Four Decades in the Life of a Puerto Rican Community:

The Impact of Island Development, and What Can Be Done for the Future

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This is a preliminary report in an investigation of economic development and social change. The research site is Jauca, a semi-rural village on the south coast of Puerto Rico. The time frame is 1940 to the present. Field research in Jauca in 1948-9 by Sidney Mintz provides a data baseline. My goal has been to identify island economic, political, and social trends or conditions which had direct impact on the village; to understand how village organization changed in response to these inputs; and to note how village level responses have or may influence subsequent island development.

Field research took a total of fifteen months over the period from May 1980 to May 1982. During all this time I lived with a family in the village. In addition to my Regional Science Association fellowship, I received funds from the National Science Foundation, Wenner-Gren Foundation, and Columbia University. I was assisted in the field by my wife, Leslie Farragher-Ferguson, for four months; and by two research assistants, Lissette Pardillo and José Rivera, for ten and six weeks, respectively.

Early in the fieldwork, two questionnaires were distributed to a randomly slected 20% sample of village homes. Using preliminary computer results on several social diagnostics as a guide, fifteen families were selected from the sample as representative of the village. These fifteen families were the focus of work in the second half of research. Among the investigative techniques used with them are: semi-structured interviews on local and island history and current conditions, semi-structured interviews on individual life history, random visits to homes to observe and record daily behavior, and estimations of income, expenditures, and value of property and possessions. Several techniques

aimed at elaborating the personal networks of husband and wife. Names and basic social data were collected for relatives, intimate friends, neighbors, regular acquaintances, and ritual co-parents (compadres). Besides work with the fifteen families, information summarized in this report is from formal and informal interviews with other individuals, extensive archival research, and participant observation in daily life.

The present report represents a preliminary synthesis worked-up during the final stages of field work and immediately after my return. "Preliminary" must be stressed. I have not yet analysed quantitative data, or even processed all non-quantitative material. A rewrite several months from now would be able to add more figures and hard dates, and would probably make some factual or interpretive revisions. It would also result in a more even time coverage. This report gets more detailed as it approaches the present, a result of the fact that more recent events were easily remembered and elicited, while understanding older trends will rely more on the yet-to-come analysis of archival material.

The body of the report has three parts. The first is a brief summary of those aspects of Puerto Rican history since 1940 which are relevant to understanding changes in Jauca. The next section is a summary of my main research findings, in the form of a decade by decade account of change in Jauca. The final section outlines a plan for community revitalization that addresses the central problems identified in the preceding parts. Since these policy recommendations are based primarily on my findings about one village, it is appropriate to comment on the representativeness of this particular community.

I chose to work in Jauca because of the historical perspective provided by the work of Mintz and another researcher from the 1950's, José Hernández Alvarez. In 1948, Mintz looked for a field site repre-

senting the south coast corporate sugar producing areas. After a few months, he chose the municipio of Santa Isabel. (A municipio is roughly equivalent to a U.S. county, but with a central town surrounded by rural barrios, or villages. The town carries the same name as the municipio.) Santa Isabel represented an extreme type of land concentration and U.S. corporation dominance. After a few months in Santa Isabel, he selected Jauca as representative of the municipio's barrios. So in 1948, Jauca was representative of one common type of production organization, in a time when a few forms of production dominated the entire island. Mintz's colleagues in the "People of Puerto Rico" project studied other production types.

Presently, island production is much more diversified, sub-divided, and geographically mixed. Other factors besides production are relevant to the developmental interests emphasized here. The result is that basic production arrangements are not currently useful indicators of representativeness.

Nevertheless, Jauca remains representative of a larger area. After fifteen months in the field, I established to my satisfaction that the historical changes which affected Jauca affected other rural barrios in the south coast sugar region in much the same ways. These same historical changes were also felt in the mountains and cities, but since their social structures differed from those of the south coast, the local impact of and response to these changes probably also varied considerably. Great care should be taken in extrapolating specific conclusions from Jauca to these areas. On the other hand, the fundamental problems of development which I identify in the beginning of the policy recomendations section were structured largely by forces above the village level. In this case, local reaction may have varied in specifics, but the problems have been felt to greater or lesser degree throughout the island.

Jauca's value as a representative research site can be discussed in another sense. By most social and economic indicators, Santa Isabel falls in the upper part of the bottom half of all of Puerto Rico's municipios (at least it did before the recent south coast economic crisis). Jauca, by available measures, falls near the top compared to other Santa Isabel barrios. So the village tends toward the center of Puerto Rican social and economic conditions. More than just a mid-point, Jauca has an unusually good mix of "traditional" and "modern" sectors. Being in the heart of one of the island's main farm areas, its economy and work force remain strongly tied to agriculture. At the same time, Jauca is astride the main state coastal road, and enjoys exceptionally good access to nearby towns and cities. This and other factors led to the growth of a large population of professional, administrative, factory, and white collar workers. Finding both so well represented in one site is unusual, so Jauca is an unusually good place to see the interaction of old and new forms and making a living.

An overview of recent Puerto Rican history

The 1930's were brutal. Puerto Rico was an "offshore farm", supplying mass produced agricultural commodities to the mainland market. Sugar production dominated after the decline of coffee and tobacco, and four U.S. corporations dominated sugar. Politics served business interests in a time when vote buying and coercion made democracy a farce. Socially, the island went through an identity crisis over its destiny and relationship with the U.S. In the country, on the coasts and mountains, in the cafetals, tobacco farms, and plantations, the rural population was more concerned with survival than identity. They suffered under grinding poverty.

Change was on the way. Fierce hurricanes had raked the island in 1928 and 1932. In their wake, Washington provided its first aid, and

became aware of the desperation of the rural poor. Men who worked in the relief agencies were encouraged in their desire for change by the new Roosevelt administration, and would later form the core of the Popular Democratic Party's reform agencies. The sugar industry was to grow even into the 1950's, but federal legislation enacted in 1934 limited Puerto Rican production and refining capacity, thus discouraging investment and modernization. Labor unions, especially in the sugar industry, struggled for a fair deal. Socialist and Nationalist parties mounted strong challenges to the insular economic and political structures.

In 1938, Luis Muñoz Marin, son of the former spokesman for the island's hacienda owners, broke with the Liberal Party to found the Popular Democratic Party--the "Populars". Muñoz martialled an alliance of the poor, small colonos (independent sugar cane growers) victimized by the corporation mills, the remaining hacendados, and a small but active group of reformers. In a brilliant populist campaign, he visited the remote corners of the island. He pledged to deliver bread, land, and liberty. He railed against the selling of votes, and in back yards and cafés, he asked the people to "loan" him one vote--if he did not deliver on his promises in one term, they could take it back, and throw him out. The people responded, and the Populars surprised everyone by taking control of the legislature, two years after the founding of the party. At the same time, Roosevelt appointed as governor Rexford Tugwell, a dynamic New Dealer. Together, Muñoz and Tugwell set out to transform the island's political and economic landscapes.

Laws were passed regulating wages, hours, and working conditions. Legislation supported the unions, even as union leadership was being absorbed into the Popular political machine. A land reform act broke up some of the largest sugar holdings, ensured fair treatment for colonos by the corporate mills, freed homesites for landless agricultural workers,

and provided for proportional profit sugar farms. Tugwell took special interest in civil service and fiscal reform. Economic development was to be accomplished through agricultural modernization combined with government run factories using local supplies for local markets. The Second World War provided both compelling reason and the means for this type of development. The island experienced shortages due to its exposed maritime supply routes; and the mainland demand for island rum provided a bounty of tax revenues.

Between 1945 and 1947, the government changed course. The government factories and farms had not produced immediate economic success. Newspapers and business interests had maintained constant fire on more radical policies. Tugwell, the main force behind some of the radical efforts, resigned in 1946, leaving no counterbalance to a new generation of more pro-business technocrats. So new land acquisitions declined, proportional profit farms fell from favor, and government factories were sold, mostly to the Ferre family interests. Teodoro Moscoso and other officials of the planning apparatus argued forcefully and successfully for a development strategy based on North American capital invested in local manufacturing, and secondarily on promoted tourism. This new view was not compatible with Munoz's former independentista views. He began to speak of a permanent compact with the United States. Many of his old supporters responded by leaving the Populars to form the Puerto Rico Independence Party.

The new development orientation slowly began to show results. By the early 1950s, North American firms were coming in increasing numbers, attracted by federal tax exemption, a ten year local tax holiday, and low labor costs. The first industries were labor-intensive, mostly in apparel. Soon more capital-intensive plants appeared. By the mid-'50s, planners wrote effusively of huge core complexes of heavy industry, which

would generate a swarm of "downstream" industries. Full employment by 1965 seemed a reasonable target.

Just as the economy became more reliant on U.S. capital, the island's political link was solidified with a 1952 constitution creating the Commonwealth, or Estado Libre Asociado. The move toward more permanent association with the U.S. was greeted with Nationalist uprisings and attacks, both in Puerto Rico and Washington. The Independence Party garnered nearly 20% of the 1952 election vote. A severe government crackdown followed, and support waned for both parties.

With the new emphasis on industry, agriculture fell into decline. Sugar production peaked in 1952, then began to drop in acreage, yield per acre, and yield per ton of cane. The sugar industry had been overinflated and inefficient, sustained by U.S. tariff policies, below-subsistence wages, and unfair dealings with colonos. By the late 1940s, the industry found itself with declining profits and antiquated field production techniques. Coffee and tobacco production fared little better, but reverses earlier in the century had left them already in a secondary position. Dairy production became the dynamic sector, as former cropland became pastures. Mass migration from agricultural regions began in the late 1940s.

Many migrants went to San Juan. New industries were concentrated there. People came seeking jobs or higher wages. The metropolitan population exploded during the 1950s, swamping the government's ability to provide basic services. This prompted the first industrial decentralization program. The incentives to locate in remote areas were most favorable for light labor-intensive industries, like apparel. Consequently, most new industrial jobs created in these areas would go to women.

Other migrants headed to the continent. Workers found new opportunities in the post-war labor shortage. Many began as seasonal migrants,

channeled by the Puerto Rican Department of Labor into U.S. field labor. But they soon began moving to the cities, for permanent jobs at higher pay. The social impact of "la migración" would be enormous, both within Puerto Rico, and upon those who went to live in the north.

On the social front, the government continued with land distribution for landless farm workers. Poor children were given shoes and a better diet through school lunch programs. Wages crept up, and the new Social Security, unemployment, and veterans' benefits programs added a measure of economic security. But unemployment and poverty remained the island's most pressing problems.

Expanding government and commercial sectors, along with industry, were creating a new middle class, especially in the cities. In the later 1950s, many of them began to vote for the pro-statehood Republican Party. The middle class reacted against the Populars' monopoly on power, its rural orientation, and its jíbaro (inadequately translated as "hillbilly") image. Perhaps Muñoz's constant preaching against independence contributed to the growing view that Puerto Rico would be better off as a state.

Entering the 1960s, Puerto Rico enjoyed rather astounding economic growth, and an optimism about the future that would last into the early '70s. GNP and personal income rose. Employment expanded and diversified, and more new jobs went to non-metropolitan areas. Improved social services reached even the poorest communities. But cracks had begun to appear in the foundation.

Planners decided that the island could not continue to attract new capital investment without continuing the local tax holidays, so the once temporary program to give industry an initial kick became permanent. Many of the first industries established left after their ten year local exemption expired, creating doubts about the durability of the economic miracle. The capital/labor ratio increased steadily, producing fewer

jobs per dollar invested. The Kennedy Rounds of tariff negotiations weakened the national market barriers which had protected apparel, footwear, and other labor-intensive industries. Foreign competition would be a problem by the end of the decade. Construction of massive petrochemical complexes created temporary prosperity, and a swollen construction industry which could never be maintained in normal times. The petrochemical plants also polluted air and water, severely affecting fishing in many areas. The goal of full employment receded and quietly died.

Agriculture declined without pause. Many of the labor saving techniques and machines installed by sugar growers had the paradoxical effect of reducing yields, ulimately weakening the industry even more. Despite new government subsidies and other efforts, sales and closings of sugar mills continued throught the 1960s. With the big exception of dairy farming, and a few other lines, agriculture showed few signs of life. Speculation took land out of production, and food imports rose.

Migration to the mainland had become an integral part of plans to reduce unemployment. But the northward stream diminished in the '60s. Further, a new group of "return migrants" became visible in metropolitan areas around 1962. Panicky officials spoke of wiping out the progress of the past ten years should the return trickle become a floood. Some returnees joined with the expanding urban middle class to create new kinds of problems, like urban sprawl and conspicuous consumption of luxury items.

Politically, the Populars remained firmly in control. But things were changing. Incensed by the PDP position on "moral issues", notably family planning, the Catholic Church mounted political challenges in 1960 and 1964. They won few votes. But many of their supporters had become disillusioned with the Populars, and later joined the growing

support for the Republican Party.

It had become clear that Puerto Rico's political compact with the U.S. was not completely satisfactory. Unsuccessful attempts to improve it were made in 1959 and 1966. A plebiscite in 1967 strongly favored the Commonwealth over either statehood or independence options. But it raised more questions than it had answered. The plebiscite was widely interpreted as a vote of personal confidence in Muñoz Marin, which there was no doubt he would win. Independence forces boycotted the vote; statehood supporters lost, but made a surprisingly strong showing.

Within the Popular organization, criticism had grown of Muñoz's one-man rule. In the early 1960s, he set out to institutionalize PDP power. The process was not smooth. His hand picked successor, Robert Sanchez Vilella, was elected governor in 1964. But he and Muñoz broke relations a few years later. The Popular machinery eliminated Sanchez as its gubernatorial candidate for 1968, so he mounted his own campaign for re-election. The Republicans had regrouped under the name "New Progressive Party", and the strong leadership of industrialist Luis Ferre. Sanchez's candidacy drained off enough Popular votes to let the unthinkable happen. In an election sullied by defamation and mud-slinging, the Populars lost the governorship to Ferre.

In retrospect, Ferre's four years appear as the high water mark of Operation Bootstrap, as the island development program was known. It was a prosperous time of rising wages and employment. Industry grew, and showed a new trend towards the high-technology pharmaceutical and electronics industries. Government employment expanded, and salaries rose. Construction was maintained by large government projects, such as the highway connecting San Juan and Ponce.

But the rate of industrial investment showed a clear downturn. The sugar industry went critical, and the government took control of

production through purchase or rental of land and mills. Government finances were still in acceptable shape, but the state had assumed debts and operating costs which would plague it in coming years. Political infighting and the status debate were transformed into non-stop concerns. Discontent grew in some sectors, as manifested in industrial strikes, anti-war demonstrations, university protests, re-formation of the Socialist Party, and squatter invasions of unused land.

Rafael Henandez Colon led a reunited Popular Party to victory in 1972. With what the economy had in store, the Populars might have done better to lose. The optimistic view that economic growth was unstoppable was about to be dealt a death blow.

The OPEC oil price hike shocked the island. Besides expectable problems like soaring inflation, the hike eliminated the price advantage upon which the petrochemical industry had been built. Then, as the mainland recession deepened, it dragged Puerto Rico down with it. (Increased linkages of the two economies had made the island much more sensitive to mainland economic fluctuations.) The local maritime shipping and telephone industries had long been neglected, and were nearing collapse. The government purchased them, thus jacking up its public debt. This fiscal burden limited anti-recession spending. What there was was supported by unpopular government salary and hiring freezes, and an income tax surcharge. The government run sugar industry sustained huge losses due to high wages, low productivity, poor management, and a weak market. Mechanization was promoted, leading to further declines in production. The "safety valve" of stateside migration closed off, as returning thousands resulted in net in-migration. Unemployment soared, and crime became a major problem. The institution of the food stamp program and increases in other federal funds may have prevented major social unrest.

In 1976, Hernandez lost to Carlos Romero Barcelo (NPP). Romero

also has suffered from turns in the economy. Many economic indicators slowly returned to pre-recession levels in the late 1970s, and public debt returned to manageable sums. The construction and petrochemical industries never recovered, however. An ambitious agricultural diversification plan was implemented, and has begun to show some success. But the goals of increasing employment, promoting self-sufficiency in food, and saving the sugar industry seem no nearer to realization. Unemployment dropped, but not to pre-recession levels.

In the past year, the economy has taken another dive. Federal cuts reversed the trend of steadily rising federal inputs, reducing government income and the aid received by the poor. Bankruptcies and unemployment have soared. Public utility rate hikes have hurt consumers and businesses. Business has held off on new investment due to the triple uncertainties of imminent changes in federal tax regulations, the possible impact of the Caribbean Basin plan and other federal initiatives, and the uncertain future of a deadlocked island government. This February, the sugar industry came within a hair's breadth of complete shutdown. The huge CORCO petrochemical complex did close, probably never to reopen.

The economy seems out of control, without direction. Bankers and government officials have long meetings on regulations concerning the billions of dollars of accumulated business profits. But their options seem not to include the scale of renewed investment needed to turn the economy around. And many question whether such investment would be desirable, given the already overwhelming North American business dominance. Planners and politicians extol the benefits of the growing high technology industrial sector, and hope to strengthen the island's industrial, commercial, and technological links with surrounding nations. But whatever long term benefits these strategies bring, no one seriously

suggests that they alone can substantially reduce unemployment or poverty.

The political situation is even worse. In another dirty and divisive campaign, Romero won re-election by some three thousand votes, and the Populars won control of both houses of the legislature. The two parties are incapable of cooperating, and the gears of government have frozen. Party spokesmen are obsessed with the issue of political status, yet they have presented the issue so polemically that the public has no legitimate basis for comparing the options. Politicians often seem more concerned with their own welfare than that of the public. Graft, scandal, political abuses and favoritism fill the daily papers. The executive branch has found itself on dangerous collision course with unions, university students, squatters, and even the courts. The legislature passes few laws, and recently has been distinguished by organized jeering sections, a near brawl among legislators, and accusations of witchcraft.

