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## *A Reexamination of the Causes of Northwest Coast Warfare*

R. BRIAN FERGUSON

### Introduction

The Northwest Coast culture area includes seven major cultural divisions extending from the Alaska panhandle to the northern shores of Washington state (see Figure 8.1). These cultures differ in many respects, notably in language and social organization, but they all share characteristics that have led anthropologists to consider them as a cultural unit (Kroeber 1923). These characteristics can be found outside the Northwest Coast, but their total configuration and elaboration reached a peak among the Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, Bella Coola, Nootka, Kwakiutl, and Coast Salish. These peoples were characterized by (1) subsistence strategies heavily oriented toward maritime resources, especially the seasonal gluts of spawning salmon; (2) status ranking of individuals, which some analysts dovetail with three class-like horizontal strata; (3) highly developed redistributive economies, centering on the potlatch; (4) an elaborate ceremonial life; (5) a striking, sophisticated art style; and (6) warfare.

With the exception of the last, all these characteristics have been subject to intensive anthropological research. Warfare receives special

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*WARFARE,  
CULTURE,  
AND ENVIRONMENT*

*Edited by*

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


Fig. 8.1 Local Populations and important place names of the Northwest Coast. Tlingit: 1, Angoon; 2, Chilkat; 3, Sitka; 4, Stikine; 5, Takuo; 6, Tongass; 7, Yakutat; Tsimshian: 8, Fort Simpson; 9, Kitkatla (Sebassa); Bella Coola: 10, Dean Channel; Nootka: 11, Ahousat; 12, Barkley Sound; 13, Cape Flattery; 14, Chickliset; 15, Clayoquot; 16, Hesquiat; 17, Kyoquot; 18, Moachat; 19, Muchalot; 20, Ozette; 21, Ucluelet; Haida: 22, Masset; 23, Kaigani; 24, Skiddan; 25, Skidegate; Coast Salish: 26, Chinook; 27, Comox; 28, Cowichan; 29, Fort Langley; 30, Fort Nisqually; 31, Fort Victoria; 32, Klallum; 33, Kwanthen; 34, Lermmi; 35, Samish; 36, Songish; Kwakiutl: 37, Bella Bella; 38, Blunden Harbor; 39, Fort McLoughlin; 40, Fort Rupert; 41, Kingcome Inlet; 42, Knight's Inlet; 43, Kwakiutl; 44, Lekwiltok; 45, Newitty; 46, Nimkish; 47, Quatsino Sound; 48, Rivers Inlet. (Adapted from Duff 1969.)

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
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attention in only two published studies. Swadesh (1948) analyzes motives in Nootka war texts. He describes Nootka warfare as efficient and deadly, concluding that wars were fought primarily for material gain in the form of captured slaves and territory. Codere (1950) presents a very different picture for the Southern Kwakiutl. She describes their warfare as highly ceremonialized, involving a great deal of bluster but few casualties. She denies any material basis for the conflicts, arguing instead that they fought to gain or recover lost prestige. Even though Drucker and Heizer (1967) challenged aspects of Codere's analysis, the opposed images of Nootka and Southern Kwakiutl warfare remain widely accepted. Rosman and Rubel (1971: 139), for instance, explicitly endorse both Swadesh's and Codere's conclusions.

The long coexistence of these two views testifies to anthropology's general disinterest in the topic of war. The Nootka and Southern Kwakiutl were similar in their cultures and their relations to the natural environment. They were affected by similar historical developments. They had a long and extensive history of interaction, which included war. Their territories adjoin one another on the northwest of Vancouver Island. Yet we are told that war for one was a materially inconsequential social game, whereas for the other it was a deadly struggle to control basic resources. This strains credulity, for if both were true, we should at least expect that the Nootka would have encroached on Southern Kwakiutl territory. Instead, it seems that the Southern Kwakiutl expanded at the Nootka's expense (Boas 1890: 608-609).

Warfare elsewhere on the coast has received even less analysis. Explanations of fighting rely primarily on informants' statements of goals, often generations after the fact. Relying on these statements, portrayals of war tend to fall between those of Swadesh and Codere. Material goals are recognized, but so are a variety of other motivations. DeLaguna's study of a Tlingit community provides a typical example: "The major causes for war as indicated in the stories told at Yakutat were the desire for slaves, for captives to hold for ransom, for booty, rivalry over the rights to sib crests, jealousy over women, and desire for revenge for previous killings or abuse of a helpless person" (DeLaguna 1972: 581).

The lack of theoretical interest in Northwest Coast warfare has allowed misconceptions about it to grow. Woodcock (1977: 183-184) generalizes Codere's view to all Northwest Coast peoples, suggesting that war was more a horrifying idea than a significant practice. Montagu (1976: 250) and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979: 130) cite the Southern Kwakiutl as an example of a relatively nonviolent culture. Otterbein



1, Coast Tlingit; 2, simishian; 3, Fort 11, Ahousat; 4, uiat; 5, Kyoquot; 6, 7, Kaigani; 8, 9, wichan; 10, Fort 11; 12, Lermmi; 13, Fort McLoughlin; 14, Lekwiltok; 15, n Duff 1969.)

(1973: 937) reverses Swadesh's conclusions, placing motive such as headtaking above land acquisition. Clearly, it is time to take a hard look at Northwest Coast warfare.

In this chapter, I side with Swadesh to argue that the underlying generator of all Northwest Coast warfare was conflict over critical resources. However, this cannot be reduced to a single variable. To explain even Nootka warfare, conflicts other than those identified by Swadesh must be considered. The preeminence of conflicts over resources becomes evident only through cross-cultural, diachronic comparison of four general factors: (1) population numbers and distribution, (2) temporal and spatial availability of subsistence and trade resources, (3) changing demand for resources as a result of changing patterns of trade, especially in trade with Western agents, and (4) labor requirements for production and exchange. Each category must be broken down further to identify specific variables affecting a group at a given time.

Two social patterns also must be considered. One is the existing relations of opposition or alliance between groups; the other is within- and between-group power differences. Both involved problems of survival and subsistence. Both were structured, in part, by conflict over resources and war. Both in turn affected further elaboration of war patterns. A third social factor affecting war was the social organization, or kinship systems, of Northwest Coast peoples. Social organization will not be given much attention, however, for reasons that are discussed in a closing section.

In saying that conflict over resources was the basis of war, I mean that the control of critical resources was the predominant goal in launching attacks (allowing for the secondary social considerations just mentioned). By addressing both the pattern of conflicts between groups over resources, and the question of motivation, this analysis differs from two related approaches in the study of war (see Chapter 1, this volume). First, several cultural ecologists invoke conflict over resources to explain war, but they explain the linkage between need and response as a form of sociocultural adaptation. They are not centrally concerned with motives, which they see as malleable and bent to society's needs. Second, other anthropologists do invoke individual motives to explain war, but they accept at face value the mixed goals provided by informants. My analysis does not rely on informants' recollections to establish motives. The proposition that groups went to war when it was in the material interest of the decision makers to do so—when war had become the preferable option for people seeking ways to remain alive and well—is a hypothesis tested against actual

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behavior. Applying this proposition to historically changing circumstances of local demography, ecology, and economy, one can explain major variables such as periods of intense war, periods of relative peace, which groups were attacked, and which groups launched attacks. This is not an attempt to reduce a social phenomenon (war) to individual psychology, for the goals people seek are structured by eminently social forces. It is an attempt to link the two so as to provide a more complete explanation, without invoking the epistemologically nettlesome concept of adaptation.

Emphasizing material goals does not deny that a variety of other motives, discussed in a closing section, entered into decisions to make war. However, motives such as the quest for prestige or acquisition of ceremonial titles are relatively constant cultural values. War patterns were not constant, but highly variable. Other motives add little to the more mundane considerations I stress in explaining these variations. This does not mean that cultural norms and values were not central in other social activities. Because of the costs and hazards of war, practical considerations were probably more prominent here than in other, less life-or-death matters.

This chapter relies almost exclusively on published material. To avoid any appearance of selecting only those cases that fit my model, I refer to every conflict I found that involved five or more deaths. This totals just over 200 conflicts, many involving multiple incidents of combat. Because of the uneven coverage of published material, this record is very far from complete. Contextual information also is limited. Many wars are simply mentioned without any elaboration. These limits of information are reflected in conditional phrasing, in which I speculate on factors that may have led to a particular war, suggest that a particular area should have been peaceful at a certain time, and so forth. Archival or ethnohistoric research could check many of these points, and so test the validity of the material incentive hypothesis.

### Forms of Violence

Recent archaeological work indicates that warfare was endemic on the Northwest Coast for at least 3000 years (MacDonald 1979: 11). The basic pattern was fairly uniform throughout the culture area in historic times. Most attacks were carried out by sea. Raiders could travel hundreds of miles, carrying provisions with them. Among the northern matrilineal peoples, the basic unit in war was the local clan segment. In

the south, it was the village. If conflicts expanded, more inclusive groupings might be drawn in. War parties varied in size from a few canoes to huge flotillas with many hundred men.

The classic form of attack was the night or dawn raid on a sleeping village. Hundreds could die in a raid, although casualties usually were much fewer. At other times, enemies were slaughtered treacherously at feasts or peace ceremonies. Small parties or individuals were picked off by slave raiders or in prolonged attritional campaigns. A chance meeting of enemies might become a disorganized free-for-all. On rare occasions, a stockaded house or village would be put under siege (DeLaguna 1960: 150; Swanton 1905: 404-407).<sup>1</sup> Generally, the attitude toward war was pragmatic. Tactics were tailored to maximize enemy casualties and captives. When ritualized combats are noted, they are usually in the context of an existing potlatch relationship.

War plans were made in the winter and executed during milder weather. Proposed targets and tactics were debated openly. Men of noble status could influence a debate to the extent of their military reputation, and could attract fighters with promised rewards. However, except under unusual circumstances, they could compel only their slaves to fight for them. A war leader had command in battle. His death could throw a raiding party into disorganized retreat. Most actual fighting was done by a few experienced warriors, with the rest of the party supporting them or joining in as needed.

War technology was highly developed. Villages were located in or near defensible sites, often incorporating sophisticated features such as concealed exits, double-walled houses, or spiked rolling-logs. These fortifications were matched by an elaborate complex of weapons and armor (see Gunther 1972; MacDonald 1979). After contact, firearms quickly replaced native weapons in war, except for close-quarters fighting.<sup>2</sup> Some postcontract groups even had cannon, or canoe-mounted brass swivels. The quantity and quality of Western weapons often meant the difference between survival or extinction of a local group. Consequently, native peoples quickly became reliant on Western trade.

The rest of this chapter argues that these wars were fought to control valuable resources. The nature of these resources varied with locality and time period, and so did the associated conflicts. To illustrate these variations, I discuss Northwest Coast peoples under three headings, based on broad similarities in subsistence and trade situations. Grouped together are the Tlingit, Tsimshian, and Bella Coola as the northern river peoples, the Nootka and Haida as the outer coast peoples, and the Coast Salish and Kwakiutl as the peoples of the sheltered straits.

## The Northern

Several Tlingit, Tsimshian, and Bella Coola peoples enjoyed a favorable position for salmon and sealashore resources, which coastal peoples also had (see DeLaguna 1960: 150). Some from those in the mountains.

