

The rejection of cane work, specifically, had implications far more general than the concept of masculinity. More and more local young people were turning against work in the fields. The strains this created are suggested by what seems to have been a common conflict within families in the 1950s. The father would accuse his son of being lazy, because the son did not want to work in the cane. The son would reply with something like, "I'm not like you father, I want to see something for my work". This often led to or was accompanied by a quarrel over the authority of the father. It was not unusual for the son to leave for New York in an atmosphere of bitterness. (The stereotype of those who migrate to the U.S. being lazy is suggested in Seda [1973: 13] and Torres Zayas [1963: 75, 101, 106]).

This generational conflict was, I believe, the pivotal point of the general crisis in values. As described above, the scarcity of field labor that developed in the late 1950s was a factor leading to intensified efforts toward more thorough

"no sirve pa'nada, esta como basura" ("one is not worth anything, one is like garbage").

mechanization, which many cane workers feared would lead to the complete elimination of their way of making a living. The rejection of cane work by many young men was more than a difference, it was a threat to older men's livelihood.¹ The threat of job loss was a direct challenge to older men's entire sense of identity. For reasons already discussed, accelerated elimination of cane field jobs would damage if not destroy the economic basis of being a man and the authority within the family. It would reduce one's ability to fulfill social obligations. It would undermine the sense that the rich and poor were in a sense equal, for now the poor seemed to be becoming economically superfluous (see Hernández Álvarez 1966: 155). All of this combined made it increasingly difficult to act as a man of respect, to conserve one's dignity.

I suspect that older folks in Jauca I had always perceived the young as lacking in respect. But the normative gaps and conflicts of the 1950s were far greater than usual. For the cane worker, whose greatest hope had been "to win for himself a measure of permanent security" (Mintz 1951: xiii 2), his entire way of life seemed suddenly on the verge of extinction, partly due to the attitudes of the young. The dislocation experienced by older people seems comparable to that described by Seda

1. Although my discussion here is linked specifically to the situation in sugar cane production, I suspect that the general outlines of this generational clash in work-related values was relatively common. It could occur anywhere that rejection of traditional low pay work by younger members of a community undermined the viability of that work.

(1973), except that Jauca I appears to have been spared actual violence. For the new "middle class", there also was change and discomfort, but their job and income situations were improving so that the over-all strain was less. Today, informants from these two socioeconomic levels tend to respond quite differently in appraising this period, a variation which confused this researcher until I realized the significance of the internal divisions within the community.

Municipal council records support Hernández Álvarez's description of increased conflict. In 1949, the council imposed an 8 p.m. curfew for children under sixteen, with the explanation that staying out late had made them insolent and demoralized (Asamblea Municipal, Libro 12: 222). This curfew was enforced. Informants recall running for home when they were children when they heard the curfew siren blow, and cases where the police brought home children found out after curfew. In 1951, another ordinance made an offense out of what may be translated as "disorderly behavior" (faltar al respeto publico) (Libro 13: 48). In 1958, it was made an offense for non-authorized people to enter school grounds (Libro 14: 412).

This period could be characterized as anomic, particularly for the hard pressed cane workers. But as much as the problem of an inability to attain desired ends by culturally accepted means, another problem was having to choose between values. For those with an opportunity to obtain the newer jobs, the choice was between economic improvement and traditional family

patterns. For cane workers, it was between staying in Jauca I and trying to preserve one's traditional identity, or of cutting it off, and seeking a better income in U.S. cities. Eventually, most people would have to make a choice. Ambivalence must have been intense, for any choice would involve substantial self-inflicted loss. It would not be surprising if this situation led to neuroses and other mental disorders, as in fact are described and analyzed in Seda's (1973: 46, 141) contemporary account. This might explain why the spiritist centers were founded in Jauca I just at this time--spiritism being in a sense the "psychiatry of the poor" (Rogler and Hollingshead 1961). (Seda [1973: 135 ff.] also reports an upsurge in spiritist activity in the 1950s).

These last observations bring us back to a point raised several pages back, that under changed circumstances old values ceased to be mutually reinforcing, and instead led to contradictory impulses. My argument was suggested to me by an informant who read Hernández Álvarez's article at my request. The informant said the description of a crisis in values in that article was accurate, but went on to explain that local people have always sought some way to improve themselves. In other words, what was creating this breakdown in the local value system was the pursuit of the long-held central goal of economic betterment. In the circumstances of the 1950s, that pursuit often required abandonment of other ideals.

Jauqueños as part of a political force. In 1940, jauqueños

were part of a militant and powerful political movement. By 1960, they were politically inert, or at least passive. This change must be understood in terms of the internal characteristics of the people in Jauca I and similar communities, and in terms of their integration within the insular panorama of interests and alignments. Internal characteristics have already been discussed in detail, and now can be quickly summarized.

In 1940, the internal differences of the people of Jauca I paled in significance compared to unifying conditions. Jauqueños shared a subcultural pattern that was distinctive, relatively uniform, bounded and separated from other socioeconomic groups, and internally cemented by networks of strong dyadic ties. In the next two decades, internal divisions became very significant, villagers grew more integrated into insular culture pattern and so local subculture became less distinctive and local heterogeneity increased, the clear boundary which had separated jauqueños from higher socioeconomic groups faded and was spanned by the new "middle class", and the pattern of dyadic bonds between villagers--while still very important--had been substantially weakened. Still, there was an ideal of unity among villagers, an idea that persists even today. Its survival may be because the ideal was never put to a real test in terms of political action.

The political deactivation of Jauca I residents can be

attributed to three overlapping and interacting trends. First, the major issues that generated action in the 1930s and early 1940s had been resolved, at least to a point. Second, institutions for the expression of local political issues, the union and the Popular Party, developed in a way that increased central control and diminished the input of grass roots membership. Third, changes in Santa Isabel's economy led to a diversification of jauqueños' interests, so that people within the community found themselves in differing positions in regard to island political divisions and issues. All of these will be considered in the following section.

The most direct avenue of political expression for jauqueños in the 1930s and early 1940s was the local sugar workers' union. A militant rank and file was straining against the more conservative FLT leadership. Santa Isabel was in the forefront of the 1930s south coast sugar workers strikes. In January of 1942, south coast workers led a rebellion against FLT leadership, rejecting the contract they had negotiated. Some 80,000 workers struck. There was violence, killing, and the potential of much more to come (see Edel 1962: 46-47; Minimum Wage Board 1942: 11-13, 50; Tugwell 1977: 221-222, 232-234). At the beginning of this chapter, I described this strike as a point where the sugar workers held the future of Puerto Rico in their hands. Had they not acceded to Muñoz and accepted arbitration, the colonial power structure quite likely would have shifted into a mode of violent repression, rather

than the controlled liberalization it had been pursuing. Sugar workers would never be this influential again.

1945 saw another prolonged sugar workers strike, although one sugar union leader alleged that this one was purposely provoked and prolonged by the corporations, which were lobbying for increased federal price support at the time (Committee 1945: 2, 217, 225). The next few years were relatively calm (Annual Report of the Governor 1946: 10; 1947: 38-39; 1948: 137). In 1948, there was another major strike. Union leadership called out both field and mill workers. This was a tactical blunder. Taft-Hartley had been extended to Puerto Rico in 1947, and under its provisions, bringing in the mill workers meant that all the strikers were obliged to return to work for a cooling off period. By the time that ended, most of the harvest was in. The union's gains were far less than was hoped (Mintz 1951: xiii 13; 1956: 398). From this point on, labor relations with Aguirre and throughout the sugar industry became more routine and less confrontatory. There were fewer strikes, and those that did occur were short and non-violent. I found no way of assessing the relative militancy of Jauca I or Santa Isabel cane workers compared to other areas during these strikes. I suspect that they remained at the forefront until they were weakened by the factional struggle within the local union, described below.

By the late 1940s, workers had won important concessions, but less by union action itself than by union-PPD cooperation.

Conditions of cane work, and particularly the susceptibility to scabbing, still made it difficult for even the most militant workers to beat the Corporation.¹ In the 1940s a working arrangement developed in which the government would back basic union demands with legislation or regulation, and then the union would keep a vigilant watch over Aguirre's compliance with the law. One finds strong disagreement today as to whether it was the unions or the Popular Party (or Muñoz Marín personally) which is most responsible for workers' gains.

Whoever gets the credit, gains for workers in the 1940s were substantial. Wage and earnings increases were described earlier. The work day was limited to eight hours, seven for some jobs. There was guaranteed pay if workers had to be sent home early because of some administrative lapse, such as a lack of railroad cane-cars to load. Conditions in the field improved, as the verbal abuse of mayordomos was curtailed, and laborers were guaranteed elementary rights such as cold

1. According to Mintz:

A number of factors make the use of the strike as an instrument for winning better working conditions difficult in the sugar industry. To begin with, cane work prevailingly is of an unskilled nature--any worker can perform nearly any job; what is more, competition for jobs is considerable, and strikebreaking is not uncommon. An additional problem is the vast expanse of land to be patrolled during a strike. (1956: 399)

The comment on "competition for jobs" suggests that the division into lower and upper groups was, in certain circumstances, a factor weakening rural worker solidarity. Wolf (1971: 173) makes a relevant observation, that the personalistic orientation of dyadic networks may be a handicap in actions such as strikes, where a more universalistic orientation can be more effective.

drinking water in the fields. When Aguirre began to burn cane before harvesting in order to cut down on cane trash being shipped to the mill, workers won time-and-a-half for this dirty and unhealthful work. Compliance with all these rules was assured by union representatives on duty in the fields. Other benefits, such as medical care and prescription drugs, were transferred from the Corporation to the union control.

Gains in political rights were as great or greater. The colonias and even Central Aguirre itself were opened to union and political activity, culminating eventually in the establishment of a union shop. Evictions, arbitrary firings, and blacklisting were banned. The power of company stores was restricted, although not eliminated. Besides the manipulation of store credit, workers could still be intimidated by Aguirre administrators' continuing ability to reward or punish by manipulation of work assignments. But the rural proletariat had won much of what they had demanded.

At first, Aguirre tried to get around the laws and negotiated agreements, and the union watchdogs caught many violations. The union sponsored several successful lawsuits for back pay. One major suit involved irrigation workers, whose work day was limited by law to seven hours. They had been working eight, without overtime pay. Hernández Álvarez (1964: 147) notes that workers collected as much as \$1,500 from such suits. The continuing vigilance of the union finally made Aguirre play by the rules. By the early 1950s, it was living

up to its legal obligations, and to that extent at least, was dealing fairly with its workers.

A very common comment by informants about this development is that Aguirre had learned to respect. Respecting its workers more, there was less need for conflict. This provides an insight on prevailing views on class relations. One older informant, and one of the most politically astute, elaborated. He linked the degree of open labor-management conflict to the idea of dignidad, and the mutual recognition by the rich and the poor that each made a necessary contribution to society--the rich their capital, and the poor their labor. A sense of respect opened the door to cooperation. Far from a Marxian idea of inevitable class struggle, this essentially Durkheimian attitude reminds us of the fact of the long dominance by the conservative FLT and Socialist Party, both of which were concerned mostly with immediate economic issues. It is entirely consistent with this pattern that cane workers should be more interested in receiving a small houseplot than in government appropriation and administration of Aguirre. And it also follows from this pattern that once basic demands on wages, work conditions, and political freedom were met, the unions would lose much of their sense of purpose.

Another development striking at the core of unionism was mechanization. Union representatives, many of whom were also PPD officials, opposed increased mechanization up until the 1948 election, and then did a rapid reversal, arguing that

mechanization was needed for the industry's survival (Mintz 1956: 399; and see below). Mintz notes in this context the linkage of the union to the PPD, and the fact that the PPD government was seeking ways to cut costs on the proportional profit farms. But this may be a rare instance where such cynicism, usually entirely appropriate, is unwarranted.

Despite my skepticism about many of the alleged "truths" about the Puerto Rican sugar industry, I see no reason to disagree with the view that in the late 1940s, unit labor costs would have to be substantially reduced if Puerto Rican sugar was to remain viable within the U.S. market. Older informants today accept that this was true back then, but it is not clear just when they came to accept that view.

The Santa Isabel union position around 1957 is described by Brameld (1966: 145-146). It was that mechanization could not be stopped, but that it could be regulated, phased in "gradually in order to prevent wholesale unemployment". They had an agreement with Aguirre that new innovations would be discussed with the unions before their being introduced, but apparently even union officials were not confident about the strength of that agreement. Another response was to put up \$100,000 of its funds to invest in a factory that would locate in Santa Isabel. One factory, however, could absorb only a fraction of the threatened sugar workers. On this critical issue, the union had been thrown on the defensive.

Local union strength was weakened also by prolonged

internal factional struggles. The opening conflicts are described by Mintz (1956: 398; 1974: 193-200), but details of these and especially of the later fights are not clear. Informants provided limited information on this subject, which I suspect is due to the general pattern of avoiding discussion of conflicts within the community.

In 1940, Santa Isabel's sugar workers' union was still part of the FLT, even though the view had been growing that the FLT was irreparably compromised. In 1944, more militant CGT organizers arrived in town. There was great enthusiasm for this new union and its dynamic leader, a man named Bernacet. The CGT had a more democratic procedure for selecting barrio representatives, which impressed local people. Membership increased explosively.

Only a few years later, around 1947, the union local began to fall apart. Bernacet and his loyalists were locked in a struggle with another faction led by the mayor since 1944, Francisco Robledo. Both men are recalled as loyal Populists, and I found no suggestion that this was related to the insular division of the CGT in 1946. Mintz (1956: 398) characterizes the fight as being over "division of political spoils". Taso Zayas supported Robledo. His complaint against Bernacet was that he and other officials claimed excessive expenses, and that they failed to make required payments from union funds--in one particular case, to cover the costs of a funeral. The struggle was drawn-out, and related to parallel struggles for

control of the local PPD machinery (below). At first Bernacet retained his control of the union, but he later left the area, leaving the union to mayor Robledo. This may have been arranged by the PPD hierarchy. By the time of Bernacet's departure, the infighting, combined with the mishandling of the 1948 strike, had led to a loss of faith and interest in the union. When Mintz was in the field, there were only about 100 active members in Jauca I, and the Santa Isabel local was much weaker and less militant than locals of nearby municipios.

Meanwhile, a new union had been organized at Central Aguirre in 1941, under the Popular-linked leader Chepo Caraballo. By 1949, this union was expanding outwards, contesting with another syndicate led by Armando Sánchez. In the early 1950s, the Santa Isabel local was caught up in the fight, with mayor Robledo originally allied with Sánchez. Caraballo's union won a local election. (Some informants assert that Caraballo and Sánchez agreed to divide up local municipios). Mayor Robledo reached an accomodation with Caraballo, as his local was incorporated in the Sindicato del Obreros Unidos del Sur, which itself was affiliating around this time with the CIO (below).

That seems to have ended local factional/jurisdictional disputes. Around 1957, Brameld (1966: 356) could report: "in contrast to the weak condition described by Mintz, organized labor in Cañamelar is now relatively strong and solidly inclusive of the bulk of the working population". He goes on

to note the "dominating figure" of the local union leader (Robledo). Caraballo's Obreros del Sur retains jurisdiction today, and Caraballo himself is widely remembered as having made great gains for working people. But there were suspicions of improprieties, both within the local and the larger syndicate. Brameld (1966: 65) also records, apparently in reference to Santa Isabel, that "tens of thousands" of dollars in union funds had "not been properly audited". Informants recall specific encounters with union leaders in which the misuse or disappearance of funds is evident. One commented on the union's purchase of a brand new Ford for Robledo around 1959, "I can even remember the color". People were impressed, but this confirmed some suspicions of corruption.

Brameld (1966: 65) adds to this, "there is discouragement of democratic participation and criticism by rank-and-file members". This is not surprising, since the head of the union was a loyalist in an extraordinarily centralized political party; and, as will be described below, since contracts were negotiated at the insular level, under the auspices of mainland unions. There was little room for grass roots initiatives. While things were improving, there was probably little impulse for such initiatives anyway.

Regarding other, non-sugar industry unions in Santa Isabel, there is not much to report. Only teachers had the numbers and similarity of employment conditions to be likely to unionize. Island-wide, teachers were slow to organize unions (below), and

Santa Isabel helps us understand why. Brameld (1966: 71-73) describes for them a disinterest in unions that verged on disdain. The status-conscious teachers pointedly ignored an invitation to a sugar union party. They also expressed no interest in teaching about unionism in school.

The multiple blows to union strength in Santa Isabel were matched by events on the insular level. Trends on both levels worked in the same direction, but they were largely distinct. Insular development will be described later. The next section describes local political developments in Santa Isabel and Jauca I.

The 1940 election campaign in Santa Isabel was discussed at the end of the previous chapter. The PPD made specific pledges, and lectured not to sell one's vote. The party picked its local candidates, and later explained their choices to the public. Their mayoral choice was a poor candidate, the Socialist and Liberal parties still had loyalists, and Aguirre Corporation still employed naked coercion against Popular supporters. (One activist inside Destino had the roof taken off his company-owned house). The incumbent Liberal mayor, a member of the wealthiest family in Santa Isabel, won his second term in 1940.