Social conditions are scarcely better. Government economists write wistfully of the good old days of 12% unemployment. The old goal of reducing income inequality is not heard these days. Housing programs, education, and health services are all in bad shape and getting worse. Crime, family breakups, and mental health problems testify to a profound social malaise. A passive dependency has been fostered by transfer payments, and "politicization" (polarization along party lines) has crept even into family life. According to many, traditional ways of thinking and behaving are in retreat before North American media and migrants.

Puerto Rico enjoyed over two decades of enviable economic growth. "Democracy" came to mean something. The poor were assured the basic means of survival. No one can or should try to minimize these accomplishments. But those good times ended, and do not seem about to return.

Puerto Rico now is in a crisis comparable in some ways to that of the 1930s. The economy, politics, and social life have all arrived at a point where something has to give. A look at any newspaper, a visit to any gathering will bear out the generality of this opinion. As in the 1930s, the popular discontent creates potential support for a new approach to the existing problems. The difficulty is in finding a model for change.

In the next section, I will describe how one community has fared over these past forty-odd years of change. Then I will outline a plan by which community revitalization can be an end and a means to lifting Puerto Rico out of the present doldrums.

One village through four decades of change

The 1940s.

In 1940, Santa Isabel and several neighboring municipios were controlled by the Central Aguirre Corporation. This Boston based sugar firm began buying land a decade after the U.S. occupation. By the 1930s it owned 7,249 cuerdas (.97 acres) of Santa Isabel, the lion's share of the town's fertile land. As in other sugar areas, the Corporation's expansion had hastened the decline of the old hacienda system, and eliminated almost all of the scattered subsistence farms. Here the process of consolidation was more extreme than in other sugar areas, eliminating as well most medium size land owners. A very few colonos remained, and a few absentee-owned fields delivered their cane to non-Aguirre mills. With these exceptions, Aguirre towered above all. And with the exceptions of a few wealthy families and a more substantial middle class found mostly in the town, the U.S. Corporation confronted a relatively homogenous population of "rural proletarians".

Sidney Mintz described these workers in 1949 as landless and essentially propertyless, store buying, and dependent on wage labor. Above all, they were poor. A good day's pay was 85¢. During the months of

"dead time" between harvests, few made that. Many lived on Aguirre land in Aguirre houses, bought from Aguirre stores, and received their limited medical care from Aguirre doctors. When elections rolled around, a pair of shoes, a few dollars, or an open threat insured that most voted for Aguirre's favored candidates, so that even the municipal government practically belonged to Aguirre.

The workers were mobile. Families often relocated through choice or necessity. Formalized behavioral rules allowed a newcomer to fit in quickly. These rules of cooperative public behavior also helped suppress potentially disruptive competition and conflict over limited opportunities. Rural proletarians knew who they were, and knew they had to hang together. They were class conscious, and fairly united. Mintz noted how the effortless community of the old haciendas had already been disrupted by increasing integration in social relations beyond the immediate locality. But the workers remained tightly knit together as kin, neighbors, friends, and compadres. This unity provided the basis for an active grass-roots union movement.

Jauca, the focus of this investigation, was in the center of Aguirre operations. Within the barrio, in fact completely dominating barrio land, was Colonia Destino. Destino had been one of the more important south coast agricultural estates of the late nineteenth century. Its land was well suited to cane production, and land values were accordingly high. Destino's acquisition in 1910 was Aguirre's first major purchase in Santa Isabel. By 1940, sugar production so dominated local terrain that the settlements were virtual islands in a sea of cane. Much cane meant much work. Jauca was relatively prosperous, supporting a few merchants. The absence of land for new housesites was probably the main reason that population did not grow. The total of 1181 residents in 1940 was only 51 more than in 1930. Other barrios with less work and less valuable

valuable land grew substantially in the same period.

Most jauqueños lived in one of two settlements. The village proper was stretched out along the main coast highway. That had about 50 houses. Then there was Destino. This old hacienda had become the center of Aguirre's field operations in Jauca. Fenced in with its administrative buildings, warehouses, and workshops were forty shacks for workers and their families, two barracks, and a few larger houses for local administrators and foremen. Life inside Destino was more regulated by Aguirre than in the village, even though all but a few merchants in both sites shared similar work in the cane. Inside, insubordinate workers could be (and often were) cast out of their houses. Villagers had more secure homes, and so were slightly less under the Corporation's thumb. Villagers were called "independent", while Destino residents were often called, only half in jest, "slaves". Besides Destino and the village, there were two smaller colonia settlements, and a few scattered houses or house clusters. Some of the houses were along Jauca's two beaches. The changed power relations after the Popular victory led to rapid growth of the beach settlements.

During the harvest, Destino barracks housed seasonal laborers from the nearby mountains. They came from their highland subsistence farms to make a little cash. Most returned home during the dead time. A few had remained permanently on the coast over the years, appreciating the higher wages and relatively steady work. But this influx was restricted in Jauca by the limited living sites. About 1943, some highlanders set up shacks on one of the beaches. Prior to 1940, any such attempt would have been crushed, physically, by agents of the absentee landowners who claimed title to the beaches. (Ownership of the beaches is still being disputed today.) With the Populars in San Juan, the squatters were allowed to stay. By the late '40s, the beaches had grown to sizable

settlements of fisherman and recent arrivals from the highlands. The highlanders gave the beach settlements a distinctive cultural flavor.

The Popular victory and implementation of their program would significantly alter working life in Jauca. Minimum wage legislation did not cause a sudden jump in pay. But wages crept up slowly, and abuses were eliminated, especially in certain types of piece work. The work day was reduced to eight hours. Union efforts to organize and represent workers received legal backing. One very important reform concerned the Aguirre owned "American Store". The government abolished a practice by which workmen's purchases on credit were deducted in advance from their wages. This practice had kept many workers permanently in debt to the Corporation, and its elimination was an important weakening of its control. But the poverty remained. And Aguirre continued its established policy of simplifying work tasks, mechanizing, and generally cutting labor inputs. This resulted in an increased seasonality of work through the decade, as dead time work proved more easily mechanized.

Another major effect of the Popular labor laws was to transform labor-management relations. The PPD's rural power base made it responsive to union ideas. Backed by law, vigilant unions made Aguirre learn to respect its workers. The often violent confrontations of earlier years quickly disappeared. Strikes would continue, nearly up to the present, but their frequency and intensity would diminish.

Yet as a result of this victory, the unions were to experience new problems. Through the 1940s, and more so in the next decade, sugar workers' unions would fuse with the Popular organization. Many able leaders were elected as island representatives. This increased their ability to represent workers' interests, but at the same time, the unions were being co-opted. The politicians in San Juan became more important than the local leaders in the barrios. Unions would still

achieve concessions in the years to come. But increasingly, they functioned mostly as watch dogs, vigilant to insure that the Corporation did not violate laws or existing contracts. In doing so, the union brought several suits which won large, lump-sum payments of back wages to workers.

Politically, local life took a great leap forward. Vote buying and direct coercion were virtually eliminated. The potential of this democracy unleashed was shown in the Popular victory itself. Within Santa Isabel, a Popular was elected mayor in 1944. He was to dominate local politics for twenty-four years. In the late '40s, the local sugar workers' union collapsed under charges of corruption, favoritism, and mismanagement. The mayor soon organized a new union to take its place. He was repeatedly elected its president, providing a concrete example of the merging of union and political activity. His "dynasty" is often compared to Muñoz on the local level. Despite problems which arose near the end of his career, he still enjoys a reputation as an able politician who cared about the lot of Santa Isabel's poor.

But the political reform was to stop short. The victorious Populars faced a situation where much of the population was illiterate, most were without political sophistication, and the money and media backed a Republican opposition which had shown few scruples in the past. So perhaps what happened was unavoidable. Rather than teaching people to critically evaluate the qualifications and program of individual candidates, the Popular message was to vote the straight party line. This message was hammered home in a nightly radio broadcast, and a free party newspaper distributed in the barrio. Through these media and the work of local Populars, the party was to shape the consciousness of a people who formerly had little knowledge of island events. And the consciousness formed was distinctly Popular.

The PDP was portrayed as a unified, dedicated organization, selflessly working for the good of the people under the watchful eye of Don Luis. A myth was created around Muñoz. He came to be seen as a benevolent father figure, to be trusted, followed, but never questioned. This is clear in interviews with older informants. Generally, they show detailed knowledge of Popular programs, but remember little of Tugwell's instrumental role in the reform, and less about the Popular re-orientation of the mid-1940s. Mintz reports that in the late 1940s, some maintained a critical skepticism, and others felt some disillusionment with the new government already. But these attitudes would remain in the minority for the duration of Muñoz's rule. As one man told me, "Don Luis taught us how to use the vote--a little".

A second chain of events was touched off by World War II. Its immediate effects included shortages of basic imported foods, and a measure of prosperity occasioned by construction of local military bases and the providing of support services for service men. Some jauqueños were drafted or enlisted. Their families received substantial benefits by local standards. Many used this money to build or improve houses.

A more signicant long-term effect was in the way service had changed the returning veterans. Most avoided work in the cane. Many used veterans benefits to study. Since most had had only a few years of school before the army, not many reached high school graduation on the veteran program. Still, they became better educated than most of their contemporaries. With more education, a greater knowledge of English, and preferential hiring of veterans, some moved into the slowly growing middle class. Some had learned to drive in the army--a rare skill in those days. Rarer still, a few were able to buy cars, and others set up stores.

The veterans' values and way of acting had changed, whether because of changed socio-economic status, exposure to North American ways,

or, more likely, both. Marriages provide a dramatic example. The established form had been for a couple to elope and live together without any legal or religious ceremony. After the war, the number of Catholic weddings skyrocketed from an average of 12 per year for all of Santa Isabel for the five years before the war, to 86 per year in the five years after.

The increase of marriages was part of a larger process of religious change. Most jauqueños called themselves Catholic. They believed in God, and had a special reverence for the Virgin Mary. But they seldom went to church or received the sacraments. Even the socially important act of baptism was more commonly performed in the home by friends than in the church by a priest. The Catholic Church as an institution was seen as suspiciously close to the town's rich, physically inaccessible because of its location in the town, and costly to attend. Religious activity in the barrio was more likely to be spiritist than strictly Catholic. (Spiritism is a melange of Catholic, African, and individual beliefs, which emphasizes direct interaction with the spirit world. Until recently it was tolerated by the Catholic hierarchy. It will be discussed in more detail later in this report.)

The Catholic Church's attempts to reach the rural population have fluctuated ever since, depending on the temperament of the priest at the time. At the end of the '40s, it seems to have been making some effort to reach out. A proselytizing order of monks made appearances, and mass marriages were performed in the barrios, including one in Jauca. Around the same time, the priest would offer occasional masses in homes.

A more concerted effort was being made by new Protestant churches. A small Evangelical Church had existed in Jauca for many years, but that congregation had grown little. In the 1940s, a much more active Pentecostal sect arrived in Jauca. Its lively services could scarcely be ignored. And it aimed its preaching directly at the poor. Revivalistic churches have

often been associated with periods of social change. So it is not surprising that the Pentecostalists enjoyed substantial success in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

In the late '40s, another change was brewing which was to have a tremendous impact on local life. A labor shortage developed on the mainland, and Puerto Rican workers migrated en masse to fill the gap. In Jauca, a pattern of seasonal migration was well established by 1949. Jauqueños looked for agricultural work, which was all they knew. Few joined in the budding movement to San Juan. Few went directly to U.S. cities. Instead, sugar workers went to northern fields when the local sugar harvest ended, and returned for the next sugar harvest. At first this movement was under the control of the Puerto Rican Department of Labor. When the air fares dropped a few years later, the Department was skirted and most went on their own. The steady pulse of seasonal migration would have an enormous effect on life in Jauca in the coming decade.

Social change in Jauca in the 1940s was more potential than actual. Not that social life was static. I doubt that there has ever been an unchanging decade in Puerto Rican social life. Besides the several changes already described, there continued the long term trends described by Mintz as part of Aguirre's growing control. These included increasing dominance of impersonal capitalistic relations in the workplace, and increasing definition of the rural workers as a distinctive class. At the time of Mintz's work, one of his colleagues in another site reported older folks complaining that the young had lost respect for the old ways. In Santa Isabel a couple of years later, the town council passed a curfew to deal with the growing problem of wild youth, so it seems that here too they felt the changing times. But in retrospect, the main significance of the 1940s seems to be in setting the stage for the multi-faceted, nearly breath-takingly rapid changes of following decades.

The 1950s. Seasonal migration dominated social life in the '50s. Most men joined in the march northward for six months or more of the year. Wages saved or sent home provided a big boost. Houses were bought or improved, store-bought furniture became common, radios were found in most households, and the old tattered and patched clothes began to fade away. Life was still seasonal, marked by the presence or absence of the men. But in purely monetary terms, some families now found themselves in better shape during dead time than during the harvest.

By the mid to late '50s, the higher wages being paid in northern agriculture began to affect the labor force available for the cane harvests. Many would work in the cane just long enough to earn plane fare, then head to the U.S. Those who obtained better work in the states sometimes found that unemployment payments made work in the cane not worth the effort, and so sat out the harvest. This declining work force pushed on Aguirre's established policy of mechanization. Those who remained in Jauca, especially the older cane workers, began to feel their livelihood threatened. Shovel work, which had been relatively skilled and secure work, was almost entirely eliminated. The labor saving machines and techniques led to diminishing yields in the cane fields.

As men began leaving work in the cane, the solidarity of the male labor force was weakened. Men who had seen each other day after day, year after year, now would see each other only outside of work hours, and then for only part of the year. This process continued and accelerated as local occupations became more diversified. It would inevitably contribute to a weakening of the class identity upon which the Popular victory had been built. I suspect that this breaking up of the male cohort made easier a limited restructuring of male and female sex roles in the next decade.

Seasonal migration changed other ways of living. Formerly, many

had kept small year-round gardens. These never amounted to much, but a little went a long way in dead time. Now, men who had spent dead time in the U.S. did not need the food or the aggravation of a small garden plot. And so the last vestiges of local subsistence farming died out.

As the lure of the cane diminished, and that of the mainland increased, the migration of highlanders to Jauca fell to almost nothing. Highlanders had been coming to the coast for at least fifty years, bringing with them their distinctive, somewhat more rigid way of life. This slow infusion stopped as Jauca switched over to being a net labor exporter, and the mountains began to send youth to the cities and the mainland.

It can be imagined that repeated seperation of husband and wife would strain some families. Some did fall apart, but apparently not too many. A more widespread effect relates to child rearing. Traditionally, the father had applied any needed punishments, while the mother was something of a pushover. Even though other relatives sometimes stepped in, children, especially boys, enjoyed much more liberty when the father was away. Some jauqueños now believe that a general breakdown in parental exercise of discipline can be traced to this time. In another change which I cannot yet explain, the total number of births in Santa Isabel turned down in 1947.

Migration promoted increased consumption through raised income. It also led to a degree of status consciousness previously unknown. The returnees sported "american" clothes and other purchases from "el norte". Such items became a mark of prestige. Many also assumed, or at least aped, North American attitudes and values. They chided local ways as backward, and tried to act "cool". In the later 1950s, rock and roll and hair straighteners were all the rage.

The basis of another important value change has already been mentioned. The traditional male role had always included working. The man

was supposed to be outside, bringing home the beans. When unemployment payments let many men sit home through the harvest, this traditional definition of male adulthood began to lose force.

In the early 1950s, a new element was added to the migration pattern. More of the seasonal travelers began moving to northern cities, and getting permanent jobs. The standard pattern was for a man to go from a U.S. farm or directly from Jauca to the home of a friend or relative in New York. The New Yorker would put up the newcomer, show him around, and help him get a job washing dishes. Once established, the newcomer would look for a home and a better job, and then send for any family left behind. Often, he would then be available to help others move north.

These moves had been limited before. It was difficult to move to a city without a contact. Contacts for jauqueños had been few. There had been a handful of locals established in New York since the teens. They were joined by a few World War II and Korea vets who went directly to the city on being discharged. They formed a nucleus. After they had helped the first wave of new migrants come in, the basis was established for a much larger permanent migration.

The social consequences of a permanent move varied by individual. Many maintained close ties with the people back home--writing, visiting, and sending back aid. Of this group, many had planned to stay in New York for a few years only, to accumulate enough money for a house or store back home. But then they got "trapped", by a job, a new family, debts... Some gradually lost contact with Jauca. And a good number who did not plan on returning had cut practically all ties on the day they left. Beyond the level of individual cases, "la migración" was a severe blow to the interpersonal ties that linked families and the larger village society. People still remember how the wailing at a

departure was like that of a funeral.

For a young man hoping to escape the poverty of his youth, migration was one of two options. The other was military service. Many enlisted or were drafted, especially during the Korean War. Like World War II, war in Korea brought temporary prosperity to Jauca. Direct benefits to the families were less than before, but more men from Jauca were involved. With the money they sent home, houses were expanded or repaired, and families had a little more to live on. And as after World War II, the veterans came back to new possibilities. One mayordomo (field supervisor) recalled that almost none returned to work in the fields. They went to U.S. cities, or were given preferential access to non-agricultural job openings, or went back to school. Most Korean vets began their "second education" at a higher grade than had World War II vets, because of the improved educational programs of the '40s. So many were able to finish high school, some even going on to college.

Because of these veterans' benefits, military service and migration were not equal as means of escaping poverty. Both provided an immediate economic lift. But military service was much more conducive to an improvement of one's life chances. That is, it promoted upwards mobility more assuredly than did migration, especially seasonal migration.