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## The Tlingit

Precontact population of 2.5 persons for the Tsimshian result of a Lisiansky 1841 expedition to exploit sealashore resources. Tlingit depopulation

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### The Northern River Peoples

Several major rivers meet the sea within the territories of the Tlingit, Tsimshian, and Bella Coola. Warfare here centered on control of resources associated with the rivers. Those controlling river mouths enjoyed a favored subsistence position. They usually had rich supplies of salmon and other river-spawning fish, but also could use ocean or seashore resources. Upriver people had to depend more on the salmon runs, which were not entirely dependable.<sup>3</sup> People living on exposed coasts also had food problems (see the section on the outer coast peoples). Some Tlingit territory is like this. Prior to depopulation, people from exposed coasts or upstream locations regularly tried to displace those in more favorable, estuarine locations.

The river mouths also were centers of trade, both before and after contact. Furs and other items from the interior were traded down the valleys, and Western buyers clustered around the estuaries. Control of this trade was a continual source of conflict.

#### The Tlingit

Precontact Tlingit numbers are estimated at 10,000, with a density of 2.5 persons per mile of coastline (compared to 8.2 for the Haida and 7 for the Tsimshian [Kroeber 1939: 135, 170]). This low density may be a result of a restricted variety of food resources (DeLaguna 1972: 36; Lisiansky 1968: 237; Suttles 1962: 136) and a technology ill-equipped to exploit sea fish (Langdon 1979: 116). Or it may be in part an underestimate, resulting from a failure to appreciate the extent of early Tlingit depopulation.

The brief Spanish visit in 1775 left smallpox, which claimed, by some estimates, half the population (Fleurieu 1969: 221; Krause 1970: 103). The Russians moved in around 1800, and the unbroken European presence after that was accompanied by one plague after another (Krause 1970: 103). By Veniamof's calculation, total Tlingit population in 1835 was 8650. Smallpox in 1836 reduced the numbers by about 40% (Krause 1970: 43, 63; Langdon 1979: 112). These early, frightful losses make it doubtful that any pressure on food resources existed in historic times. No postcontact wars are attributable to competition over the food resource base,<sup>4</sup> although there are indications of such fighting before contact.<sup>5</sup>

The Tlingit originated in the interior. Some time in the past, they began moving down the river valleys and over land to the coast (Bancroft 1874: 96; DeLaguna 1972: 17; Drucker 1963: 200). It can only

be guessed whether the previous inhabitants of the coast accepted this intrusion peaceably. Around contact, the Tlingit gradually were pushing north and west, displacing Eskimo or other recent migrants to the coast in a process that often was marked by heavy fighting<sup>6</sup> (DeLaguna 1972: 257; Drucker 1963: 148; Gunther 1972: 140; MacDonald 1969: 245; Oberg 1973: 56). This movement, in turn, may have been forced by Tsimshian and Haida migrations. Boas's (1970: 355-378) informants recalled a long series of exterminative raids fought between the Tlingit and Tsimshian over control of the Nass and Skeena estuaries. These occurred during most of the eighteenth century, with the Tlingit finally losing and being pushed north (also see Boas 1889: 831; 1895: 560n.). During the same period, some 1800 Haida engaged in a series of battles to displace the Tlingit on part of the Prince of Wales Archipelago (Langdon 1979: 113; Swanton 1909: 89).

After contact, the Tlingit fought mostly to control trade. Between 1799 and 1805, all the Tlingit except the Sitka group, plus some Haida (Lisiansky 1968: 223; Miller 1967: 140), launched a series of attacks against the Russians and their Aleut hunters. Two Russian posts were wiped out, along with several hunting parties and camps, before the Russian warships could impose an uneasy truce. Sporadic resistance continued for at least a decade (DeLaguna 1972: 159, 170-176; Krause 1970: 29-39; Lisiansky 1968: 150-162, 219-223). The Tlingit resented the Russian presence because United States buyers gave better exchanges (DeLaguna 1972: 170). More importantly, the Russians were interested less in buying pelts from the Tlingit than in hunting for them themselves. Their hunting force of 900 Aleuts was scattered throughout Tlingit territory, and was depleting rapidly the number of sea otter (Lisiansky 1968: 152, 164, 242) and fur seals (Simpson 1847: 222). The reluctance of the Sitka, who lived around the major Russian post, to join in the attack probably was due to the economic advantages that accrued to all "home guard" fort Indians (see below and Fisher 1977: 29).

The Tlingit uprising achieved a limited success. The Russians stopped hunting in some areas (DeLaguna 1972: 177) and generally became more attentive to Tlingit interests (Krause 1970: 37). But the Tlingit failed in their major goal of expelling the Russians, and at the cost of great destruction to their villages. Constant Russian vigilance ruled out later surprise attacks<sup>7</sup> (Krause 1970: 38, 41).

The Russians eventually came to be an accepted fact of life, but other conflicts continued. Immediately after the Russian victory, a Tlingit hunting party was wiped out by another Tlingit group, which led to more fighting between the two (DeLaguna 1960: 145). The rela-

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relationship of this incident to other events of the period is unclear. Most conflicts centered on control of the fur trade from the interior. Major river trade routes were controlled by the Chilkat, Taku, and Stikine Tlingit (Krause 1970: 134, 136; Oberg 1973: 106; Simpson 1847: 210, 216). These routes were important before contact, and may have been the cause of precontact fighting. DeLaguna (1972: 273-275, 580-581) reports a 5-year war that occurred around 1786 or earlier, in which an alliance of several Tlingit groups attacked the Ganaxtedi sib of Chilkat. The war was motivated by a combination of jealousy of the Chilkat's wealth and retaliation for earlier slave raids. The attackers eventually were defeated.

The inland routes assumed even greater importance in the 1820s and later. By this time, the Tlingit were dependent on Western trade. In addition to a number of other items,<sup>8</sup> they required a constant supply of guns and ammunition (Krause 1970: 40; Lisiansky 1968: 239; Rich 1941: 321). Because the sea otter almost had been eliminated (Krause 1970: 40; Simpson 1847: 224), the flow of furs from the interior became the main source of wealth, with the estuarine middlemen making enormous profits. Monopoly privileges to the trade were defended zealously, and trespass on the routes was penalized by death (Collison 1915: 148; Drucker 1963: 129; Krause 1970: 67, 115, 137; Oberg 1973: 106, 150; Rich 1941: 245, 1960: 41). A Hudson Bay Company (HBC) proposal in 1836 to establish a trading post up the Stikine was met with resolute opposition by the Stikine people, who would permit no interference with their lucrative monopoly (Rich 1941: 319-322). When the HBC in 1852 established a post 300 miles up the Chilkat trade route, a Chilkat war party dismantled the fort and escorted the traders back to the coast (Drucker 1963: 53). The Chilkat monopoly may have been the richest in Tlingit territory. They were feared widely, and seem to have had influence over other Tlingit (Gunther 1972: 180; Krause 1970: 66-77). Their wealth and strength appears to have made them immune to attack during the fur trade. That was not the case for the Stikine, who fought regularly with the Sitka.

Sitka, or New Archangel, was located on the outer coast of Baranof Island. It had been a major trade center during the maritime sea otter trade (Wike 1951: 16), so naturally the Russians established their major outpost there in 1799. After the Tlingit uprising, the Russians did almost all of their trading at this post (Krause 1970: 41). In return for provisioning the fort, the Sitka received a regular supply of trade items (Krause 1970: 41-42), but they were missing out on the middleman benefits of an active fur trade. Russian prices were not competitive, so the estuarine groups preferred to wait for a U.S. ship or, after 1831, to

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take their furs to the HBC's Fort Simpson (DeLaguna 1972: 170; Krause 1970: 41, 137; Rich 1941: 246; Simpson 1847: 209-216). The Sitka would have profited from a diversion of the interior trade to the Russian post, a conflict of interest that makes intelligible the history of war between them and the Stikine (DeLaguna 1960: 149-157; Oberg 1973: 106).

One midcentury attack by the Sitka on the Stikine around Wrangell resulted in heavy losses for the attackers. After their defeat, the Sitka "started to buy things around Wrangell. The Wrangell people were making good money" (DeLaguna 1960: 155). The Sitka were not satisfied with this relationship, and so they killed 40 Stikine at a peace ceremony (DeLaguna 1960: 155). This conflict expanded to include Stikine attacks on the Russians, who may have been suspected of complicity in the massacre (Krause 1970: 45), and several raids on Angoon. The reason for the latter is unclear, although slave raiding figured into at least one conflict. (DeLaguna [1960: 146-155] provides details of the convoluted relations between Angoon, Sitka, Stikine, and the Russians.)

As mentioned, the Chilkat were probably too powerful for the Sitka. Durlach's genealogical data showing extensive intermarriage between the two (cited in Rosman and Rubel 1971: 43-44) suggests that they had formed an alliance. The Taku role in this period is unclear. They enjoyed a profitable monopoly on interior trade. But, prior to 1840, instead of trading these interior furs directly to Western agents, they were exchanged for slaves from the Kaigani Haida and "Hood's Bay Indians" (Simpson 1847: 216). How this fits into larger patterns of trade is not explained (see the later discussion of the Kaigani). When the HBC established its Taku post around 1840, the local inhabitants attempted to insert themselves as middlemen in the coastal trade, but apparently were prevented from doing so by the company (Simpson 1847: 215). A Tsimshian raid on Taku in midcentury (Collison 1915: 79) suggests that they did not achieve, or could not sustain, the military superiority enjoyed by the Chilkat.

The southernmost Tlingit group were the "large and warlike" Tongass (Krause 1970: 74). They appear to have been allied with the Stikine (Dunn 1845: 195), and were heavily involved in the Fort Simpson fur trade (Rich 1941: 323). In the 1830s, the Tongass, the Gitksan and Niska Tsimshian, and others, warred against the Tsetsaut, a division of the interior Tinneh who recently had pushed toward the coast. Some Tsetsaut groups had to pass by Tongass territory on their way to Fort Simpson. It was these whom the Tongass attacked (Collison 1915: 309; Dunn 1845: 194-195; Niblack 1970: 342; Rich 1941: 271), suggest-

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ing that the Tongass, like the Tsimshian, were trying to impose themselves as middlemen. The Tongass or a nearby Tlingit group and others exterminated some 500 Tsetsaut living slightly further north during this same period (Boas 1895: 555).

The need for slave labor was another source of conflict.<sup>9</sup> Besides their usual productive value, slaves were important to estuarine traders as carriers on the long treks to inland suppliers (Oberg 1973: 106). In midcentury, one estimate put slaves at 9–12% of the total Tlingit population (Townsend 1978: 10). Wealthy individuals around 1827 owned 20 to 30 slaves (Krause 1970: 105). Most slaves were obtained from the south through Tsimshian and Haida intermediaries (Averkiewa 1941: 92; DeLaguna 1972: 177, 469). The wealthy Tlingit could well afford to buy slaves. Sanger (1960) also suggests that long-distance slave raiding was prohibited by the heavy Tlingit reliance on sockeye salmon, which ran in their territory during the period of optimal weather for long-distance travel. But some short-distance slave raiding did occur. The precontact raiding of the Chilkat already has been mentioned. The Yakutat, who did not control a river pass, regularly raided and were raided by Chugach Eskimo (Birket-Smith 1953: 100, 142; DeLaguna 1972: 257). Baranov had the misfortune of meeting one such raid in 1793 (DeLaguna 1972: 159; Krause 1970: 29). The Sitka, also without a river, raided other Tlingit groups (DeLaguna 1960: 149; Wike 1959). Raiding for plunder alone seems to have occurred on targets of opportunity, as when a Haida potlatch party was blown ashore (Collison 1915: 198; Swanton 1905: 364), or when one group acquired wealth out of proportion to their strength, as when the Yakutat plundered a Russian post and subsequently were raided (DeLaguna 1972: 261–270). Another practice was the capturing of a man of noble status and holding him for ransom. Reports of this are found throughout the Northwest Coast. But like plundering, it seems to have occurred when the opportunity presented itself, and was not a major incentive in initiating wars.<sup>10</sup>

Large-scale armed conflict seems to have ended by the mid-1860s. The disastrous smallpox epidemic of 1862–1863 (Duff 1969: 43), combined with increasing penetration of Western missionaries, miners, settlement, and industries (Fisher 1977; Knight 1978; LaViolette 1973) made the 1860s the major watershed for all Northwest Coast peoples. The Tlingit experienced the added impact of changeover from Russian to U.S. rule in 1867, which brought chaos to their economy (DeLaguna 1972: 180). Yet they were not broken, and threatened uprisings against the growing alien occupation in the late 1870s brought the permanent assignment of a U.S. warship (Krause 1970: 47, 71). The final blow fell

in 1882, when Angoon was destroyed by naval bombardment (DeLaguna 1960: 158).