The 1944 election was different. Now virtually all the rural workers were convinced of the PPD's good intentions and their ability to deliver. They voted the straight party ticket (see Mintz 1974: 187-190). Francisco Robledo was elected

mayor, but only after winning the nomination in a factional fight within the Party (below).

The link between many jauqueños and the PPD was like their other social ties, personal, rather than segmented and instrumental. Support of parties for many people had been a total thing, "like with religion" (Mintz 1974: 186) only more so, once the party had delivered on a promise or a favor. Muñoz encouraged this unconditional support, urging voters to place "one single X" under the symbol of the Popular slate. Support of the Party carried with it the expectation that Party representatives would respond to personal needs. This was not considered dishonest. Taso Zayas, who was about as moral and politically conscious as they came, expected personal assistance in return for campaign work, as well as the favorable legislation that had been promised. In the historical context, it is hard to imagine any other rational position, especially after the experience of laboring to bring the Socialists to power, and then receiving virtually no benefit (Mintz 1974: 185-186). When expected help was not forthcoming, supporters felt betrayed (Mintz 1974: 190-192, 204-205). Some, such as Taso Zayas, just withdrew from politics. Others went over to the opposition. These "wounded doves" provided a major source of recruits for the Independence and later Republican parties, although their numbers remained limited in Santa Isabel until the later 1950s.

The structure of local politics in the late 1940s seems to

have varied greatly by municipio, as the particular configurations of local socioeconomic divisions articulated with insular party arrangements. In Nocorá, sugar workers were less fully proletarianized, and government control of sugar farming made the PPD the indisputable center of power. Workers there accepted the centralized authoritarian structure of the Party as long as its representatives responded to their personal needs. They overlooked its excesses, wanting their protectors to be stronger than other parties (Padilla 1956: 295-297). In San José, people also looked for strength and responsiveness in the local political machine. There, party politics retained two features more characteristic of earlier years. A more viable local opposition fueled maneuvering for advantages to control patronage; and people expected political authorities to act more like old patrons, to be available to help resolve any problem, even interpersonal disputes (Wolf 1956: 247-251).

In Santa Isabel, local politics was comparatively less significant. People distrusted and disliked the town's politicians, and had fewer expectations of them, no doubt because they had already been let down by them, and for other reasons discussed below. The primary loyalty was to Muñoz Marín personally, who reached directly into the barrio homes via his radio addresses. Any break with Muñoz or his party was seen as a traitorous act. Mintz observed two types of follower, the totally committed and uncritical munocistas, and

those who preserved some critical detachment, watching carefully the PPD's actual performance (Mintz 1956: 395-396). With the passage of time, and the delivery of more benefits for which Muñoz claimed and received credit, the adulation of Muñoz became the norm, so that even the wounded doves commonly excoriate the PPD local politicians and Party hierarchy, but spare Munoz himself.

In the absence of the major government enterprise of a proportional profit farm, and since after 1944 Popular dominance was such in Santa Isabel that opposition parties could not even hope to capture local government and its patronage, the municipal government did not have much to control or deliver. It doled out a few house sites in the rural barrios, and cooperated with federal and insular programs in house and other construction in town. When the parcelas program finally arrived in Santa Isabel, the mayor presided over the distribution. The local government established and operated a municipal slaughterhouse, but this was met with mixed feelings by the rural folk who were required by law to use it. The government provided jobs, but the better, more permanent ones went to other supporters than those in Jauca I. The most important resource at the disposal of the mayor was the funds for improving medical service, and discretionary funds for aid to the indigent and for emergencies. These last resources, and their skillful use, seem to have been the main basis of solidification of the local power of Robledo, who

remained in power until 1968, and is sometimes compared to Muñoz Marín on a local level. A common complement about Robledo was that he was one of the first to arrive at a wake, bringing with him coffee and other supplies.

The local organization of the PPD is described by Mintz (1956: 395) and seems to have changed little since then (see Anderson 1965: 171). Officially, barrio committees were popularly elected, with one representative for each hundred registered Populans. Barrio representatives then met to elect mayoral and municipal assembly candidates. In actual practice, a very limited public input was eclipsed by strong central party direction. (It will be recalled that the insular PPD organization had moved toward extreme centralization of authority). Usually there was little fighting over selection of candidates. The decision of party officials sanctioned by the authority of Muñoz Marín, would end most contests. Usually the Party hierarchy would favor incumbents, whose control of patronage also gave them a strong local following.

The biggest struggle over a nomination involved the same individuals who were fighting for control of the union. After the failure of the Popular mayoral candidate in 1940, the 1944 candidate position was up for grabs. Bernacet, Robledo, and one other man had their own supporters. After an initial deadlock, Robledo won the election by barrio representatives. Bernacet for a time threatened to defect from Popular ranks, and rapidly lost support because of that. He relented, but

that move may still have been one cause of his ultimate defeat by Robledo in the subsequent struggle over control of the union. After Bernacet lost or gave up that fight and left Santa Isabel, he reportedly was given a job by the PPD.

These victories made Robledo in 1948 the head of the local union and Popular party. Given the debilitated condition of the union, there could be no question as to which organization was dominant. As was the case throughout Puerto Rico, the CGT union leaders were often Popular stalwarts. Bernacet reputedly was a compadre of Muñoz. (From what I could learn, Santa Isabel did not have a significant presence of the more radical wing of the CGT, which was less controlled by the PPD leaders and purged because of that.)

This overlap of union and party shows up also in Jauca I. Taso Zayas named the members of the barrio union and party local committees in the mid 1940s (Mintz 1974: 190, 194). Three men, Don Taso and two of his compadres, served both on the five-man union committee and the six-man party committee. One other compadre of Taso served on each board, so that of a total of eight individuals for the two organizations, five at least were linked together by compadrazgo. So it is fair to say that local political and union leadership was close to identical. In retrospect, Taso Zayas concluded that overlap between unions and political parties was a mistake, because politicians could use this arrangement to portray themselves as labor's advocates when they really were not (Mintz 1974: 200).

(Don Taso's credentials as an observer of politics are buttressed by the fact that he and one other man were singled out for Mintz by mayor Robledo as good contacts in Jauca I. Robledo explained that both men had been active in his campaigns [Mintz 1974: 2]).

It is interesting to observe that from a total Jauca I population of about 1300 in the mid 1940s, and despite the generally high level of political consciousness of that population, union and party leadership was concentrated in a small, personally bound network. I know of two other PPD activists of around the same time who do not appear on either committee, and they too were personally linked to this network. The incomplete information I have on these individuals indicates that at least half of them were making a living in the slightly better jobs, and/or were living as "independents" off the colonia. Lacking information about the others, it is possible that some were field laborers living on the colonia. At a minimum it can be concluded that a disproportionate number of political leaders came from the upper group, and it is possible, even likely, that this group strongly dominated organized political and union activity.

After the 1948 elections--the elections themselves are discussed along with insular politics, below--the political leaders of the municipio moved to consolidate their authority. This was consistent with the authoritarian centralization going on in Party and government at the time. The intent was

seen in the post-election distribution of patronage. Rather than hearing barrio committee recommendations for jobs, the municipal leaders "wanted to stop the mouths of the barrio committees" (Mintz 1974: 204). Control of patronage, of course, is a major element of political power. This successful maneuver by town politicians represented a decisive defeat of barrio activists. At the same time, the town leaders executed their fast reversal on the issue of mechanization. It was this general turn of events that led Taso Zayas to withdraw from politics. If this consolidation of central power occurred in other municipios around the same time, and I have every reason to believe that it did, it would represent an important turning point in Puerto Rico's political history. From this point on, the Popular Party could pursue a cooperative policy with capital, without fear of radical opposition rising from its grass roots.

The hostility between barrio and town politicians became palpable during Mintz's fieldwork. People in Jauca I saw town politicians as "lazy hangers on", a view matched by the "low regard" of town officials for barrio committeemen. Town leaders were thought of as superfluous and less than competent appendages of the insular PPD, and it was to that Party and its leader that jauqueños directed their loyalty and attention (Mintz 1956; 393-395).

Despite the resentment related to the town politicians' power play, what they had achieved was greatly increased

institutional control. Mintz (1956: 393-394) notes this, but also that its significance was still very limited. By the time of Brameld's visit nearly a decade later, this control was much more important. The town was the political center of the municipio (and the commercial and services centers as well), the local party hierarchy was seen as the "political trunk line" to the capital, and the mayor had become a commanding and respected figure (Brameld 1966: 357). As with the union, party politics settled into a stable, controlled routine.

But just as barrio committees lost power in the centralizing trend, so too did the municipal government lose some of its prerogatives. A major step was taken around 1946, when the insular government assumed responsibility from the towns for the financing and administration of schools. This move prompted the municipal assembly to petition for a reversal of this act (Asamblea Municipal, Libro 11: 336). The school system, however, employed too many people to remain apart from local political struggles. In 1959, Santa Isabel had a primary to decide the PPD candidate. (Primaries were usually employed in this period to resolve factional disputes [Anderson 1965: 195]). The exact reason for this primary is not clear, but it was most likely related to a dispute over the school administration going on at just that time.¹

1. The municipal assembly passed a resolution (Asamblea Municipal, Libro 15: 146) supporting the auxiliary superintendant of schools--who, it is claimed, enjoyed the support of the teachers--against the superintendent. The resolution says that this dispute was adversely affecting the

Loss of control of the schools was the biggest blow to the town government's autonomy, but other developments also increased the direct impact of centralized control. Hospital functions were a major source of the mayor's local popularity, but as noted earlier, the insular government was in the 1950s moving to consolidate advanced medical facilities in a few district hospital centers. The police department had long been under direct insular administration, so its expansion represented an expansion of insular government on the local level. Of similar consequence was the establishment sometime in the 1940s of a local division of the insular fire department. (One former mayordomo who was asked to join the department said its organizers looked for "important people" as members). The relative growth of insular government employment and direct administration was another way in which local life was becoming progressively more oriented to higher level power centers. The town government, while seemingly growing in power by the encapsulation of barrio committees, was actually losing autonomy and becoming more a link in a rigid chain of command beginning in San Juan.

The last aspect of local politics to be examined before moving on to insular political events, is the affect of political propaganda. Jauqueños' opinions about insular political events and trends was, obviously, shaped by what they knew about them. Who controlled the information they received,

entire school system.

and what did it tell them? It will be recalled that prior to 1940, island media were very limited in Jauca I. In the 1940s, newspapers and radios became more common. The message they carried was Popular. In the earliest PPD campaigns especially, the free newspaper El Batey was widely available and avidly read. Then and later, Muñoz's regular radio addresses were listened to by virtually everyone in Jauca I who could get near a radio. Older informants, recalling these broadcasts, sometimes imitate Muñoz's sonorous tones, as he exhorted solidarity of the pobres, and urged a straight Popular vote. (Manners' [1956: 132] description makes Tabara seem more isolated from the media in 1949, so the rate of media penetration may have varied considerably).

The significance of this control of accessible media was more profound than any single election result. It affected rural workers' general political orientation. I suggested earlier that the long FLT-Socialist dominance had fostered an economistic orientation among workers. The information that filtered through island media continued to promote this orientation. Padilla's discussion of Nocorá residents' concern with "immediate solutions to immediate economic problems", rather than with broader issues such as status, describes a situation which applied in Jauca I as well.

This basic interest is reinforced by their lack of access to institutions which operate on the national level and their lack of knowledge regarding them. Relations between the United States government and the government of Puerto Rico are mediated through institutional channels which remain invisible and cannot be understood on the local

level. People therefore do not show much interest in these relations. Federal decisions and functions which affect them are regarded as decisions and functions of the Puerto Rican government. Legislation passed by the United States Congress which results in benefits to Puerto Rico is viewed as an accomplishment of the political leaders of Puerto Rico. Unfavorable federal decisions, such as the closing of the port of Tipan by the Federal Maritime Commission, are blamed on Puerto Rican leaders belonging to an opposition party. (Padilla 1956: 299)

It will be seen below that this failure to give any credit to the Federal government was becoming a significant bone of contention by the late 1950s.

The paucity of available information, and the bias of information that was available, left unmistakable traces in the recollections of older informants. Munoz is given credit for the federal Social Security program in Puerto Rico, and for giving Puerto Ricans the right to migrate to the U.S. Tugwell is remembered only vaguely, and then primarily as a friend and ally of Muñoz, without any major impact of his own. A 1951 rift between Muñoz and a very well respected CGT/PPD leader over the issue of worker representation in government agencies (below) was dismissed as anti-Popular propaganda by one of my most knowledgeable informants. He did not believe it happened. People in Jauca today know more about the 1946 rupture between Munoz and the pro-independence forces, which involved a major restructuring of insular party arrangements (below). But there is only the most limited knowledge about the crucial economic policy reorientation of the later 1940s, which arguably was of much greater significance.

By the time of the People of Puerto Rico fieldwork, the

decision had been made public to emphasize the attraction of U.S. investors instead of government establishment and operation of industries. The community studies give no indication that this decision was well-known in the rural areas. Regarding it, Mintz (1951: xiii 14) observes, "Some Poyal workers are aware of this decision, many other do not seem to be". There is no indication that any information reached the villages about the underlying factors or true significance of this shift, as were described earlier in this chapter. Not even the project researchers seem aware of these. In the one paragraph discussing recent economic planning in the staff's introduction, the change appears as merely a rational modification of earlier plans (Steward et al. 1956: 76). In a following discussion of political conditions, they note the threat that had been posed in 1944 by the U.S. Congress conservatives, but with no hint as to how this threat was accommodated. On the same page, there is a reference to the power of wealthy interests, but with the implication that the PPD direction was still set against them (Steward 1956: 81-82). Writing in 1952, Mintz (1953a: 250) apparently believed that the land reform program might still move for more forced takeovers of corporate holdings by the government.

When asked today about the major economic changes associated with Operation Bootstrap in the 1950s, older informants repeat the public positions of Fomento at the time, which have all been shown (above) to be highly dubious. So the

decline of agriculture in the 1950s is recognized and regretted, but thought to be an unavoidable consequence of impersonal market forces. Operation Bootstrap itself is thought to have been primarily a jobs-creation program, and as the only viable way of creating jobs at the time. I witnessed an interesting reaction when I asked one politically informed older man about the sale of the PRIDCO factories. His first statement was that the sale was to put control in the hands of Puerto Ricans (the repeated government explanation for the earlier takeover of U.S. sugar corporation land). Immediately realizing the inappropriateness of this rationale, he added, "...of Puerto Ricans outside of the government". Being an old-time Socialist and union veteran, this modification still seemed to trouble him. Then he explained that the purpose in making that change was to eliminate the possibility of government administrators manipulating the workers. A pause followed, and he said "I understand that they were sold to the Ferrer". I confirmed that, and he ended the discussion with an eloquent "hmmmp!".

The real story behind the late 1940s economic reorientation and capital's return to political power remained, and still remains, a well-kept secret. In the late 1940s and even more recently, the poor believed that Muñoz Marín was responding primarily to their interests, not those of the capitalists, and that Muñoz was actually using the political power he obtained with the votes of the poor to control the economic behavior of

powerful money interests. After 1950 or so, media reaching the barrio was from more diverse sources than the PPD, but the Republicans were not about to broadcast their rapprochement as a criticism, and if the pro-independence forces were aware of the new arrangements (I do not know if they were), their entire political message was withering anyway under the repression and anti-independence propoganda of the 1950s. This is a very important fact. I have argued on several occasions in this thesis that the political definition of socioeconomic groups is a result of both the internal characteristics of those groups and their position within the island arrangements of interests and power, of alliance and opposition. After about 1946, the lack or manipulation of information prevented poor people such as those of Jauca I from seeing the realities of those arrangements.

This raises the issue of class consciousness among the people of Jauca I. There is not a great deal which can be said about it for the period in question. Only limited information exists in published sources, and my experience in exploring the point for present-day Jauca makes me hesitate to project backwards for the past. But some broad characteristics can be identified.

First, as described in Chapter IV, a sense of identity had developed by the 1930s, even if the boundaries of this self-identified group were fuzzy, and may have varied by situation from including only corporate sugar workers to all of

the island poor. As described in this chapter, the self-identification was greatly undermined in the 1940s and 1950s, although not completely disrupted. Second, as just explained, from the mid 1940s jauqueños and other rural poor lost sight of their true position within the insular political panorama. It could be said that they developed a "false consciousness". Third and fourth characteristics, also noted earlier in this chapter, are the reformist, economic quality of the rural proletariat's demands, and the associated Durkheimian view of relations between classes. The last characteristic was mentioned only in passing before, and merits more consideration here.

As noted in the discussion on respeto, conflict was seen as engendered by personal qualities, by failure to live by the rules. If there were respect, there need be no open conflict between classes. This applied to mayordomos and even to faceless corporations like Aguirre. Conflict was not inherent in the class structure itself. This perception is consistent with the local historical experience of inequality (i.e. the old haciendas), the persistence of patron-client structures in nearby highlands with which coastal people were acquainted, and the cooperative ideology of the FLT and Socialist Party. Evidence that this was in fact the dominant view of class relations among the rural poor is found in regard to attitudes about the law.