Increasingly through the 1950s, veterans in school were joined by younger students with government educational aid. Child labor laws encouraged children to stay in school. Low cost or free lunches, school buses, and free shoes removed part of the financial burden on the parents. For the first time, a substantial number of students passed from the elementary school in the barrio to the higher grades offered in the town. The best students received scholarships beginning in primary grades. Thanks to government aid, the late '50s saw the startling phenomenon of cane workers' children going to the newly expanded University of Puerto

Rico. Although there was still little local work for those who obtained a high school degree, college bound students would become the professionals of the next decade.

The 1950s saw increasing prominence of federal transfer payments. The importance of veterans' benefits has already been described. Both the '40s and '50s also had some free surplus food distribution, and pitifully small welfare payments to the disabled. But important new steps were taken in the '50s when the Social Security and unemployment insurance programs went into effect locally. Together, the federal payments helped take the sharp edge off poverty. They also created a new, direct relation of dependency between villagers and the federal government, which this author suspects as being largely responsible for the decline of pro-independence sentiments after 1952.

The 1945-1955 period represents a transition from the older unmitigated poverty, to the less extreme, more regulated poverty still common today. The poor still could not live <u>well</u>. But most would be able to obtain the basic necessities. What is considered a "necessity" changes with the times, of course. The returning migrants and veterans had already introduced new standards. Television (which is discussed below) also promoted consumption. But even without the magic of video, consumption had grown and changed. Between 1945 and 1955, several new types of stores were established in Santa Isabel. They were: a hardware store, a construction materials outlet, an electronic appliances store, a bicycle repair shop, garages, gasoline stations, a radio store, dance halls, and billiard parlors. By 1955, General Electric and Esso had joined an island department store chain in competing for local business. The Aguirre American Stores were still operating, but consumers with new options soon turned away from them.

Towards the end of this decade of transition, in 1954, two

occurrences punctuated the end of the sugar Corporation's domination, and the beginning of the local effects of the industrial decentralization program. Local implementation of land reform gave half-acre parcels to the poorest sugar workers. The practical effect was limited for a couple of years, since few of them had the resources to put up even a shack on their new land. But then new regulations and taxes forced Aguirre to divest itself of worker houses. The forty shacks in Destino, and others from nearby colonias, were moved to the newly divided "parcelas". Aguirre was reasonably cooperative through this relocation. At the time, some suspected that the Corporation could see the writing on the wall, and that the parcelas settlement at least had the virtue of anchoring their work force in the area. But when Aguirre lost direct control over workers housing, it lost much of its remaining power over workers' lives.

Yet even in this tremendous improvement, negative aspects must be noted. Inside the colonia or out, the workers' shacks remained poor living quarters. Life for the new parceleros was without electricity or paved roads. Water had to be carried in cans from public taps. Sanitary facilities were whatever one could make. Less tangibly, the move from Destino caused a shift in the sense of community. Before the move, Destino workers' families had enjoyed a forced intimacy. Life was not without conflicts. But the intensity of daily contact produced a feeling that they were all like one family. In the parcelas, people found themselves mixed together with less familiar families from other colonias, the beaches and elsewhere. The parcelas had more than twice as many families as the village proper by 1960, and they were stretched out along a quarter mile of Route 1. People began to drift apart. In Destino, neighbors had routinely interchanged cooked food at dinner. As the distances between friends widened, this custom began to fade out.

Modern manufacturing appeared on the local scene when the Paper-Mate company opened a pen factory in neighboring Salinas. Manufacturing was not completely new. One of Aguirre's mills was located in western Santa Isabel, and some needlework had been done in houses or small workshops for many years. But Paper-Mate was something different. It exemplified the diverse social changes set in motion by manufacturing employment. Discussion of these changes will be postponed until the section on the 1960s. In that decade, other factories came in to make this kind of work more common.

Throughout these years of economic upheaval, political life was remarkably calm. Santa Isabel and Jauca had been and remained firmly in the Popular camp. The 1952 referendum on the Constitution was seen as a confidence vote for Muñoz, which he carried easily. The Independence and Nationalist parties had only a few backers, and did not constitute a significant local force. But even though the Populars easily won the elections, some individual disillusionment had been evident even by 1950. By the end of the decade, a few came to feel that the PDP was stagnating, and no longer working for the poor. They went to the opposition Republican or Christian Action parties. This trickle would swell in the next decade.

One area in which the political system really delivered was public health care, long a primary concern of the poor. Malaria and other infectious diseases had been declining through various government programs for years. The Popular government stepped up these efforts. In 1950, nearly all births took place at home with a midwife. By 1960, most occurred in the local hospital. Problematic cases were even sent to the District Hospital in Ponce, beginning, as it turned out, a long term process of downgrading the local hospital facilities. Hospital births lowered infant mortality. At the same time, it disrupted what appears

to have been a central symbolic complex. Home birth and the period before and after birth had been soaked in meaning and structured by prohibitions, prescriptions, and traditions. Much of this went by the way, eliminated by the fact of hospital birth, or dismissed by doctors as superstition.

In 1957, television arrived in Jauca. The first sets were owned by merchants or other better-off individuals. Children would be allowed in to watch, and would pack the floors and stare in from the windows to see the new marvel. (In some nearby barrios, the first owners charged admission.) The sets spread rapidly, being a very prestigious item, so that regular TV watching quickly became a habit. With it, other habits changed.

TV was and is a great promoter of consumption. It created awareness of new products and needs. And TV entertained. Men began to stay home to watch TV instead of roaming or socializing with friends and neighbors. Perhaps most important was the effect on children. Children learn to play by watching others play. Television not only kept the kids inside, breaking up the much larger play groups of the 1940s, but it showed a new kind of play. On television commercials, most play is in small groups centered around a toy. These toys had to be bought, not made like the older toys. They could be broken or taken by other children. With this new "toy intensive" play, children had a new opportunity to learn to distrust and compete with their peers. And of course, television had the function of hooking both young and old into the larger society much more firmly. Local subcultural variations would diminish as all of Puerto Rico tuned in to the same messages--messages created or controlled by individuals or forces far removed from the rural barrios.

Clearly, the pace and scope of change increased in the 1950s.

Above the individual trends already discussed, a few summary statements are possible.

The long-term, historical trends noted by Mintz had accelerated markedly. The people were becoming increasingly re-oriented to institutions or structures above the village level. They lived, worked, and fought in distant lands. They depended on income sent by the good graces of Washington. They stayed longer in the schools, went to church more often, and used the hospital more regularly. They became enmeshed in the economy as consumers. Traditional beliefs were supplanted by those of technical experts. And local people relaxed their militant position as defenders of their own destiny, leaving it to their leaders in San Juan.

The integrity of the old community went into decline. The solidary workforce fragmented, ties of constant coresidence were strained or broken, and the formalized rules of public behavior were subverted by new ideas from "el norte". In one transcendently important reversal of past trends, the community became socially differentiated--by veteran status, by foreign residence history, by educational level, by job type, by income, by house type, by religion, and even by political party.

Change had become so pronounced that change itself was a recognized part of the environment. Hernandez Alvarez lived in the Jauca parcelas for two months in 1958. He found that the majority of parceleros were dissatisfied with the speed and direction of change. They felt that a few had benefited disproportionately from recent opportunities, while the majority (about 90%) were being passed by. The bitterest and most oppressive conditions of the past were gone. But their old way of life was clearly on the wane, and the future seemed to offer little but more migration and poverty. Certain aspects of spiritism have been associated with social dislocation and stress (as will be discussed later).

So it is probably not mere coincidence that two spiritist centers opened in Jauca in the later 1950s.

The 1960s. The 1960s saw increased movement in the local economy, and migration moved into the background. Even though new problems appeared, the '60s are generally regarded as a prosperous time. It was a time of new opportunities. Social differences which had developed in the previous decade structured the way a person could respond to the opportunities, and so combined with factors of personal psychology and plain luck to send individuals off on different trajectories.

Cane production continued its historic slide. Mechanization continued, without halting the steady downward lines on all the production charts. Early in the decade, the Boston owners of Aguirre sold out to French shareholders. A drought around 1965 reduced the new owners' profits. Within a few years, they decided to quit sugar production entirely. They drafted a plan for selling some of their land, and planting the rest in a wide range of fruits and vegetables. This plan came as the sugar industry went critical throughout the island. Faced with the prospect of total collapse and an aroused union movement, the government stepped in to nationalize Aguirre in 1970.

Despite the precarious condition of the industry, sugar workers did well throughout this time. Minimum wage legislation and contracts produced steadily rising wages, bonuses, benefits, and work protection. The late 1960s and early 1970s are fondly remembered as the best time to work in the cane, even while it is said that the evident mismanagement and declining productivity was clearly reducing the competitiveness of Puerto Rican sugar.

The first years of the 1960s saw a new kind of agriculture in Santa Isabel. Fleeing the Cuban revolution, the Swiss-owned Nestle-Libby Corporation established a plant and field operations just a few

miles from Jauca. At first, they entered into a cooperative agreement with Aguirre, growing tomatoes and a few experimental crops on Aguirre land. Libbys processed and packaged the produce, concentrating on tomato sauces. Later in the decade, they broke with Aguirre and suspended field operations. All the ingredients for their canning would thereafter (up to today) be imported. But Aguirre and later the government maintained fresh vegetable production for sale to the local market. During the 1960s, fruit and vegetable production would not approach the the significance of sugar cane. But on a visit in 1965, Mintz noted that some 1200 acres were devoted to the new crops, and 900 to 1,000 people were getting seasonal employment from them.

This new kind of agriculture introduced two changes in the social organization of field labor. First, the work was non-union, as it has remained to this day. Second, most of the field workers were women. There had always been women working in the cane fields, more in the 1930s than in later years. But these were mostly hardship cases--widows or abandoned wives. A woman working side by side with the men in the fields certainly did not improve her public image. This mild stigma, coupled with the physical demands of field labor, its seasonality, and low pay made it the opposite of work becoming available to women in factories. The latter was much sought after, selectively available, and held on to as a career. Field labor for women was more a temporary way to maintain poorer families when the male breadwinner was out of work. More will be said shortly about women working.

During the 1960s, wages and working conditions in local agriculture grew nearer to those prevailing on the mainland. Simultaneously, other economic opportunities were opening, and Puerto Rican migrant laborers in the eastern U.S. faced new competition from Mexican and Caribbean workers. Seasonal migration would continue to be a major

fact of life even into the 1970s. But it was clearly declining throughout the '60s. Permanent relocation to the U.S. likewise continued at a slower pace than in the 1950s.

Fishing was another traditional occupation that took some blows in the 1960s. Jauca never had a large group of fishermen. But its small core added a distinctive flavor to local life, especially on the beach. Fisherman now say that the catch of various kinds of fish fell off in the 1960s. Shellfish, lobster, tortoise, and manatee also declined, the latter two nearly to the point of local extinction. Two reasons are evident. One is pollution from petrochemical plants further down the coast and from runoff of onshore pesticides and herbicides. The other is depletion from over harvesting. As intra-island travel developed, Salinas became known as a seafood center. Increased demand jacked up the price paid to fishermen, who then intensified their efforts and became less discriminate in their take. Pollution and over-harvesting have also made scarce the once abundant land crab.

While agriculture and fishing sputtered along, other sectors expanded. In manufacturing, shoe and apparel factories opened in and around Santa Isabel. Besides production workers, many were to find employment as security guards and support personnel. Public sector employment expanded. State and federal funds provided for more medical personnel and teachers. New or expanded government programs meant larger office staffs. The police force and public utility's work crew enlarged. More were employed in state supported construction. As other sectors expanded, commercial jobs expanded apace.

The changing structure of the local economy had become evident in the 1950s. The 1960s felt the full impact of this change. Offices and factories required different rythms and responsibilities than work in the fields. Some could not make the transition. Even today, there are

those who prefer field work. But they are a minority. From the beginning, factory and white collar jobs have been coveted. They were cleaner, lighter, out of the sun, and better paying. So from the beginning, there have always been more people seeking these jobs than were jobs available. The social repercussions of these new, scarce jobs were to be enormous.

One change was in education. The Popular government had always emphasized education. More than just a goal in itself, they saw in education a way of increasing Puerto Rico's "human capital"--the skills the work force could offer potential investors. Also, lengthening time in school reduced the available workforce, and so depressed the rate of unemployment. But except for those highly motivated few with college as a goal, and veterans who were paid to study, the incentives for staying in school had been limited. In the late '50s, there were still few jobs outside of the cane for those who finished high school.

When the factories and other white collar jobs came, employers found a ready pool of high school graduates. Most employers instituted a high school diploma as a job requirement, regardless of its relevance to the work. If nothing else, this served as a quick way of screening the abundant applicants. So a high school diploma became a significant social marker, dividing the population into two groups with different positions in the job market. And so parents began to put more emphasis and energy into their children's education, seeing in it a real opportunity for improving their lives. They would goad the kids, telling them that if they didn't study, the cane would be waiting for them. High school enrollment climbed through the '60s, as federal funds aided in expansion of educational programs. More went on to college.

But the very success of this emphasis on education became a problem by the end of the decade. When the economy failed to expand as rapidly as the educated work force, the high school diploma began to

depreciate in value in the job market. In the 1970s, those who stayed in school to avoid a future of field labor would often find that field labor was the only work available.

The increased emphasis on education brought new financial strains for some families. Basic costs were paid by the government. But notebooks, pocket change, clothes, etc. were burdens of the family. Clothes weighed especially heavily. With the new status and style consciousness of the 1960s, a child who dared to appear in patched or worn clothes would be ridiculed by classmates. School costs had two implications. First, those with better incomes would be more able to keep their children in school, adding a hereditary element to the new social division. Second, many parents came to see children as burdensome financial responsibilities. Time and again informants told me that in the old days, another child or two made no difference economically. But with the costs of a high school or college education, parents had to restrict the number of births.

Education was not often enough for landing a good job. It helped to "know someone", to have a friend, neighbor or relative as a connection. Use of personal connections was an old pattern. Contacts had been important in getting or changing jobs in the cane. The pattern of reciprocal aid had been institutionalized in ritual god-parenthood, or compadrazgo. Compadres established a life-long pledge of mutual assistance, and a person could have as many as fifty compadres.

But what had changed was the social significance of personal contacts. Placing a friend or relative in a stable factory or white collar job could significantly restructure his life opportunities. It was a pass to mobility which might be unobtainable by one's individual efforts. The co-operative egalitarian links of compadrazgo were superseded by the competititive relation known as padrinaje (from padrino, or god-

father), signifying that one's life chances could be determined by the intervention of a sponsor or advocate. With such aid, one pulled away from the mass. Padrinaje pushed the "traditional" and "modern" work force further apart. Those in the better jobs associated more with each other, so the social ties along which favors flowed turned inwards.

Social mobility was matched by local geographic mobility, as more people traveled to work. Except for the migrants, agricultural workers worked close to home. Traveling any distance was difficult and expensive. But travel was getting easier. Through the '50s and '60s, local roads were improved. Public cars were more numerous and affordable by those with work. Many bought their own cars in the 1960s. The biggest jump in commuting came with the construction boom (discussed below). A twenty or thirty mile trip became routine. A more permanent group of commuters developed with the factory and white collar jobs. The links of padrinaje had drawn in a far flung work force. People from Jauca worked not only in the town, but in Salinas, Coamo, Juana Diaz, and even the cities of Ponce and Guayama. And people from those places came to work in Santa Isabel. Through this interweaving of the work force, local economic fluctuations acquired a regional character. And local people acquired wider social horizons.

Another major change brought by the new kinds of work was the greatly expanded opportunities for women. Beginning with Paper-Mate, nearly all of the factories would hire more women than men. Office work and retail sales positions became largely female domains. Teaching and nursing gave more jobs to women. Before looking at the implications of this change, we must first consider <u>why</u> so many areas became "women's work".

Some specialization is not hard to understand. Some factories use female skills to produce feminine items, as in machine sewing of

bras and girdles. Other tasks, such as inspecting pen points or general office work, are not self-evidently feminine activities. To judge from current beliefs and recollections, it was held by employers and local people alike that women were more dexterous, and could perform detail work better than men; and that women were more dependable, and less likely to miss a Monday after a hard weekend. Some informants suggest a third reason why employers prefered (and prefer) women; that women were more easily intimidated, that they would put up with abuse from foremen, and that they were less likely to unionize.

The educational requirement also favored females. As part of the traditional sex roles, males are taught to be adventurous and gregarious. Girls are taught to be more restrained, and generally were kept inside the house. While the girls would be at home studying, the boys would be out playing. Not surprisingly, girls did better in school, and more boys dropped out. The graduating classes show a clear majority of females. So a greater proportion of females had the requirements for a high paying job. Padrinaje also enters in. A man with connections often could help place his wife in a job.

Finally, there are reasons why a job type filled predominantly by women should become even more dominated by women. Despite any preferential hiring of female workers, there seems to remain a pro-male bias in promotions, or in being hired on for a better job in another enterprise. In at least some cases, the male minority simply moved up and out. A male in a mostly female job situation would probably want to leave. People comment that it looks "funny" to see a man working, surrounded by women. Regardless of what others thought, such a man would feel somewhat isolated on the job. A visit to nearly any social gathering reveals that men and women have distinctive and seperate ways of socializing. One man cannot easily fit in with a group of women.

The move of women into the job market met some initial opposition. Catholic Church spokesmen worried about the possible effects on the family and morality. In some families, both husband and wife were resolutely against this change in the traditional division of labor, as some remain today. But most saw the opportunity as a blessing. It is hardly surprising that women working set in motion other changes.