### The Tsimshian

Kroeber's (1939: 135) population estimate of 7000 for the precontact Tsimshian (including Niska and Gitksan divisions) is probably too low. Good historic information begins in the 1830s, and the Tsimshian are estimated at 8500 for 1835 (Duff 1969: 39). Although it seems likely that they were affected by the early plagues decimating the Tlingit, the first reported epidemic was smallpox in 1837. It killed up to a third of some settlements (Brink 1974: 46; Rich 1941: 271).

As with the historic Tlingit, food was not a major issue in postcontact (post-depopulation) Tsimshian warfare. It was, however, "a major enticement to war in prehistoric times" (MacDonald 1980: 9). George MacDonald of Canada's National Museum of Man currently is studying Tsimshian warfare, using nearly 1000 pages of unpublished accounts. He (1980: 24) states: "Oral accounts are consistent that the traditional causes of warfare were to capture food first and foremost."

Family traditions tell of extensive fighting over territory before contact. Most believe that the Tsimshian came down the river valleys from the interior, pushing out prior Tlingit inhabitants (Drucker 1963: 200; Swanton 1952: 607; cf. MacDonald 1969: 242). Archaeological evidence indicates expansion southward along the coast, to outlying islands, and back up the Skeena valley (MacDonald 1969: 245). Around contact, Tsimshian and Bella Bella were trying to exterminate the Xahais to take their territory (Drucker 1963: 148). Somewhat later, Tsimshian attacked Tinneh groups who recently had pushed out from the interior (Collison 1915: 307-310).

The rivers of Tsimshian territory were valuable trade highways to the interior. Archaeological evidence suggests that wars occurred over control of valley passes since circa 1000 B.C. (MacDonald 1979: 11). The stakes in trade control took a great leap when Western goods entered the trade network. MacDonald (1980: 14) believes that this occurred through long-distance native trade 75 to 100 years before actual contact. This protohistoric Western trade, he (1980: 24) asserts, destabilized traditional territorial arrangements and led to unprecedented militarism in the eighteenth century.<sup>11</sup> Most of the supporting evidence for this radical reinterpretation of contact in the Northwest remains unpublished. But MacDonald (1980: 12, 16) does describe one series of wars involving the Kitwanga Gitksan. Ostensibly fought for revenge, the wars actually were directed towards control of newly important

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trade trails. The Nass and Skeena estuaries also were contested just before and around contact. Major wars there involved Tsimshian, Tlingit, and Haida (Boas 1970: 355-377; Collison 1915: 67, 71, 82).

Direct Tsimshian contact with Europeans began in the late 1780s, but remained episodic until the land fur trade some 40 years later. Oral accounts show that, like the Tlingit, the Tsimshian in these early years were fighting against encroachment by Russian-Aleut hunting expeditions (MacDonald 1980: 14).

The HBC founded Fort Simpson near the mouth of the Nass in 1831, and moved it to its present location near the Skeena in 1834 (Fisher 1977: 26). Shortly thereafter, 9 of the 12 Coast Tsimshian tribes moved their permanent villages to the fort (Drucker 1963: 118; Duff 1969: 18). In midcentury, Fort Simpson was the largest native settlement on the coast (LaViolette 1973: 22), numbering some 2300 people (Garfield 1966: 7). The Fort Simpson Tsimshian enjoyed a most favorable trade position, dominating both the major trading post and river of the north. From its founding, Fort Simpson was the "grand mart" of the Northwest Coast and the HBC's most important station (Fisher 1977: 26; Rich 1941: 286, 1943: 235). In 1841, some 14,000 Indians passed by the fort (Niblack 1970: 337).

The local Tsimshian made a fortune by provisioning the fort, and by acting as middlemen or otherwise regulating trade (Fisher 1977: 30; Rich 1944: 48). But they had difficulty with some visitors, especially the "obstreperous Haida" (Fisher 1977: 31). Fights between Haida and Tsimshian at the fort were common in the 1830s (Boas 1970: 389-392; Collison 1915: 172; Crosby 1914: 118; Harrison 1925: 146-148; Murdock 1935: 240; Rich 1943: 212; Simpson 1847: 206; Swanton 1905: 384-387). The precise cause of these conflicts usually is not stated, but they clearly involve Tsimshian attempts to profit off the Haida. In the best-described battle, fighting was triggered by the Tsimshian demanding larger pieces of fish in trade (Swanton 1905: 384). The fighting lasted several days, until the Haida ran out of ammunition (Boas 1970: 390). They attempted to get away by offering the Tsimshian "property" (Swanton 1905: 384-385). A much smaller fight (only five died) occurred in 1841, because some Haida balked at delivering potatoes that a Tsimshian "had purchased" (Simpson 1847: 232).

In time, some Haida arranged to trade at the fort under protection of Tsimshian partners. Their yearly meetings were accompanied by lavish gift exchanges (Murdock 1935: 240; also see Dunn 1845: 189). The Kaigani Haida seem to have been negotiating for such an arrangement in 1836 (Rich 1941: 323). From the behavior already described of the Fort Simpson Tsimshian (and of all "fort Indians"), it seems likely

that the Tsimshian were getting the best of the gift exchanges. This would explain why many Haida later chose to trade in Victoria—a round trip of over 1000 miles, compared to about 100 miles to Fort Simpson. It also would help explain the apparent renewal of hostilities at the fort around the 1850s (Collison 1915: 89; Crosby 1914: 117–123).

Besides dominating native trade at the fort, these same Tsimshian exercised a monopoly on trade up the Skeena. All the chiefs were made wealthy by this trade (Drucker 1963: 129), but a chief titled Legaic particularly benefited. Chiefs of the Legaic line apparently had dominated inland trade since at least the mid-eighteenth century (Boas 1889: 831). They levied a tax on all upriver trade (Garfield 1966: 35; MacDonald 1980: 19–22). One Legaic's dominance was aided by the marriage of his daughter to an HBC official. His wealth and power were so great that none dared attack him (Fisher 1977: 41, 46).

Some upriver suppliers benefited from these trade arrangements. The Carrier could get better prices from Tsimshian middlemen than from HBC traders in the interior (Bishop 1983: 154), because the HBC paid only a fraction of coast prices in the interior (Rich 1941: 245). However, coercion was more important. In the 1830s, Legaic led a series of wars aimed at establishing a trade monopoly. His superior weapons led to quick victories over petty trade controllers in the interior. The upriver Gitksan Tsimshian remained unwilling trade partners. Besides doing their own trading through the coastal Tsimshian, they were forced to allow the latter direct access to the Babine for trading (Adams 1973: 155; Garfield 1966: 7). The Gitksan, and perhaps the Niska, in turn waged war on the Tsetsaut Tinneh to take their hunting territories and/or to monopolize their trade. The earliest of these conflicts seem to have been caused by Tsetsaut expansionism towards the coast. However, by the violent 1830s, the Tsetsaut were clearly on the defensive (Adams 1973: 115; Barbeau 1950: 9; Boas 1895: 555–560; Collison 1915: 319; Duff 1959: 27–30).

After subduing interior traders, Legaic turned on his coastal rivals. The Niska, who controlled the Nass estuary, were prime targets. With no Western port in their territory, they were vulnerable to attacks by other Tsimshian and Haida. But the Niska were organized into confederacies, and apparently were able to resist the assaults (Green 1915: 63, 80; Howay 1925: 387; MacDonald 1980: 19–24).

Tsimshian demand for slaves was considerable. At midcentury Fort Simpson, 9 tribal chiefs had 10 to 20 slaves each. Some 50 lineage heads each had 2 to 10 slaves (Garfield 1966: 30). A factor contributing to this demand may have been the preeminence of eulachon (candlefish) oil in Tsimshian trade (Garfield 1966: 95). Preparation and

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overland transport of this grease must have put a premium on captive labor (see MacDonald 1979: 39).

Slave taking was a major incentive for war in prehistoric times (MacDonald 1980: 24). The picture is more complicated in the historic period. According to Garfield (1966: 29), the Tsimshian either bought slaves or captured them in raids. She (1939: 268, 273) reports that the different Tsimshian groups often raided each other for slaves, but does not specify the time. One Legaic was a raider of sufficient renown to provoke retaliation by combined forces of Tsimshian, Bella Coola, and Kwakiutl. From Garfield's description (1939: 268), this seems to have been before the move to Fort Simpson. I could find no clear instance of Fort Simpson groups raiding to capture slaves after they had congregated at the fort. I suspect they were sufficiently wealthy that they could buy the slaves they needed. Other Tsimshian did raid. The Kitkatla Tsimshian (also known as Sebassa), not located at the fort, were notorious for their raids on their southern neighbors (Dunn 1845: 184; McIlwraith 1948/II: 346-356). Slave raiding and trading may have been their only way of getting a share of the Fort Simpson wealth. (Battles between Kitkatla and some Kwakiutl are discussed later.)

A few other conflicts are reported. One is the unexplained sacking of a Taku Tlingit village by Tsimshian (Collison 1915: 79). Another, possibly mythical, account tells of one group exterminating another in a dispute over the catch from a commonly owned weir (Boas 1970: 306). Garfield describes a long feud between two Fort Simpson groups later in the century (1939: 269-271). Finally, Boas (1970: 410) mentions a battle and a "general war," but I could obtain no details about those conflicts.

The sketchiness of information for the 1860s and 1870s make it impossible to fix a date for the end of Tsimshian warfare. The slave raids on southern neighbors do not appear to have continued into the 1860s, although a party of Rivers Inlet Kwakiutl were murdered by the Kitkatla as late as 1890 (McIlwraith 1948/II: 359). Some fighting between the Fort Simpson Tsimshian and Haida continued beyond the smallpox epidemic into the 1870s. Disputes over control of trade were not eliminated by depopulation, but the friction was reduced as the HBC gradually undercut native middlemen (Knight 1978: 60, 231; also see MacDonald 1980: 22). As the chiefs' traditional source of wealth and status was eliminated, they turned to the missionaries, who both reinforced their positions and opened up new roads to wealth (Knight 1978: 245; and see Blackman 1977: 463; Fisher 1977: 127). Missionaries helped arrange a final peace between Tsimshian and Haida in 1878 (Crosby 1914: 119-121).