One indicator of attitudes about the class order of society

is attitude toward the police and the legal system. Prior to 1940, jauqueños experience with legal officials was limited, and mostly negative. The police and courts were openly allied with the landowners and corporations. Pastor Díaz could summon the police and have a man locked-up on his word that the man had been foraging on his land. Supporters of the Socialist Party could be jailed to keep them from voting. Strikebreakers were protected, and strikers assaulted. Consequently, local people were loathe to call on the police for any reason, and would refuse to testify in courts. This general pattern is recorded for Nocorá and San José also, and is also related in all cases to the pervasive dyadic ties cross-cutting the communities (Steward et al. 1956: 484).

After 1940, the labor-related conflicts with the law ended swiftly in Santa Isabel. But other conflicts related to local subcultural practices persisted. Pasturing animals on company fields, selling fish or butchering animals without a license, making and selling cane rum, and after about 1947, selling non-government lottery chances--all were widely practiced illegal activities in Jauca I and other communities (Mintz 1956: 361-367; 1974: 180-183; Padilla 1956: 299; Wolf 1956: 251-253) (but not in Tabara-Steward et al. 1956: 484). All these practices were considered morally defensible, regardless of the law (Mintz 1956: 362). Resentment about the lottery law was pronounced. As described above, the lottery was the most viable local avenue for self-improvement for many. The illegal

lottery was much preferred over the government game (see Mintz 1974: 181-182 for an explanation why). And the government's hypocrisy on this issue was laid bare when one Jauca I woman was sentenced to three months in jail for selling illegal chances, just at the time when newspapers printed photographs of the elaborate and luxurious gambling rooms in the new Fomento-funded Hilton (Mintz 1956: 365). Yet nothing I have read or elicited connects these laws to the PPD or Muñoz Marín. There apparently was no developed sense that a party and government for the poor should end criminal laws targeted on the poor, or that keeping these laws, or introducing it in the case of the lottery, revealed something about the true orientation of the government.

It is interesting to question why political ideology was not more developed and radical, especially considering the polarized situation and the dismal local history of reformist politics. Unfortunately, this topic cannot be adequately addressed by interviewing, decades after the fact. Perhaps research into workers' writings, such as that of Quintero Rivera, can provide answers. One obvious possibility regarding this point is that workers' ideology is more shaped by the ideology of the dominant labor organizations than by workers' immediate experiences, and in Puerto Rico, events conspired to produce an overwhelming conservative tendency within these organizations.

In Chapter IV, it was described how the people of Jauca I

fit into larger insular patterns in such a way that their interests had political weight. Their primary affiliation was with the sugar workers, the rural proletariat. The rural proletariat was big enough to command attention, and clear enough in its interests so that even if its leadership sold out, new leaders emerged from the grass roots to press the demands of rank and file. With the Popular triumph, the sugar workers were incorporated within a broader front. They joined other poor, who had different strategic positions within insular arrangements, but whose interests were potentially complementary to those of the sugar workers. And they joined smaller middle and upper income groups whose interests in the early 1940s also could accommodate reform in favor of the poor. One element of the political genius of Muñoz Marín was to perceive the possibility of cooperation of these major socioeconomic divisions, and to make their political alliance a reality.

Within the PPD alliance, the relative size and militancy of the cane workers made them a major force for pushing radical reform. Mintz (1951: xiii 14; 1956: 396) wondered if they would maintain their own course if the PPD faltered. He was optimistic that they would. But he underestimated the problems to come in the next decade. The rural proletariat quickly shrank in numbers, both for the island and Santa Isabel. What remained lost much of its internal coherence. Its organizations of action were centralized and closed-off to

local initiatives. Its demands were defused by the attainment of limited gains. In dealings with other socioeconomic groups, it faced greater complexity, made more incomprehensible by propaganda. All these trends combined with developments on the insular level (to be described shortly) to result in the rural proletariat losing the political initiative and being thrown on the defensive. Taso Zayas, whose life history through the 1920s and 1930s illustrates the development of a sophisticated and dedicated political activist, and who was at the center of barrio union and political activity in the 1940s, withdrew from politics just as these trends began to be clear, turning instead to religion (Mintz 1974: 204-205). But--and this more than anything testifies to the genius of Muñoz Marín--to this day Taso Zayas remains a loyal Popular.

Puerto Rican Politics II: ca. 1946--1960

We now pick up the narrative of events, arrangements, and trends in insular politics that began this chapter. The earlier discussion left off at different points in time. Discussion of changes in insular status went furthest, following the continuous efforts to eliminate the appearances of colonialism up to the creation of the Commonwealth in 1952. Discussions of government reform and reorganization went up to the completion of the major institutional changes, around 1950. Discussion of party politics, unionism, and the general area of insular political struggle left off around 1946, with the break between Muñoz Marín and the pro-independence forces. Understanding political developments after that, and even the break itself, requires an understanding of the insular economic changes and the village level consolidation of PPD support that have now been described. In the following section, I will return to insular power struggles, dealing first with developments in union activities, and then with electoral politics.

Unionism. 1946 began a series of terrible blows against militant independent union activity in Puerto Rico. There had been problems before then. As noted earlier, the link of the supposedly independent CGT to the Popular organization, and the absorption of labor leaders into the Party, had begun by 1940. In hindsight, radical union leaders saw in this the slow erosion of union strength, but that was not apparent at the

time (Sáez Corales 1971: 131-132). There were also jurisdictional conflicts. The fighting between the FLT and CGT was still very significant in 1945 (Committee 1945: 178), and events already described for Santa Isabel's union show the danger of factionalism even within the CGT umbrella. The CGT itself was divided into radical and more moderate factions, at least since March 1945 (Sáez Corales 1971: 132). Still, the CGT was strong and free enough to cause problems for both private and government employers. Radical leaders from the CGT joined in militant actions and forceful negotiations over wages in PRIDCO plants. There were many strikes across the island in 1946. The CGT leadership that year accused the government of trying to set up puppet unions in PRIDCO plants, even while still endorsing the government's active stance in favor of industrialization (Paláu de López 1980: 137, 146).

Then in 1946, pro-independence CGT leaders were ejected from the union, just as many were from the PPD. This included many of the most radical leaders (Sáez Corales 1971: 132-136). Late the same year, Muñoz Marín introduced legislation to give the governor (then Piñero) the right to declare a state of emergency in case of a strike or the threat of a strike by public employees (Paláu de López 1980: 146). Fiscal 1946-1947 saw a marked decrease in the number of strikes and workers on strike, and an increase in the number of controversies handled instead by the government Labor Relations Board (Report of the Governor 1948: 137). In 1947, the Taft-Hartley law was

extended to Puerto Rico (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 113). This had a major impact. As described before, it was instrumental in weakening the sugar workers strike of January 1949. It was also used about that time to justify police action to break a militant strike in the Ponce Candy Company (Sáez Corales 1971: 134-135). Throughout the island, PPD control over the sugar workers' union was gradually becoming more complete, as described above for Santa Isabel (and see Mintz 1956: 397). To judge by Padilla's (1956: 299) description, the nominally independent unions of cane workers on the government proportional profit farms were totally controlled and manipulated by Party higher-ups. Truly independent union organizers were sometimes hounded and prosecuted by local and federal agencies as part of the general repression of the late 1940s and early 1950s (Sáez Corales 1971: 134-137; and below).

Even the appearances of an independent CGT were evaporating. Ernesto Ramos Antonini was a founder of the CGT and a promoter of much pro-poor legislation in the 1940s. In Jauca, Ramos Antonini is remembered as a great friend of the poor. In 1949, he made a public statement in favor of legislation that would put representatives of the workers on the board of directors of the government public corporations. Munoz responded a few days later, stating that such a measure was not needed because "today the workers of Puerto Rico have right here in la Fortaleza [the governor's residence] an indubitable defender of their justice" (quoted in Anderson

1965: 214). (This was the dispute referred to earlier, which my Jauca informant did not believe occurred). Ramos did not introduce the legislation, and after a few other setbacks, severed his ties with the CGT in 1951 to concentrate exclusively on his PPD duties (Anderson 1965: 213-215).

In 1950, CGT leaders failed in efforts to block a vote of confidence in a PPD official whom they had called anti-labor (Anderson 1965: 214); and the union was weakened still further by another factional split and defection, this time over support for Public Law 600 (Knowles 1966: 220). Those who had left or were expelled from the CGT tried to consolidate and reorganize, with little success (Steward et al. 1956: 78). Any would-be militant who still wished to remain employed must have been given pause by the stance of the government. The government had adopted the role of the great harmonizer, and labor was expected to cooperate in order to stimulate investment in manufacturing (Quintero Rivera 1974b: 206-207).¹ As part of its promotional efforts, the government operated "an extensive program of worker selection, technical training, and guidance to manufacturers to facilitate the establishment of

1. The following statement by one of the government's labor experts is indicative of the official attitude toward labor organizations:

The problem in the pioneer plant, therefore, is to find a way to make workers understand that the workloads assigned to them as inexperienced workers are temporary and tentative and that the goal standards are very much higher. Here, as in the case of piece rate, labor relations policy needs to be pointed towards keeping standards flexible and preventing traditions from setting. (Rottenberg 1953: 90)

high levels of productivity and factory discipline" (Moscoso 1953: 68). The program of worker screening remains prominent in Fomento's industrial promotion literature up to the present. I have never seen any description of their criteria for worker selection, nor could I obtain information on present day guidelines in visits to relevant offices. I think it is fair to assume, however, the "uncooperative" union militants would not find work where Fomento had any say in the hiring.

Another challenge to local unionism was the new effort by mainland unions to organize in Puerto Rico--a natural development considering the increasing penetration of U.S. corporate investment. The CGT affiliated with the CIO in 1949, and in 1952 came under the jurisdiction, within the CIO, of the United Packinghouse Workers (Knowles 1966: 321-322). The merging of the national AFL and CIO led to a formal unification of the CGT and the AFL-affiliated FLT into a new "Federacion del Trabajo", but this was mostly on paper (Lewis 1963: 230). Although the United Packinghouse Workers tried to establish hegemony, it was soon being challenged by other mainland unions. The ILGWU and Amalgamated Clothing Workers were organizing by the early 1950s. In 1958 the Teamsters, having been expelled from the AFL-CIO, launched an aggressive local organizing campaign. To counter their effort, the AFL-CIO promoted its own Seafarers Union. Unfortunately, the Seafarers themselves soon began competing with other established unions (Knowles 1966: 321-322; Ross 1976: 149-150). Much energy was

wasted in all this infighting.

The mid 1950s were a low point for unionism in Puerto Rico. Longshoremen staged a long strike over wages and the bulk loading of sugar in 1954. This militant strike substantially disrupted shipping, and reportedly scared mainland investors. The insular government met the situation through emergency legislation that temporarily made the docks a public utility, which made the strike illegal (Ross 1976: 153-155). One ex-Socialist in the PPD could not in conscience vote for this legislation, and he was summarily expelled from the Party (Anderson 1965: 165). The CGT dissolved itself in 1954 (Anderson 1965: 215).

The divided nature of unionism even in areas of established union strength is shown in regard to the sugar mill workers' contracts negotiated for 1955-56. 26 of the 32 island mills are reported to have signed contracts: 10 with the United Packinghouse Workers, 4 with the FLT, 2 each with two different offshoots of the CGT, 1 with the International Longshoremen, and 7 with unaffiliated locals (USDL 1956: 33).¹ The situation in newer economic areas was even less encouraging. In 1958, only 27 of 455 Fomento promoted plants were unionized. Only 35% of island workers were union members that year (Lewis 1963: 229).

1. In practice, a degree of unity was maintained among the unions. The UPW negotiated a master agreement with the Association of Sugar Producers, which represented the largest mills. This stood as a model for other negotiations (USDL 1956: 33).

The insular labor leadership of the later 1950s was characterized as inexperienced, and heavily weighted with lawyers (as usual). Many of those who really began as laborers were aspiring to leave the union to move into political jobs (Lewis 1963: 229, 234). The possibility of any grass roots initiatives was stifled by the fact that few if any unions had secret ballots in elections, and by the growing dominance of mainland unions. These were fervently anti-communist, and often did not even translate the contracts they negotiated into Spanish (Lewis 1963: 230-231). The government attitude toward unions ran from manipulative paternalism to open hostility, and the media and public opinion in general were exhibiting a strong anti-union sentiment (Lewis 1963: 222, 224-225, 232).

From a pro-labor view, the news was not all bad, however. Along with the dockworkers, there were other relatively militant unions, with the public car drivers standing out among them (Anderson 1965: 216). An anti-union bias of many teachers has been described for Santa Isabel. Nevertheless, teachers were slowly drifting toward unionism. A teachers' association had been formed with government encouragement in the early 1950s (a move in the direction of corporatist populism). Its orientation was pro-PPD, and loyalty to the Party was definitely considered in regard to promotions within the public educational systems. Even so, this group's leaders were challenged by a pro-statehood group of teachers (Lewis 1963: 333, 447). As reported earlier, teachers were becoming more

dissatisfied in the 1950s, as their salaries were kept low by government policy. The extent of disaffection is suggested by what apparently were sporadic efforts to establish a more independent representative group, despite strong government pressure against this (Anderson 1965: 216; Lewis 1963: 232).

The growth of the mainland unions, for all the problems that they caused, also signified a weakening of local government control of unions (Lewis 1963: 233). 1958 to 1960 saw a burst of strikes, including among others telephone workers, dockworkers, public car drivers, sugar workers, and even teachers (Hanson 1960: 216; Lewis 1963: 256). In 1960, four dockworker unions established a unified council (Lewis 1963: 231). Militant electrical workers succeeded in obtaining a "model" union shop agreement, despite strong government resistance (Lewis 1963: 228, 230). These steps portended a stronger union movement in the 1960s.

Party politics. Partisan struggles from 1946 to 1960 can be divided into two periods. In the first, up to about 1954, the PPD and government were engaged in active suppression of Nationalist and other pro-independence agitators. In the second, from 1954 through the end of this chapter's coverage in 1960, the PPD ruled without any serious challengers, although it would face new problems associated with this hegemony. The two periods will be discussed in turn. Before beginning the narrative of events, there will be a brief review of events leading up to the 1946 conflict, and the general social

alignments represented by existing parties.

After squeaking into power in 1940, the PPD hammered together a coalition that ran away with the 1944 elections. The 1940 PPD support was strongest in the old Liberal Party areas, the highlands. Many of those activists were for independence. In the following four years, it added to its base most of the former supporters of the Socialist Party, including sugar areas such as Santa Isabel. After the 1944 victory, PPD dominance was so complete, that the bandwagon effect was pronounced. Petruccio (1947: 108) observed that virtually all of the old Liberals and Unionists had climbed on. This left only 4.5% of the vote for the Liberals, now known as the Reformist party (which also included a faction of the old Republican party), in the 1948 elections. This remnant of the Liberal party broke apart shortly thereafter. The Socialist Party hung on a few more years. Their 10.1% of the vote in 1948 shrank to 3.0% in 1952. They disbanded in 1954. The Republicans, under various party names and alliances, was the only old opposition party to remain viable. Although by no means an electoral threat to the PPD, their share of the vote remained about the same from 1948 to 1952. From then on, as we will see, Republican fortunes increased until they became the major opposition party (Anderson 1965: 34-36, 43).

After 1944, the PPD faced no significant electoral challenge. But its leadership did face political threats from two other directions. One was the pro-independence forces

within the PPD, organized in the Congreso Pro-Independencia. Encouraged by the 1944 landslide, offended by the meddling of reactionary U.S. legislators, and worried by Muñoz Marín's acquiescence to and then support of the federal initiative to promote some intermediate political status, the CPI forces moved to open opposition of Muñoz's leadership, and stepped-up agitation for independence. With so many of the Party's cadres in favor of independence, this represented a genuine danger for Muñoz.

An even more dangerous threat, however, was the rightward moving orientation of U.S. colonial policy. Power balances were tipping in Washington. A rising conservative political tide, combined with the efforts of U.S. and local capital, had made it a real possibility or even likelihood that all of the Popular's first years' reforms would be undone. My interpretation of the events of 1945 and 1946 has been that Muñoz Marín decided to eliminate this latter threat by changing political and, especially, economic policy to suit the interests of conservatives and capitalists, and that this left him free and able to crush the internal threat from the PPD's left wing. The expulsion of the CPI in February 1946 followed closely the new understanding Muñoz Marín reached in Washington in the summer of 1945. From that point on, the pro-independence forces and the radical unionists both were losing ground every day--as the move toward Commonwealth advanced, as government and PPD institutional power became more

centralized, as Puerto Rico grew ever more incorporated into the U.S. economy, and as Muñoz skillfully built his cult of personality.

The 1946 breach is where the previous discussion left off. Before continuing to discuss subsequent events it is necessary to examine the bases of support for each of the political parties, and the role of the issue of political status in shaping that support. In the 1948 elections, for the first time there were three political parties representing three distinct positions on status: the PPD campaigning in favor of the Commonwealth; the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno, formed out of the CPI in 1946 and in favor of independence; and the Partido Estadista Puertorriqueno, the pro-statehood Republicans, who in this election maintained their 1944 electoral alliance with the dwindling Liberals and Socialists. The pattern of three parties standing respectively for commonwealth, independence, and statehood remains to this day. It is often assumed that a vote for one or another party is an endorsement of their favored political status option. That is not true today, and it was not true in 1948.