It fed a challenge to traditional sex roles, to the idea of machismo. In the traditional family, the male brought home the food, and the wife obediently tended to domestic chores. When women began bringing home their own pay, many succesfully challenged the old division of household labor and authority. Many became less tolerant of the traditional male prerogatives, including the double sexual standard. This kind of challenge was not universal, nor always successful. Many women had to shoulder the responsibilities of a job in addition to their household duties. Some women adapted by reducing their chores. This meant eating beans from a can and using instant coffee, tolerating messy rooms, and most significantly, having fewer children. Even where women succesfully won a more egalitarian relationship, it was not without some cost. The woman too had traditional prerogatives, such as the luxury of avoiding some responsibilities, and having the home recognized as the wife's domain. These were not compatible with the new marriage structure.

When both spouses worked, they obviously could not devote as much attention to the children. Older kids might be left alone; younger ones might be brought to relatives or a paid sitter. This lack of parental supervision is commonly credited locally for a breakdown in respect among the youth. Old, infirm parents also became a burden for working adults, although it would not be until the 1970s that some were sent to institutions or day care centers.

Finally, one other consequence of both spouses working is of paramount importance in restructuring local class arrangements. By the mid-'60s a new pattern was clear. A man with a high paying, modern job would have a good chance of having his wife work in a factory or elsewhere. An agricultural worker would almost never have a working wife. With two incomes, both of which were higher than agricultural wages, a new middle class was being defined. As already described, these families had their own sub-cultural variations, and their economic situation was in a different league.

Construction work was another dimension of the 1960s boom. Construction had long been a sometimes thing in the vecinity of Jauca. Some WPA work had been done in the depression, mostly in swamp drainage. Wars had meant base construction, which drew in many people, but for short periods. The '40s and '50s had seen sporadic work in road improvement. All together, it wasn't much. Building took a leap in the '60s. Government stimulated construction of roads, industrial buildings, and housing. Along the south coast, construction of petrochemical complexes had begun in the 1950s and continued well into the 1960s.

Jauca was still not as caught up in construction as were some nearby communities. The earliest petrochemical plant (CORCO) was nearly forty miles to the west, and drew more workers from that region. When local construction work did develop, specific barrios with early toeholds came to dominate contract work and specialize in construction. Jauca was not one of them. Since the 1970's construction collapse devastated the specialized barrios, Jauca was lucky. But some construction work did become available, reaching sizable proportions a few years into the decade. Unlike other new work, construction remained a male job. And its availability was a major factor in reducing the northward stream of migrants.

Some jauqueños worked in building the Phillips oil refinery in in Guayama, some twenty miles away. For them, this meant months or even a couple of years of high pay. But the longer term impact of the refinery was almost entirely negative for Jauca. To my knowledge, no jauqueños obtained work in the completed plant. Yet the environmental impact was significant. Pollution reduced fishing, combining with other adverse environmental influences.

A local housing boom gave more construction work. There were new parcelas divisions in and near Jauca. Now, however, the government went a major step further, promoting the construction of low cost housing. Work on the houses was by owner-volunteers and hired laborers. Two co-operative urbanizaciones (middle class divisions with more elaborate structures) gave additional work. But even more important than the jobs they provided, new housing represented a material and symbolic leap in local living standards, it reflected the ability of people of different economic levels to cooperate (or not), and it accented the new economic differentiation that had grown since the end of the '40s.

The symbolic significance of home ownership in Puerto Rico has been documented several times. Home owners of all economic levels devote much of their resources to home improvement. The government's low cost housing project addressed this longing for a good house. It arrived in Jauca around 1962, and was open to all except the beach dwellers and a few others with unclear title to their land. The first project houses were 18' by 18', and made of poured concrete. Even without indoor plumbing, they were light years ahead of the patched-together shacks they often replaced. The first houses were built by cooperative work brigades of the owners themselves. The total cost was just over $400, payable in tiny installments. When the first project went well, public enthusiasm led to a second project, with identical houses at slightly

higher cost.

Although the parceleros built and paid for their own houses, the Popular Party reaped a tremendous dividend of support and outright gratitude for providing the opportunity. This counteracted in some cases the disillusionment that had set in by the late '50s. Moreover, the self-help, mutual aid aspect of the projects has been hailed by planners, politicians, and plain people, as perhaps the outstanding moment in Puerto Rico's development. Men and women worked together, aiding each other, learning physical skills and the art of cooperative self-reliance.

Self-help and mutual aid were to be a part of all later building projects, but the glory days had already begun to fade by the second project. The problem was this: all the houses in a given project were constructed at once. Participation in the cooperative work brigade was required of all family heads involved. But one could pay for a substitute to do one's share of the day's work. Few did this in the first building project, since few made more at their own job than what they would have had to pay a substitute. By the second project, more were in better positions, and did hire substitutes. The hired laborers would work only a regular eight hour day, while the cooperativistas put in much longer hours. Those who hired substitutes were supposed to show up after their jobs to pitch in with the volunteers' ongoing work. But in practice, some began to show up late, or not at all. This was the beginning of disputes which grew until self-help and mutual aid were simply requirements, with most of the cooperative spirit gone. In a sense, it was economic differentiation--the fact that some were making higher incomes--that ruined self-help. Economic differentiation and housing were related in several other ways.

One striking aspect of most parcelas developments is the jumbled mix of housing styles. An elaborate two story structure may sit next

to a tiny, dilapidated wood shack. This mix reflects the tight land market, and the way individual family fortunes may have diverged from the time the parcelas were divided. But in the mid-'60s, a new kind of housing project went into planning. A group of professionals and employees of Aguirre planned an urbanization in Jauca. By the time it was built in 1969, a second urbanization was being planned. The urbanizations show that even into the late '60s, the local middle class was capable of co-operative self-organization. I doubt that they could do so easily today.

These are Santa Isabel's only urbanizations outside of the town itself. There seem to be three reasons why Jauca has two, while the other barrios have none. First, Jauca had always been relatively prosperous and centrally located, and so had a sizable core of merchants and professionals to promote the urbanizations. Second, Jauca's strategic location on the main road between Santa Isabel and Salinas made it attractive to interested parties outside the community, who came in on the project. Third, a personal connection facilitated building in Jauca. The result of building the two urbanizations was that Jauca entered the 1970s with a relatively large and sharply distinguished middle class.

The late '50s and the 1960s saw changes in the beach settlement as well. As people moved from the beach to new more secure sites in the parcelas, many houses or sites were sold to non-residents for vacation homes. This process has continued so that today, most of the beach homes belong to people from the town, Ponce, or even further away. The transfers of houses continued in spite of a legal decision around 1965. The old landowners of the sugar period brought and won a case giving them clear legal title to the beach property. But winning in court did not resolve the issue. The families are still in place, and the legal owners are still trying to remove them.

There was increasing pressure for living sites in the late 1960s. Population and land values rose faster than in the '50s. Squatter invasions became common. Two occurred in Jauca. One fizzled out right away. The other established a sizable community on Aguirre owned land just west of the parcelas. This invasion, like all squatter invasions, required a good deal of planning and cooperation.

Jauca's population grew more in the 1960s than in any other decade (from 1,621 to 2,287). The generation coming of age was born in the '40s, after the rate of infant mortality had fallen, but before the birth rate decline. With so many people, it simply became more difficult to know everyone, especially for the older people to know all of the young. This problem was aggravated by the drawn out lay-out of the settlement, which reached exactly one mile from the beginning of the old village to the end of the parcelas. Recognition was also made difficult by the steady movement of people to and from Jauca in search of any available house site.

Housing was not the only field through which social organization and differentiation became apparent. Around 1965, some community members formed a civic club dedicated to improving life in Jauca. They obtained crossing signs for the school, and the first rural trash collection by the municipio. They collected Three Kings Day presents for poor children, and organized programs for Mothers' Day. But the club cracked apart and failed in 1968 in a dispute over whether it should remain a civic club or move more into social activities for its members. Before that happened, it had come under attack by a second club with links to the PDP, which had a fairly overt political purpose, and by some members of the community who accused it of being of and for the middle class. A second club was organized in the wake of the first, this one with a clear Popular bias. It would run into problems within a few years.

The political problems of the clubs reflected the growing penetra-

tion of political issues in daily life. On the island level, the '60s brought increasing criticism of Muñoz's one man rule of the Populars. Republican strength was creeping up. Personal esteem of Muñoz remained high, but people were tired of unemployment and poverty which never went away, and Popular politicians wondered how long Muñoz's popularity could carry the party. The intervention of island politics in the local clubs was an expression of the PDP's efforts to institutionalize control of political life in the communities. Another attempt at control was explained to me by a community organizer who had worked in other areas of the island. He explained how even those federal anti-poverty programs which were specifically designed to foment community participation in planning were rigidly controlled by the party apparatus. During their salad days, the Populars had been content with ideological hegemony. As that weakened, they attempted to increase institutional penetration. Their efforts would soon be matched by the NPP.

The ugly fight that developed with the PDP over the Muñoz/Sanchez split ended the age of political innocence. As one man told me, before politicians had probably done bad things, but news of them did not reach the public. Now it did. The mud slinging continued through the 1968 campaign and beyond. Politics had been a thing of every four years. After 1968, it became a constant theme, debated without respite. But in the late '60s, politics still lacked the power to be really devisive.

Locally, the Popular Party suffered the same fate as the gubernatoral candidate. The mayor who had governed, with a brief sojourn as an island legislator, since 1944 lost to the NPP challenger in 1968. His defeat is part of the story of union-political party relations. Until 1965, the local sugar workers had been independent. Then came a campaign where two island syndicates competed for representation of Jauca's workers. A Salinas based syndicate which had been organized in

1963 won the election. It (like the other syndicate) enjoyed close ties to the Popular leadership. Santa Isabel's Popular mayor remained President of the local chapter. With this new united front, and continuing political support, the unions achieved steady and relatively painless increases in benefits.

Some, however, have suggested that the island unions were falling into complacency, demanding increases when they should have sought a share in running enterprises. The unions as a whole did not meet the challenge of changing economic structure. Locally, they had no success in unionizing new kinds of agriculture or white collar work. They had only a few successes in unionizing local factories, and some of them were short lived. At least one factory closed its doors soon after being unionized. Paper-Mate closed down around 1963, and although here the reason seems to have been the expiration of its tax holiday, local workers had learned a bitter lesson. Unlike the cane, which was literally grounded in the area, the factories could and would move if circumstances became unfavorable. The unions also suffered from charges of corruption. In steadily accumulating cases, officials were believed to have abused or simply pilfered union funds. In one scandal, the mayor was implicated. This, coupled with personal problems and a sense that his administration had run out of ideas, led to the New Progressive mayoral victory.

Other changes were apparent in the 1960s--some new, and some continuations of trends evident in the 1950s. Public health care continued to be available and of good quality, even while functions were gradually transfered to Ponce hospitals. Environmental pollution was becoming increasingly hazardous. The toxin Aldrin was used massively in pest control up until its banning in 1974. Several deaths were attributed to it. In an absence of proof, this author suspects that

high levels of the Aldrin residue, Dieldrin, remain in the soil at present. Further, that these and other chemicals were responsible for sharply declining populations of birds and certain land animals, including land crabs, and that they may still constitute a health hazard for humans.

Like earlier decades, the 1960s had its own war. Vietnam. But unlike earlier wars, the local impact was almost entirely negative. Jauqueños went to fight, and they later received GI educational benefits. But now, better educated veterans would be surrounded by hundreds of non-GIs with equal education. Other benefits were also of relatively less importance than after earlier wars, given the higher standard of living that had since been attained. If there was any preferential hiring of vets, it wasn't very noticeable. And if the Vietnam veterans received less than their share of rewards, they were saddled with an excess of problems. Some returned psychologically disturbed. Others, with drug habits. Many people think the vets were responsible for introducing large scale drug use to the area. True or not, drug use did increase through the later 1960s, simultaneous with a rise in housebreaking and some other crime.

The final major trend of the 1960s to be discussed is the continuing expansion of consumption. Television promoted it. Spreading car ownership let people travel farther to shop. By the mid-'60s, some were going to Ponce to shop, even for groceries. This increased as North American style shopping centers opened in Ponce. As car ownerhship was still limited, this extension of shopping ranges was mainly a middle class phenomenon. And among the middle class, a kind of status competition was expressed in their buying. Chandeliers, carpets, color television, etc. swept through as media promoted fads.

A more basic and widespread change was in food consumption. There

had been a long term trend dating from at least the 1920s, of substituting imported for locally produced food. This had been very gradual, almost imperceptible. When Mintz revisited Jauca in 1965, he found several marked changes since his earlier fieldwork. Traditional produce like root crops and fresh fish had diminished in the diet. People were eating new things, either imported or grown in the local vegetable program. They were eating more meat, some of which came frozen. In short, their food habits were coming to more closely resemble North American patterns.

The 1960s saw a general rise in income and living standards, and a fundamental change in local social life. Trends which had become noticeable in the 1950s were now institutionalized. No longer new elements in the old system, they now dominated social relations. The formerly homogenous rural proletariat had become a clearly differentiated population. The lines of differentiation were not always firmly established, but one could now distinguish a substantial middle class, hooked into the white collar, manufacturing, administrative, and professional jobs. They differed from the lower class of agricultural workers in the relation of the family to the labor market, aspects of family organization, consumption patterns, life chances of their children, associational patterns, and residence.

The integrity of the community continued its decline. Social divisions within it caused conflicts, although still few and minor. The common experiences which had provided a phenomenological "glue" for residents were no longer as widely shared. Multiple external influences pulled jauqueños' interests and experiences away from the village. And the old value consensus which had provided a strong measure of social control was confused and contradicted by new ideas. Perhaps one could say that Jauca had become "modern".

1970 to 1982. This final historical section will be much longer than the others. Besides covering nearly three extra years to bring us up to the present, it includes some speculations on the future. The currency of the material also permits more complete and detailed discussions than were possible before.

In the past twelve years, there has been something of a revolution in local agriculture. The '70s began with cane still being grown on most local land, and cane workers making very high wages. Pay soon dropped to a more sustainable level. Other than the pay fluctuations, government management of the industry produced no sudden changes. New trends became apparent as the decade wore on.

Mechanization reached new heights, moving fully into mechanized harvesting. Since most manual cane cutters came from places other than Jauca, and since contracts still guaranteed work to union members who wanted it, the initial effect was limited. The long term impact on local labor was decidedly bad. Adminstrators came to view the remaining hand cutters as an obstacle, leading ultimately to a succesful repudiation of the union's right to work guarantees. Inexperienced machine operators and several necessary field growing modifications led to much lower production. Further losses were incurred by some costly innovations in mechanized irrigation and train loading, which either did not work as planned or were soon abandoned as sugar acreage receded.

At the same time, a cozy relationship had developed between labor and management. The effort required from a field laborer eased, as the year-round administrative staff grew and grew. The government sugar corporation had become a political employment agency. With all this going on, it is not surprising that the industry sustained huge losses through the 1970s, leading to a crisis this past year. But before, and in a sense contributing to this crisis, a local alternative to sugar

cane developed: expanded fruit and vegetable production.

In the late 1960s, island planners began to focus on the possibilities of import substitution. Food production was identified as a promising area. The island had grown much more of its own food in 1920 than in 1960. With an established market, high bulk, and low unit costs, food seemed like a natural. Various ideas were floated through the '70s. When the Romero governemnt came to power in 1977, it discarded the fledgling Popular program and started its own. The idea was to set up project areas of large scale, heavily capitalized production. Santa Isabel already had some vegetable production, and some of the best soil on the island, so it was chosen to be the site of the mixed fruit and vegetable project (known as frutos menores). Using the same philosophy that guided his approach to industry, Romero turned to foreign agriculturalists. Two Israeli enterprises with a reputation in advanced production techniques were supported heavily by government loans. Eleven smaller farmers received assistance on a much smaller scale. The program limped along for three years. Only in this past harvest have most farms broken through into profitability.

For the people of Jauca to date, the frutos program has created more problems than benefits. Crop dusting results in pesticides blowing over the village. A change in field topography required by new irrigation systems has left the village exposed to regular flooding. Last May, two houses were washed into the bay. If a hurricane hits with heavy rains, there could be a real tragedy. People also complain about the work provided in the highly capitalized farms. They maintain that the frutos (at least up until this past harvest) provided fewer jobs, of shorter duration, for lower wages, and with less consideration for the workers, than the cane. Some with longer term perspectives have other complaints. They feel that the program was a good idea, but it has gone

off course. Specific complaints heard are: that the Israelis' main concern seems to be exports, not production for the local market, that the land is left fallow for too long each year, that the program should give more encouragement to local Puerto Rican farmers, that the rapid expansion of land planted by the Israeli firms have made them the new "bosses", replacing Aguirre, and that a plastic mulch being used in the fields may permanently damage the soil. Of more immediate concern is the suspicion that the commercial success of frutos has led to an unstated government plan to let the sugar industry fail, to free more land for the new crops. There is a great deal of popular resentment of the new program, at least as it has been run so far, and support for a return to more sugar cane production.

The community response to these problems illustrates its lack of power. A group of citizens, mostly from one urbanization which physically projects into the fields, formed a committee to protest the environmental hazards. The leader of the committee has consulted with government officals and farmers, but has sought to avoid confrontations or a court case. To date, they have won some small concessions in practice, but no guarantee that these concessions will be honored next year. When a government committee visited Jauca to hold public hearings on the new program, they gave hours to representatives of the government, the union, and the growers. Then they promised the growers a second hearing to listen to their problems in more detail. Community representatives were allowed only brief presentations at the end, after several senators had left and the others looked anxious to do so. Months later, Jauca has seen no response to their complaints.

In late 1981, the sugar workers' union launched a drive to unionize the two Israeli enterprises. The growers responded with a heavy-handed propaganda campaign, and threatened to leave if the union won.

It lost.