### The Bella Coola

The precontact Bella Coola population is estimated to be about 1400 (Swanton 1952: 548). They controlled a very rich resource territory, for the entire population was ensconced on lower river valleys or on the upper reaches of saltwater inlets (McIlwraith 1948/I: 1). They were spared intensive Western contact until well into the land fur trade period, and we have no records of early epidemics. Conflict over food resources continued longer than for the Tlingit or Tsimshian.

The Bella Coola probably pushed out from the interior in comparatively recent times (Drucker 1963: 15). It seems that similar pressure from upriver groups was applied to them in the nineteenth century. The Carrier sporadically raided Bella Coola settlements, and the latter retaliated (McIlwraith 1948/I: 601). Local traditions indicate that the Carrier replaced Bella Coola settlements on the upper Dean River (McIlwraith 1948/I: 15-16).

Their rivers were well stocked with salmon, which was their main trade item with other peoples. The abundance allowed them to purchase all their slaves, which in precontact old days were said to be 30-40% of the population (McIlwraith 1948/I: 158). But this bounty also brought attacks from the outside. Kwakiutl groups regularly raided the Bella Coola to obtain salmon when their own food was scarce. They picked their targets on the basis of accumulated supplies (McIlwraith 1948/II: 339). After the Bella Coola had been reduced by smallpox in the 1860s, the Bella Bella, who had not been hit so hard, were reported preparing for major assaults on them (Poole 1872: 185). Poole ascribed this to long standing grievances between the two peoples, but evidence of cooperation between the two in war suggests that the Bella Bella were after the Bella Coola's rivers. In sum, the Bella Coola were usually on the defensive. Reflecting this orientation, they believed that killing or capturing people in war was acceptable, but that taking land was downright indecent (McIlwraith 1948/I: 132).

Fortunately for the Bella Coola, their villages were defensible. Located at the mouths of steep river valleys, they had clear views of approaches, and upstream groups often would flock to the defense of exposed downstream sites. The downstream villages were often stockaded, and many raids were disasters for the attackers (McIlwraith 1948/II: 339, 349, 362-364). Unfortunately for the Bella Coola, raiders did not confine their attacks to the villages.

Kwakiutl and Tsimshian regularly raided for slaves. They occasionally attacked villages, but concentrated on picking off isolated fishers or gatherers (McIlwraith 1948/II: 344-369). Referring to all the

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raids, McIlwraith (1948/II: 338) states "it appears probable that at least several villages of the Bella Coola were embroiled every few years."

Most Bella Coola fighting was defensive, and they were rather inept when pressed to offensive actions. Two attempts to punish Tsimshian slave raiders were disorganized disasters that cost the Bella Coola many lives and further emboldened the raiders (McIlwraith 1948/II: 346-356). On occasion, they even put themselves under military command of the Bella Bella (McIlwraith 1948/II: 342). One exception to this pattern was a series of raids against the Kwakiutl under the leadership of Potles.

Potles was a leader of extraordinary power. He did not hesitate to kill individuals who displeased him (McIlwraith 1948/I: 175). His reputation attracted followers when he announced his intent to attack the Kwakiutl. Three raids, over about 10 years, killed a great many Kwakiutl and gained the Bella Coola much plunder (Boas 1897: 426-428, 1966: 110-116; McIlwraith 1948/II: 364-369; Rohner and Rohner 1970: 199-200). These attacks are especially interesting because Boas's accounts make it seem that at least the first and third raids were caused by insults to the Bella Coola. When one reads McIlwraith, however, it turns out that the Kwakiutl villages involved had been repeatedly raiding the Bella Coola, and after the retaliation they were much less of a threat (1948/II: 362, 370).

Their rivers put the Bella Coola in a good position for the fur trade. In 1836 they were the biggest supplier of furs to Fort McLoughlin in Bella Bella territory (Rich 1941: 325). They obtained many of their furs from the inland Chilcotin, because the HBC post in Chilcotin territory paid a fraction of the price on the coast (Rich 1941: 272).<sup>12</sup> They also had profitable trade relationships with some Carrier groups (Goldman 1940: 340-353). Yet they also fought with the Carrier and Chilcotin (Brown 1873: 13). It may be that because the Bella Coola never had a fort within their territory, and so never attained wealth or strength comparable to the Fort Simpson Tsimshian, these inland groups were tempted to try to bypass the Bella Coola middlemen, and hostilities resulted.

The Bella Coola offer an interesting example of war supposedly for ceremonial, noneconomic purposes. McIlwraith's informants swore that in the old days, an observed error in ceremonial procedures would bring a raid by an outside group (1948/I: 192; II: 19-20). There are several reasons to doubt this. McIlwraith suspected that this was a fiction used to impress youths with the need to observe ritual procedures strictly. In the two cases of such raids provided by informants,

the ceremonial violations seemed to be pretexts concealing more serious concerns. None of McIlwraith's informants knew of an instance in which their own people had launched a raid for this purpose (1948/II: 19-20).

I found no information on the termination of Bella Coola warfare. It probably followed the epidemics and white penetration of the early 1860s.

### The Outer Coast Peoples

The outer coast location of the Nootka and Haida is central to their conflicts over subsistence and trade. For subsistence resource conflicts, the critical factor is that both had territory that was exposed to open ocean and territory that was more sheltered. The exposed areas were hit directly by fierce storms. Bad weather could disrupt subsistence activities all over the coast, but it was the greatest threat to those who faced the Pacific. Many maritime resources became unavailable, stored food rotted, and the specter of hunger was often seen (Blackman 1976: 5-6; Brabant 1900: 55; Drucker 1951: 37; Gormly in Suttles 1973: 622; Pidocke 1965: 135-136; Stewart 1977: 135; Swan 1972: 65; see Wike 1951: 62 for several other references). The high wind and surf also could wash away canoes and houses (DeLaguna 1960: 132; Drucker 1983 91; Swan 1972: 65, 143). Nootka and Haida on these exposed sites often tried to displace people from more sheltered sites.

On the other hand, the outer coast position had advantages during the maritime fur trade. Their territories were well provided with sea otter, and they were natural ports of call for the earliest fur traders. The Nootka and Haida achieved great wealth in the late eighteenth century by selling their own furs and by acting as middlemen for furs from the inner coasts. Their demand for slaves increased as free men devoted more time to procuring otter pelts (Wike 1951: 96). With the shift to a land fur orientation in the early nineteenth century, the Haida had to confront the threat, and the Nootka the actuality, of being cut out of the Western trade network.

#### The Nootka

Before contact there were about 8000 Nootka, including the somewhat distinct Makah (Swanton 1952: 588). Their territory on the west coast of Vancouver Island and the northwestern tip of Washington state had exposed and streamless beaches alternating with sounds and inlets containing salmon streams. Those living on these exposed coasts suf-

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ferred many privations, and there was a long-term tendency to make alliances with or make war on groups in more favorable locations (Drucker 1951: 7, 37).

Several accounts of such wars are available. Before contact, the Ucluelet did not own a salmon stream. They scouted around for the best stream, eliminating some as targets because of affinal ties to the owners, and finally attacked. They killed or enslaved all the previous owners and occupied the area (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 362-367; a summary and analysis of all the war accounts in this source is available in Swadesh 1948). Around contact, the Ucluelet attacked an alliance of two other groups who themselves were warring to obtain streams, again decimating their opponents and taking their territory (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 373-377). The Ahousat of the outer coast lacked salmon streams around the time of contact. In a long war, they exterminated one group for their territory (Drucker 1951: 344-353), and soon after attacked another for their streams. Most of the latter were killed, but some survived by putting themselves under the protection of a nearby group (Drucker 1951: 236). The Ahousat were not always successful in their campaigns. Prior to these 2 wars, a war party of 50 Ahousat canoes had been destroyed in battle (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 353-355). In fact, the successes of both the Ahousat and Ucluelet were due largely to support from the powerful Clayoquot, and the wars of expansion just after contact are related to the Clayoquot aim of regional hegemony over trade.

Conflict generated by food shortages was not restricted to groups on the exposed streamless coasts. The powerful Moachat moved their permanent village site to Nootka Sound just after contact in order to better control the Western trade (Nicholson 1962: 28). In doing so, they appear to have weakened their control of food-producing territory. They became dependent on supplies from the Spanish post (Vancouver 1967/III: 304), and when they took fish from their old territory, the current occupants deeply resented it. Maquina, the famous Moachat chief, dealt with this resistance by slaughtering 40 of the hostile group at a feast (Nicholson 1962: 28). In 1804, a few years after the Westerners left, the Moachat were experiencing famine. The discontent was so great that Maquina feared for his life. He defused this threat by leading a raid on a large village some distance away, returning with plunder, slaves, and enough food for a great feast (Jewitt 1896: 191-195).

A family legend from before contact centers on the alienation of rights to drift whales by a marriage. In the ensuing war, some 850 people are said to have died, and the losers' territory was taken (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 339-341). Claims to drift whales were a regular

source of trouble for the Nootka (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 382; Brabant 1900: 59). Another account from before contact tells of the war between four Ahousat bands. One of the four massacred another, and then the nobles of the victorious band began exploiting everyone else.<sup>13</sup> A breaking point was reached, and the exploiters all were killed (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 346–349).

Several Nootka wars around contact and in the 1850s involved more than subsistence resources. These wars are associated with the Nootka confederacies. In seeking their causes, the discussion leads to an examination of how aspects of war, trade, and contact combined to produce changes in the political economy of the Nootka.

Around contact, the Nootka were grouped into at least five confederacies, plus a number of smaller independent groups (Drucker 1951: 5; 1963: 122). The exact nature of these confederacies, and of early explorers' reports of hierarchical relations between groups,<sup>14</sup> never has been clear. Drucker (1983) has asserted that the confederacies were ceremonial orderings, and had no political unity outside of warfare situations. Several bits of evidence suggest that the confederacies and reported hierarchical relations were more than ceremonial but less than political—they centered on the control of trade.

The imposition of native middlemen in trade was a clear pattern among the Nootka. In their first major contact with Europeans in 1778, Cook observed the enforcement of a trade monopoly by the strongest group in Nootka Sound (the Moachat?):

our first friends, or those who lived in the Sound seemed determined to ingross us entirely to themselves. This we saw on several other occasions, nor were all those who lived in the Sound united in the same cause; the Weakest were frequently obliged to give way to the Strong, and were sometimes plundered of every thing they had, without attempting to make the least resistance (Beaglehole 1967: 299; also see 302, 326).

In 1788 Meares (1790: 142–149) noted forcible monopolization of trade by the Clayoquot. A century later, the Moachat still were forcing the up-canal Muchalot to trade exclusively through them, and to accept greatly inflated costs for the Western goods (Jacobsen 1977: 61).

The genesis of forced middlemen relations in precontact times can be related to long-distance native trade. The west coast of Vancouver Island was a main route between the peoples of the north and those of the Washington and Oregon coasts (Mozino 1970: 63; Swan 1869: 30). This trade may have worked in the same manner as the later slave trade, when large groups intercepted passing trade, buying and reselling to the next large group at a higher price (Sproat 1868: 92). If MacDonald's (1979) hypothesis on Western goods filtering in through na-

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tive networks is correct, these routes may have been increasing in value throughout the eighteenth century.