The great majority of Puerto Rican people in the late 1940s had no direct interests represented in the various status options. This is not to deny that these status options involved crucial economic matters that could greatly affect their lives. But unlike such matters as land reform, minimum wage legislation, tax policy, etc., the economic impact of

status alternatives is not explicit and obvious. To assess the likely impact of one alternative vs. another would require information about many political and economic realms, and the likely resultant trends in all of them. This information was not available to most people. Then, as now, most people had no rational basis for deciding which status option was more likely to better their own material circumstances. Very often, commitment to a status option reflected commitment to a leader who supported that option. Other voters lacked even this indirect commitment to a status option. They would support a party because they supported a particular party plank or program, or out of loyalty for some past benefit received. Many voted for one party because they wanted to vote against its opponents, either because of principle or out of personal animosity. In times and areas where an opposition party appeared to have a real chance of winning, support could be based on the hope of sharing in the spoils of victory. For a large part of the electorate, the status positions were no more than battle flags to rally around in struggles over more immediate concerns. Most people were not primarily concerned with status.¹ But the status-related interests of the

1. Two observations from the time show both the complexity of the status issue, and its limited relevance. The first is based on extensive interviewing throughout the island in 1946.

There is no clear-cut definition of the interests which support one point of view or the other [for independence or for a continued relationship with the U.S.]. Conservatives, reactionaries, and leftists are found on both sides. Perhaps a rough division could be made along these lines:

political elite are more clear, and these are what shaped the different parties' stands.

This perspective is especially important for understanding the overwhelming votes for PPD candidates. The personal loyalty to Muñoz Marín described above for Jauca I was by no means unusual. The intensity of the bond is suggested by the comment of one man at a PPD rally in 1956: "The day that you die, Don Luis, I will hang myself" (quoted in Lewis 1963: 377). Muñoz explained the status issue to his faithful followers in a July 4 radio address in 1948. The "simple truth" he told them, was that he, Muñoz, would prosper under either statehood or independence, but that either of those options would be a "tragedy" for the island, utterly ruining the economy, and causing the mass of the people to "die of hunger" (quoted in Wells 1969: 228). As long as Muñoz held control of the PPD and

those who are conscious of having profited personally from the ties with the United States see the good that has come to the Puerto Ricans; those who are not aware of any profit to themselves or their people see only the evil from which the island suffers. (Petrullo 1947: 76)

The second observation is based on intensive fieldwork in a Puerto Rican town. The report is date 1948.

[M]ost of the inhabitants of the many small towns and or the rural areas are not intensely preoccupied with the question of Puerto Rico's colonial status. These people are too deeply involved in everyday problems of making a living, marrying, reproducing and raising children, and trying to enjoy a bit of recreation now and then to give thought to such complex, usually incomprehensible matters as political status, tariff advantages or disadvantages or the position of Puerto Rico among the nations of the world... Once the city and University are left behind, the status question is likewise left behind, for the rest of the island's population performs its daily activities seemingly unaware of, or indifferent to, the question of Puerto Rico's political status. (Siegel 1948, quoted in Wells 1955: 30)

the trust of the people, most Puerto Ricans would be pro-commonwealth.

Why did the PPD leadership support the commonwealth option? First and foremost, it must be remembered, the Estado Libre Asociado was virtually imposed on Puerto Rico by the federal government. When Muñoz hung back, he found the process of "decolonization" proceeded without him. But as it developed, the arrangement proved to be quite congenial for some Party leaders. To see that, we must look at who were the leaders, and what were their interests in the later 1940s. Two of the politically active groups identified by Quintero Rivera (1980: 82-89) as contributing to the narrow PPD victory in 1940 were the militant union activists and the dedicated independence advocates. Both were expendable after the 1944 victory, and most of those leaders were ejected from the PPD in 1946. The third group identified by Quintero as crucial in 1940 then came to dominate--the new, modernizing "middle class". This group provided the young, U.S. university trained technicos who consolidated control of high government positions between 1947 and 1952, sometimes pushing out older pro-independence intellectuals in the process (Navas Davila 1980: 26; Wells 1969: 201).

Quintero Rivera (1980: 93-97; also see 1974b: 204) describes their interests. The "middle class" long held aspirations to political leadership. Certainly Muñoz Marín did in the 1920s. Those who came to power in the 1940s were

descendants of the old hacendados, biologically in many cases, and ideologically in their philosophy of benevolent paternalism. Unlike the hacendados, they did not envision a united "family of Puerto Rico", without internal cleavages. They recognized divisions within the Party supporters, but these were portrayed as non-contradictory, and of lesser importance than the common interests to be served by alliance. Occasionally there would be internal conflicts, and one role of the leadership was to work out generally acceptable compromises.¹

Quintero Rivera (1980: 90, 94) calls this group a "political class" ("clase politico o de estado"), whose interests were in the control of state machinery, and whose relationship to the means of production was defined by the control of the instrumentalities of the state. Whether or not this is a worthwhile usage of the concept of class will be discussed in the conclusion. But I see no reason to doubt his identification of the interests of those who were associated with the government. And given these interests, their support of the commonwealth option over independence or statehood is easily understood.

Despite occasional talk of a referendum including independence as an option (as in the 1940s bill of Senator Tydings), it is unlikely that the federal government would have

1. This is a very serviceable political concept, similar to Mao's concept of "the people" (Mao 1971: 433-434).

tolerated an actively pro-independence government in the 1940s. It is also unlikely that any Puerto Rican government could have survived against active federal opposition, especially as the latter would have been combined with the active opposition of most capital. Statehood, even if it were attainable (and most people thought it was not), could staunch investment because it would bring federal taxation, and it would have a questionable impact on insular government finances. There would be gains in federal transfer payments, but the loss of the returned rum excise tax would be a blow. The very high local tax rate might have to be adjusted downward if federal taxes were imposed on top of them, or at the very least, there would be even more difficulty in collecting local taxes. (In 1956, about 60% of local taxes were not paid [Barton 1958: 4]). In addition, statehood might assist the island Republicans, who were affiliated with the national Republican Party, more than it would the Populars, who were not so affiliated with the Democrats. The commonwealth option avoided all these dangers for the government elite. As already described, the Estado Libre Asociado permitted a dramatic expansion and consolidation of state activities and control. It allowed a relatively free hand in local affairs, within established limits, and financed much of the government's program with federal funds.¹ It also

1. The dependency of the insular government on existing financial arrangements with the federal government is shown in the following description of the Planning Board's projections for government finances for 1945 to 1951.

The Planning Board is, in its Six Year Plan, limited to

facilitated private investment, which if not benefiting most of the population, certainly was an asset for those associated with Fomento. Commonwealth, then, was the best option for government elite interested in protecting their own position.¹

The Republican party, under its various names, was for statehood. Its public support was limited, especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Those who voted for Republicans out of support for statehood probably were the same type of followers identified for the 1930s. The main support then came from those directly benefiting from the U.S. presence, such as people with relatively good jobs in U.S. firms. That interpretation is consistent with the fact that Republican strength in the late 1940s was in the cities and towns, not in the countryside (Anderson 1965: 43). The pattern would expectably be more complex than in the 1930s since people

financial operations. It assumes continuance of Federal aid for housing, roads, education, health, agricultural subsidies, exemption from the federal income tax, and the return to the insular government of the federal internal revenue taxes on Puerto Rican products which at present are the backbone of insular income. These revenues are estimated at 43.4 per cent of the total general income for the next six years. (Petrullo 1947: 122)

1. As with many of the insular trends described earlier in this chapter, the growth of this new governing group finds strong parallels elsewhere in Latin America. Petras (1970: 37-53), challenging the idea that the middle class represents a progressive force in Latin America (see Johnson 1958), argues instead that they tend to go with whomever has power, in order to protect their own high consumption life-style. In recent years, he continues, this meant cooperating with U.S. investors. Although these middle class groupings often made demagogic appeals for a middle class-worker alliance, when implemented their programs benefit the former, while the latter receives little.

employed by private or governmental mainland bodies would have to consider whether their job would survive in statehood. Although this was a limited basis for support into the early 1950s, it had obvious growth potential as the U.S. economic penetration increased. Other than that, many people voted for Republicans for reasons unrelated to status, as illustrated in the discussion below of San José.

For the Republican leadership, there were more substantial stakes. Even though Republican leadership had been drawn uniformly from the wealthy families of the island, still it was plagued by factional fighting through the 1940s. The fighting reached a peak in 1950-1952, in regard to the party position on the upcoming plebiscite on the constitution (Anderson 1965: 84-89). The faction in control up to 1952 was led by Celestino Iriarte, and was for maintaining party neutrality in regard to voting for or against the proposed ELA. They were challenged and eventually beaten by another faction advocating a party position firmly against the referendum. This group was somewhat suspect because it had broken party discipline in 1940 to ally with Liberals. Its leaders were Miguel García Méndez and Luis Ferré. The interests of these two brothers-in-law were very clearly pro-sugar corporation. García Méndez was the president of the Sugar Producers Association in 1949 (Anderson 1965: 89). Ferré's ironworks had relied on sales of its products to the sugar mills (Hanson 1960: 153). It will be recalled the Puerto Rican sugar production at this time was

running above the quotas, with sugar accumulating in warehouses. Cutbacks were ahead, and Puerto Rico's sugar producers had ample experience with what they could expect in Congress without representation.

Scheele (1956: 446) describes a related division of sympathies among the prominent families of San Juan. While the majority went to the PPD in 1948, for reasons described below, this majority was mostly people whose main income came from non-agricultural sources. Families whose income came from agriculture, and more particularly from sugar, were still strongly for statehood and the Republican party. They were concerned with more than just political status. They "feared what they called the 'socialistic' and 'communistic' tendencies of the Popular Party... They considered this a threat to their interests". This observation is not inconsistent with my argument that Muñoz Marín in 1945 had agreed to back-off from new land takeovers. Despite that, sugar corporations certainly had no reason to like the PPD and its program. And in 1948, despite any back room agreements, the PPD was still actively campaigning on the accomplishments of its land reform, which could not have reassured large landowners.

The Independence Party (PIP) was founded by members of the CPI after their expulsion from the PPD. They and other pro-independence people quickly incorporated as a party, and made it to the ballot in 1948. PIP took 10.2% of the vote in 1948, but nearly doubled that in four years, to 19% in 1952.

After this promising start, it fell off to marginality. As described by Anderson (1965: 103-117), up to 1960 the Independence Party never quite gelled as an effective organization. It was never more than a collection of diverse groupings unified only by a sense of national patriotism. The difficulties it confronted were truly substantial. Many independence supporters, including some of the most able leaders, remained in the PPD, seeing it as the means to eventual independence. PIP activists were openly divided about participation in an electoral system which many of them considered to be illegitimate. The Party's emphasis on internal democracy led to a lack of internal discipline. Actual goals in regard to independence remained undefined, in part because of a strong left-right division within the Party. Finally, after all these problems, PIP had to contend with the active harassment of government officials (below).

In the case of the Independence Party, it is less possible to distinguish the social base of the leadership from that of the mass of supporters. The "mass" in this case was rather small, and the Party structure was open to participation. Leaders had different backgrounds. Founding members included ex-Populars, ex-Nationalists, members of the small Communist Party, and militant Catholics--the Church already turning critical of the PPD's birth control policy and materialistic orientation (Anderson 1965: 103, 111-112, 215-216), (and probably worried about the perceived linkage of Protestantism

and North American influence). One general characteristic of the leadership was that it was well-educated. Many university professors and even more lawyers than usual were represented (Anderson 1965: 115).

The Party's electoral base is not clear. The platform had a pro-"middle class" bias (Anderson 1965: 115). Although they idealized the country folk, the jibaro, as an expression of national culture, they seemed unwilling or unable to deal with the issues of concern to rural people (see Petruccio 1947: 149). They had virtually no support from agricultural workers in 1948, as shown below. What also shows in the coming discussion of local electoral patterns is that the overlapping groups of public car drivers and veterans supported the Independence ticket. An appreciation of the role of veterans may be needed to understand the one-time surge of PIP votes in 1952. Some 43,400 new veterans from Korea must have accounted for a substantial part of that surge. As their G.I. benefits ran out, and they confronted the limited job opportunities of the early 1950s, many of those skilled veterans would join the migration to the U.S. cities. PIP also had the support of those who sympathized with the Nationalists (below) but who were frightened by the legal penalties associated with becoming a Nationalist. (Nationalists were expected to refuse to register for the draft [Manners 1956: 125]).

Although PIP was not a real electoral threat to the PPD, it still represented an active political force outside PPD

control. From its inception, PIP used a tactic which it has continued up to the present, that of arguing the case against Puerto Rico's colonial status in the U.N. and other international forums (Paláu de López 1980: 44). This represented a danger to the PPD and its federal allies, since as explained earlier, the plan was to get international recognition of Puerto Rico's "decolonization" while making only minimal changes in its relationship with the U.S. The U.N. would be called on to accept that Puerto Rico had become a truly self-governing territory. So PIP was a problem for the Populares.

The last organization to be considered is not an electoral party, but a small band dedicated to the overthrow of U.S. colonial rule, the Nationalists. Their leader Albizu Campos was let out of the federal penitentiary in 1943, but he remained in New York until 1947 (Anderson 1965: 45). When he returned to Puerto Rico that year, his organized followers were few. An extensive list of Nationalists and their sympathizers compiled for the use of the police, came to only 4,257 around 1950. The active core was probably between five hundred and one thousand. This core, however, was fiercely dedicated and trained for military action, and they saw the movement to the Commonwealth, correctly, as a major step toward assimilation (Anderson 1965: 46).

Nationalists were key in developments after 1948, just as they had been in the 1930s. Nationalist participation was

prominent in a student strike that closed the University of Puerto Rico in 1948 (Ramos de Saⁿtiago 1970: 106). They soon moved to more direct and violent action. In 1950, at the end of October, they staged an uprising in several places around the island. This included an attempt to storm the governor's mansion, and the brief seizure of the town of Jayuya. All told, 21 Nationalists, 9 policemen, and 1 National Guardsman died in three days of fighting. Two days later, Nationalists attempted to assassinate President Truman in Washington. In March 1954, in the last of their violence, four Nationalists opened fire from a gallery in the U.S. Congress, wounding several Representatives.

The reasoning behind the uprising and other violence has never been clear. It has been called "insane", and there have always been questions about the sanity of Albizu Campos in his later years. Even sympathetic observers agree that it had absolutely no chance of actually toppling the government and seizing power (Maldonado Denis 1972: 196). Albizu's intent may have been to stop a drift toward total assimilation in statehood (Wagenheim 1975: 81). But statehood was not really on the agenda at the time, as far as I can tell.

The impact of the violence was dramatically different from the impact of Nationalist-related violence in the mid 1930s. In the 1930s, the Nationalists were a lead point in a growing wave of protest against the status quo. Their actions scrambled existing balances of forces, and helped to intensify

political conflict leading ultimately to major reform. In the 1950s, those once-building forces of change had been co-opted, deflected, or otherwise neutralized by political countermoves and changing historical circumstances. This time, Nationalist actions provided a pretext for a mopping-up operation against pro-independence forces, including many people in PIP.

The crackdown against Nationalists and other radicals began before the uprising. Law 53, known as the "law of the muzzle" was put into effect in 1948. This was basically a translation of the Federal Smith Act of 1940, and it made it a crime to in any way promote change in the government by violent means. The language of the act was extremely broad in its coverage (Maldonado Denis 1972: 197; Wells 1963: 343). Its application was equally broad, especially after the Nationalist revolt, when Muñoz Marín seized on PIP's rather neutral statement of disassociation from the Nationalists as proof that PIP too was in favor of violent action. In the wave of arrests that followed the revolt, many PIP activists were swept-up, and just at the time of the two day voter registration period for the upcoming referendum on Law 600 (Anderson 1965: 105-109).

The next few years, up to 1954, were the height of the repression. People were prosecuted for pro-Nationalist statements, or for attending a ceremony commemorating those who died in the 1869 Lares revolt. There were a total of 84 prosecutions under the Law before its repeal in 1957. These prosecutions were accompanied by documented violations of

constitutional rights, government toleration of reported police excesses, and systematic discrimination against pro-independence individuals in government hirings and promotions (Lewis 1963: 341-344; see also Enamorado Cuesta 1957; Dabón et al. 1968; Seda Bonilla 1963). Several of the remaining pro-independence leaders within the PPD left it or were expelled at this time. Most notable among them was then Attorney General Vicente Géigel Polanco, the author of much of the PPD's early social legislation, who was dismissed from the party without any public explanation in 1951 (Anderson 1965: 162-163). At the University of Puerto Rico, Chancellor Benitez abolished the student council and banned all political activities. (Activities supporting current government policies were generally not considered to be political)(Lewis 1963: 455; Steward et al. 1956: 454-455). By the later 1950s, the Nationalists and their sympathizers were dispersed, imprisoned, or had withdrawn from Nationalist politics.