Efforts to unionize frutos workers are impeded by the difference between them and cane workers. Most cane workers are adult family men, and cane work is more or less their life's career. Some cane workers have now shifted over to the frutos. But in overview, the frutos workers are different. They are younger. Continuing the Libbys pattern, many are women. For many, the work is a temporary or supplementary source of income. There are still more workers available than jobs, so there is high turnover. (Some workers claim that certain farmers purposely encourage rapid turnover to avoid paying some legally mandated fringe benefits.) It is, in short, not a group easily mobilized to struggle for workers rights. So even though the great, great majority of jaueños are very pro-union, organizing the frutos workers may be a tough nut to crack.

On the heels of the frutos defeat, the union was to receive a more severe shock. The government sugar corporation laid off scores of workers in the mills and workshops, then demanded a series of givebacks. When the union tried to negotiate, they were given the ultimatum of taking it or facing complete and permanent shutdown of the industry. Even after agreeing to all demands, it was uncertain for weeks if there would be a harvest this year. Harvesting finally began, but few are optimistic about the future. There are bad omens.

One of the most fertile stretches of land in Jauca, which Mintz estimated to have been in continuous production of cane for over three hundred years, is currently being divided for sale for housing development. The government has announced its intention to withdraw from managing field operations. It is handing over land to former corporation administrators, to be operated as private cane-growing enterprises. Those familiar with the situation are very skeptical that many of these

new colonos will be able to survive, and suspect that this is simply a way of letting the sugar industry fail outside of government hands.

The verdict must be reserved on local agriculture's new direction. Sugar is a troubled industry world wide, and an enormous investment would be required to make Puerto Rican sugar price competitive. An alternative type of cane cultivation aiming at increasing total biomass for energy production remains a highly promising but unproven idea. As for the frutos menores, after the unionization effort, wages improved and there was more respect for the workers. In this past harvest there were many more jobs and for more time than previously. And the frutos do serve local markets, even while a good portion is shipped abroad. The situation is still unstable. Whichever way it goes will greatly affect Jauca's future.

Consider one possibility. At present there is a surplus of available labor for the frutos program, even though that labor is being drawn from up to twenty miles away. Were the acreage in frutos to double or triple in coming years, as seems very possible, there would develop a labor shortage during the peak months. Who would fill the need? Puerto Ricans from other parts of the island? Dominicans? Haitians? Whoever, a large seasonal migrant population residing in the area every year would have noticeable consequences. Or another change: whether the new sugar colonos make it or not, Santa Isabel will very probably have twenty or more medium to large scale farmers in years to come. They will control job opportunities and most of the land. Their presence cannot but transform local class and power relations.

Turning to other economic sectors, employment in government, manufacturing and construction varied in the '70s. Generally, those sectors which had expanded in the 1960s grew more slowly, or even diminished, while a few new areas opened up. Government jobs in education, health

care, the police, and public utilities were mostly filled by the late 1960s. The occasional available job usually went to someone with connections. Government office jobs and a few other types would continue to grow in fits as new federal programs and monies became available. One important innovation was federal CETA and summer youth employment, which provided a great deal of work. These programs were wiped out by last year's federal budget cuts, proving to all that what Washington giveth, Washington can take away.

Those who already had government jobs began the decade in strength and prosperity. Under Ferre, most had won substantial concessions in pay and benefits. When the recession hit in 1974-5, Governor Hernandez froze government hiring and wages. Discontent among government employees was instrumental in his defeat in 1976. Some improvements were forthcoming during Governor Romero's first term; but since his 1980 victory, relations with public employees has been severely strained. Besides granting no or minimal wage increases, the government has threatened several areas with cutbacks, and has subcontracted work to non-union firms. Many suspect a barely hidden policy of government union busting.

The situation is complicated by political and class factors. The public utility workers and one of two competing teachers' unions are fairly radical, with many members leaning towards the Socialist Party. But the electrical workers' (UTIER) leadership is challenged internally by both more centrist and more radical factions; and the second teachers' union is associated with the Popular organization. Further, the NPP has an aggressive policy of hiring and promoting political loyalists in all areas controlled by the island government, which includes the educational system and public utilities. All this lends a marked political character to union questions, and this coincidence of factors makes the issues all the more divisive of the local population.

Union disputes do not involve everyone, though. In contrast to the generally pro-union attitude of jauqueños, they remained neutral during the recent UTIER strike. When pressed on the subject, most disapproved of the union position. The electrical workers, they argued, are among the best paid on the island. The acts of sabotage during the strike hurt the public, and it would be the public who would ultimately pay for any wage increase. Several complained that UTIER and other established unions were interested only in themselves, regardless of the costs to the poor.

The utility workers lost the strike by most estimates. That, the government's hard hand, the depressed economy, the political divisions, and the lack of strong public support, all place public sector unions in a very weak position.

Manufacturing can be divided into two subdivisions: labor intensive industries (mostly apparel) established in the 1960s, and newer capital intensive plants (mostly electronics) established within the past few years. The former have puttered along without drastic changes. Since the Paper-Mate closing, cutbacks and closings have approximately balanced expansions or openings. Workers released from one plant have often had first crack at new jobs in others. Consequently, the major part of the labor intensive work force has remained constant for years. New permanent positions have been difficult for younger people to obtain.

The capital intensive plants are products of the past five years. Westinghouse electronics are the most important of the new factories. This new type of factory has been well received. The pay is good, the work light and clean, and the future seemingly secure. They provide work for both men and women. (One personnel officer proudly told me how in keeping with affirmative action, the plant hired exactly 50% women in the past year--a questionable policy under prevailing conditions.)

These new factories require new skills, and opened a small window of mobility in the later 1970s. Now those jobs are filled, and the state of the vast majority of the population remains unchanged.

Westinghouse has a policy against nepotism. But jauqueños complain that other forms of padrinaje still rule hirings and promotions. Upper echelons especially seem closed to anyone from Santa Isabel. While electronics appears to be a field with a future, the future of these plants in Santa Isabel is not certain. Accumulating grievances are making workers more sympathetic to a union point of view. Even though no union has attempted to organize the workers, the management has made clear their anti-union position. Many believe both that unionization will eventually come, and that then the electronics plants will leave.

When local opportunities in the better types of work closed off, education lost a major buttress. Teachers report that students today are very aware of the lack of jobs, and so are not motivated to study. With less motivation, they are easily interested in other things, like marijuana, and often end up dropping out. The idea that there are more jobs available for women probably amplifies differences deriving from childhood sex role training in contributing to a much higher male drop-out rate. Even with this reduced interest, the schools continue to generate more degrees at all levels than the economy can absorb. So a high school degree has become a necessary but insufficient ticket for occupational success.

Construction began the 1970s in good shape, with work available in housing and the San Juan-Ponce highway. It fell with the recession, and has never recovered. This meant a loss of some local jobs. But as already discussed, construction was not a major prop of Jauca's economy. This mitigated the effect of the mid-'70s recession, which was so severe for the island as a whole. Another mitigating factor was the arrival

of food stamps in the same year.

Food stamps, or cupones, immediately became the most significant of all transfer payments to individuals. Prior to this, there had been federal and insular payments to the old, disabled, temporarily unemployed, veterans, and women with dependent children. These programs had been restricted in eligibility or benefit levels. Several federal programs, such as SSI, never applied to Puerto Rico. In contrast, most local families were eligible for substantial benefits in cupones. In April 1980, the U.S. census reports 19,832 residents of Santa Isabel. Social Service records indicate that 14,126 of them received program benefits. Jauca had 2,610 people, 1,644 receiving cupones. This meant a monthly infusion of $520,893 into Santa Isabel, $63,500 specifically for Jauca.

As the most visible of all direct transfer payments, cupones have come to symbolize all government aid to families. The transfers have affected many aspects of local life, and are often the subject of heated discussion. Three issues stand out: the adequacy of aid levels, the question of fraud and abuse, and the impact of cupones on people's willingness to work.

It is generally agreed in Jauca that the beginning of cupone distribution was accompanied by a great deal of wasteful and frivolous spending. The monthly benefit was in many cases the largest lump sum payment the family had ever received. It was often poorly managed. But soon a new equilibrium of better nutrition and more measured spending was established. People now eat better than they did even ten years ago, with this change most noticeable in the poorest families. Food stamps are the means, even though many families still find themselves short and eating less for the last few days before the next payment.

From the United States Congress to the streets of Jauca, it is often said the food stamp and other aid programs are subject to large

scale abuse and fraud. There is some truth to it. One does witness circulation of cupones between individuals, purchases of non-eligible goods, under-reporting of income, and failure to report family circumstances accurately. This is small scale stuff. Although it might add up to very substantial amounts, the costs of minimizing it through increased enforcement would probably surpass the savings. Further, these small scale violations really are inevitable under present circumstances. The poor of Puerto Rico cope with prices comparable to the mainland, but receive a total package of benefits below U.S. minimum levels. If total income is less than minimally necessary, it is not surprising that rule violations will occur as people struggle to make ends meet.

The great majority of food stamp recipients live frugally. Local sentiment even supports cracking down on those who really abuse the program. But the major source of abuse is above the local level. It is clear that substantial fraud is involved in higher level processing of the cupones. For the majority of Jauca beneficiaries, which means the majority of jauqueños, a cutback in benefits will probably mean a deterioration in diet. This is why there is a high level of anxiety over still unsettled changes in levels and forms of cupone payments due this August.

Another commonly heard suggestion is that cupones and other aid have created vagos (vagrants), people who prefer welfare over work. It need be emphasized that this is an extremely common complaint in Jauca, heard from people of all socioeconomic levels. To assess it, we must look at the recent situation in unemployment.

It is difficult to pinpoint when chronic unemployment became a serious local problem. It is not always easy to sort out from the seasonal unemployment of cane or migrant workers. Detailed local statistics exist only for the last few years. Informants say that

in the old days, anyone who wanted could find work during the harvest, and most had some work even in dead time. They remember that it was around the mid-'60s that it first became difficult for someone who wanted to work to find work. By the early '70s, it was a serious problem. Santa Isabel, with its concentration of fertile land and good mix of factories, passed through most of the '70s in fairly good shape. Unemployment has been much lower than in Salinas. Since the late '70s, it was even below the island unemployment rate (14.8% in July 1981, compared to 20.4% for the island). This will probably change when new figures are released which reflect the job crisis which has hit the south coast as a result of petrochemical, sugar, and other layoffs. But even before the current crisis, factory managers told me of 30 to 100 applicants for every job. An administrator of a nearby hospital spoke of more than 30 men applying for an advertised job as a janitor, some of them practically begging for the post. This author has witnessed several examples of the desperate, frustrated search for <u>any</u> kind of regular employment.

There are occasions where odd or part-time jobs go unfilled for some time, often simply because the personal network of the man offering work (e.g. in building a patio) happens not to include anyone available with the needed skills. This does not happen often, but when it does, the experience may be widely recounted, and fuel the belief in vagos. But this author believes that no permanent job, or respectable temporary work, in Santa Isabel goes unfilled for want of an applicant.

If that is true, why do people think there are so many vagos? First, there is some selectivity in approaching jobs. Many individuals, young men mostly, who have a high school degree or higher, have not been able to obtain a white collar or manufacturing job, and yet refuse to apply for work in the frutos menores. This is not a surprise, since for this generation, field labor was used as a bogey man to keep children

in school. Second, some who are laid off and receive unemployment insurance wait until the benefits are near expiring before really trying to get new work. And third, there is a psychological process of internalization of the ruling ideology. Among the group with the least chance of employment--young men with no experience and little education--there is a rueful acceptance of the label vago. Those with no hope of getting a job may laugh and say they would rather collect cupones than sweat for a living. To evaluate this attitude, one must appreciate that a month's pay at minimum wage tops $500. An individual living alone with no income would normally receive total government benefits of $66 per month. A couple gets $122. In most cases, economically, there is no comparison between working and being "on the dole".

In this context, one must question regulations in aid programs which require people to actively seek work. Food stamp recipients who are able to work must register in a job placement program. In July 1981, the program placed four of a total of 5,187 registered individuals. Unemployment insurance recipients must visit at least three prospective employers, and provide the name of to whom they spoke. I, nor anyone else I have spoken to, has ever heard of anyone getting a job in this way. The rules simply waste the time of the applicant and the interviewer. The job-seeker also throws away several dollars in transportation costs. But the true measure of the mandatory job search requirements is not their failure, but rather what would be the effect if they did work. Does the government really want to put people who do not want to work in scarce jobs, taking positions away from those who do? It is possible of course, that these rules are not intended to put people to work at all, but to irritate and humiliate them so that they drop off assistance roles. Even in this the rules cannot have much success, since so many have no income alternatives. Perhaps the most tangible effect of these

and similar rules is that they teach people to view the government as an adversary.

The notion of vagos sponging off U.S. taxpayers underlies the job search requirements. The frequency with which one hears the term even in Jauca suggests that it has a profound significance for local people as well as government regulators. Why?

Theoretically, a vago is one who does not want to work. Someone who wants to work but cannot find a job is not a vago. In practice, however, the term is often used indiscriminately. The image of able bodied men passing their days out of work is deeply distrubing. It runs counter to the "work ethic" supporting all industrial states, and the news media frequently lament the ethic's supposed decline. More relevant to local attitudes is that non-working males fall outside of established norms. The idea that to be an adult, a man must work was noted by Mintz and emphasized in one study of another rural Puerto Rican village. It is rarely expressed now, but there are many indications that it remains an unspoken ideal. A man's identity is defined, in part, by what he does. And an unemployed man does nothing, much of the time.

The troubling image of the idle man has assumed multiple symbolic connotations. It has become the referent for several social antagonisms. Women complain that men do not want to work, but to sponge off women. The economically secure disparage the economically marginal as responsible for their own condition. These marginal individuals either aggresively accept the label, putting themselves outside respectable society; or alternatively bitterly denounce others as vagos, to try to distance themselves from the stigma. The older generation complains of vagrancy among the younger. Each political party uses the image. For independence advocates especially, it is the symbol of Puerto Rico's abject dependency on the U.S.

For many poor, the advent of the food stamp program was the most prosperous time they have ever known. Since then, rises in the cost of living have chipped away at their living standards. The Department of Consumer Affairs has kept increases down in several basic items; but at the same time, the government has boosted electric and water charges, cigarette and alcohol taxes, and is pushing for a boost in gasoline tax. Increases in the state university tuition and other costs mean that poorer students may have to drop out. Anger about sharp and sudden government rate increases would be moderated by quality in the services. But the electricity blacks out, sometimes daily, and this routinely burns out household appliances. (A ruined refrigerator motor is not an easy thing for a poor family to replace.) Street water pipes break and leak for months, so parts of the village have little or no water at peak hours. Roads have crater-sized, car-eating potholes. Garbage collection has recently improved, but had been pretty bad.

Other costs have also risen, notably cooking gas and building materials. Some families have returned to cooking with locally produced charcoal, and many houses have been left only partially completed. The charcoal and unfinished houses are frightening portents for many, who believe that their lives are on the road back to the poverty of the old days. Deteriorating medical care reinforces that impression. Throughout the 1960s, the government actively and succesfully promoted improved medical facilities as a symbol of the island's progress. The degree to which the local and insular politicians can provide free medical care to the poor is now for many the critical measure of a regime's success. But there has been a long term trend to shift all but the simplest of services to regional hospitals, which naturally makes them less accessible. One local hospital closed this year, and others have reduced services. New "voluntary" minimum service charges

were imposed. Several types of medicine have been removed from the free public dispensary, so that the poor must buy them in private drugstores. Often they cannot afford them, and so do not buy all the medicine prescribed. Medical costs influence people's attitudes toward savings. Several individuals told me of small nest eggs wiped out when they or a relative became ill.

In recent years, Puerto Rico has experienced net internal dissavings. That is, people spend more than they have. This is often identified as an internal obstacle to development. But most Puerto Ricans are poor, and it is asking a lot of poor people to expect them to do much saving. This is especially true given the all-pervasive exhortations to consume. Puerto Rico is now one of the mainland's major markets. Television averages over 25 commercial product messages per hour. The government calls on people to "play, play, play" the government lottery, and penalizes gasoline conservation with higher taxes. When one politician's dire warnings about the impact of upcoming federal budget cuts led to a drop-off in consumer spending, the island's major business publication had a fit, demanding that the politician retract his statements to get spending rolling again.

The effects of advertising and fads are very noticeable. Purchases of new goods filling newly created needs are voluntary only in the abstract. Someone who resists the non-stop barrage of advertising for weeks or months before Mothers' Day, Fathers' Day, Valentine's Day, and both Christmas and Three Kings' Day runs the risk of being considered slightly deviant. Conspicuous consumption among the middle class sometimes leads to competitions between neighbors in house adornments, furniture, children's toys, etc. Besides all this, inflation makes time-buying in one sense clearly more rational than saving.

In the nearly complete absence of any encouragement to save, what

appears remarkable is that many do save--in banks, cooperatives, or small job savings groups. Also remarkable is the way this supposed national character flaw has been internalized. One actually hears people say "we Puerto Ricans don't like to save". Not so remarkable, actually, since this message is regularly presented in island media. In short, islanders are urged to buy, then chastized for spending.

The geography of consumption changed in the 1970s. Shopping in Ponce became common. Even the poor joined in. Naturally, this damaged the position of some town merchants. When food stamps arrived, many transfered their food shopping from the barrio to the town, or even to Ponce. Larger stores had lower prices, and the traditional local practice of maintaining a runnning account in a local store to be paid at the end of the month was prohibited under food stamp regulations. So a greater part of barrio business became incidental "convenience" purchases.

In 1974, the highway from Ponce to San Juan was completed. What had been a major expedition over twisting mountain roads became a ninety minute jaunt. A major reorientation of shopping began, which continues today. Many of the middle class go to San Juan or cities along the way for durable goods. The Christmas season sees a steady flow to the huge shopping plazas of the capital. Local merchants have organized publicity campaigns to get people to shop locally, but the effect remains to be seen.