Direct contact and accelerated Western trade raised the stakes, and generated more conflict (see Meares 1790: 196). The two dominant confederacies were led by the Moachat of Nootka Sound (the site of a Spanish post and a major trade center) and by the Clayoquot of Clayoquot Sound (the major port for U.S. ships [Gunther 1972: 52]). Both were exceptionally numerous, wealthy, and powerful (Fisher 1977: 18; Howay 1969: 382; Jewitt 1896: 134n.; McKelvie 1946: 36). Their head chiefs, Maquina of Moachat and Wickananish of Clayoquot, totally dominated regional trade and amassed great fortunes (Fisher 1977: 12; Meares 1790: 145-157, 184, 228-230; Vancouver 1967/III: 307; Wike 1951: 16, 18).

The Clayoquot achieved their position by a series of wars around contact, in which at least five local groups were wiped out or subjugated (Drucker 1951: 240-243). In 1791, Hoskins observed Wickananish preparing to attack another group "who had not of late in every respect paid them that homage which they thought due to so great a nation" (Howay 1969: 269). The Moachat also were involved in wars around contact (Jane 1930: 110; Meares 1790: 196, 267) and could tell the Spanish of wars dating back 200 years (Mozino 1970: 63). The Clayoquot further attempted to impose a middleman relationship on the powerful Makah under chief Tatoosh. In 1788, Tatoosh refused to deal directly with Western traders. Meares (1790: 155-157) was certain that he had an arrangement to deliver his furs to Wickananish. But Tatoosh was the chief of a large, strong group, and around this same time he "declared war" on Wickananish (Meares 1790: 179). The Makah apparently lost, for the next year peace was restored and they regarded Wickananish as superior because of his military strength (Narvaez in Wike 1959). The Makah had been at a real disadvantage, because they lacked a regularly visited port (Nicholson 1962: 14). The Clayoquot had used their regular contact with U.S. ships to obtain enormous quantities of guns and ammunition (Howay 1969: 43; Mozino 1970: 16). The advantage of the Clayoquot and Moachat in terms of firepower apparently secured unchallenged dominance, for no wars are reported between the late 1780s and just after the turn of the century. As we shall see, their power was challenged effectively at a later date.

In the normal course of affairs, Moachat and Clayoquot did not extract a share of another group's trade by naked expropriation. Rather, it was done through unbalanced ceremonialized gift exchange (Jewitt 1896: 138; Meares 1790: 120, 142-147; also see Howay 1969: 265). These exchanges undoubtedly were related to the affinal ties powerful

chiefs imposed on less powerful groups. Powerful chiefs took brides from their military inferiors, and gave as brides their close female kin (Jane 1930: 105; Meares 1790: 229, 268; Wike 1951: 99). According to Meares (1790: 229), it was through these relationships that the strong chiefs exercised "power" over other groups. Other than allegiance in war, Meares does not specify what "power" meant, but Mozino, who lived among the Nootka for 6 months in 1792, was more specific. He (1970: 42) concluded, tentatively, that their "civil administration" was "purely economic." So it seems that the ceremonial and military unions and hierarchies also were economic arrangements centering on the control of trade.<sup>15</sup>

What of the internal structure of the Moachat and Clayoquot groups? Ruyle (1973) relies heavily on reports about them in arguing that Northwest Coast societies represented an "incipient stratification system." Was the nonslave population "incipiently stratified"? To answer this, we must first consider in a general way how factors of war, trade, and contact could combine to lay the basis for stratification. Under certain circumstances, commoners and lesser nobles may have found it in their short-term interests to support developments leading to the creation of a ruling class.

If part of a middleman's wealth were redistributed within his local group, members would have an interest in supporting his attempts to control trade. But because middlemen kept much of their wealth, the wealth gap separating them from commoners grew much wider (Wike 1951: 97). The support of European traders, which was essential after contact for maintenance of profitable middleman positions, also emphasized the distinctiveness and reinforced the power of a few nobles (Collins 1950: 340; Howay 1969: 309; Jane 1930: 23, 54, 115; Krause 1970: 45; Strange 1928: 19; Suttles 1958: 169). Regional dominance led to a greater concentration of wealth from trade in a central village, but it also increased social impaction. Dissatisfied individuals were less able to remove themselves from an overbearing chief's domain (Wike 1958: 224).

Possession of many slaves by the nobles would be supported by commoners, because slaves did much of the drudge work for a group (see note 8). Jewitt's (1931) log suggests that slaves may have been a kind of labor bank. With ecological and social (see Ferguson 1983) limitations on food storage, slaves were available for intensive exploitation in periods of shortage. Jewitt, who was held as a slave, was overworked and underfed especially at these times. Slaves also were used to protect their owners and enforce their will, even within the local group (Jewitt 1896: 189; Sproat 1868: 114; also see Drucker and Heizer

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1967: 91). Fierce warriors were useful in confrontations with external enemies, but they also could intimidate members of their own group (Boas 1966: 106; Codere 1950: 99; Collins 1950: 100; Garfield 1966: 37).

Several instances are reported of nobles attempting to coerce and exploit commoners, but most of these were unstable and short-lived situations (Boas 1966: 45; Haeberlin and Gunther 1930: 58; Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 346-349; Suttles 1958: 162, 176; Wike 1958: 223). Among the Clayoquot and Moachat of circa 1785-1802, however, the factors just described came together in a way conducive to the formation of a relatively stable exploitative class (Fisher 1977: 16, 18; Howay 1969: 382; Jane 1930: 23-36, 104, 115-117; Jewitt 1896: 131; Meares 1790: 145-147, 196, 228; Vancouver 1967/III: 307; Wike 1951: 16, 18, 99).

Contemporaries reported that the nobles were set apart from the rest of the people by marriage, burial arrangements, food consumption, status markers, deference behaviors, and presumed spirit qualities (Howay 1969: 65, 386; Jane 1930: 29, 98-115; Mozino 1970: 13-30). They also stated that the head chief could decree death as punishment for misbehavior (Jane 1930: 23, 115; Mozino 1970: 43). Nootka chiefs by tradition were titular owners of group territories (Drucker 1951: 248). Clayoquot and Moachat chiefs got a share of the produce of land and sea (Jane 1930: 111), and goaded their people to work longer and harder (Jane 1930: 111; Jewitt 1931: 46; Meares 1790: 149, 265). But chiefs also sought to attract new followers (Jane 1930: 108). Jewitt notes that even Maquina's power, although considerable, had limits when it came to economic exploitation:

The king, or head Tyee is their leader in war, in the management of which he is perfectly absolute. He is also president of their councils, which are almost always regulated by his opinion. But he has no kind of power over the property of his subjects, nor can he require them to contribute to his wants, being in this respect no more privileged than any other person. (Jewitt 1896: 215)

There is no suggestion that Nootka chiefs had the power to deny their followers access to food-producing territory. Because unequal access to "the basic resources that sustain life" is a key diagnostic used to distinguish ranked from stratified societies (Fried 1967: 186), this indicates that the Nootka were not stratified. But if we consider the vitally important Western trade goods, and the unequal access that militarily dominant chiefs had to their source (the Western traders), then some Nootka communities clearly were stratified, or perhaps were even fleeting secondary states (see Fried 1967: 230).

Thus, the answer to the stratification question must be a qualified yes; qualified because the Moachat and Clayoquot represent unusual

situations, and the internal hierarchy clearly was dependent on continuing Western support. Within 2 years of the withdrawal of the Europeans, Maquina feared assassination (Jewitt 1896: 189) and the nobles were "brought so low as to be obliged to go a fishing" (Jewitt 1931: 80). Further, stratification was limited. Ruling cliques made their fortunes by dominating regional trade. This required attracting and holding a sizable force of armed men, which set limits on internal exploitation.

War, trade, and contact interacted in this instance to promote military, economic, and political centralization, up to a point. This centralization, in turn, affected war patterns. Moachat and Clayoquot chiefs had real power to decide war plans. They could call on "vassals" and field larger war parties. Their goals were less to destroy enemies than to conquer and exploit them. I suspect that similar developments occurred elsewhere on the Northwest Coast, where published descriptions are less complete. A more detailed study of warfare would have to take this possibility into account.

The favored trade position of the Nootka did not last. Sea otter were hunted out quickly, in some areas by 1792 (Mozino 1970: 48). Traders became more familiar with the coastline and were shifting to other trading areas by 1799 (Wike 1951: 16). The Nootka's first response to this change was to plunder those ships that did arrive. The *Boston* was taken by Moachat in 1803 (Jewitt 1896: 63-68) and the *Tonquin* by the Clayoquot in 1811<sup>16</sup> (Franchere 1969: 124-127). Of course, this only increased their isolation. But the scarcity of land furs in Nootka territory gave traders little incentive to visit (Brown 1896: 18; Dunn 1845: 166; Jewitt 1896: 61). The "Nootka could make no effective response to this experience and they lapsed into obscurity as far as European traders were concerned" (Fisher 1977: 44).

I found only one report of conflicts for the period between 1810 and 1850 (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 381-384). This may be due in part to the lack of information from this period (Drucker 1951: 12), but the small scale of the fighting in the report suggests that this was a time of genuine peace. This is to be expected: with no trade, there could be no conflict over trade. The balance of population with food resources is less clear. Only one relatively minor outbreak of smallpox is reported for early-contact Nootka (Wike 1951: 58), but syphilis was widespread by the early 1790s (Jane 1930: 115; also see Sproat 1868: 275). It seems highly likely that over 20 years of intensive contact resulted in significant depopulation, so the absence of reports of fighting over salmon streams may be related to a drop in numbers.

Isolation from Westerners, however, meant relative isolation from their diseases. In the early 1850s the Nootka population was estimated

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Primarily, the area. One episode (1811) (Drucker 1951: 12) involved their streams, but the impact was minimal. However, small-scale conflicts of the pressure throughout the area.

One factor important to the Nootka was "based on the major trade center. Increased greed for female slaves and the raiding of small groups of men on the coast would prompt the Nootka (Drucker 1951: 417). The accounts.

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at 7800 (Grant 1857: 293), about the level at contact.<sup>17</sup> This population renewal figured in the incredibly intense period of warfare from about 1850 until the early 1860s.

The three reasonably full accounts of wars in this period involve (1) the Clayoquot and Moachat against the Kyoquot (Drucker 1951: 340, Jacobsen 1977: 66-69; Nicholson 1962: 79; Sproat 1868: 188-196); (2) the Moachat and others against the Muchalot (Drucker 1951: 232-234, 345-365); and (3) all the tribes in Barkley Sound against each other (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 412-439). Additionally, there is mention of 10 other wars or massacres (Barrett-Lennard 1862: 41, 134; Brown 1896: 21-27; Drucker 1951: 362, 364; Nicholson 1962: 14, 78; Sproat 1868: 153, 196). Riley (1968: 80) refers to wars between the Cape Flatery and Ozette Makah that probably date to this period (also see Gunther 1927: 184). There is no reason to believe this list exhausts the actual conflicts.

Primarily, the war against the Muchalot was to gain their fishing area. One episode of the long war in Barkley Sound was over a river. Colson (1953: 47) reports that the Makah were attacked regularly for their streams, and her statement also probably relates to this period. However, smallpox in 1852 (Drucker 1951: 12) must have eased some of the pressure for food, and the general impression of total war throughout the period calls for other factors in the explanation.

One factor is the increased value of slaves. Slaves always were important to the Nootka. Donald (1983) has claimed that Nootka society was "based on" slave labor. With the development of Victoria into a major trade center in the 1840s, their value as an item of trade was increased greatly. Victoria became the center of the regional slave trade. Female slaves to be used as prostitutes were especially valuable, commanding a price of nearly £30 worth of goods. The larger tribes regularly raided smaller tribes, either selling directly to Victoria or to middlemen on the south coast of Fuca (Sproat 1868: 92). The chronic raiding would prompt more raiding, because selling slaves was a major way of obtaining the weapons needed for defense (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 417). The capturing of slaves is prominent in each of the three war accounts.