There were several votes during this time. In the 1948 campaign, Muñoz made support of the proposed constitution and the commonwealth option a question of confidence in him and his policies (Wells 1969: 229). Of course, he won. The elections of 1948 and 1952 reflect the hegemony of the PPD. They took about two-thirds of the vote (see Table 5.17). If not for provisions in the new constitution guaranteeing representation of minority parties in the legislature, they would have been effectively eliminated from government. In the two votes

related to political status, the results were similar. The first, in June 1951, was to approve Law 600 authorizing a Constitutional Convention. 65.1% of the electorate voted, and 76.5% of them voted yes. The second vote, in March 1952, was to approve the Constitution. 59% of the electorate voted, and 81% approved (Ramos de Santiago 1970: 123, 126). Various opponents of the commonwealth option had urged a boycott of the vote, and as noted the PIP voter registration efforts were disrupted in the aftermath of the Nationalist revolt. These and other factors led some to challenge the validity of the vote (see Geigel Polanco 1981; Ramos de Santiago 1971: 123-126). It is true that voter participation was lower than in most regular elections (which ran between 72% and 82% of the electorate). But the magnitude of the approval leaves no question that the majority of Puerto Ricans were in favor of Muñoz's Constitution. Certainly in Jauca I people were ready to give their vote to Muñoz, whatever destiny he chose for Puerto Rico, as will be seen in the following discussion of elections in Jauca I and other local communities.

For the people of Jauca I, the issue of political status had always been of secondary concern, behind immediate political and economic issues. It is not clear to what degree jauqueños had responded in the 1930s to Nationalist efforts to link their problems to the U.S. domination. Many recall Albizu Campos respectfully as a highly intelligent and dedicated patriot. Mintz (1956: 394) notes a diffuse, pro-independence

sentiment in Jauca I. But there were few if any avowed Nationalists in Jauca I at any time, and the local CGT apparently lacked any strong support for the pro-independence radical faction of that organization. In the town of Santa Isabel there were independentistas. The head of the fire department in the mid 1940s was one of their leaders, as was at least one member of the town's last rich family, a family that was involved in cane growing, commerce, and local Liberal Party politics.

Jauqueños recall the split of 1946. It had its partisans in Santa Isabel, but it was not a major fight. Muñoz Marín, all agree, was the leader who people in the area would follow. PIP had some supporters, but the independence faction had no roots into the rural countryside. Current perceptions of the 1946 division of insular politicians varies by current political sympathies. Staunch Populists today say that there had been no change in Muñoz's positions, that the split was caused by the independence supporters' attempt to seize control. Independentistas today say that Muñoz became afraid of the rising support for independence, and set out to crush the movement.

The 1948 election in Santa Isabel belonged to the PPD. Rural workers were solidly behind Muñoz, but so were many of the prominent families, such as remained, in the town. The owner of a local pharmacy became an elected Senator of the PPD. The Coalition was supported by other old families and many

teachers, and by individuals who remained loyal to Republicans or Socialist parties for personal reasons. PIP was supported by veterans, who were often resentful of the treatment they received in the army; by public car drivers, who were angry with the PPD over a matter of licensing and were attracted to PIP because of a plank in its platform favoring them; and by some teachers and semi-skilled workers (Mintz 1956: 393, 396; 1965: 330). Mintz (1965: 330) pointedly comments on the lack of support for PIP among the rural workers, and on the contempt of some local PIP supporters for the agricultural workers. They referred to the latter as "animals", and made no effort to explain their rationale for independence--which according to Mintz was very weakly developed anyway--in free discussions with rural people.

The work of Mintz's colleagues illustrates the way local political contests varied by local social arrangements. In San José, the Coalition was still relatively strong, in part because the local election of 1948 was still being fought between old rivals over old issues. Republicans were supported still because they were against the old "Spanish" landowners, and were opposed still because some of their leaders had been "dark". Because the Republicans were more formidable than in other areas, the election remained in good part a struggle to control patronage. PIP was not a significant contender. Many of the middle class expressed support for independence sometime in the future. But fearing the possibility of a sudden cut-off

of aid from the U.S., they voted Popular (Wolf 1956: 246-248, 261). (A decade later, they did not even aspire to independence in the future [Brameld 1966: 355]).

In Nocorá, on the other hand, the Republicans were not a significant opposition to the overwhelming dominance of the PPD. Some more educated people, and the wounded doves, went to PIP. Here, government officials were overt about using their control of local resources to punish those not loyal to the PPD (Padilla 1956: 298).

In Tabara, the Republicans again were insignificant, but this was one of the strongest areas of pro-independence sentiment. Some PIP supporters even hoped to win in 1948. Yet the pattern of PIP support was not very different from that in Santa Isabel or Nocorá: veterans, drivers, those with a grudge against the PPD, some of the more educated in teaching or government posts, and some of the town merchants and poor. Very few agregados or small farmers were outside of the Popular ranks by 1948. Like Nocorá, PPD leaders made it plain that they would punish those who did not vote Popular. (I found no indication of such open threats in Santa Isabel or San José). The PIP supporters were stunned when they lost badly. Some considered joining the Nationalists, who were clearly preparing for armed action at the time. They changed their minds after confronting the specter of being jailed for refusing to register for the draft, as one Nationalist representative explained they would have to do (Manners 1956: 124-125).

To return to Jauca I, the years just after 1948 represented something of a peak for the PPD.¹ Muñoz Marín's personal popularity was enormous. The reserved skepticism noted by Mintz (1951: xiii 14)--which I suspect may have characterized only the most politically aware minority of local residents--seems to have virtually disappeared. When Muñoz Marín spoke in the town, the plaza filled to overflowing. Informants recall him being thought of "like a god". People would follow wherever he led.

Political activity between elections was very limited, not non-stop as it is now. PIP was the only active opposition. They agitated against the draft during the Korean war, and showed film of war casualties in the town plaza. People were frightened by these images, but they were more frightened by the prospect of jail for not registering. Opposition to the draft was partially offset by the minor boom brought about by various military-related sources of income coming into Santa Isabel. It was also dampened by the active political repression.

Although informants agree that there were no incidents related to the Nationalist uprising in the area, the crackdown was apparent. Active independentistas "had trouble" with local police. In 1951, the municipal assembly passed a resolution on the danger of the international communist conspiracy allegedly

1. It was not the only peak for the PPD. Another surge in popularity was associated with the low cost housing program that came to Jauca in the early 1960s.

threatening the United States, Puerto Rico, and, yes, Santa Isabel; and creating a civil defense council to protect the town against it (Asamblea Municipal, Libro 12). One dedicated muñozcista told me approvingly that anyone seen wearing the Nationalist "uniform" (black shirt and white pants) would be whisked off to jail.¹ Another informant told me that if there were any Nationalists in Santa Isabel, they kept it quiet, and confined their actions to more anonymous urban centers.

PIP and other opponents failed to make a major dent in the votes on the Constitution. Informants do not recall the vote as a greatly contended issue. Muñoz Marín explained that the Constitution would be good for Puerto Rico as an agreement that would guarantee it its rights (which was something sugar workers could relate to). The vote was portrayed as a vote of confidence in Muñoz Marín. Informants today repeat the PPD's position then: statehood was not attainable, and independence was asking for starvation. In all of this, Jauca I and Santa Isabel fell squarely within general insular patterns.

Returning to the insular level, the situation entering the mid 1950s was a new one, with the Popular Party having to face the problems of absolute success. Its effective moves against the pro-independence and radical labor forces was just one dimension of a broader change. Other dimensions were involved in defining the PPD's seemingly impregnable position. One is

1. I do not believe that the majority of jauqueños shared this disregard for civil rights. They certainly do not now.

the reduction of any possibility of a new protest bubbling up from the grass roots. Muñoz Marín was able to act with impunity against the left because he had secured for a time effective control of the electorate. He held this control: 1) by his tight authority over the major party and government organizations and over part of the propaganda system; 2) by loyalty and thanks for the actual benefits the PPD had delivered, which were substantial by any reckoning, and were truly impressive if you added in the federal benefits for which the PPD took credit; 1 and 3) by dint of Muñoz Marín's great personal charisma.²

1. The PPD's practice of taking credit for federal programs was turning into a real issue by 1960. Lewis observed: ...a feeling on the part of the federal staff in San Juan that the official Puerto Rican insistence on the indispensability of an association with the United States has gone hand in hand with an official policy of withholding from the insular electorate these facts of United States financial participation in the insular process. (1963: 183) He goes on to note the "angry protest" in 1960 of one federal administrator for the failure to give credit to Washington for some \$300 million in housing and urban development aid. As described above, much of the direct assistance to the poor came through federal aid, so being able to take credit for these funds was an enormously significant political asset.

2. Muñoz Marín's charisma is undeniable, but it cannot explain his political success. It would not, did not, hold up his political stature when he was out of favor with both Washington and the Liberal Party leaders in the late 1930s. It was Muñoz's revived support from federal officials, along with other political conditions, that enabled him to ride the historical trends to his pinnacle of power. With that institutional power, his charisma grew and became a powerful force. The old people, whose eyes sometimes mist over when they talk about Don Luis, repeatedly note all that he did for them. Apart from the power centers, unable to deliver the goods (or at least some of them)--Muñoz's charisma would not

But even with all this apparent security in PPD support, anyone with memory of the experiences of the Socialist Party and the FLT, would recall that one group among the poor, the rural proletariat of sugar workers as constituted in the 1930s and early 1940s, provided a strong social base for rapid formation of radical organizations challenging established leaders. More than any other division of the poor, these workers posed a potential threat.

In this context, the changes described above for Jauca I's sugar workers assume political significance on the insular level. These changes, which seem quite typical for sugar workers throughout the island, represent a process which Quintero Rivera (1974b: 205) has labeled the "unmaking of the plantation proletariat". Their loss of numbers, the decay of internal bonds, the weakened and changing state of the sugar industry, and the loss of local control over any political organizations, all made the rural proletariat more passive, and increasingly unlikely to generate a challenge from below.

With the left flank secure, and its own ranks firmly in line, the PPD could deal with the right. The leadership of the

have gone far.

But the personal loyalty to Muñoz, once forged, was a tremendous bond. Many older people will say that they will remain a Popular until they die, out of respect for Muñoz Marín. The feeling in the 1950s can be glimpsed in an account by Wells (1969: 304): "During the 1956 campaign, for example, Muñoz was called papa, padre, and even hombre Dios so often by the country people as he toured the island that he finally spoke out against the practice". Even today in Jauca, older people sometimes say "We are all children of Muñoz".

PPD, especially the elected rather than appointed leaders, had always included wealthy people. In the 1950s, the core of the municipal government administrations throughout the island was socially similar to that found under the old Liberal Party (from whence many of those politicians came). They were large farmers, merchants, and professionals. These local leaders spilled over into the insular legislature, joined there by labor leaders and, of course, lawyers (Lewis 1963: 353).

The wealth that opposed the PPD centered around the sugar corporations, and others with major interests in the U.S. connection, especially the importers and others linked to shipping. Although these interests were soundly defeated in the 1944 election, they still had muscle to apply to the government in other ways, as described earlier. This local right wing played a major supporting role in the U.S. Congressional interventions that led to the 1945-1946 change of economic policy. With this new economic orientation, there emerged a growing basis for bringing much of the old Republican support into the PPD.

As already described, the technicos steering PPD and government economic policy saw themselves as harmonizers of the different interests represented within the Party. The public emphasis on this harmonizer role grew more pronounced after 1946. Prior to then, U.S. imperialism and the sugar corporations had been blamed as the cause of Puerto Rico's problems. These attacks ceased. Now, the inadequate level of production

was identified as the prime social malady (Anderson 1965: 66-67; Quintero Rivera 1980: 10)).

Fortunately, Scheele's direct observation of the prominent families of San Juan dates to around this time. He (1956: 446) records that many of the wealthy were changing to support the PPD, especially those whose incomes were derived from manufacturing or commerce rather than agriculture. They supported Muñoz Marín, and the PPD because "the party had somewhat moderated its policy toward capital and business... And it assured businessmen that no new laws concerning wages and working conditions were contemplated". These businessmen were in favor of the newly announced program of attracting foreign investment, which they believed would help local commercial firms. They went along with the commonwealth option out of fear of independence and a conviction that statehood, which might be more desirable, was not a possibility. As noted earlier, those wealthy families that stayed with the Republicans were mostly those with interests in the sugar industry, and so were strongly committed to statehood. It was in this context of growing harmony with the right that the discordant notes of the left would be suppressed. As noted earlier in this chapter, by the time the U.S. Congress had to ratify the Puerto Rican Constitution, Muñoz Marín had become the friend of conservative Republicans.

While never abandoning populist rhetoric, Muñoz Marín and the PPD moved substantially to the right. The tactic worked.

The mid 1950s was a period of unparalleled consensus in party politics, with the exception of the continuing suppression of the dwindling radical forces. Within the PPD, Muñoz Marín wielded nearly absolute power. His word was law (Lewis 1963: 323; Wells 1956: 483-486; 1969: 303). External party opposition was narrowly circumscribed. Both Republicans and independentistas confined their opposition to the status issue, supporting the PPD on most other legislation. In the 1955 legislative session, 85% of the bills passed unanimously (Anderson 1965: 209; Wells 1956: 31). During this period of virtually complete one-man rule, within the parameters set by capital and the federal government, Muñoz Marín moved "to perfect" arrangements. He launched several initiatives at this time. Many, including the cultural development program dubbed Operation Serenity (Anderson 1965: 148) had only limited impact. Others were more substantial.

One new measure was a law enabling political parties to hold primaries. This idea was raised by Muñoz Marín in 1953, with the intent of weakening the local factions that so easily arise in authoritarian structures based on patronage, by allowing the people to decide which prospective candidate was most loyal to the party programs and ideals. The law, passed in 1956, allowed but did not require primaries. The decision to call a primary, who would be eligible to participate as candidates, and how the vote would be conducted, all were left in the hands of the central committee of the party. For

instance, the central committee could, if it chose, disqualify any candidate, with no option for appeal. Rather than opening a new door to democracy, this act wrote into insular law the virtually unrestricted power of party leadership (Anderson 1965: 25-27). Moreover, nothing in this law prevented Muñoz Marín from simply intervening directly in local PPD disputes (Anderson 1965: 179-180).

Another new measure was to provide government subsidies to all legitimate parties in election campaigns. Muñoz raised this idea in 1955, ostensibly with the intent of eliminating the undue influence of the rich and the corporations by putting restrictions on large contributions. As passed in 1957, the law made funds available to each of the three established parties. In the debate preceding passage, PIP delegates objected to the proposed legislation, arguing that it would tend to "mumify" the existing party structure: even if a new party could muster the 80,000 signatures required to qualify for the ballot, they would still not, under the terms of this law, be qualified to receive campaign subsidies. One of the bill's PPD sponsors replied that it was an intent of the act to screen out frivolous parties (Anderson 1965: 27-29).¹ Along

1. Wells (1969: 304-312) cites the electoral subsidies law as evidence of Muñoz Marín's interest in raising levels of democratic participation. As explained in the text, the law can be interpreted in other ways. Wells' position that Muñoz was trying to increase democratic participation is contrary to the position I have maintained: that Muñoz's efforts were directed against the possibility of disruptive political initiatives from the masses. So it is interesting to examine the other evidence that Wells produces to support his case.

with lessening the possibility of successful campaigns by new parties, this law had the added effect of creating new internal problems for PIP (below).

The lack of opposition would not last. As already described, in the later 1950s the PPD was losing control of unions to mainland organizations. The control of the PPD rank and file remained firm well into the 1960s, but in 1957 an open breach occurred between Muñoz and Benitez, the UPR Chancellor,

Wells describes two other allegedly pro-democratic initiatives by Muñoz. One was a community organization project discussed in 1949. The idea was to organize the poor of rural and urban communities to solve their own community's problems. This is often an attractive idea for politicians, because it suggests that pressing social and economic problems can be resolved with little expense for the state. The idea would come up again in the 1960s. But in the 1950s, it faded quickly. According to Wells, Muñoz failed to follow through with support for the program. He did not resist the objections of local party officials, who found in the first experimental implementations, that the mobilization of the community quickly led to problems in local political control. In 1952, Muñoz went along with a much more bureaucratically centralized assistance program.

The other, an inquiry on civil rights, was initiated by Muñoz Marín in the aftermath of the repression of the Nationalists. In 1955, the General Assembly of the United Nations made provisions for investigating human rights within member nations. It will be recalled that PIP had already hit on the tactic of arguing its case before the UN, so the General Assembly's action might have represented a golden opportunity for pro-independence forces. But they were beaten to the punch by Muñoz, who immediately contacted the UN with a proposal to establish such an investigative body. Working with the ACLU, Muñoz created a distinguished and independent panel. But after that, the group was left without funding for two years. When it finally was modestly funded in 1958, it went to work. The panel's findings and recommendations in 1959 were mixed, from the PPD's point of view. But more generally, they were irrelevant. "Governor Muñoz appeared not to take any of the recommendations very seriously" (Wells 1969: 309).