The new highway has facilitated much greater centralization of institutional life. This is not so visible within the village, but it is an inescapable fact if one has any contact with government agencies or private firms. Local offices send records to San Juan. They need central office clearance for small decisions. They regularly report to and are reviewed by the central office. All of this may be more

efficient for the agencies, but not necessarily so for the public. On several occasions, this author had to visit San Juan to obtain simple data about operations of local offices.

We saw how in the 1960s, changes in land use and residence came to reflect the changing internal structure of the village. This intensified in the 1970s. The decade began with the local and insular government combining legal pressure and unspecific promises of future aid to dislodge Jauca's squatters. Most of them dispersed, after having spent about four years on the site. Others remained, defiant, and only left when new living sites were actually made available a few years later. Simultaneously, Jauca's second urbanization was built, thus concentrating more the middle class residences. Since housing conditions remained poor for the majority, the government sponsored two more low cost programs, one in 1972 and the other about six years later. Each represented new, more commodious house styles. But each represented big jumps in price ($1,765 and $4,432 respectively, both without labor). They were beyond the means of many poor families.

The growing younger generation put on pressure for more living sites. Strict legislation prevented more land invasions, but did nothing to alleviate the need. A new parcelas division was allocated in 1976-77, which provided some respite. But there is no prospect of new divisions to relieve the now rebuilt pressure. Nor has there been much recent aid in home construction. Aid has been completely frozen for nearly two years. What talk there is of new government aid envisions wood frame houses replacing poured concrete--another indication to many that things are returning to the bad old days. Meanwhile, young families with limited incomes have to stay in their parents' homes, erect simple shacks in someone's back yard, or rent. Ownership of a substantial house once again seems beyond the reach of many.

Housing and land also reflect tensions of class and party. Within Jauca, the wooden shacks and unfinished shells of concrete contrast with new balustrades, facades, and additions to houses of still prosperous middle class. In the urbanizations, some look down on the parcelas as the home of crime and immorality. In the parcelas, the urbanizations are seen by some as the home of snobbish nouveau riche. These apprais-als are far from universal, but neither are they unusual. This type of tension is reflected more concretely in other areas. Parcelas youth who go to play basketball or join parties in the urbanizations have at times been excluded. In the schools, the middle class students are highly represented in the upper educational tracks. On a few occasions, they have tried to organize parties and other activities which would have excluded the other children.

Transcending the boarders of Jauca are other conflicts. While the young and poor find land and housing beyond their reach, the land around Jauca may be on the verge of major development. Much agricul-tural or marginal land which did not pass into government hands has been or is being divided into lots of about five acres, and sold. Buyers include a very few wealthier jauqueños, and a mixed bag of investors from Santa Isabel to San Juan to Brooklyn. The future of this land is not clear. Some owners plan to farm it, but much of it is too poor for farming. Since Jauca's bays are acknowledged as the best potential swimming beach sites along fifty miles of coast, and the land in question is at or near the beaches, there is a clear possibility of a radically new type of development, or at least major land speculation. Real estate speculation has been a problem even within the settlements. In the parcelas, several people who did not actually need parcelas managed to get one, or even more. They were then sold, at pure profit. The sellers are reported to have had good political connections.

Politics has intruded in other ways. The last division of parcelas was stained by charges of political favoritism. The issue dragged out over the change in administrations, so both parties got to share. At present, recently constructed low cost housing in the town is again being apportioned by political criteria.

Politicization of housing is one aspect of a larger problem. Needs and expectations exceed the economy's ability to supply. The government controls a major part of the economy and the distribution of goods. Control of the government is contested by two closely matched parties. (The Independence and Socialist parties have respected voices, but poll few votes.) Party loyalists expect their men to favor them in allocating benefits; and the party machine expects those who receive benefits to tow the party line. This is seen in allocation of government contracts and funds of various kinds. More importantly, at least for village organization, is how government jobs are controlled. Virtually everyone with whom I spoke was in agreement on one point: political loyalty is more important than ability or training. Incompetents can achieve high positions, and skilled employees can be fired or eliminated through more subtle techniques. People are afraid that a simple expression of opinion on politics can jeopardize their livelihood. One often finds people who, literally, look over their shoulders and hush their voices when talk turns to politics. Some complain how they are forced to lie even to their neighbors about politics in order to protect their jobs. The situation is disgraceful, and both parties share the onus. But this control over patronage gives the central party apparati control over local political life. With a few exceptions, local candidates are the choices of the upper echelons, not the reverse.

Controlling the electorate is more difficult. Political bickering and scrambling for small advantages is more or less constant, even at

the municipal level. The social club organized in Jauca in the late 1960s broke apart around 1971-72 over the use of funds and the alleged political purposes of some members. Later attempts to organize clubs were strictly along political party lines. Local elections get red hot. Most agree that the 1980 election was more bitter and divisive than any before. The elections, the bickering, and the struggle over patronage have sustained an extraordinary level of politicization of everyday life, especially among the middle class where patronage looms large. Some neighbors do not speak to each other because of politics. In some cases, the bitterness has even divided families. No one likes this state of affairs. Even those directly involved would like to be free of it. But with the political institutional structure being what it is, people have no choice but to go along.

Many people have responded by withdrawal. They are beginning to reject the politicians and the system they represent. In the 1980 election, the number of eligible voters who did not vote rose by 50%. Many more now say they will not vote in the future. What one senses is more than discontent. The political system is losing its legitimacy, its mandate to govern. Nothing could be more serious.

Turning from politics to family life, it is clear that the family too has been buffeted by the changing economic climate. Two kinds of family arrangement stand out as problems of role incompatibility. One involves middle class families where both spouses work, but which maintain traditional sexual division of household tasks. In these, a woman is saddled with all the housework, often accompanied by traditional disadvantages of being female, and has a full day at the job. These women suffer from an overloaded set of duties. On the opposite end of the economic spectrum are poor families with unemployed men. Men find themselves being economically superfluous at best. Robbed of their

traditional roles in the job market, they may cling to the image of being a macho. The wife often does not appreciate this pose. Both these types of families run a risk of breaking up. I suspect that the 1980 census will show that the percentage of female headed families, which had been declining, has begun to rise again.

Even where the family is stable, both spouses working continues to mean that children and elderly parents may be given less direct attention. In recent years, some older folks have been sent to a government day care center in a nighboring barrio. And children are becoming less and less affordable. Few women of reproductive age express a preference for more than three children. A startling number of reproductive age women have been sterilized, perhaps 40% in Jauca. (A government supported agency actively promotes the sterilization option.)

One must not imagine that family life in Jauca is nearing collapse. The majority of cases appear to be stable, workable relationships, especially if the couple has already lasted a few years together. Many people think that the family, in general, is nearly as united as in earlier times. The housing shortage, for all its ill effects, has forced some families to physically remain together. The breakdown of the old male cohort and the attraction of television keeps more husbands home more of the time. Television programs and advertisements present an image of sharing and communication between spouses which perceptibly influences local attitudes. Economic equality of working pairs also can (but does not always) lead to a degree of communication not commonly associated with older, more patriarchal patterns. Communication seems to have improved between parents and children. The brutal punishments used in some families even into the 1960s would now invite state intervention as child abuse. Modern fathers have more opportunity to know their children than <u>their</u> fathers, who were almost never at home in many cases.

And if the family today is sometimes shaken by economic forces, this is not new. Mintz emphasized the importance of practical economic factors in ordering families in 1949. While recent economic trends have produced some new forms of role conflict, they have also mitigated other conflicts. Until recently, increased economic differentiation of jauqueños was accompanied by a context in which even the poorest were assured a minimally adequate living. I suspect that this minimized the necessity of asking for assistance from family, friends, and compadres; and that this in turn meant that upwardly mobile individuals were under no economic pressure to cut ties to poorer relations, as has been the pattern in other Caribbean islands. If these suppositions are correct, it follows that further deterioration of the conditions of the poor will lead to fracturing of extended family ties.

Familial ties at present cross economic lines. But there is a clear pattern of middle class endogamy. People with a better education or job tend to marry people of a similar status. This is especially true of professionals; and especially of professional women. Since women are well represented in the professions, many find it difficult to locate acceptable spouses, and marry late or not at all.

Another factor promoting family unity is religion. Catholic and Protestant churches emphasize the importance of the family, and actively promote family activities. They also share a formal requirement of church weddings for members and opposition to birth control, sterilization, and abortion.

Before further discussing the role of religion in Jauca, there remains a final point to be made about the family. Beyond all the social forces which structure the environment and possiblities of a family, a large part of its fate remains determined by the individual psychology of its members. Chance events--luck-- also play an important role.

(The same statement can be applied to the progress of any individual person.) And within families, one notices differences in the dynamic interactions between members. For example, I found that several aspects of local folk traditions, which are nearly forgotten in the population at large, are very actively retained within some families. To date, I have not been able to ascribe any identifying social characteristic common to these families, other than that they are "traditionally minded".

To focus on changes in religiosity in Jauca, it must first be said that it has been difficult to establish clear historical trends. Religious activity presents a confusing picture. Overt expressions of religious faith are omni-present. From bumper stickers to open air proselytizing, from chapel construction to spray painted slogans, signs of religious activity greet one constantly. But one must distinguish the zeal of a few from the position of the majority, just as one must note the distinction of individual faith versus institutional participation. Quantitative historical data are very limited. Informants disagree on even the most recent changes. For these reasons, the assessment of changes of religious feeling will be mostly limited to a comparison of the situation described by Mintz to that of today, and some words on evident current trends.

Participation in the Catholic Church is currently on an upswing. In Mintz's time, the Catholic Church could claim nearly complete identification by the populace, but a very low rate of institutional participation in church activities. This probably remains the dominant pattern, but it has been accompanied by increasing participation. A few reasons for the change can be adduced. The church has shed the old image that it was the domain of the rich. Gone are the reserved pews for the town's wealthy families. Improved transportation has made the town church more accesible. The church has reached out, physically and

organizationally. A new chapel was constructed in Jauca this year, largely through volunteer efforts. The current pastor has actively promoted retreats, instructional and social activities, and civic minded groups. It is impossible to say whether this represents a long term change, or the short lived accomplishments of a particularly active and able priest.

The Catholic Church plays a role in culture change and class rearrangement. Certain practices which formerly co-existed with the church are now in eclipse, or actively opposed by the priest. Spiritist practices are inseparable from the Catholic faith for many people, and formerly were tolerated by the clergy. Now spiritism is actively opposed. Informal baptisms of children at home had been the most widely practiced of all Catholic rites, and a lynchpin of the compadrazgo system. Now the church opposes the practice except in emergencies. The "rosario de la cruz" (assumg "rosary of the cross") is a very old traditional May celebration. It was already in decline by the 1930s. But the custom was kept alive in a few families, and by a public rosario sponsored by the church. Two years ago, the church dropped the custom. In these and other areas, the Catholic Church has distanced itself from folk traditions that show no clear class identification. In other areas, the church's present orientation dovetails with socioeconomic relations.

Church auxiliary groups appeal to a civic boosterism more common among the cosmopolitan middle class than among the poor. Church emphasis on fulfillment of sacraments and other duties conforms to middle class economic possibilities and their concern for appearance. When the bishop came to Jauca to consecrate the new chapel, his message was that Catholics must follow church doctrine, rather than simply have faith and lead a moral life by one's own standards. This message runs counter to the sentiments of many, who feel that Sunday Mass attendance

has become a forum for showing off expensive clothes, and that some of the most sanctimonious church goers are not "buena gente" (good people) by local standards. These criticisms are usually heard coming from poor people.

Changes in Protestant churches are also difficult to assess. There are about twelve in all of Santa Isabel, and three in Jauca. Together, they may have as many as 2,000 members. The Protestants are extremely vocal and visible. But their dispersed structure, their tendency to subdivide, and the sometimes fad-like and temporary nature of conversions make it difficult to judge if they are expanding or declining. There has been some reorganization of Jauca's Protestant congregations recently, but despite that, I would hazard to guess that there has not been any significant change in the rate of participation in the past decade. The congregations are built around a solid core of a few families, and these have remained constant.

In the 1940s, the fundamentalist Protestant sects were associated with the poor. Unlike the Catholics, the poor were prominant in the locally oriented congregations. Indeed, many feel that the successful appeal of the Protestants to a wider social group spurred changes in the Catholic Church's attitudes. But presently, the Protestant congregations are so mixed as to make association with any class difficult.

In publications and in conversations in Jauca, some have associated Protestant sects with North American influence. Be that as it may, they have no clear political association. Several of Jauca's independence advocates are Protestants. If these churches are politically conservative, it is in their practice of discouraging active involvement in politics. Some Catholics, however, also disavow politics as too dirty a game for a religious person.

Mintz has suggested that the spread of fundamentalist faiths

was a response to the social dislocations of the '40s and early '50s, and that their required aestheticism could be seen as a kind of mobility promoting adaptation to changing opportunities. The latter aspect is not in clear evidence today. But the churches today clearly do constitute a form of community re-integration. Protestants tend to associate among themselves in relatively stable, respectful relationships. They marry other Protestants. Church activities are their main recreation. When they need help, they rely on each other. And besides, the churches have filled a deeply felt spiritual void for many. The question which I still cannot answer is, given this re-integration function, why the churches did not spread more in later years, as change accelerated. I also cannot say if they can maintain these functions in the future. The demands on time and behavior made by fundamentalist sects is challenged by the seductive consumption ethos bannered by the media. Church memberships currently consist mostly of the very young and the old, as young adults have left. Even long time members have rejected some traditional but non-mandatory positions, such as not owning a television. I was intimately exposed to some Protestant families during my time in the field. I acquired a deep respect for their beliefs and way of life. I cannot help but feel, however, that they have entered a critical period, and that the way they handle the challenges of the 1980s will determine their course for decades to come.

The third major theological position common among jauqeños is not thought of as a religion, but more as a collection of beliefs and practices supplemental to the Catholic faith. This is spiritism, a mixed bag of Roman Catholic and African customs, tempered by a few influential writers, personal insights, and lately, as a result of cultural contact in New York, admixtures of Cuban, Haitian, and even Central American beliefs. Spiritists believe in an active spirit world, which can be

manipulated to help one overcome problems and be happy and succesful. When people manipulate spirits to harm or unduly influence others, this is not spiritism but witchcraft.

The great majority of jauqueños believe in spiritist practices in one sense or another, since both Catholic and Protestant churches condemn spiritism as being in touch with demonic forces. This condemnation causes some to practice in secret, so making it difficult to estimate how many believe in spiritism as a potentially good and efficacious thing. Various lines of evidence suggest that from one third to one half of adults do at present. Several informants suggested that active interest in spiritism has risen in the past few years, and their explanation as to why could come from a textbook. Times are getting tough, they say. When that happens, people look for any way possible to improve their situation, even the spirits. Further, when people have misfortunes, they often blame other people as its cause. So hard times mean increased suspicions of witchcraft, and that calls for spiritist remedies.

Spiritism is highly individualistic. There are specialists and centers in Jauca and nearby. They may be consulted for particularly difficult problems, and occasionally for instruction. (In light of changing work and family patterns, it is noteworthy that one specialist reports the most common problem these days is male impotence.) Centers often have a small group of devoted followers. But in matters of beliefs, spiritists mostly keep to themselves, and follow their own counsel. To visit a specialist involves the risk that he or she will try to steal away one's own spiritual helpers. Spiritists also run into problems with neighbors or family, based on suspicions of witchcraft, and so may be somewhat isolated socially as well as spiritually.

Finally, there are people outside of any religion or faith.

Atheists are a distinct minority, but can be found without much looking. In daily life, they are often indistinguishable from the much larger group of people who profess a belief in a supreme being, or who even identify themselves as Catholics or Protestants, but who engage in no religious activity of any sort. (This would include non-active spiritists.) The religiously non-active population is probably about a third of the total.

It is worth noting that Jauca's religions represent three types of integration into the larger society. The Catholics are hooked into a centralized, hierarchical world institution. The Protestants have island and even higher levels of organization, but the local congregation is a more autonomous and powerful unit. The non-practicioners and most spiritists are outside of any institutional religious structure.

As divergent and in a sense competitive faiths, one might expect strained relations between Protestants and Catholics, and open hostility between them and ardent spiritists. A little probing does uncover some bruised feelings. But normally, religious differences do not erupt into interpersonal conflicts. The Protestants may keep somewhat to themselves; the spiritists may be a little withdrawn. But if religion makes jauqueños a little apart, they are still not distant because of it.

Another potentially divisive social marker is race. Changes in racial attitudes have not been discussed chronologically, since they are even more difficult to approach than religious views. Racial attitudes are as sensitive as they are intangible. Even the current situation is murky. Most jauqueños espouse a view formerly accepted by most writers: that there is no racial problem in Puerto Rico. More recent writers have argued that racism does exist, but is denied, suppressed. Some have argued further that racism has been aggravated by U.S. cultural penetration, especially through the changed attitudes of return migrants.

Until I can fully analyze my data, especially that on personal associations, I can do little more than sketch the complexity of the issue. Mintz concluded that what might appear to be racism was better understood as a factual association of more negroid features with lower occupations, combined with a generalized color preference for light over dark. Today, an association of color with job type on the village level is not clearly evident. The color preference is. At first, I viewed this association of "white" with "good" and "pretty", and of "black" with "bad" and "ugly", as simply an expression of racism. Until one day I saw a one and one half year old girl sort out vanilla and chocolate cookies, and throw the chocolate ones away because they were 'ugly'. Similarly, many people refuse to eat black beans because they are "ugly". Are such acts meaningfully understood as expressions of racism?