Another factor was a new industry that came to the Nootka in the 1850s. This was the processing of dogfish livers into oil for sale to the growing lumber industry. The oil was used to grease planks over which logs slid (Stewart 1977: 153). It rapidly became the major occupation of the Nootka, and the first major source of trade goods since the sea otter. Schooners scoured the coast looking for suppliers (Brown 1896: 118-119; Drucker 1951: 12, 45, 56; Sproat 1868: 4, 53). The Makah both

produced oil and acted as middlemen for more northern groups. They sold an average of 5000 gallons per year, up to 16,000 gallons, for 50¢ per gallon (Swan 1869: 31–32). This labor-intensive industry must have increased the demand for slaves, and may have brought on direct competition for rich dogfish fishing grounds. It certainly brought back the dispute over regional hegemony over trade.

I could not find much information about the Moachat during this period, but the Clayoquot had not changed. They were still much-feared raiders (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 414). Sproat (1868: 114) noted that they were the only tribe in which he had observed an annual "tribute" to the chief. Other Nootka complained that they freely altered potlatch procedures to suit their interests, and nothing could be done about it (Drucker 1951: 243). The Clayoquot convinced the Moachat to join them in an unsuccessful expedition against the Kyoquot, with the goal of reducing them to "a tributary tribe" (Drucker 1951: 189).

But the trade situation had changed. The resources now were more diffuse. The traders travelled the coast, and there was no European center to monopolize. Guns were not concentrated in the hands of a few. So when the Clayoquot's allies, the Ucluelet, tried to "bully" the other tribes of Barkley Sound (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 413), they were faced with fierce resistance that lasted several years.<sup>18</sup> The Clayoquot were challenged even at home, for Brown (1896: 25) reports that in 1863 the five tribes of Clayoquot Sound were locked in combat. By 1881, both the Moachat and Clayoquot had been "conquered and plundered repeatedly" (Jacobsen 1977: 61). The most fearsome tribe at that time was the Chickliset, one of the anti-Ahousat alliance of 20 years earlier (Jacobsen 1977: 66). But by 1881, real Nootka warfare was already a thing of the past.

War and the smallpox of 1863 had reduced Nootka numbers drastically (Brown 1896: 20–27; Sproat 1868: 275). Slaves would still be valuable and an incentive to raid, but the increasing presence of Western war-ships brought a gradual suppression of such raiding (Sproat 1868: 153; Swan 1869: 51). The later conflicts that are reported lack the intensity of former times, and were terminated more easily (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 442, 443, 451–457). Drucker (1951: 13) puts the official end of Nootka warfare at 1875, when Father Brabant established a mission at Hesquiat.

### The Haida

An analysis of Haida warfare faces a major problem. We have many accounts of wars, supplied mostly by Swanton (1905: 364–448), but

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these accounts lack contextual information and, more importantly, even approximate dates, which makes them difficult to use. Because there were no Western settlements in Haida territory until the second half of the nineteenth century, contextual information for the wars from other sources also is scarce. For these reasons, this reconstruction must be regarded as more tentative than others.

Dawson (in Langdon 1979: 112) put the precontact Haida population at 8000 for the Queen Charlotte Islands, plus 1800 more for the Kaigani Haida of the Prince of Wales Archipelago. The density per mile of coast (8.3) is about the same as the Nootka (8.2) (Kroeber 1939: 170). This dense population was supported by a relatively fragile resource base. There were no deer on the islands, and the variety of other land fauna was restricted compared to the mainland (Suttles 1962: 136, 137). Their salmon runs were smaller than other coast peoples, and they relied heavily on halibut and other ocean fish (Blackman 1975, 1976; Langdon 1979: 113; Stewart 1977: 20, 145). At the same time, they experienced winter winds up to 90 mph, and winds often of 50–80 mph during other seasons (Duff and Kew 1958). Protection from the elements was a primary consideration in choosing house sites (Brink 1974: 21), but regardless of location, all Haida could face severe food shortages by the end of winter (Blackman 1976: 4–6). The subsistence problems of the Haida makes it likely that their migration from the mainland in the distant past was the result of forced displacement, rather than of the attraction of greater access to marine mammals, as Inglis (1970: 155–156) has suggested.

These subsistence problems would be severe especially on the west coast and on exposed sections of the north coast. In contrast, the east coast was known as "the coast where canoes can land easily" (Swanton 1905: 374). The ecology of the west and north explains the Kaigani migration.

Early in the eighteenth century, the Haida of the west coast were raiding other Haida and Tsimshian. The victims combined forces in a prolonged campaign, and finally scored decisive victories. Shortly thereafter, around 1720, the west coast people and people from a densely populated section of the north coast fought their way into Tlingit territory in the Prince of Wales Archipelago. Wars with the Tlingit over territory appear to have continued up to the time of contact (Harrison 1925: 43; Langdon 1979: 113; Swanton 1909: 89; Boas 1970: 380–385 may be a part of this). This migration left the west coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands largely depopulated at contact (Dixon 1968: 224; Howay 1969: 351). Later, some groups from the east were driven to the west by wars (Dalzell 1968: 318), and then wars between the west

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coast groups and other Haida resumed (Swanton 1905: 373-376, 380-383). When diseases later reduced the Haida population, those living on the west coast moved to more favorable eastern sites (Brink 1974: 23, 30; Dawson 1880: 117).

Swanton (1905: 404-425; 1909: 232-233) reports several other conflicts from before or around contact, but there is not enough information provided to demonstrate that they were over resources. Collison (1915: 172) reports a precontact tradition of a fight begun over a drift whale, which suggests that the Haida were no better than the Nootka at sharing these windfalls peaceably.

Precontact accounts of slave raiding between Haida groups (Swanton 1905: 415) and against the Nootka (Curtis 1916: 54-56; Meares 1790: 196) and Tsimshian (MacDonald 1980: 12), suggest that the Haida may have been more involved in such early raiding than other coast peoples. This would not be surprising. Besides their normal value for labor, slaves would be especially valuable to the Haida for exchange purposes (see Simpson 1847: 216). By holding Tlingit or Tsimshian captives for ransom (Murdock 1935: 242), or by trading slaves from elsewhere, the Haida could obtain a share of the wealth of the precontact interior trade. Perhaps slaves were used to obtain eulachon oil, which would be especially valuable for the Haida at winter's end. Because no eulachon ran in Haida territory, they traditionally obtained the oil through barter with the Tsimshian (Dawson 1880: 112).

The advent of Western trade drastically changed the Haida's fortunes. Sea otter was plentiful. Dixon, on the first trade visit to Haida territory in 1787, obtained 1821 pelts (Dixon 1968: 228). The trade quickly made the Haida the wealthiest people on the coast (Gunther 1972: 130; Murdock 1935: 240-241). But unlike the Nootka, no Western posts were established within their territory. This had several ramifications.

One was the Haida's proclivity for attacking ships. At least five trade vessels were attacked by the Haida between 1791-1795.<sup>19</sup> Two were repulsed, with high native losses, but three were successful, with the crews killed and ships plundered (Howay 1925: 292-301; also see Brink 1974: 38; Fisher 1977: 15-16; Harrison 1925: 40). These attacks were motivated in large part by the high-handed tactics of the traders, but the temptation of such a concentration of wealth goods certainly must have also encouraged the attacks. The Nootka, too, had tried to capture the first trade ship that visited them (Howay 1925: 288), but they soon saw and clearly stated as much, that the wealth derived from a constant Western presence far outweighed the temporary abundance from one plundered ship (Vancouver 1967/III: 307). It was not until the

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regular settlements were removed that the Nootka again attacked ships in earnest. For the Haida, the alternative of long-term cooperation had not been an option.

The absence of Western centers also limited the ability of a few groups to control trade. Colnett in 1787 witnessed an apparent attempt to monopolize trade around Cook's ship (Gunther 1972: 122). A few reports indicate some economic dominance by the chiefs of the Skiddan and Skidegate (MacDonald 1979: 40; 1980; Poole 1872: 108) and these should be investigated further in regard to local war patterns. But nothing as developed as the Nootka confederacies and regional hierarchies is reported for the Haida. Wike (1951: 19) attributes this to the relatively equal power of different chiefs. This relative equality may be related to the absence of geographically demarcated zones of dense habitation, and perhaps to a different position in precontact trade networks.

The Haida acted as middlemen between early traders and other peoples on the inner coasts. By 1799, one Westerner estimated that more than half the skins obtained from the Haida originated on the inner coasts, especially from the Nass region. But the trade ships soon began direct visits to these other sources, and because of the distance involved, the Haida could exercise no control over their actions (Wike 1951: 16-19). The Kaigani Haida were an exception. They kept effective control of the trade of nearby Tlingit (Wike 1951: 16-19), and continued to supply sea otter pelts in quantity long after other Haida (Rich 1941: 329). Kaigani attacks on Nass River Tsimshian (Green 1915: 80; Ferguson in Wike 1959; also see Bancroft 1874: 164n; Fisher 1977: 43) suggests that they were trying to control this rich source of furs as well, and force may explain why the Taku Tlingit handed their furs over to the Kaigani (Simpson 1847: 216). Other Haida groups turned to raiding for supplies of pelts and other wealth as their control over trade diminished (Gunther 1972: 126; Murdock 1935: 241). Plundering, however, could not reverse the general trend of Haida fortunes.

The sea otter had been largely hunted out by 1820 (Barbeau 1957: 2; Fisher 1977: 44). Trade ships were going elsewhere (Wike 1951: 17), and no trade posts were established in Haida territory. The land furs that were the focus of the growing HBC activity of the 1820s and 1830s were scarce (Dunn 1845: 197; Green 1915: 85). Like the Nootka, the Haida found themselves without a product or a market. At the same time, their economy had become dependent on a constant inflow of trade goods (Blackman 1977: 45-46; Brink 1974: 32).

Another factor must have made their situation even more desperate. Smallpox hit some Haida in 1774 (Wike 1951: 58), which probably

temporarily eased pressure on food resources. A detailed census taken between 1836 and 1841, however, put their numbers at 8328 (Swanton 1952: 573), or only some 1500 below the precontact figure. Even with these reduced numbers, an ecological change probably had severely eroded their traditional resource base. Simenstad *et al.* (1978) have discovered that in the Aleutian Island chain, the elimination of sea otter results in growth in numbers and size of herbivorous epibenthic invertebrates such as sea urchins, limpets, and chitons. This growth results in a marked depletion of nearshore macroalgae, the basis of the food chain that supports fish and the marine mammals that prey on them. Coastal zones lacking sea otter also lack nearshore fish and harbor seals, both major elements of Haida subsistence. Food shortages, then, may have figured in the wars described by Swanton (1905), and also heightened the need to find something to trade. (Later traders came to rely heavily on foodstuffs for exchange all along the coast [Wike 1951: 51-52]).