In sum, Wells' argument of Muñoz Marín's commitment to raising democratic participation is extremely weak. The best statement I have heard on the matter came from one of my informants: "Muñoz taught us how to use the vote--a little".

who had his own power and patronage base within the University. The reasons behind this quarrel are not clear, but it was to fester for years (Anderson 1965: 165-166). The latter half of this decade also saw the slow development of organized pressure groups, including ones for coffee growers, public employees, manufacturers, and the medical profession (Anderson 1965: 210-211; Lewis 1963: 373 n. 36; Wells 1959: 87). A greater challenge came from the Republicans, who were learning how to compete with the Populars on their own terms (below). But the Republicans would still not have done so well if the PPD had not begun to falter.

The Populars were paying a price for their success. They were losing vitality, their public image was becoming tarnished. Too many Popular leaders seemed concerned primarily with themselves. Lewis (1963: 384-387) notes some fifty local power struggles, mostly over patronage, in the 1950s and early 1960s. Each struggle would create losers, each of whom was a potential defector to the opposition. The San Juan PPD, the biggest local organization, had taken on all the attributes of an old-style urban machine. It dispensed small benefits to the poor as personal favors (Lewis 1963: 390). Its ranks were swelled with "liason officers", whose major reason for existence seemed to be as a reward for Party loyalists, who would in turn kick back 3% of their pay to the machine (Anderson 1965: 175). Kickbacks from all government employees provided up to 90% of the Party's income in the late 1950s,

despite civil service reform and the electoral subsidies law (Lewis 1963: 333; Wells 1959: 475).

Despite efforts to portray themselves as administrators rather than politicians, there was a growing sense that the Popular government was politicized and corrupt (Lewis 1963: 345, 388), and a corresponding sense that Operation Bootstrap might be played-out, that the government suffered from a "failure of purpose" (Reimer 1960: 25). The PPD, in its total centralization of power, had cut itself off from any real input from the grass roots. Local politicians had become organizers and cheerleaders, not real leaders or representatives of their constituencies (Anderson 1965: 180). The Party had even left-off propagandizing the masses, and PPD newspapers no longer were distributed in the barrios (Lewis 1963: 389). The Republicans mounted a campaign to brand Muñoz Marín a "dictator", and some even thought he might be beatable in 1960 (Lewis 1963: 388, 392). (They were very wrong). The PPD hierarchy recognized these problems and the need to rejuvenate the Party. They sponsored extensive discussions on the subject in 1959. But their efforts to reactivate grass roots participation would fail, largely because the Party leaders were not willing to give up any real power (Anderson 1965: 151-152, 185-186, 198). With the exception of some of the unions, the PPD had not succeeded in doing what some Latin American corporatist regimes had done. It had not created institutions that reached to the grass roots, allowed and

accepted local initiatives, and then channeled them in acceptable ways. Despite all its powers of control, the PPD was slowly losing its hold on the electorate in the later 1950s.

Meanwhile, the Republicans had turned a corner. The 13% of the vote they received in 1952, after two years of intense factionalism, was a low point. They then began to reorganize under the leadership of García Méndez and Ferré. They became the Partido Estadista Republicano (PER). In 1955, they still seem to have lacked any clear program, other than a commitment to statehood (Wells 1956: 36-37). But by the next year, García Méndez and Ferré were firmly in control of a reorganized and centralized party structure, and they were thus able to give the venerable Republican Party a new look and orientation (Anderson 1965: 182-183, 187). The leadership was still firmly tied to the wealthy of the island (Lewis 1963: 393). But they wanted to win, to reclaim the perquisites of power (Reimer 1960: 24). To win, they had learned, required new tactics. So, like the PPD, they pledged to avoid entangling electoral pacts, which had so obviously compromised parties in the past (Anderson 1965: 89-90). And Luis Ferré, a well-liked public figure, embarked on a new drive for mass recruitment. He campaigned on a platform of promises of economic and social legislation (Anderson 1965: 90-94).

The time was right for such a change. Republicans had always drawn support from those whose livelihood depended on

the U.S. presence, and the number of such people was growing daily. This advantage was magnified by the Popular campaign to discredit the independence option by portraying disastrous consequences if it should come. The Republicans played on this by suggesting that Muñoz was, in secret, a pro-independence radical, just biding his time (Lewis 1963: 394). The growing "middle class" of Puerto Rico in the 1950s has been described as being conservative, jealous of their new status, and fearful of being reabsorbed into the mass of the poor. They were ready to turn to the party of business for protection against the poor, organized labor, and even the "socialistic" orientation of the PPD, regardless of questions of political status (Anderson 1965: 42; Lewis 1963: 186, 249). The wounded doves who felt slighted by the PPD now constituted significant numbers. They wanted to cast a vote against the PPD, and with PIP obviously failing, the PER was the way to go. Anderson (1965: 42) cites disaffected local political caciques as the explanation of the growing PER vote in scattered municipios. But the major strength of the Republicans remained in the growing urban zones (Anderson 1965: 36, 42), where the PPD's rural reforms created the least benefits. It seems possible that those new "middle class" members who had moved to the cities from rural areas were more conservative than those who remained behind, since by intent or not, the move to the city could weaken personal ties to the rural poor. At any rate, the new Republican approach showed results. Their share of the

vote went from 13% in 1952, to 25% in 1956, to 32% in 1960 (Anderson 1965: 43).

PIP, on the other hand, was weak and getting weaker. It had no patronage to control, few heavily capitalized backers, and was going through the repression of the period. It still maintained its rationalistic, legalistic orientation, and directed its efforts at court decisions and international forums. Efforts to organize grass roots support remained limited. In belittling the accomplishments of Operation Bootstrap, PIP frightened those who had benefitted from the promotion efforts. These fears were fanned by the news media, which whipped up a phobia about independence, and which jumped on those who questioned the benefits of association with the U.S. PIP added planks to appeal to the "middle class", and began to call itself the "defender of the middle class". At the same time, it attempted to deemphasize economic issues in general, to focus attention on political status. But if anything, the "middle class" seemed to be leaning toward statehood. On top of these problems, PIP was damaged by factional fighting, the lack of funds, and finally by the apparent hypocrisy of agreeing in 1959 to accept government electoral subsidies after having fiercely opposed the subsidy law on principle (Anderson 1965: 114-117, 152-153, 159, 165-166; Lewis 1963: 391, 398-406). PIP vote dropped from 19% in 1952, to 12% in 1956, to 3% in 1960 (Anderson 1965: 43). Anderson, writing in the early 1960s, seemed to believe the

Independence Party to be on the verge of extinction. (It survived).

Another blow to the Independence Party came in the form of the Christian Action Party (PAC). Militant Catholics had been prominent within PIP since at least 1952. For the 1956 election, they pushed their agenda within PIP, emphasizing not only Christian values, but the sanctity of private property, and the need for income and property tax relief (Anderson 1965: 111). In 1960, with PIP visibly failing, the militant Catholics formed a separate party (Anderson 1965: 42). Two U.S. bishops in Puerto Rico sponsored the creation of Partido Acción Christiana, specifically to oppose the PPD's policy of disseminating birth control material, and the PPD's opposition to religious education in the public schools. The bishops sent pastoral letters to be read in local churches. The letters forbade Catholics to vote for the PPD, and informed them that it would be a mortal sin to do so (Wells 1969: 272-273). PAC surmounted the stringent party registration requirements via the extensive use of fraudulent signatures (Anderson 1965: 23). The presence of PAC changed the debate in 1960 from political status to church-state relations. PAC did not do well, taking only 7% of the vote. Still, this was more than twice what PIP got, but the quirks of the electoral system resulted in PIP securing minority party representation in the legislature, while PAC did not (Anderson 1965: 112-113).

Jauca I fit right into the later 1950s patterns, and

illustrates the local processes contributing to insular trends. The PPD remained firmly in charge through the 1950s. Brameld (1966: 77) found it still enjoyed the mandate of the poor around 1957. But electoral results (Table 5.17) show what informants recall, that from 1956 onward the PPD was losing ground to the PER, while PIP faded dramatically--in other words, the island pattern. They recall that some of the local poor, whose economic conditions were still perilous, had lost faith in the PPD. They saw the PPD as looking out for itself--for the poor, all there was was talk. Government was "estancado". (Many of these individuals would later be brought back into the Popular fold by 1960s housing programs). Some of the discontented went to PER. Others, dedicated Catholics, went to PAC. The nasty 1960 campaign made them even more opposed to the PPD, so when PAC finally disappeared, many would go over to the Republicans. But the great majority of jauqueños were still Popular, and they saw PAC as an unwarranted intrusion of church into state.

Then there were the local wounded doves. Personal grievances were accumulating. One major source of problems was the union's use of its funds, which of course reflected on the mayor. Some of the defectors went to PER, some to PIP. There were also "middle class" voters in Santa Isabel. They went to all of the parties, but Brameld (1966: 69, 78) observed a tendency to turn away from the "socialist" and high tax approach of the PPD. The PPD was seen as a party more for the

Table 5.17

Vote in Insular Elections, Puerto Rico and Santa Isabel, 1940-1960

(Simplified, by percentages)

	Partido Popular Democrático		Republican-Socialist Coalition/ PER*		Tripartite Unification/ Liberal**		P.R. Independence Party		Christian Action Party	
	P.R.	S.I.	P.R.	S.I.	P.R.	S.I.	P.R.	S.I.	P.R.	S.I.
1940	38.0	34.1	39.0	25.7	23.0	40.0	---	---	---	---
1944	64.7	74.7	28.7	12.6	6.5	12.7	---	---	---	---
1948	61.2	71.7	24.1	13.3	4.5	6.0	10.2	9.0	---	---
1952	65.0	77.5	16.0	10.3	---	---	19.0	11.2	---	---
1956	63.0	69.5	25.0	22.2	---	---	12.0	8.3	---	---
1960	58.0	64.0	32.0	31.5	---	---	3.0	2.5	7.0	2.0

* In 1956 and 1960, PER only.

** In 1940, Tripartite Unification; in 1944, Liberal; in 1948, Reform

Explanation: 1940, 1944 percentages calculated on votes for Resident Commissioner, 1948-1960 percentages on votes for Governor (Santa Isabel percentages).

Source: Anderson 1965: 39, 43; Estadísticas de Las Elecciones, Junta Insular de Elecciones, various years.

poor than the "middle class". Also, younger people were reaching voting age. They did not remember as well the horrible old days, and they had gone through an adolescence saturated with North American influence. Finally, there was a general sense of corruption, as already noted in regard to the union. Around this time, a substantial fund for the renovation of the town plaza disappeared "between the commas". So while the PPD was still firmly in charge, its base was eroding, just as throughout Puerto Rico.

The last topic in this chapter is, again, the issue of the island's political status, as seen by the people of Puerto Rico, and as seen from Washington. The status issue has already been discussed in relation to support for different parties in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As described there, status was only one factor in the decision to vote for a given party. Nevertheless, the issue of status was growing in significance in the late 1950s. It was being debated constantly, and the new media carrying the debates were now reaching more into local communities. And the public's opinions seem to have been changing. Although a vote for a party was not necessarily a vote for its status preference, the decline in PIP and rise in PER strength, and the magnitude of these voter changes, certainly indicate a trend in preferences.

The most general condition explaining these changes is the variety of specific factors associated with the growing absorption of Puerto Rico into the U.S. economy. More people

were actively involved in U.S. enterprises, and many more would face immediate and substantial loss of benefits if political ties to the U.S. were terminated abruptly and with prejudice. Another factor is that in the late 1950s it began to seem more possible that statehood might actually be attainable. Tugwell (1953: 145) raised the possibility forcefully in a public address. Then came the admission of Hawaii as a state, which had been ruled out by Congress in the 1930s (Lewis 1963: 425). Whether statehood really was possible is unknown and perhaps unknowable, but it will soon be seen that the federal government at the time was pleased with things just as they were.

While conditions were tending to favor the statehood option and weaken support for independence, the PPD attempted to close off debate. Before the votes regarding the constitution, there was ample room to interpret the ELA as a transitional status, to either independence or statehood. A few years later, by 1956, the official PPD position was that the ELA was permanent, and that the status issue had been resolved once and for all. The 1956 election victory was cited as confirmation of this judgement by the people. The debate continued, nonetheless, and shortly the PPD and Muñoz Marín were also publically considering changes in status arrangements. In 1959, Muñoz stated that once Puerto Rico had reached the economic standards of the poorest U.S. state, there could be a plebiscite to choose between a continued Commonwealth or statehood. The

independence option was not to be included.

Party leaders were also seeking ways "to perfect" the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S., a possibility that had been raised as early as 1954. Specific proposals were advanced in 1959 in the Fernós-Murray bill introduced in the U.S. Congress. (Antonio Fernós Isern was the Resident Commissioner at the time). The Fernós-Murray bill was to replace the Federal Relations Act, i.e. the old Jones Act provisions which continued to regulate federal-insular relations after the creation of the ELA. These provisions had been ruled out of bounds as unchangeable when the U.S. Congress authorized Puerto Rico to draft a constitution. The proposals in the Fernós-Murray bill were wide ranging and substantial, and included giving the island considerable autonomy in matters such as immigration, currency controls, tariffs, and other basic attributes of sovereignty. All these efforts met with a resounding lack of support in Congress. The bill was never reported out of committee.

For the PPD's position, the bill was worse than just unsuccessful. All the debate surrounding it weakened the case for Puerto Rico's alleged decolonization. There was little to support and much to undercut the official PPD position that the ELA and federal relations were all together a mutual compact, which as they interpreted it, meant that the U.S. Congress could not unilaterally change federal-insular relations. It seemed that neither the U.S. Congress nor the courts agreed

with that interpretation, although no measures were taken that actually contradicted it. At the same time, the episode made it painfully clear that the basic structure of insular-federal relations, largely unchanged since the Jones Act was passed in 1917, were not open for serious negotiation (Anderson 1965: 1965: 66-67; Lewis 1963: 397, 416-418; Ramos de Santiago 1970: 150-161; Wells 1969: 250-252).

It is not difficult to understand the attitude in Washington. The Fernós-Murray bill would substantially limit federal sovereignty over Puerto Rico. Moreover, despite dissatisfaction and debate concerning status within Puerto Rico, the existing arrangements seemed fine to federal policy makers. Unlike 1940, there was no need or powerful group pressing for modifications. In 1953, President Eisenhower announced to the UN that Puerto Rico had achieved self-governance, and the UN accepted this contention (Wells 1969: 248). Allegedly decolonized, and supposedly charging forward to prosperity, Puerto Rico had changed from an embarrassing liability to a tremendous asset in the U.S.'s international relations, especially concerning Latin America.

The federal government was promoting the line that underdeveloped nations should adopt North American style political patterns and a free market economy. When Latin spokesmen challenged this view as unrealistic, the response was that Puerto Rico was demonstrating that it worked (Aguilar 1968: 92; Ross 1976: 134). Latin nations wanted

government-to-government development assistance, while federal representatives argued that instead the nations should open their doors to U.S. private investment (Aguilar 1968: 106-108). The much touted "manufacturing boom" in Puerto Rico would be of obvious value to the U.S. government position, even if the boom was in large part illusory.

In fact, Puerto Rico was unique in so many ways, that any dispassionate observer would have to severely question it as any kind of model for independent nations. This was pointed out at the time (Galbraith and Solo 1953; Lewis 1963: 184-185). These reservations had little impact. From the early 1950s onwards, the federal government was spreading the word of the Puerto Rican "miracle" throughout the world, and sending foreign visitors to the island "to see how it is done". Puerto Rico was an asset in diplomacy with the less developed world and a propaganda weapon against Communism, along with its continuing military significance. Puerto Rico took on the added function of being a laboratory for testing programs and training experts on development (Emerson 1953: 13-14; Hanson 1953: 111-115; 1960: 9-10, 320; Ross 1976: 134, 143-144). With such a gem, why should the federal government want to change the island's status?

In retrospect, the case of Puerto Rico does suggest important lessons for underdeveloped nations, although these lessons are not likely to receive wide publicity by representatives of U.S. capital and/or the federal government.

The successes of the 1950s became even more substantial through the 1960s. Up until 1973, Puerto Rico would remain the shining star of free market development. Employment in Fomento promoted plants increased from 46,000 in 1960 to 105,500 in 1970 (USDC 1979: 130). Insular gross product in constant dollars increased by an astounding 132.2% from 1960 to 1973. But in 1974 the bubble burst. Gross product in constant dollars from 1973 to 1983 grew by a pathetic 10.7% (Junta de Planificación 1983: A-3; Puerto Rico Planning Board 1985: 6). Unemployment rose from its long steady base of 10-12% to fluctuate in the high teens and low twenties (Junta de Planificación 1983: A-24). Both the boom and the bust were consequences of the development policy established in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as will be described in future work.

While various divisions of the U.S. power structure continue to benefit greatly by Puerto Rico's incorporation in the U.S. federal system, it is no longer advantageous to them as a model of development. In regard to development, the island seems to be an embarrassment again, and it is noticeably absent in pronouncements about advisable development orientations, despite the fact that what is being recommended today often bears an extremely close resemblance to policies implemented in Puerto Rico thirty years ago. Embarrassing or not, the inescapable fact of the matter is that Puerto Rico's selected road to economic stagnation was precisely that which the federal government and U.S. private capital demanded. In

future work, I will describe where this path of development led in the years up to the present, and how Jauca changed over the same time. For now, this narrative has reached the end.