Yes, people keep physical characteristics of individuals in mind, especially if the individual is dark. One can elicit most racial stereotypes common to North American bigots. Some "whites" say they prefer not to work with "blacks", and would not want their child to marry one. On the other hand, this author never witnessed even a minor racial incident. Nor have I discovered (yet without quantitative analysis) any associational barrier between colors. And despite any parental reservations, people of very different physical type do marry. And yes, one does hear some return migrants speak of "niggers", and some seem to view black and white as more discrete categories than in native racial classifications. But the degree to which their opinions have affected other people, or even their own actions, is not clear.

The discussion has brought us to the next topic: how migration changed in the 1970s. Seasonal migration had declined to few by the end of the '60s. The rise in local living standards that came with

cupones ended it. Non-seasonal migration has continued. People who want to build up some capital, or who are bored with local life, or who have personal or legal problems to escape, still head north. The number probably dipped in the mid-'70s when the mainland recession hit. Between that recession and new local assistance, island conditions improved relative to the mainland. Jauca was no exception to the pattern of return migration that hit the island in the middle of the decade.

Since the permanent migration had began, there were always those who returned after years away. But they came individually, in small numbers. In the mid-'70s, they came and came. It was not just the economy that brought them, although that provided a trigger. Many, probably most of those who moved north in the 1950s went with the idea of eventually returning, but with economic security. Now this group was middle aged or older, having spent more than twenty years away from "home". They began to return to fulfill their dreams. Some succeeded, establishing themselves as merchants, or landing good jobs, or building a good home and retiring. But more found frustration. Their savings were not enough for a house, their stores failed, they were unable to get work comparable to their occupations in New York, Newark, or Chicago. And they had to confront the difficulties of living in a still semi-rural village: mosquitos, floods, no telephones, poor transportation, little entertainment, etc. And there were social problems.

The returnees had changed in their time abroad. They were more worldly. They had grown accustomed to higher standards of living, or at least of plumbing. They had come to appreciate privacy, a very strange value in Jauca. Traditional ways of thinking and behaving had faded and been partially replaced by North American attitudes. The gulf was and remains particularly serious for some children, to whom

even the language was foreign. But adults suffered too. The typical expression of the conflict is when the returnee complains of too much gossip and too much meddling in his life, and the local people complain that the returnee is stand-offish and stuck up. What has happened is that the returnee finds his behavior, which would be acceptable in a U.S. city, the subject of extensive comment and disapproval. So he withdraws.

The result of all this is that many return migrants stayed only a short time, then went back to the states. This "second return" has picked up in the last few years, as the economy has worsened. Joining them are more new migrants, and in the past year, even some new seasonal agricultural laborers. Last October and November, a great many spoke of leaving to find work. The bitter northern winter and an unexpected amount of work in the frutos menores dampened the urge to leave. But I suspect that in the next year, reductions in transfer payments, a stagnant local economy, and deteriorating services will provoke a significant increase in northward migation. In one difference from previous times, most potential migrants now say they will head to the sun belt or other areas where there is work, but not back to the cities of the northeast.

While many return migrants have left, many remain in Jauca. The young ones who grew up off the island, the "newyoricans", are often singled out as a bad influence on local youth. They suffer under a stereotype of being prone to delinquency, wild, sexually hyperactive, and often on drugs. I do not have the information to judge how closely this image matches reality, but for whatever cause, the social problems which became apparent in the 1960s became a constant in the 1970s. Housebreakings are commonplace. After being robbed three or four times, many middle class families put protective grillwork around their houses. During my stay in Jauca, there was one frightening rash

of break ins and even two armed robberies. When I left, Santa Isabel was in shock from a string of brutal murders. Local people attribute both types of crime to drug use and drug traffic.

Marijuana use is common among teenage males. A few use other drugs. There are rumors, which I did not even attempt to investigate, that the area is a center for larger scale drug trafficking. Given the limited work opportunities for teenagers, there can be little doubt that some of the money funneled into drugs comes from other types of crime.

Return migrants and veterans probably did stimulate local drug use. But another major contributing factor is the limited recreational facilities in the area. The only local theater (except for one in Salinas which shows only kung-fu films) closed in the 1960s, a victim of television. Besides religious services and sports, the main public entertainments are dances and patron saint festivals in nearby towns. Both activities prominently involve drinking, and the latter, gambling. Even outside these contexts, gambling and drinking are the pastimes of those with nothing else to do. Many youth simply prefer marijuana to alcohol. Drug use leads to a gap between the young and old, who see marijuana as a very dangerous thing; and between kids and the police, who actively go after users. This is one reason why local people are suspicious of strangers--they have had experiences with undercover police. A few years ago, one gained entry to the community by introducing himself as a social scientist.

Crime is a real problem. But it is also an exagerated problem. For instance, one might hear a resident of the old village or an urbanization say that they would not go into the parcelas at night without a gun, or that they avoid the parcelas entirely, because of all the thieves there. In fact, there is no reason to fear being mugged in the parcelas. I suspect that fear of the parcelas stems from the fact that it is the

largest, densest concentration of people in Jauca.

I came to believe that pillo (thief) was a symbol. As with "vago", the word provides a discrete representation of a diffuse, amorphous reality. For some of the better-off, "pillo" is a word which expresses disapproval of the "unwashed masses" without invoking an overt class distinction. For others, "pillo" may represent a fear of uncertainty. To walk through an unfamiliar section of the parcelas is to enounter all kinds of people, many of them strangers, who might behave in unpredictable ways.

Jauca has lost much of its integrity as a community. Its residents are differentiated by occupation, income, politics, religion, education, generation, migration history, and more. These are reflected in differences in ways of thinking and life styles. The dis-integration of the community is as much a result of Puerto Rico's development as are factories or changed living standards. But the relation of these social changes to the development process is less evident than direct economic or political consequences. Because of the complex, gradual interactions involved in social change, views of this relation vary widely. It might be that no two jauqueños see the situation exactly the same. But it is important to attempt to assess this public opinion, if only to understand how people view the results of the past four decades, and to get some idea of how they may react to future changes.

How do jauqueños see their community, forty-two years after the start of Puerto Rico's peaceful revolution? Some acknowledge one or another of the social differences as being important, usually because that individual has had a personal experience relating to that difference. Political affiliation and class may be becoming more widely recognized as serious divisions as more people's lives bump into them. But the majority of jauqeños still maintain that the community is one,

that everyone is essentially the same. They recognize social differences, but they deny their significance in community life.

Mintz found the same sense of unity in 1948-49, but then in unqualified form. He noted a strong class identity, accompanied by tendencies to cooperate and to suppress interpersonal conflict. Today, there is little need to cooperate. But conflict suppression remains evident. Even mild criticism of a third party is often followed in conversation by "but (he is) a good person" ("pero buena gente"). The local unity which was necessary for survival in the '40s remains today as an ideal. It should be recognized that this ideal is a valuable community resource. It provides a base for community cooperation. It should also be realized that the ideal is under assault by the reality of social differentiation, and unless something is done to reinforce it, it will soon be gone.

If the people of Jauca still conceive of themselves as a unified body, how do they explain the social problems and conflicts they face? Rather than look to differences in social background, they individualize a problem by blaming character flaws. If one does not believe in significant social differences, then there is no need to try to put oneself in someone else's shoes. There is a certain lack of empathy, and a tendency to project conditions within one's own reference group to all of the society. Social circumstances might be acknowledged as secondary factors, but the central responsibility for disapproved behavior is within the person.

Two clarifications of this idea are needed. First, this individualization of responsibility is not a local invention. I think it is shared by most North Americans, for instance. And in one sense, it is completely accurate. Ultimately, it is the individual that chooses a particular course of action. But it is society that structures the

available choices. Second, this perspective applies to the social, not the individual, level. For a particular, known individual, people might bend over backwards to find mitigating circumstances or background for bad behavior. But when one speaks of the condition in Jauca or Santa Isabel in general, then one hears about the "bad people", the vagos, the pillos, or, most important of all, the people of little or no shame ("sinoverguenzas").

The concept of shame is closely related to that of respeto (respect). A man of respect will be acutely sensitive to feeling shame. The English translation of "respeto" does not do it justice. It is a central concept in Puerto Rican culture. Respeto involves behaving appropriately and fulfilling ones' obligations in all social situations. It is in this sense of the word that I interpret what is without question the most common criticism of life today in Jauca--that people no longer respect. This complaint transcends specific contexts or problems to signify that, generally, people are not acting the way they should, that nobody can be counted on. This is heard even from those elements most likely to be singled out by others as troublemakers. Jauca's old social uniformity is gone. But rather than accept the divergent and in some ways conflicting goals and values--a disturbingly relativistic position--many lash out at the 'sin verguenzas'.

How do jauqueños see the relation between their local problems and the larger process of development and insular change? Here, opinions are so varied as to defy even identification of a majority view. Some, especially those who do acknowledge significant social divisions, tie the problems directly to specific aspects of past development. Nearly everyone understands that the community problems are somehow tied to that process, but most can offer no explanation as to how. Some feel development has been accompanied by a breakdown of parental

responsibility, and this is the root of other problems. Others see things in religious terms, as punishment or fulfillment of prophecy. Others opt for a position which is very popular in the media and among some politicians, that the basis of current problems is decay of the moral fiber.

How do jauqueños see their future in relation to the island's trajectory? It isn't bright. Few expect major improvements in any aspect of their lives. Most suspect that living standards will go into decline, some asserting that they will sink to the level of 1940 again. The expectation is that unmitigated poverty will be worse the second time around, because there will be so many young people unprepared to cope with it; and because the community will not be united ("unido") as before. Even those who see Jauca as a community without important social divisions understand that it is no longer knit together as before. And anyone can see that even as the poor begin to worry about food, some people in the community are still doing very well. People fret that such differences will divide Jauca in the future. One man explained the situation like this: "In the past, the economy improved, but it brought many social problems. Now, the economy is going down, and all we will have left are the problems." I asked informants what they forsaw ten or fifteen years ahead. Several times I received the same chilling reply: civil war.

There is not much talk of changing history's course. Most either lack faith in the island leaders' intentions, or else expect that the difficult times are simply unavoidable, like an act of God. (This view is promulgated by some representatives of the power structure.) There is virtually no suggestion that local people, working together, can do anything to alter their fate. But I do not attribute this to the "fatalism" so often ascribed to the Puerto Rican personality. I

think it is a realistic appraisal of the current situation. For the past four decades, jauqueños' lives have come increasingly under the influence of larger institutions, which have their own power structures and priorities. Even those individuals charged with representing local interests can be distant and controlled from above; or when they do take an interest, seem powerless to get results. And even if local people had more power to control their destiny, it is unclear what they should do with it. The island power structure has defined political status as the issue, and status is a complicated question, removed from the pressing, immediate needs of villagers. Jauqueños have exchanged their old condition of naked oppression and exploitation for a more subtle and affluent state of dependency and powerlessness. They have become part of a marginal population under a network of control centers.

The situation is not entirely bleak however. During my time in Jauca, I witnessed the activity of a group of residents protesting crop dusting, and a group trying to bring telephone lines to the barrio. A committee of parents of disabled children was formed to lobby for educational and other benefits, and several new neighborhood athletic teams were put together. Besides addressing immediate needs, these groups promoted communication and interaction transcending social differences. The participants felt good about what they had done. I believe that there are a great many people who would rise from lethargy and apathy, if they thought they had a real chance to accomplish something. In the following section, I sketch a plan for creating a structure of opportunities to mobilize people at the community level.

A proposal for community revitalization.

In keeping with Regional Science Program directives, this section outlines policy recommendations based on the field research. The recommendations address central problems of development experienced in Jauca

and, I believe, in the great majority of Puerto Rican communities. These problems can be summarized as follows. The bonds holding the community together have weakened or dissolved, impeding cooperation and increasing individuals' sense of isolation. Social differentiation has approached real division, and social conflict appears a near possibility. As internal ties weakened, villagers reoriented to institutional centers above the village level. When they became more integrated to larger societal structures, they did so as a relatively powerless population. The island's institutions seem out of touch, non-responsive, or positively oppressive. Unless something is done to correct this situation, future efforts at change will be dragged down on the local level by apathy, resistance, inefficiencies, and lost opportunities.

I propose a plan for community revitalization--a structure of incentives fostering greater organization, power, and responsibility for local communities. The goals are greater community integration, improved standards of living, and augmented participation of the people in the democratic process. The plan is no cure-all. Those who say that resolution of the political status question is the basic issue for Puerto Rico are probably correct. Within the current state of indecision, there are severe limits on forward motion. But this plan provides a way for bringing the people more fully into this and other important debates, and so might open a path toward their resolution which does not exist at present.

One of four principles that guided construction of this plan is that short term incentives be structured toward resolution of long term problems. The others are: that the recommendations be of general value and completely non-partisan; that all parts of the program have low start-up and operating costs, both in money and organizational terms; and that the rewards for organization be tangible and directed to the

local community. This last principle means that successful community action will inspire emulation. The program is not to be imposed by decree from above. Rather, local successes will provide an internal dynamic of incremental growth. Failures, and there will be local failures, will provide a lesson, but otherwise will not affect other communities.

At the beginning, the organization would consist of Community Councils of two levels; the neighborhood (barrio or barriada), and the muncipality or urban division. (I am less familiar with urban organization, and acknowledge a rural perspective in this plan's formulation. Adjustments would be needed for urban situations.) A third, island level of organization would be added eventually. But this should be created by vigorous local groups themselves. It would be a big mistake to start the program with an established island bureaucracy, which would then dominate local units. The first and fundamental level must be the local communities.

Each level is to have five divisions: sports, culture, community maintenance, economic development, and political orientation. Each Neighborhood Council division would have one non-paid representative, chosen by democratic procedure for a set term of limited repetition, and subject to recall and replacement by a simple majority vote. Neighborhood Councils (the five division representatives) would have public meetings at regular intervals to report on activities, and to listen to community members. The representatives of a particular division within a municipio will also meet together on a regular basis to coordinate activities, exchange information, and tackle municipal problems. These assemblies of division representatives would themselves choose one representative (who would then be replaced on the neighborhood level). Those selected would continue to attend section meetings, but would

have additional duties as Municipal Council division representatives. The Municipal Council would meet as needed to oversee or take action on the municipal level.

Sports. This is the simplest division, and potentially the easiest to organize. It draws on the substantial existing interest in amateur athletics. The purpose in a sports division is to provide a recreational alternative to hanging around intoxicated, and to promote communication and spirit within the community.

Many communities already have some amateur sports. These haphazardly put together teams receive enthusiastic local support. The new sports division would not disrupt existing programs, but add to them. (It would be good if the neighborhood representative were someone already involved in local sports promotion.) The representative would work with government officials and the community maintenance division representative to improve or develop local sports facilities; and stir up interest for new teams in baseball, softball, volleyball, and basketball. Non-team sports like boxing or perhaps even billiards (pool) could also be encouraged. Divisions based on age, sex, or physical build should be considered to promote maximum participation. How far all this can go will depend on the enthusiasm of a particular community. In many cases, it will be possible to organize some team sports even below the barrio level, almost on a block basis. Above the barrio, the municipal representative would organize municipal teams, with the best of the local players. Neighborhood and municipal representatives would arrange competitions both within and between municipios.

Culture. This division has a wider scope than sports, and its potential accomplishments would be more variable from place to place. Through development of traditional crafts and arts, this division, like the sports division, would provide something to do, promote community

identity, and increase communication, especially across generations. But here, efforts would have the additional pay-off of boosting income for individuals, the area, and the island.

The initial job of the neighborhood representative would be to locate older, or not so old, individuals who still practice or remember the old traditions, and who would be available and interested in teaching younger people. Representatives, especially the municipal division representative, would seek government aid to establish municipal workshops. If initial capital is needed for equipment or other expenses, loans could be negotiated, to be repaid as a percentage of later earnings from workshop members.

A proposal for increased community crafts production dovetails with recently announced government plans to develop island crafts centers. Since what I propose is community based, it can recruit more teachers and apprentices. But the island centers could operate as places of advanced instruction, and provide guidance for local efforts, which will expectedly vary in quality at first.

At present, virtually all "island crafts" are foreign made, and most of what one finds for sale is junk. This is not necessary. Although a visitor to most tourist sites would never know it, Puerto Rico does have a tradition of native crafts. These include wooden statues of saints, gourd-work, and other carvings, musical instruments, masks, baskets, dresses, hammocks and nets, seashell crafts, and more. Modern crafts include various styles of painting and sculpture, jewelry, and ceramics. More functional trades, such as furniture making, could be built up in the same crafts context.

Merchandising of local products would be promoted by division representatives, perhaps in concert with economic development division people. Besides establishing a local retail outlet, they could place

crafts in tourist centers, and bring them to fairs and festivals. A percentage of sales receipts would go to pay off debts, another to the expansion of workshops, and the rest going to the artisan.

Arts promotion would be done in the same way. Puerto Rico boasts several distinctive music and dance styles. Bands and dance troups could be organized under the guidance of older practitioners, but here using also recordings, films, and printed materials. Perhaps some form of starter instruction sets could be designed and produced. Age divisions of performing groups might be appropriate. Neighborhood groups could act as a training ground for more advanced municipal groups. In all this, as in craft production, emphasis should be given to distinctively local traditions where they are known. The artistic groups, like the athletic teams, can be a source of community pride. The multitude of town carnivals, patron saint festivals, and other celebrations provide a ready made showcase for their talents. This type of performance would certainly upgrade the festivals, which presently focus on eating, drinking and gambling. Eventually, island competitions could be arranged. This type of touring and friendly competition would quickly increase interest in participating, so should be a major concern of the municipal representative.