In contrast to the Nootka, the Haida did adapt to the new trade climate. They became producers of large quantities of potatoes, wood carvings (especially canoes), and argillite carvings (Anderson 1863: 74-75; Barbeau 1957: 1; Fisher 1977: 44; Garfield 1966: 12; Knight 1978: 42, 67; Poole 1872: 305; Rich 1944: 48). The Nootka, too, tried to produce goods for trade (Knight 1978: 42, 57), but their soil was too thin for potatoes (Mozino 1970: 6, 85), their trees were not as good for carving, (Suttles 1962: 136), and argillite is found only on the Queen Charlotte Islands (Duff, 1969: 82). But the Haida still lacked a market. To trade, they had to go elsewhere, and their travels were not peaceful.

The conflicts involved in the Fort Simpson trade already have been discussed. The Haida fought just about everyone they passed on the way to Victoria, especially the Bella Bella and the Fort Rupert and Lekwiltok Kwakiutl (Brink 1974: 38; Collison 1915: 88; Poole 1872: 282-289). Often, Haida expeditions were on the defensive against piratical attacks. But they also were raiding for plunder and slaves. It seems that no area on the entire coast was safe from Haida raiders (Boas 1928: 137-141; Brink 1974: 36-39; Collison 1915: 88, 220; Curtis 1916: 133; McKelvie 1949: 57, 61; Murdock 1935: 241-242; Nicholson 1962: 78; Simpson 1847: 203).

Slaves in this period would retain their old value for subsistence production and trade. They probably increased in value with Haida emphasis on commercial production. Knight (1978: 230) suggests that slaves played a large role in potato cultivation. Slave raiding and/or trading made some chiefs very wealthy (Brink 1974: 37-39; Crosby 1914: 119). Slave taking, and retaliation for it, figures prominently in

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ue for subsistence value with Haida 230) suggests that ve raiding and/or 74: 37-39; Crosby es prominently in

several of Swanton's war texts. It may, along with the subsistence problems already discussed, largely explain the fierce midcentury warfare described by Swanton (1905: 364-392) and others (Collison 1915: 104, 221-225; Crosby 1914: 116; Dalzell 1968: 322).

Haida warfare ended in the 1860s. At least two ongoing wars were halted when smallpox hit in 1863 (Dalzell 1968: 318, 322; Swanton 1905: 392). Dawson (1880: 132) reports that slave raiding was "abandoned due to the wholesome dread of gunboats." The Haida were reported as peaceful from the time an HBC post was established at Masset in 1869 until the establishment of white control with a mission and fish oil industry in 1876 (Brink 1974: 6, 55, 88).

### The Peoples of the Sheltered Straits

Most Coast Salish and Kwakiutl territory bordered inland waters. These sheltered straits were relatively well protected from severe storms that could disrupt food supplies (Drucker and Heizer 1967; Suttles 1962: 137). The territory offered a greater diversity of food resources than could be found further north (Suttles 1962: 133-138). Coast Salish and Kwakiutl were significantly less dependent on marine resources than other peoples of the Northwest Coast (Murdock 1967: 102, 106). Predepopulation struggles over subsistence resources had no overarching theme, like fighting for estuaries or sheltered living sites. Wars involved attempts to take salmon streams, to move from exposed islands, to push coastward from less well-endowed interior or up-stream lands, and to acquire more room for an expanding population.

The inland straits lacked sea otter (Howay 1969: 265n; Newcombe 1922: 27, 71; Vancouver 1967/I: 250). Because this was the only pelt actively sought by the maritime traders (Howay 1969: 337n), the Coast Salish and Kwakiutl were marginal to the early fur trade (Codere 1950: 113; Collins 1950: 335). This marginality means, among other things, that we have little early information about either culture. In the later land fur trade, both cultures were subject to localized influences that led to marked subregional variations in warfare patterns.

### The Coast Salish

Coast Salish territory was less rugged than the rest of the Northwest Coast, and it supported relatively dense settlement (Kroeber 1939: 170). Kroeber (1939: 135) estimates that before contact there were 23,700 Gulf Salish, plus another 6000 around Puget Sound.

Large-scale fighting, apparently over territory, was in progress at the time of contact. Vancouver (1967/I: 254–256) reported finding in 1792 large numbers of skeletons by deserted beach settlements. Vancouver always drew a most sympathetic picture of the peoples he met, and he could not believe that the natives who greeted him so warmly had done this to each other in combat. He suggested disease as the culprit, and he may have been partially correct. But two years earlier, Quimber (cited in Wike 1959) attributed similar remains to ongoing wars of the Klallum, noting that many of the skulls were “harpooned.” Vancouver wrote that territory was of little importance to the Klallum, whereupon Hewitt, another member of his expedition, appended the comment: “A strange assertion as it is one of the most frequent causes of War among them” (in Wike 1959). Manby and Menzies also reported regular war among the Salish (Wike 1959).

The wars seem related to regional and subregional variations in subsistence resources. Like the northern river peoples, the Salish had pushed their way out from the interior (Borden 1950: 245; Drucker 1963: 17, 20). The advantages of coastal living were clear. People on the salt water made good use of marine resources (Suttles 1962: 135), whereas famine was frequent upstream (Collins 1950: 332). The low population density around Puget Sound (6 per mile of coast) as compared to the Gulf of Georgia (20 per mile of coast [Kroeber 1939: 170]) suggests a restricted resource base in the sound. Collins (1950: 335) believes the people of the sound fought people of the gulf before contact. Salish living in areas without salmon streams tried to obtain them. Curtis (1913: 26) relates a clear tradition from the early eighteenth century in which the Lermmi, who lived on streamless islands, wiped out most of two local groups and took their land at the mouth of the Nooksach River. Another family legend has it that the Kwanthen conquered and occupied the mouth of the Fraser (McKelvie 1947: 2).

Population growth seems to have been responsible for other conflicts. The Samish had been pushing out their neighbors for 200 years (Curtis 1913: 25). The Klallum virtually had exterminated the Chimakum (Curtis 1913: 19; Swanton 1952: 417).

Contact, as usual, brought disease. Signs of prior epidemics were noticed in the 1790s (Jane 1930: 50; Vancouver 1967/I: 275). With the beginning of a regular European presence in the 1820s, the Coast Salish experienced a series of epidemics (Curtis 1913: 5). With depopulation came the end of wars for resource territory.

Precontact trade may have been a factor in the wars over river estuaries. Although I found no information on native trade along the Nooksach or Fraser, the trade along the Columbia to the south was dominated by the Chinook in a way comparable to that of the northern

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river peoples (Wike 1951: 102). But it may be that the less rugged topography of the Salish area made domination of routes to the interior less feasible.

The relative isolation of the Coast Salish during the maritime fur trade was brought to an end with the shift of interest to land furs. The HBC established Fort Langley on the Fraser in 1827, Fort Nisqually in the south of Puget Sound in 1833, and Fort Victoria on the southern tip of Vancouver Island in 1843. The traders' interests brought a shift in hunting patterns (Collins 1950: 335). If this change was accompanied by new conflicts over hunting territories, as seems likely, I could find no mention of it.

I found no information on the circumstances surrounding the establishment of Forts Langley and Nisqually, but the founding of Fort Victoria was accompanied by conflict. At first, local Salish resented the permanent establishment and agitated to remove it. They were dissuaded from outright attack by a demonstration of the fort's cannon (Bancroft 1887: 107-109; Fisher 1977: 39). The local Songish groups soon saw the benefits that accrued to "home guards," and settled into a middleman situation that made them the wealthiest of the Salish (Collins 1950: 337; Fisher 1977: 29).

The trade opportunities at these forts attracted expeditions by more northern peoples, who proved to be more than a match for the Salish. Those at Fort Langley could not regulate the dreaded Lekwiltok Kwakiutl (Fisher 1977: 31; McKelvie 1947: 40-50). The Songish could hardly dictate to the Haida, who at one time threatened to attack Victoria itself (Collison 1915: 89). The Haida, Lekwiltok, and other Kwakiutl attacked various Salish groups in the area for slaves and plunder, adding an element of insecurity for the Salish that was not present before contact (Collins 1950: 335).

Salish groups on the southeast coast of Vancouver Island and the north coast of Washington state were exposed to trade expeditions passing to Victoria. They often were raided by these expeditions. They in turn raided each other and weaker Salish groups for plunder and slaves (Curtis 1913: 14, 32, 75; Grant 1857: 287, 296; Gunther 1927: 270-272; McKelvie 1947: 2, 33, 39; 1949: 59; Stern 1934: 103; Walkem 1914: 16). Even the Nootka were targets of Salish raiders (Brown 1896: 23, 26; Colson 1953: 47; Smith 1940: 159; Swadesh 1948: 81). The worst offenders were the Cowichan, who were the only one of the southeast Vancouver groups to control a productive salmon stream (Suttles 1962: 135) and who consequently were the most numerous, at 2000-3000 people in the early 1850s (Grant 1857: 293, 297), with some 500 "fighting men" (Douglas 1854: 28).

The question arises as to why those Salish groups who were at-

tacked by passing trader-raiders in turn raided other people. Other Salish also raided, but on a smaller scale (Smith 1940: 152-154). The groups from the two mentioned areas dominate the reports. An answer to this question is suggested by the work of Smith (1940: 50) and Collins (1950; also see 1979). They found that Salish groups that were outside of the main trade routes, but that were still subject to regular raids from the outside, came to delegate more day-to-day authority to war leaders. The villages existed in a constant war readiness, under aggressive and capable warriors. This probably also happened in those groups exposed to the full force of the northern trader-raiders. Similar events seem to have occurred among the Bella Coola under chief Potles. But under Potles, the Bella Coola only went on the offensive to stop the Kwakiutl slave raiders. They did not become raiders themselves, for unlike the Salish groups in question, the Bella Coola were comparatively well off. They had salmon and furs from the interior to trade. The Salish controlled no river trade routes, so to obtain wealth, they would have to raid. Plunder and slaves would mean more than just living better for these besieged groups. Because wealth was needed to buy the weapons, and allies, (see Ferguson 1983) needed to fight off the northern raiders, war booty probably meant life itself. This is shown in a report about the Cowichan in the mid-1850s. One Captain Prevost visited them to demand that they cease their raiding. He expected resistance to this idea, and was "floored" when the Cowichan readily agreed to stop raiding, if only the government would guarantee their protection from outside attack (McKelvie 1949: 60).

Curtis (1913: 74) estimates that slaves at one time represented about 10% of the Salish population, with some chiefs owning 10 or 12. The value of slaves in the Victoria slave market already has been mentioned. The Salish groups on the south shore of Fuca were specialized middlemen in the slave trade (Sproat 1868: 92) and it can be assumed safely that many of the slaves taken in the Vancouver groups' raids were sold. The extensive raiding often provoked large-scale retaliatory expeditions by the victimized peoples (Boas 1889: 835-836; Curtis 1913: 14, 33-35; Smith 1940: 157). (Some Salish retaliatory strikes against the Kwakiutl are discussed below.) Altogether, the Salish of midcentury were experiencing a period of intense, ongoing violence (Collins 1950: 335-337; Haeberlin and Gunther 1930: 12; MacFie 1972: 470).

Beginning in the 1840s, the Salish faced a growing influx of white transients and settlers. Most of the non-Indian population of British Columbia was concentrated within their territory (Knight 1978: 28; LaViolette 1973: 9). Sporadic conflicts with whites resulted (Fisher

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#### The Kwakiutl

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1977: 98, 107; Grant 1857: 294; McKelvie 1949: 59; Poole 1872: 294). At the same time, the Salish were becoming incorporated into farming, mining, lumbering, and other wage labor situations (Knight 1978: 67-71; Simpson 1847: 179; Swan 1972: 96). This integration, combined with the constant presence of warships, led to a gradual diminution of hostilities. The smallpox of 1863 probably ended any lingering conflicts.