CHAPTER V
Conclusion

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In this final section, I will briefly summarize some provisional conclusions of this research. Provisional must be emphasized, since all conclusions are subject to revision after I complete the work up to 1982. The conclusions to be discussed fall within two general areas: the type of explanatory approach developed in this thesis, and the nature of class.

Explanation. This has not been a typical ethnographic monograph. The focus has been on long term processes, occurring and interacting at different levels of analysis. This approach raises several issues.

One issue concerns the possibility of reconstructing social history by elicitation from informants. This issue can be addressed via two specific questions: What would this reconstruction of changing social patterns in Jauca I be like without the benefit of previous work by Mintz and others? What does the current study say about the accuracy of Mintz's reports? The two will be discussed in turn.

Without the previous study, the entire effort would have been made much more difficult, taken much longer, and been much less detailed. If it had not been for Mintz's own culture history, I could not have gotten more than a faint impression of the life-ways he reconstructs for the family hacienda around the turn of the century. Research also would have been generally more difficult if the people of Jauca and Santa Isabel were not literate and interested in their own history,

to the point of producing several local history publications. Beyond these very important general considerations, some kinds of social patterns are much more difficult to reconstruct by elicitation than others.

Certain things were easy. These include: major events, such as the opening of the parcelas (even so, dating of these events is fuzzy); long term trends in prominent structures or patterns, such as the mechanization of cane work; past behavioral regularities, such as the sharing of food; and core values, such as the expected relations among compadres or within the family (although actual behavior departing from the norm is much more difficult to establish).

Other reconstructions are more difficult. Temporary conditions seem to fade from memory. For instance, the discontent of the majority of the parceleros in the late 1950s, as described by Hernández Álvarez, was eased substantially by developments in the 1960s. Those developments renewed people's faith in the Popular program, and that tends to obscure the years of disillusionment. Without Hernández's report, I would have learned of the discontent, but perhaps would have underestimated its gravity and extent.

Another pattern described by Hernández Álvarez was the massive permanent migration of jauqueños to the U.S. Without his report, I might have underestimated its importance, for the obvious reason that those who left were not there to tell me about it.

Trends that were not obvious at the time may be impossible to elicit. An illustration of this is the loss of discretionary power by the mayordomos as Aguirre continued its rationalization of production. Mintz observed that they were already losing power during his stay in the field, although that fact was not yet obvious. Asked about this change today, informants uniformly insist that it was not until the early 1950s that the trend began.

Quantitative estimates of anything are highly suspect, unless concerning something that was dealt with in sums at the time (e.g. money matters). I began to appreciate this my first week in the field, when I asked several informants how many people live in Jauca today. Only one, a schoolteacher, would even hazard a guess, and that was 10,000 people, or about four times the actual population. Passage of time does not make such estimates more reliable.

A final problem is elicitation of information about topics that clash with local sensibilities. I have described how Jaqueños today dislike talking about interpersonal conflicts within the community, which may be understood as a legacy of the ideology of solidarity characteristic of earlier times. Instances of conflict known to have occurred were routinely denied, minimized, or "forgotten". Some individuals were exceptions to this rule, and they and direct participants in conflicts could be approached for more detailed information. That was not always possible for me to do, since some past

conflicts were discovered only near the end of the field research.

Now for the other question regarding reconstruction of local social history-- what does the present study say about Mintz's work? It should be apparent by now that it is largely supportive of his conclusions. But there are two areas where our findings contradict, and others where we diverge considerably due to different interests.

One area of contradiction concerns religion. Mintz (1956: 406-407) stressed the secular character of jauqueños, although he had some second thoughts on this after the conversion of Taso Zayas to Pentecostalism (Mintz 1974: 257 ff.). As explained in the text, Mintz may have confused a lack of participation in accepted institutional religions, with a lack of religiosity. Mintz (1956: 408) also reported a marked absence of belief in or practice of spiritism. I found these practices to have solid, deep roots.

The second area of contradiction concerns sex roles within the family, although this is not quite so clear-cut as our differences about religion. Mintz (1956: 379) portrays the relationship between husband and wife as less patriarchally authoritarian than elsewhere in Puerto Rico, suggesting that wives in Jauca I were sufficiently independent to challenge excesses in their husbands' behavior.

Informants do agree that husbands were more authoritarian in families that came down from the mountains. Nevertheless,

they also emphasize the superordinate position of the husband in local families, and this strict distinction is maintained in many families even today. Any tendency toward egalitarianism in families in the past was limited by the fear of women that their husbands would abandon them, as described in the text.

I attribute these differences between Mintz's findings and mine to a difference in research procedures. Consistent with standard practices of the time, Mintz relied heavily on Taso Zayas and his immediate circle as the primary source of information. (Informants told me this, and it is apparent in Mintz's [1974: viii] expression of thanks to those who helped him). The characteristics of secularism and rejection of witchcraft and related beliefs; and those of relative equality between spouses and independence of women, all apply perfectly to this family. My approach, in contrast, has 15 families as principle sources, selected on the basis of a random sampling procedure. This diversity of sources shows the Zayas family, like any single family, to be in some ways atypical. These findings reinforce an observation made by other anthropologists, that it is unwise to rely on a narrow circle of informants, even if, as was the case with Jauca I in the 1940s, the society being studied is bound by a fairly rigid social etiquette.

The point on sources of information brings up other differences between Mintz's findings and mine, which are not contradictory. Mintz was introduced to Taso Zayas through the

mayor of Santa Isabel (1974: 2). This put Mintz in the center of the small group of barrio union and political activists, as described earlier. While Mintz acknowledges and discusses the diversity of local people's views on politics and unions, it may not be clear that the sophisticated political attitudes prominent in his descriptions may have characterized a relatively small part of the total population. It may also not be clear that the principle source of information about life in general was a family which by local standards was very successful, with their own house off of Aguirre land, a year-round job for the husband, and a wife with her own small sales trade. Again, reliance on a broader sample, chosen by means other than existing networks of contacts, provides a more rounded view of the community.

Another point of divergence concerns the homogeneity of rural people. Mintz stressed their similarities, although acknowledging many of the differences among them which I emphasize. Our respective handling of these differences relates to our asking different questions: what holds the people together, vs. what keeps them apart. What is not apparent in Mintz's descriptions is the internal structure of differentiation within the rural workers. More will be said on these matters in the discussion of class.

Another difference concerns the characteristics Mintz (1956: 414-415) attributes to the corporately-owned sugar plantation. He lists 16 features which, he hypothesizes, are

integral to this type of productive arrangement. I have no quarrel with most of these as tendencies often associated with corporate dominance of sugar production. But to understand when and how they do apply, and sometimes do not apply, requires examination of local conditions in interaction with the large structure of the Puerto Rican and U.S. sugar industry. For instance, his first feature, "all available land in concentrated in large-scale holdings", and the associated features of elimination of resident owner-growers, clearly characterizes the local operations of Aguirre. But Aguirre is the most developed example of this in all of Puerto Rico, due to a combination of its capital resources, and the ecology of soil and water on the Ponce-Patillas plain. Elsewhere in Puerto Rico, colono operations continued, even within the shadows of huge corporation mills. In the later 1920s, the persistence of colono operations seems to have been a major benefit for some mills, because the colonos could be exploited. Under certain conditions, such as those prevailing in the late 1940s, the overall structure of an advanced, corporately dominated system of production, actually encouraged an increase in tiny cane-and-mixed-crops farms. Other features he identifies, such as the introduction of machines in field operations, application of scientific techniques to agriculture, rising cash wages, and shortening of the harvest, all are fairly associated with large-scale corporate operations in general. But for each of them, it has been shown that the

rate of progress, and even the stagnation or reversal of these trends, is a consequence of specific historical conditions within larger industry structures.

This brings up a final difference in emphasis, concerning the significance of the natural environment. Steward, of course, is well known for his study of the adaptation of human populations to their natural environment. For Mintz, the main expression of this interest seems to have been in studying the actual behavior of work in the fields--a good Stewardian approach. Informants recall and emphasize that "Sid" and "Charlie" (Rosario) were frequently out in the fields, observing and recording men at work. One result of this is an especially rich description of that labor (Mintz 1956: 356-360). It also informs Mintz's discussions on the essential uniformity of working conditions, the relations between workers and superiors, etc. I did not work this way, primarily because it would have been impossible, even if permissions were granted, to observe in any detail the work behaviors currently practiced by jauqueños. There are too many different kinds of work. Work in the fields employs a minority of local people, and even that exhibits great diversity due to the growing predominance of other crops over cane.

More than this, I began the study with the opinion that the natural environment would have a very limited significance in explaining the changes in which I was interested. In class-divided, state-level societies, the significant material

conditions represented by the natural environment, are eclipsed as determining factors by the internal divisions and power relations of society (see Ferguson 1984: 57-58). I have tried to show in this thesis that it is these arrangements that determine the trajectories of local and insular history. As the structure of the sugar industry changed over time, the effective environment changed. Certain land was profitable or not profitable for growing cane, depending on conditions in the sugar industry at a particular time.

If I had been interested in understanding different areas of Puerto Rico at one time, ecological variation would assume major importance. Looking at one area, over time, it recedes from the status of "cause" to one of "condition". As Bloch (1953: 191-193) observes, the distinction between cause and condition is not an attribute of the phenomena we study, but of the interests of the investigation. Our conditions may be every bit as important as our causes in determining a particular outcome, but because they are constants or for other reasons, we separate them out as not telling us what we want to know. In the case of Jauca I, local ecology was 100% determinative of the socioeconomic arrangements that developed there. If the land was hilly, the soil infertile, and the water supply restricted, the area would not have been taken over by Aguirre, and that, of course, would change everything. But acknowledging that, local ecology tells us less about what happened under Aguirre than does the history of larger economic

and political structures.

The focus on history which I advocate here emphasizes process over time, both for local village and insular societies. The researchers of The People of Puerto Rico project, and Mintz in particular, were pioneers of an historical approach within anthropology. Even so, they handle history mainly as slices of time, as a succession of periods.

The periodization I use is an arbitrary device used to break up the narrative. In the discussions themselves, the point is to understand the flow of time, the constant process of change. So the 1940s are not portrayed as one time period. Rather, 1943 is shown to be significantly different from 1946, and 1946 from 1949. The multitude of particular trends I discuss, at all levels of analysis, are unified by their placement in time. Repeatedly, understanding why something happened follows from understanding the time when it happened.

A long term perspective gives meaning to the term "social complexity", at both village and insular levels. Complexity finds concrete representation here in the expanding length of discussions as one moves toward the present. Much of the expansion, of course, is due to more abundant information for more recent times. Another part is related to having to explain the political and economic crisis of the 1930s, and the major political and economic shift in the 1940s, which swelled Chapters IV and V. But a great part of the progressive expansion is the addition of new elements in the structures of

society, which thereafter must be considered as variables in the logic of change. The expansion of federal agencies active in Puerto Rico, the diversification of occupations, the presence of veterans as a social group--these and many other elements, once introduced, continued to change in themselves and to interact with other social patterns. Both village and insular society were much more complicated in 1960 than in 1898.

The discussion of local and insular social complexity raises another point. This thesis is not only an attempt to reconstruct village social history. More than half the text is devoted to description and analysis of patterns at the insular or even higher levels. What is the point of that material, and is it anthropology? Yes, if the point of anthropology is to understand how human societies work.

Ever since anthropologists began to do field research on local communities in state-level societies, there have been questions about how to apply the anthropological perspective of holism. Unlike most "tribal" situations, only a small part of the total culture pattern is represented in the immediately observable local setting. It was soon acknowledged that local and supra-local societies could not be treated as separate, that they were organically joined, and that understanding of the former required at least some consideration of the latter. But it has never been clear how supra-local society should be studied, or how, exactly, to conceptualize the relation and

interaction between the two levels. A related issue is whether an anthropological perspective can be applied to the study of national social structure itself, and to the institutions and patterns of whole complex societies. We study the largest structures of "tribal" societies. Are we to exempt our own?

This thesis is an attempt to deal with these issues. As explained in the Introduction, this is not so much a history, if history is the chronical of events, as diachronic anthropology. It is organized around the idea of three social systems; economy, politics, and socioeconomic divisions. Each has its own subsystems, and each is studied at village and insular levels, with the addition of the third U.S. level in regard to the sugar industry. The goal has been to understand how they operate and interact over the long term, in varying historical contexts (environments). Facts were mustered to reveal the relations within and between subsystems, systems, and levels. Could an historian operate this way? Why not? But it is not their usual method, and it has not been done for Puerto Rico (although this study would not have been possible without the excellent historical research done on particular aspects and periods of Puerto Rico's past).

In another sense, however, it would be difficult for an historian to write a thesis like this (presuming any would want to). Although the analysis relies on the idea of distinct levels, the arrangement of presentation within the chapters is an attempt to reflect another aspect of social reality: the

existence of an unbroken chain from the most general and global events to the most particular and individual. I have tried to fill in every step from U.S. national and even international changes, through developments in insular arrangements, to transformations of village society, and even to aspects of individual thought and behavior; and to follow the weaker but still significant influences that begin within local society and feed back to affect more general processes. It seems to me that it would be very difficult to do this without intensive field work within the village.

I will not attempt to draw any general moral about the processes of change described in this thesis. That kind of generalization will be more proper after coverage is brought up to 1982. But some illustrations of the value of the approach can be provided.

One concerns the sugar industry. Despite the universal recognition of the centrality of sugar production in the colonial domination of Puerto Rico, surprisingly little research has been done on the subject. Even such basic things as how the U.S. corporations achieved their early dominance were known only in the most general terms. Perhaps a reason for this is that the operations and directions of sugar production cannot be understood within the narrow confines of insular society. Understanding requires a long term perspective on the U.S. industry as a whole, and the structure of the Puerto Rican industry within that whole. With such a

perspective, unanticipated but important developments may be discovered, such as the revival of corporate producers' power to affect insular politics (via the federal government) after 1945. On the local level, trends in sugar production thought to be consequences of corporate organization per se may be seen to be strongly conditioned by particular historical configurations.

Another illustration, particularly of the value of a holistic perspective applied to supra-local patterns, concerns the reorientation of insular government policies in the late 1940s. One task in understanding was to critically examine and clear away the politically inspired explanations of this reorientation as a rational allocation of resources for the benefit of all society. Then, developing an alternative perspective required consideration of several distinct areas, each of which had a major effect in shaping the new course. These areas included the changing international political and economic interests of the U.S., and Puerto Rico's role within them; the interests and power of various divisions of the sugar industry; restructured institutional patterns in government and political parties; and the socioeconomic divisions and alignments within Puerto Rican society. Taking all of these areas into account produces a new interpretation of what happened in the later 1940s.

Class. The primary theoretical issue in this thesis, as defined in the Introduction, is clarification of the meaning of

"class". The word itself has been avoided or put in quotes when used by informants, in order to avoid falling into any position on the nature of class, or the proper use of the term. In this final section of the thesis, I will discuss the concept in light of the findings of this research.

What makes some people appear to form a class? In Chapter IV, I identified four related dimensions. One is uniformity. Similarity of economic situation is critical, and the more aspects of that the better (e.g. type of job, type of employer, total earnings, ownership of property, etc.). But non-economic factors, any of a range of subcultural characteristics, may also contribute to the sense of identity, and may in some situations seem to stand above economic similarity.

A second dimension is the distinctive quality of a group. This has two related aspects. Distancing is one--the presence of empty social space between two recognized clusters, the absence of a gradient of intermediate types. Boundaries is the other--the existence of structural barriers impeding the movement of individuals from one group to another, and also the overt character or visibility of such barriers. These aspects of distinctiveness may be relative and changeable over the course of a social conflict. They can be viewed in relation to vertical as well as horizontal lines of cleavage, characterizing relations between peasants and proletarians as well as between rich and poor.

A third dimension is common interests. Besides being

uniform and distinctive, a group in a given social context may have common needs and goals. This brings in the element of teleology. The more intensively the common interests are felt--a function of the gravity and number of particular concerns--and the more these interests pertain specifically to a single bounded group, the greater will be the contribution to the class character of the group. Again, economic concerns will expectably be the strongest area of interests, but many others are possible; and again, the more the better for class.

A fourth dimension is common enemies. This is closely related to common interests, but it brings in the dynamics of social conflict. The degree that common interests are threatened by an identifiable social enemy, personal or institutional, rather than by seemingly impersonal socioeconomic processes, will tend to increase unity within the group by fostering an "us vs. them" situation.

These four dimensions, each of which allows for considerable internal variation, can produce simple or complex patterns: a few major, neatly defined groups; or an almost incomprehensible diversity of positions, with dividing lines very debatable. The total patterning of relations determines the character of individual groups within the system. Only the dimensions of uniformity and interests are characteristics internal to a group, and even they are strongly influenced by external relations. Distinctiveness and common enemies focus on relations between groups.