Once begun, these groups could be left largely on their own. At that point the culture division representatives could turn to other activities, such as plays or oratory. I was continually impressed by rhetorical skills displayed in daily life, and the appreciation shown for a well told tale or discourse. Simple plays by children, skilled narrations of local history or legends, even poetry recitations would have definite, if not large, audiences. These activities could take place in the platforms or bandshells located in every town square. In doing so they would help reclaim the square from the less than desirable

elements now dominant in the evenings. Beyond this, the community culture division representatives might organize small public discussions on topics such as the problems of working women, or the generation gap.

The cultural activities described here would have an important additional benefit. They could greatly aid in developing local tourism. Like other Caribbean islands, Puerto Rican tourism depends almost entirely on people seeking "fun in the sun". They cluster at the main beach resorts, and can be drawn elsewhere by any promotion offering a lower fare or more "extras". There is another type of tourist. Those who go to Spain, for instance, do not go mainly for the beaches, as nice as they may be. They go to see Spain. Puerto Rico presently draws few people interested in getting to know island culture or meeting the people because, really, there is very little for such a tourist to enjoy. The elegant country inns scattered in the interior are not doing much business. Places like Santa Isabel have virtually no tourism. (Santa Isabel has a town museum which has been promoted in some tourist materials and advertisements. Anyone who came to see it would find that the museum is always closed. This author traveled several hours to visit a Taino ceremonial site in the interior. That museum also was shut down. This does not encourage return visits.)

Established municipal crafts workshops, and the performances of native music and dance at fiestas would provide an incentive for more adventurous tourists to travel. Municipal or Neighborhood Councils could then work with government people to build up local tourism. They could establish picnic areas, print maps of local historical sites or scenic routes, and make tourist information available in the local library or mayor's office. Given the limited overnight accomodations in non-tourist areas, thought might be given to trial bed-and-breakfast arrangements with local families. I expect that local people would

not respond enthusiastically to this idea at first. But a few good experiences would be all it would take to change some minds.

If developed folk crafts and arts and minimum tourist facilities were combined with the island's climate, scenery, beaches, and above all, people, Puerto Rican tourism would be more secure. And the new tourists drawn to the island by elevated cultural activities would not be of the sometimes problematic type who swarm over the beaches; but rather people who are interested in meeting Puerto Ricans. They would not disrupt local life, and would help in repairing the island's current pronounced image problem. And that would lead to even more tourism.

Community Maintenance. The activities of this division center around small scale public works and services performed by a rotating work force selected from and largely supported by the food stamp program. It has three goals. First, to perform desperately needed work that is currently not getting done. Second, to tackle the knotty problem of dependency on food stamps, challenging the image of vagrancy, providing the work program that many local people would like to see, and helping to protect the food stamps from future cuts due to a poor image in the U.S. And third, to act as a catalyst for the entire community revitalization program by providing a direct, visible benefit for organized communities.

The work would include the kinds of projects formerly done under CETA or other employment programs. These are currently not getting done, or are being done at minimal levels. Specifically, possible jobs are: repairs of streets, public buildings, and water pipes; flood control projects; sanitation and road upkeep; public health tasks like mosquito spraying; community clean-up; school crossing guards, etc. The tasks would vary according to the self-identified needs of each community. The only restriction, and it is an important one, is that the jobs not

include work which could possibly be done under current conditions by regular public or private employees. That is, the program must not be allowed to provide cheap labor to put other people out of work. Unions should be consulted on this point.

Neighborhood representatives would consult with residents to identify and set up a priority of local needs. The municipality's representatives would meet to coordinate and decide on priorities and specific jobs. Neighborhood representatives would visit work sites in their barrios, on the idea that no one is as interested in seeing the job done right as someone who lives there. This on-site supervisions aspect implies that neighborhood representatives best have some familiarity with construction work. With continuous activities, this program would require a designated executive. That would be the municipal division representative's job.

This program requires some new government expenditures. Some materials would be needed, but not much since no major construction is involved. Supervisors would have to be paid. But many skilled workers who could supervise are currently underemployed on existing government payrolls. The government would need to chip in to supplement the food stamp fund for wages, and pay additional administrative costs. These would be balanced by savings. Presently, wastage from broken water pipes is a significant cost. The government would also benefit by avoiding flood damage, preventing deterioration of public works, making the island more attractive for tourists, etc. It would get a lot for a little money.

The community maintenance division would rely on the food stamp program for all its labor and most of their pay. I will not go into great detail on how this would work, since there are several technical points to be considered. I can address these points elsewhere if need

be. But for now, an outline of the plan is sufficient.

Able, unemployed male family heads would register their availability to work. (In deference to local sentiments, female family heads should be given the option of registering. The program is limited to family heads in order to reinforce their position within the family.) Families which receive benefits but which do not have an able, unemployed male family head would remain outside of and untouched by the program. Their benefits would continue as at present.

Everyone in this registered pool will have the option to volunteer for work. The voluntary aspect is essential, to narrow the field of solicitants, and to make it clear that this work is not some kind of punishment, but a real community service. From the pool of volunteers, individuals would be selected at random for one week of work at minimum wage. There would be a new crew each week, with some provision made to ensure the work is optimally spread around. Pay would be deducted from that month's food stamp allotment. Most of the pay, then, amounts to working for one's benefits. This will appeal to the sense of dignity, and give people a chance to demonstrate that they are not vagos. Some individuals would earn all of their benefits for the month, temporarily getting entirely off relief.

Pride can be a powerful stimulus. It works even better when backed by a material incentive. This dispels any notion that someone who chooses work over leisure is a chump. So participants would receive a variable bonus to bring their total compensation (pay plus remaining cupones) above what they would otherwise receive. The bonus would be financed by a small percentage reduction of benefits paid to families in the registered pool, augmented by government funds. (Implementation of this part of the proposal is where several of the technical points come in.) The "paid volunteers" would be assigned to a week's work,

based on that individual's skills and the community's needs. Neighborhood division representatives checking on the quality of the work would also evaluate individual performance. The program would not last long if it tolerated shirkers.

Many people in Jauca and throughout the United States would like to see a work program incorporated to aid programs. This proposal has certain advantages over some other "workfare" plans. It deals with genuinely needed work, not make-work. It would not be seen as a punishment, but as an opportunity. And it is geared to function in circumstances of very high unemployment, where there are more people receiving assistance than could possibly be usefully put to work at one time. (The only way to put all of the able food stamp and other beneficiaries to work at once would be to have them build pyramids.)

Economic Development. This division would promote small-scale economic projects. The goals are to improve living standards, to break the helpless passivity of villagers faced with economic adversity, to boost island production, and to make better use of local resources. The government already has some local enterprise promotion incentives. But this author knows from experience that current arrangements seem distant and intimidating. The community development division would provide an accessible way to build on the many good ideas which presently go nowhere.

The division representatives would initially assess new ideas, and provide a channel for technical and financial assistance for the good ones. They would work with existing government development agencies, who could help set up the program by providing a pamphlet explaining minimum requirements for financially feasible projects, a directory for obtaining more detailed or technical information, and regional advisers who would sit in on the municipal division meetings.

It would work like this. An individual or group with an idea would approach a local representative, who would discuss with them basic questions of finances, markets, management, etc. An idea that passes this stage moves to a meeting of the municipal division heads and government adviser. They would consider the project's feasibility, its local impact, and the reliability of the persons involved. Then they would vote to endorse it or not, in a secret ballot. If they approve, the municipal section chief and adviser move on to try to obtain financing and technical assistance. Perhaps a new loan program could be established using "936 funds" (foreign business profits deposited in island banks). Such direct use for the communities' benefit would certainly improve the tarnished image these funds now enjoy.

The intercession of local community representatives adds a critical new dimension to loans for small projects. The division representatives of a given municipio would acquire a reputation for reliability, which would influence how future project recommendations are received. Some project failures are expectable, and they would be allowed to fail. But the community review procedure, and the fact that loan recipients would know they were representing their neighbors, would eliminate some of the failures due to irresponsibility which have hurt other promotions. The community representatives would also receive and disseminate news of projects in other communities.

To provide some idea of the type of project which could be promoted, I will rely on examples applicable to Jauca. In Jauca, increased agricultural production is an obvious possibility. A combination of ecological and economic factors currently result in hundreds of acres of prime land being out of production for several months each year, between crops. Most of this is government owned land. Fast growing crops like beans could be sown and harvested by local people on this land. It

would not only serve local markets and provide some cash income, but benefit the soil and reduce flooding from bare fields. This is not a completely new idea. There had been some planting of beans by individuals between sugar crops, many years ago.

Unused marginal land could be put to use. For instance, I was impressed by the delicious juice of the passion fruit. It certainly could find a U.S. market. I had thought of the possibility of small scale commercial production, and was happy to be scooped by a group of small producers in Guayama. They formed a passion fruit cooperative, which is doing well and about to expand.

Small farm cooperatives, involving a few individuals working five or six acres, could form a protective band seperating main croplands from residential areas. This would reduce the cropdusting problem. Crops would be for consumption or sale. One local expert in vegetable growing told me that small intensively worked farms can have much higher yields per unit area than even the most advanced mass production techniques. Double or triple cropping is possible. The very able University of Puerto Rico Agricultural Experimental Station could provide information on high yield, labor intensive crops. Local market crops could be grown to coincide with the off-season of mass production. Other crops like strawberries or asparagus could be grown for export. The land is there, and many people have expressed interest in such an opportunity. The community economic development division could make it possible, and then help with marketing.

There is another abundant and available type of land, that division representatives could also help to bring into production. Back yards. Previous attempts to encourage back yard gardens had little success. But times have changed. In parts of the parcelas at present, back yard planting is very much in vogue. But most people do not know what to

plant or how to maintain the garden, not to mention matters like testing and upgrading soil. Locally available information, seeds, and periodic visits by agricultural technicians could result in very substantial increases in island food production.

Other non-crop areas of food production merit consideration. Rabbits have already been raised and sold successfully. Jauca has a few natural springs that could provide an important cost advantage for fresh water shrimp pools. Land crabs are scarce, but still much sought after. Medium sized crabs can be sold for a dollar to passing motorists. A little ingenuity might produce a low cost, low input structure for raising crabs. The potential of Jauca's bays for aquaculture projects could be studied. In manufactures, the economic development division could work with the cultural division in promoting crafts or furniture production and sale.

If the economic development divisions become firmly established throughout the island, they could take on larger scale projects. For instance, I have mentioned that Santa Isabel has no movie theater. Very few municipios do. I see no reason why Puerto Ricans, like North Americans, would not go to the movies, if good films were available locally at reasonable prices. Given prevailing conditions, that price would have to be less than current U.S. first run rates. But many U.S. theaters now show slightly dated films at reduced price. Most towns have large, unused buildings which could be converted to theaters. This would require some capital. To make films available for circulation at the reduced prices would require an organization of several theaters. The project would involve some risk then, but also potential profits. It would be amenable to being organized as a cooperative.

The ideas for specific projects are not that important here. The point is that if people know that they can act on an idea to make some

money, and get the basic financial and technical assistance, they will come up with their own ideas.

Political Orientation. This division has several goals. To monitor political institutions, thus freeing them from partisan excesses and enabling more efficient and effective execution of their assigned tasks. To provide informed assessment of politicians' performance in office and so elevate the quality of elections. To actively involve the public in debates of important issues, such as political status. And to provide the political clout to represent community interests free of partisan considerations. In sum, this division will work to increase participatory democracy and clean up and depoliticize government, first on the local and then on the island level.

Government activities are so diverse, that the division representatives would have to set up a schedule to assign specific tasks to individual representatives. One of the most important would be to attend the monthly municipal assembly meetings. These are open to the public, but so rarely attended that they might as well be closed. Representatives could add their voices to questions in the assembly when appropriate. Their main job would be to report back to the neighborhoods. Representatives would also act as watchdogs, making sure that everything is above board in hirings, auctions, contracts, allocation of goods like housing or parcelas, and expenditures. When it concerned public works, they would cooperate with the community maintenance representative. The municipal division representative would act as the community's spokesman in dealing with island government agencies, as in questions of zoning for new development projects; and in making complaints better heard, as in the case of the aid programs' job search requirements.

All five of the Community Council divisions would eventually operate with a third, island level of organization. This would promote

and coordinate divisional activities on a larger scale. The island level would be created by local organizations themselves when they reach the point of needing a higher level structure. This island level of organization would be particularly important in the case of the political orientation division. The representatives would accomplish many of the same monitoring functions on the island government level. But additionally, they would act as a conduit engaging the public at large in debates on major issues, and forcing attention and clear answers on questions of widespread concern.

Political status is the preeminent example of such an issue. At present, there does not exist a firm basis of understanding of the options of statehood, independence, or a continuing but revised commonwealth arrangement. The details concerning one alternative may be portrayed very differently, even within the supporting camp. And while the supporters of one option tend to portray it as heaven come to earth, its opponents will describe it as a living hell. Far from clarifying anything, the status debate as currently practiced just adds to confusion and fear. With the constant pressure of acknowledged, non-partisan representatives of the communities, the debate could change. The representatives should demand the following: a clear programatic statement of the status options (and there may be more than three); that the options be realistic, perhaps working with the U.S. Congress for assurance that it would back whichever of the detailed options the Puerto Rican people select; that political leaders actively seek areas of compromise and assurances with the options to allay the fears of that option's opponents; and finally, to clearly define the meaning and probable consequences of the differences between one option and another. The island political orientation representatives would report through channels to the

neighborhoods on these developing positions, and then come back with the questions the people still want answered. Through this system, the status issue has a chance of resolution, and without tearing the island apart in the process.

Of all the proposed Community Council divisions, political orientation is surely the most controversial. It is expectable that many politicians will oppose it, since it would impinge on their freedom of action. They will claim that it is unnecessary, a shadow government duplicating the work of politicians in representing the people. But there is no duplication of government or party functions in what is proposed. And anyone familiar with what is happening on the island knows that a great many people feel that they are not being represented, and that something must be done to reform and depoliticize government.

The issue is simple. For an honest politician of any party, who wants to work for the good of the people free from excessive partisanship, and who has confidence in the superiority of his party's position on status and other issues, increased community participation would be a blessing. His work would be made easier, and his record of accomplishment better known. For a politician who falls outside of this description, increased participation would be a problem. I believe Puerto Rico has many more of the former than the latter. But every politician must recognize now or soon, that if the deterioration of faith in government continues as at present, everyone will lose. For this reason, the political orientation division is essential.

One expectable, related problem could endanger the operation of the political orientation division, and could jeopardize community maintenance and economic development as well. That problem is the threat of politicization, the danger that party politicians may attempt

to take over leadership of these divisions to steer them on a partisan course. Achieving this would be a short-lived victory. As with Jauca's civic clubs, the suspicion of a hidden party agenda will destroy the community's full support. But the attempt will probably be made, and must be anticipated and resisted.

The point should be made emphatically and repeatedly during the organization phase of putting together the Community Councils that no person with a strong or current association with any political party should be considered an acceptable candidate for the three divisions mentioned. Sports and culture divisions would be open to politically involved people who want to do more for their community. People are fed up with the partisan bickering, and they know how it can creep in where it has no business being. Once they understand what is at stake, they can be trusted to screen out most politicians. Since the representatives would regularly face the community in open meetings, since wounded parties would leap to denounce partisanship, and since representatives could be easily recalled, those who slip through could be eliminated. The public would have to be equally vigilant against expressions of padrinaje, for there would be occasions when representatives could do personal favors, and that would be very destructive of the community's sense of unity.

The Community Councils' division representatives should all be men and women known and respected for their integrity, honor, and sense of public duty. Since they would have a good bit of work, and no pay for it, they would need be highly motivated to improve life in their community. There are plenty of people like this, and many of them have nothing but time on their hands. Those cases where a representative has to be removed, or where partisan interests capture or destroy a council through factionalization, would serve as a lesson for other communities.

If the Community Councils come to be recognized as something of value, the people will defend them.

This outline has been concerned only with the basic structure and functions of the Councils. Two large areas have not been touched. One is the constitution that would be needed, and with it all of the detailed points of organization, elections, authority, geographic divisions, etc. The other is the question of implementation, or how to get this plan into operation. Even though both areas could make or break the program in practice, I will not go into them in detail now. They are clearly secondary, in the sense that unless the basic ideas presented here are accepted first, these other issues do not matter. I can provide more on these areas if required. But a few words on the implementation aspect are needed before closing, just to show that one <u>can</u> get there from here.

The first step would be the creation of a body of island civic, religious, educational, and other leaders, who would be acceptable and recognized by all as above partisan interests. They would review the ideas presented in this report, commission any necessary studies, consider points of organizational detail, and then draw up a provisional constitution. The constitution would be ratified or ammended later by the Community Councils themselves. This group would also draft legislation for those areas where the Community Councils and government bodies would interact. Then, with a firm plan in hand, they would initiate a publicity campaign, establish a team of trained community organizers, and set up procedures by which existing community organizations or leaders could request help in setting up councils. Organizers would then go where requested, staying long enough to establish councils in any neighborhood that demonstrated interest. Non-participating neighborhoods or municipalities would see the benefits of the plan in action in

other areas, and request organization. The coverage of communities would slowly, incrementally expand.

As I drafted this plan for community revitalization, I continually had to face the question: is this being realistic? Realistically, can this plan generate enough interest to become a live issue? Realistically, can it pass through partisan and other obstacles to be accepted? Realistically, can it be implemented and function effectively in the communities? Realistically, will it be able to help solve some of the existing problems? I think the answer to all these questions is yes. In my opinion, the most difficult obstacles for this plan to overcome would be apathy and cynicism; or the combined attitude that nothing will work, so why bother trying. A lot of that is going around. But in this case, the attitude cannot be justified. Island problems will worsen unless something is done about them. The idea of mobilizing communities to deal with their own problems has never been tried on this scale. Maybe now is the time.