Classes are not primary units. They are derived from the larger social system. But existing structures then further shape themselves and the larger system. Both the internal and external dimensions of class exist in dialectical interaction. Some dimensions may affect others, in a self-propelling dynamic of the class structure. Polarization is an example. Two diffuse and internally varied groups may find themselves as enemies because of some contradictory critical interests. As their conflict develops, intermediate positions can become less tenable and intervening boundaries more rigid. Emphasis may grow on those features which unite each group, as the differences within each recede in importance. The different groups push their interests in political conflict, and the most powerful may win gains that modify the economic processes that are most critical in shaping the groups, thus setting the stage for new patterns and future conflicts.

In Chapter V, two other dimensions were found to be important in examining the internal characteristics of socioeconomic groups within Jauca I. First of these is the patterning of dyadic ties within class-like groupings. The extensive horizontal networks of the poor have been discussed in so many studies by now, that calling attention to them may be emphasizing a commonplace. But they must be emphasized to understand the internal organization of class. These ties, not class itself, are the effective social structure regulating daily behavior. If anything, class structures this structure

(also not a new idea--see Bott [1971]).

In Jauca I, we saw two coexisting functions of the network of dyadic ties, to control access to scarce but desired positions, and to provide lines of cooperation among peers for expectable needs. Before about 1948, the latter was more significant. After 1948, it was the former. But whichever function was more significant at any time, it was these dendritic personal links that transmitted the effects of insular changes through village society. And general characteristics of the personal networks affect the political response to those changes. Several particular characteristics can be mentioned based on Jauca I.

Even when horizontal dyadic links predominate, when the opportunity exists, an individual may establish ties to more powerful patrons. These vertical ties can disrupt solidarity and the ability to act as a group, as individuals look more to their patrons than their peers. The balance of horizontal and vertical ties will probably always be a matter of degree, for there will be opportunities to improve one's position by attaching oneself to a social superior even in as segregated a community as a prison.

Along with uniting peers within the rural work force, the dyadic networks simultaneously preserved over time a division within the workers, and so actually impeded the formation of one unified group. Besides preserving this general division, the nature of personal networks implies another kind of

exclusiveness. Binding one group of people may separate them from others. An illustration is Taso Zayas's close circle of political and union activists, as distinct from the mass of less active villagers.

Finally, the very personal nature of these ties, as Wolf (1971: 173) observes, is not conducive for mobilizing people for universalistic action. There may be a moral expectation for a personal reward for political services, an attitude which can lead to extensive corruption. In sum, the network of dyadic ties can be of mixed effect, reinforcing solidarity in some ways, but also creating divisions.

The second aspect of class that became apparent in the study of Jauca I in Chapter V was the crucial significance of the control of information about socioeconomic arrangements. The four dimensions of class discussed above each have important informational components, and these can be manipulated by the powers controlling media of information. Perceptions of uniformity can be minimized by playing-up internal differences (e.g. race); a sense of bounded distinctiveness can be lessened by emphasizing the unity of the "national family", and/or using instances of mobility to create a myth that "anyone can make it". Perceptions of interest and enemies are very manipulable in a world where societal cause and effect relations are not self-evident. There may be many ways to conceal realities and redirect popular antagonisms and energies. All these propaganda opportunities are subject to

some reality constraints, but except in the most simple and transparent structures, class relations as people perceive and experience them will be a combination of actually existing patterns, and the propaganda spread about those patterns.

This is crucial because it influences the political potential of a class group, the degree to which a class "in itself" becomes a class "for itself". In Jauca, people were taught a mythical history. Today, what jauqueños believe happened in realms beyond their direct observation is largely a fiction created to serve the interests of the powerful, with a distant and sometimes inverse relationship to reality. The acceptance of this fiction is one important part of the political neutralization of the people of the community.

A problem with both the internal dyadic patterns and the perceptions of class relations is that it is difficult to ascertain much about them without first-hand observation. The other dimensions of class are more obvious, and for that reason will receive more attention in the next section, in which the ideas on class summarized here are applied to a number of class-like patterns in Puerto Rico. The first part of this section will look at patterns pertaining to Jauca I over time, and the second to larger class structures that have been suggested for the island.

The haciendas of the late nineteenth century were relatively closed social worlds, and ones not expected to generate broad class groupings. Within the hacienda, there were a variety of

jobs and social positions. The most important boundary was not of a general social type, but of one particular production unit. Within those units, the most important dyadic links were vertical, of the patron-client type. The laborers of the hacienda may still have had common interests and enemies--I argued that relations on the haciendas may not have been as harmonious as sometimes imagined. But they would remain highly localized interests and enemies, particular, or seemingly so, to one or a few linked operations. Mintz (1979) argues, and I agree, that the breaking down of these closed little worlds, and the progressive individualization of local people, were important preconditions for the development of broad class groupings.

By the 1930s, a rural proletariat had evolved in the sugar regions, and the people of Jauca I were squarely within it. Their uniformities far outweighed their differences. They were bounded and distant from those above them. They had clear, pressing, basic interests in common. And they had specific enemies who opposed their interests. It is difficult to imagine anyone challenging the class character of the sugar workers.

A proletariat is the most simple and obvious of classes, the class "par excellence". But as Wolf (1971) cautions, it is an extreme and unusual pattern. We may find it only when one industrial regime completely dominates a regional economy. Even in this situation, the apparent simplicity of the class

pattern may be deceptive. In Jauca I, significant class-like divisions persisted within the proletariat, although they were difficult to perceive. And it is very difficult to establish any boundaries dividing the rural proletariat from other island poor, who could not be classified as rural proletarians. These gradients and the movement of individuals between divisions of the poor facilitated their alignment within the PPD. In fact it could be argued that once so aligned, these divisions together, los pobres, were a class, in terms of the general characteristics of class outlined here. That seems to be how many informants saw (and see) the situation. It may be that a group which appears as a distinct class in one political and historical context, appears as part of a class in another. The reverse may also be so, as the next situation illustrates.

By 1960, big changes in class arrangements were underway, although full development of the new pattern would be in the 1960s. A process began in Jauca I around 1950, which by all indications was typical of changes being felt throughout the island. People from the upper level of the poor were flourishing, and pulling away from the majority of the rural workers to merge with the long-established, though tiny, "clase media". The people of Jauca I no longer stood together as one class isolate. They were no longer uniform or distinctly bounded from those above them in socioeconomic position. Interests and enemies were diverse and diverging.

The two major divisions within the rural population in 1960

were far less clear-cut class segments than the rural proletariat of Jauca I had been. Each had some characteristics of a class, while lacking others. Members of the new middle class shared many economic and life-style attributes, but differed significantly in others, such as those related to specific occupations. The middle class could be called bounded, below by its own protective networks, and above by the lack of capital which meant that most would never be more than wage earners. But there were many intermediate cases crossing and obscuring these boundaries, and in any case they were not so compelling limitations as the cap which had limited self-improvement in the old days. The divisions between the new middle class and the continuing poor was actually denied by many of each level. In interests and enemies, the middle class was hopelessly diverse. They could agree only on very general things, like property tax reduction. But the central concerns and conflicts of most would be bound-up with their particular job. There were too many types of occupations represented in the middle class, and too few persons in any one of them, for it to develop into a unified political force, either within Santa Isabel or for the island as a whole.

For the rural poor left behind by these changes, their class character had also become more ambiguous. There was less uniformity within the group. The generational divide over cane work vs. migration was the most disruptive difference, but there were many other trends weakening their once organic

unity. The rigid boundaries that surrounded and so joined them in the past seemed less absolute because of the option of migration, and even the hope of local socioeconomic mobility for a few. Moreover, the rural proletariat had been absorbed into the larger category of "the poor". As cane work declined, and along with it the political influence of organized cane workers, the status of being of los pobres became more significant. Yet this larger category was very diverse and amorphous, and could never be a class for itself in the way the rural proletariat had been.

An interesting aspect of this change in the standing of the upper division of the old rural proletariat, is that the network structure separating it from the mass of rural workers remained essentially the same. It would be counterintuitive and analytically unproductive to insist that the upper group constituted a separate class in 1930, just as it would be to insist that it remained in the same class as the rural agricultural workers in 1960. It seems, then, that a uniform social structure may produce very different class patterns in different historical contexts.

To pass now to other views on class which have been applied to Puerto Rico, the first of three cases to be considered will be the suggestion of a "political" or "state" class, recently made by Quintero Rivera (1980: 89-90, 94, 115 n. 190). He describes the younger professionals of the 1940s as seeking control of the machinery of government as a stable base and a

platform for exercising their self-appointed role as leaders of insular politics. In pursuing this control, he argues, the group was making itself into a class, and one based primarily on its relationship to the state.

Unfortunately, this discussion suffers from a lack of care in distinguishing the small number of politically ambitious professionals actually in government from their larger social group of origin. It is difficult to think of the few dozen high level young government professionals as being a class all by themselves. If one reads Quintero's argument to be that the political activists were representatives of the larger group, rather than a class in themselves, some ambiguities are resolved but others remain. That is because the professionals are a diverse lot. They are found in prominent positions in all parties. Some, such as the teachers, were at times in open opposition to the policies of the technicos in government. What part of the professionals were defining themselves as a political class? What about middle class people other than in the professions? To define this group as a class based on the single criterion of control of state machinery seems inappropriate, and it also sidesteps rather than answers all the complicated issues about the middle class.

The next case is Oscar Lewis's formulation of the "culture of poverty". While not explicitly a statement about class structure, it is closely related, being about an economically determined subcultural pattern that tends to reinforce existing

socioeconomic inequality. As mentioned in the Introduction, the preconditions Lewis (1965, 1966: xliii-xlv) describes for the existence of the culture of poverty seem to apply to Jauca I in the later 1950s, and perhaps for earlier periods as well. Under these preconditions, Lewis expects that "some" residents would fall within the subculture. Just how many, and how poor people with the culture of poverty stand in relation to poor people without the culture of poverty, has never been clear. Around the time of his Puerto Rico research, Lewis (1970: 73) put it in terms of a "statistical profile" of traits, by which the families of the poor could be arranged in a gradient. Exactly what traits define this profile, and the relationships between them, is another area that has never been clear. Lewis (1965, 1966: xlv ff.) says there are about 70 traits involved in the culture of poverty. I will not consider these here. Some apply to many people in Jauca I, others do not. Instead, I will look at the political and theoretical bottom line: that because of their subculture, many poor people are "not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities" (1965, 1966: xlv; 1970: 79). This attributes the perpetuation of poverty, at least in major part, to the psychology of the poor. It can be examined with the information we now have on Jauca I.

In one sense, this thesis supports Lewis. There was a subgroup within the rural poor which was unable to take advantage of new economic opportunities. But the explanation

of that pattern is very different from that of Lewis. I attributed their lack of mobility not to their psychology, but to being closed out of the social networks that controlled access to those opportunities. Psychological characteristics do of course influence how well people do within their level of job opportunities, and one meets individuals whose psychological make-up appears responsible for their doing better or worse than would be expected based on family background alone. But these constitute minor exceptions to the general pattern, and they reflect individual, rather than subcultural variation.

The third and last case of a theoretical perspective on class applied to Puerto Rican society is that of Tumin and Feldman (1971: 3-7). Their approach is premised on four assumptions: 1) that class is a category imposed by the analyst on a gradient of ranked individual positions (rather than a dynamic part of the society's structure itself); 2) that class may be understood ahistorically; 3) that class may be understood without consideration of power; and 4) that class position is determined primarily by educational achievement. Any one of these assumptions could be fatal. Together, the analysis never had a chance. Failing to examine the socioeconomic parameters and historical processes that structure class as an aspect of social reality, this very thorough study is thoroughly misguided. The authors never approach an understanding of why education became an important

gateway in occupational mobility at one historical juncture, and not before nor long after that point. Neither do they see how education, even at that one time, was part of a broader structure, and one which in some ways actually restricted occupational mobility.

The approach of Tumin and Feldman illustrates a general problem of recent research on class, the practice of imposing the label "class" (or some variation of it) on some other measure or indicator, in their case on educational achievement. Other researchers, sometimes approaching their work from very different conceptual backgrounds, attach the same label to totally different and non-comparable criteria. It is difficult to see the benefit of this practice, or of any attempt to reduce the existence of class to one or a few uniform diagnostics. To illustrate, I will consider the definition of class as a direct function of the ownership or control (or lack of it) of capital, one of the most commonly used diagnostics within the Marxian view of class.

In this thesis, no factor has been shown to be more significant in shaping economic trends and government policies than the interests of those who controlled capital. Further, it has been appropriate, in certain contexts, to speak of the interests of "capital" in general. But this division of haves and have-nots does not identify all or even the most significant lines of cleavage and conflict. Many of the struggles described in this thesis have been between

capitalists. And the distinction clearly is not adequate for defining the major socioeconomic groups, often called classes by nonacademic contemporaries, which pass into and out of Puerto Rico's history.

"Class" denotes a diverse assemblage of concepts about major social groups dividing societies in a hierarchical fashion. Different analysts will have different ideas about the nature of the groups, and about the criteria and causal relationships defining them. No single definition will ever be acceptable to all of these analysts, or probably even to a large minority of them. Single definitions may also be ruled out because the nature of class itself varies by time and place. Different societies, or different historical periods in one society, will differ not merely in the number and general profiles of classes, but in what makes classes, in the forces that structure class boundaries and relationships.

The essentially undefinable character of class is suggested by the failure of giants such as Marx and Weber to come up with specifications satisfactory even for their own use. Class is not an analytical concept. Those variables an analyst may associate with class should be called by their own names, and not confused with class itself. The label "class" should be applied to actual historical groupings, rather than to the various factors which give rise to them, even though there will still be differences as to which groupings constitute classes.

One way to understand the characteristics of historically

existing classes is to focus not on the particular classes, but rather on the societal structure or system of classes. Some idea of class structure is implicit in any discussion of class. To identify a class implies the existence of others, with some form of relationship between. But anthropological investigations of class have tended to look at internal characteristics rather than the configuration of classes and their interrelations.

Looking at the structure does not begin with the presumption of a few set groups. A better approach is to investigate the range of variation and interconnections of class-related phenomena--ownership, power, occupation, income, education, subcultural life-style, self-identification, etc.--all in macroscopic societal and microscopic local patterning. This is the stuff of class, the material giving rise to historical class patterns. Then, the general arrangement of classes has a dynamic of its own. The class pattern of a society may, over time, reshape itself and modify the basic parameters of class differentiation.

By investigating the larger structure, the complex characteristics of individual classes may become more intelligible. Only sometimes will this produce a nice neat diagram of classes, a few clearly and completely bounded units, with uniform social space inside. That may be frustrating, but the complexities which preclude simple representation are the reality of class. They are what make

placement in the class structure often the single most important determinant of an individual's life. They are what shape the social conflicts that drive history. It is class structure in its complexity, not class, that orders state societies. If anthropological research is to encompass the human condition in contemporary states, it will have to deal with this most basic fact.

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Appendix
Sugar Production



Chart 1. Raw Sugar Production, Puerto Rico, 1880-1982

Source: Economic Development Administration and Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Government of Puerto Rico, Annual Book of Statistics 1950: 87; USDA, World Sugar Situation 1947: Table 11; Samuels n.d.: 33; Junta de Planificación 1983: I-7




Chart 2. Cuerdas/Acres* of Cane Harvested, Puerto Rico, 1901-1982

* Cuerdas and acres mixed in statistical reports. A cuerda is .97 acres.

Source: USDA 1950: 4; USDA, World Sugar Situation, 1947: Table 11; Samuels n.d.: 33; Junta de Planificación 1983: I-7




Chart 3. Tons of Cane Harvested per Cuerda/Acre, Puerto Rico, 1919-1982

Source: Economic Development Administration and Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Government of Puerto Rico, Annual Book of Statistics, 1950; USDA, World Sugar Situation, 1947: Table 11; Samuels n.d.: 33; Junta de Planificación 1983: I-7.




Chart 4. Tons of Raw Sugar Produced per Cuerda/Acre of Harvested Cane, Puerto Rico, 1901-1982

Source: Economic Development Administration and Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Government of Puerto Rico, Annual Book of Statistics 1950: 87; USDA 1950: 4; USDA, World Sugar Situation 1947: Table 11; Samuels n.d.: 33; Junta de Planificacion 1983: 1-7




Chart 5. Yield of Raw Sugar, as Percentage of Cane Weight, Puerto Rico, 1919-1982

Source: USDA, World Sugar Situation 1947: Table 11; Samuels n.d.: 33; Junta de Planificacion 1983: I-7




Chart 6. Raw Sugar Production, Central Aguirre Corporation, 1901-1960

Source: Central Aguirre Corporation, Internal Data Sheet




Chart 7. Yield of Raw Sugar, as Percentage of Cane Weight, Central Aguirre Corporation, 1928-1960

Source: Central Aguirre Corporation, Internal Data Sheet




Chart 8. Reported Net Income, Central Aguirre Corporation, 1919-1959

Source: Farr and Co., various years




Table 1
 Cuerdas of cane harvested, and tons of cane produced, Santa Isabel, 1909-1978

	1909	1919	1929	1939	1949	1959	1969	1978
Cuerdas	n.a.	n.a.	3,310	6,031	8,276	8,395	6,808	5,551
Tons	74,810	93,501	104,357	229,248	338,733	434,676	327,727	174,490

Source: U.S. Census of Agriculture, various years

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