### The Kwakiutl

The Kwakiutl are the critical case for this reexamination of Northwest Coast warfare, for the material incentive hypothesis I advocate is contradicted directly by the pioneering and persuasive work of Helen Codere. In *Fighting with Property* (1950), Codere describes Kwakiutl warfare as highly ceremonialized, and implies that it was not real war at all. She asserts that wars were launched "out of feelings of grief and shame, the desire to retaliate, or, above all, to acquire or maintain the prestige of being considered utterly terrifying" (1950: 98). It was this "limitless pursuit of . . . social prestige" by which she explained both warfare and potlatch (1950: 118). She further asserts that "it is impossible to discover in Kwakiutl warfare an underlying economic motivation" (1950: 64). Codere's analysis was challenged by Drucker and Heizer (1967), but her views, in whole or in part, still are accepted widely (e.g., Donald and Mitchell 1975: 341-342; Montagu 1976: 250; Rosman and Rubel 1971: 139; Weinberg 1965: 172, 176; Woodcock 1977: 183-184).

Specific disagreements with Codere's analysis are raised in the following discussion. A general criticism is that she simply overlooked a great deal of material on Kwakiutl wars. Whereas she counts only 7 cases of actual fighting for the Southern Kwakiutl, excluding the Lekwiltok (Codere 1950: 100), I found 24 cases, with indications of many more. Analysis of this additional material demonstrates that Kwakiutl warfare was as deadly and as economically motivated as anywhere else on the coast.

Kroeber's (1939: 135) estimate of 7200 for the precontact Kwakiutl population probably is too low. Weinberg's (1965: 170) estimate of 8000-10,000 is more consistent with later figures. Did this population engage in war over its food resource base? Codere (1950: 105) says "there is no instance in the Kwakiutl literature in which the purpose of war is to gain land or fishing rights and [consequently war aiming at the annihilation of groups] was not at all characteristic of the Kwakiutl." This assertion is not supported by the literature.

Boas describes Southern Kwakiutl territorial expansion on Vancouver Island before or just after contact as follows:

According to the traditions of this people the Koskemoq, Guatsenoq, Kyopenog, and Tlaskenoq drove tribes speaking the Nootka language from the region south of Quatsino Inlet. The Koskemoq are said to have exterminated a tribe of Kwakiutl lineage called Qoeas who lived on Quatsino Sound [also see Boas 1966: 44; Dawson 1887: 70; Drucker and Heizer 1967: 19]. The Kwakiutl [a specific local group of that name, later located at Fort Rupert] occupied the district from Hardy Bay to Turnour Island; the Nimkish the region about Kamatsin Lake and Nimkish River; and the Lekwiltok the country north west of Salmon River. (Boas 1890: 608-609; diacritical marks omitted)

The southernmost Kwakiutl also conquered and occupied the Campbell River area (Taylor and Duff 1956: 63). Boas's *Kwakiutl Tales* (1969: 93-94, 105) contains two other accounts of groups being wiped out for their property and fishing sites. Around contact, the Northern Kwakiutl Xaihais were "being ground to bits" by the Tsimshian and Bella Bella (also Northern Kwakiutl), who sought their territory (Drucker 1963: 14, 148).

Boas is Codere's main source of information, but his own statements seem to contradict her inferences. He tells us that there were frequent deaths in disputes over hunting or fishing grounds (1966: 35-36), that in the old days "ambitious men" often went to war to "take the land away from people" (among other things) (1935: 60), and that "the war records tell us of whole tribes that were practically exterminated" (1966: 47). Boas also argues that the multilineage structure of historic Kwakiutl villages was the result of groups weakened by war consolidating for purposes of defense (1890: 609; 1966: 46). Consistent with Boas's view, early explorers marveled at the defenses incorporated into Kwakiutl village construction (Newcombe 1922: 66; Vancouver 1967/I: 324-331).

The "pull" toward streams and inlets is entirely consistent with war patterns elsewhere on the coast. That localized food resource scarcities were the "push" that led to the attacks is suggested by the frequency of starvation tales about those groups occupying upwater heads of inlets (Boas in Suttles 1962: 132) and islands (Pidcocke 1965: 134).

It is true that no wars for territory (with one exception to be given below) are recorded after the beginning of extensive Western contact, but this is no mystery. Fort McLoughlin was established in Bella Bella territory in 1833, marking the beginning of a permanent Western presence. Dunn (1845: 181-182), who attended the founding of Fort McLoughlin, visited a Kwakiutl group that had not seen a Westerner since Vancouver—they were just recovering from a raid. Four years after the founding of the fort, in 1837, smallpox devastated the Kwakiutl (Codere 1950: 52). The extent of the damage can be inferred from the fact that the total population dropped from 10,700 in 1835

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(Duff 1969) to 7000 in 1853 (Codere 1950: 52). So no wars for territory should be expected after 1837.<sup>20</sup>

Generally, the Kwakiutl were marginal to the maritime fur trade, although the Nimkish seem to have been middlemen supplying sea otter pelts to the Nootka (Vancouver 1967/I: 348). During the later land fur trade, the Kwakiutl lacked any major trade routes to the interior on which to build their fortunes (Dawson 1887: 64). The main role of some Kwakiutl groups during the land fur trade of the 1830s was as travelling middlemen. They visited isolated suppliers and brought the pelts to market at the HBC's posts and ports of call in the territories of the Newwitty, the Kwakiutl (the local group), and the Sebassa (or Kitkatla) Tsimshian. These middlemen were very aware of competitive aspects of the trade, and took every advantage of price differences offered by different buyers (Duff 1969: 58; Fisher 1977: 28; Rich 1941: 245, 272, 281, 325).

It seems likely that control of native trade was the basic issue involved in 1838 in "an active war carried on all summer" between two of the major middlemen, the Sebassa and the Newwitty, which reduced the number of furs supplied to the HBC that year (Rich 1941: 244-245). Fur supplies were not all that was reduced. The Newwitty group was reported as "a skeleton of its former self" as a result of raids from the north. Many were carried into slavery (Dunn 1845: 164).<sup>21</sup> Three years later, it was the Sebassa who suffered. A trading-raiding party of Kwakiutl (local group) heading for Nootka territory chanced upon a small party of Sebassa. The Kwakiutl killed 24 of their competitors, and enslaved 6 (Simpson 1847: 191).

Most of the travelling middlemen probably were put out of business around 1840. It was a general policy of the HBC to tolerate native middlemen while the company was facing competition from other Western traders (Rich 1960: 42). When the competition of U.S. trade ships was squeezed out in the late 1830s, HBC officials immediately began planning to cut out native middlemen (Rich 1960: 246, 328).<sup>22</sup> One exception were the Bella Bella Heiltsuk. Fort McLoughlin was in their territory, and as late as 1845 they were acting as middlemen for furs originating in the interior (Fisher 1977: 31). Another exception, the tribes of Fort Rupert, is discussed shortly.

The early 1840s appear to be a time of relative peace, with a lowered population and fewer possibilities of trade control to cause disputes. The peace ended with the reorientation of northern trade toward Victoria later in that decade.

About the same time that Victoria was becoming a major trade center, a Kwakiutl group, the Lekwiltok, engaged in one last war for

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territorial conquest (Curtis 1915: 110–112; Taylor and Duff 1956: 663). The territory they took from the Comox Salish was at the narrowest point in the channels leading from the north to Victoria (Mayne 1969: 176). From the heights above this trade channel, they dominated the greatest concentration of wealth in Kwakiutl territory. They attempted to plunder or exact tribute from all who passed (Barrett-Lennard 1862: 43; Brink 1974: 38; Curtis 1915: 113–114; Drucker 1963: 15; Mayne 1969: 74–75). Besides preying on passing traders, the Lekwiltok ranged far and wide attacking other Kwakiutl, Westerners, and the Salish (Curtis 1913: 33–35; 1915: 107–114; Grant 1857: 294; McKelvie 1947: 2, 40; 1949: 57; Poole 1872: 293–294; Rich 1943: 215; Smith 1940: 158; Stern 1934: 100–102). These far-flung raids made the Lekwiltok the single most feared group on the coast, and even Codere (1950: 103–105; 1961: 439) admits the predatory nature of their raiding. Codere does not, however, offer any explanation for the Lekwiltok's seemingly anomalous attitude about war.

Lekwiltok raiding triggered what resembles a national war between the Southern Kwakiutl and the Salish in midcentury. Details of this war are found in references cited above. Boas (1889: 835–836) provides the most coherent general account. In retaliation for a Lekwiltok raid, two Salish groups combined to counterattack. They sustained many losses, but weakened the Lekwiltok. On hearing this, a much larger alliance of Salish assembled and again hit the Lekwiltok, nearly exterminating one of their four subdivisions and greatly damaging the others. The Lekwiltok then called on other Kwakiutl groups to their north for support, just as the Salish alliance was strengthened by the addition of Puget Sound groups. This general war between Southern Kwakiutl and Salish seesawed for some time, until a highly mobile and coordinated force of Kwakiutl surprised a massed Salish encampment, decisively defeating them.

Other greatly feared Kwakiutl were located at Fort Rupert. Fort Rupert was founded in 1849 to protect the expanded coal mine there (Bancroft 1887: 193; Knight 1978: 135). It soon developed into a significant trade center (Mayne 1969: 185). Four Southern Kwakiutl groups congregated at the fort just after its founding, and soon resumed their old pattern as travelling middlemen (Drucker 1963: 129; Weinberg 1965: 174). They visited more remote groups of Kwakiutl and Nootka, and brought their furs back for resale (Drucker and Heizer 1967: 16). The HBC may have tolerated this middleman activity because the resident Kwakiutl were seen as a bulwark against Haida and Tsimshian raiders (McKelvie 1949: 41).

According to Codere (1961: 455): "This Fort Rupert subperiod was

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peaceful and business oriented." Business oriented it was, but peaceful it was not. Like the Lekwiltok, the Fort Rupert Kwakiutl raided widely (Bancroft 1887: 194; Brown 1896: 27; Codere 1950: 116; Davis 1904: 24; Drucker and Heizer 1967: 16; McIlwraith 1948/II: 340; Poole 1872: 285). The goals of the Lekwiltok and Fort Rupert raiders, besides intimidating reluctant trade partners, were to obtain plunder and slaves.

Codere (1950: 105) claims that "in most cases [of war] plunder does not figure at all or it is of minor importance." When it is taken, she asserts, plunder is not used by the warrior for economic benefit. She fails to make clear, however, that warrior was a specialized occupational status. Warriors were attached to particular chiefs—often they were related (Boas 1966: 106)—and there is no suggestion that the chiefs were prohibited from accumulating or using plunder. She also neglects to mention that warriors comprised only a small part of a large war expedition. According to Curtis (1915: 101), "by far the larger number of the war-party were plunderers, who, when the inhabitants of the attacked village had been killed or routed, rushed into the houses and carried the booty down to the canoes. Boxes, blankets, dance costumes, utensils, food—everything was taken." But except during food shortages when the Bella Coola would be raided for salmon (McIlwraith 1948/II: 339), plunder probably was less important than slaves.

Codere (1950: 105) asserts "the economic value of the slave captured in war was so slight as to be non-existent," but the only source she cites for support concludes that "slavery on the northwest coast among the natives was of nearly as much economic importance to them as was slavery to the plantation regions of the United States before the Civil War" (MacLeod 1928: 649). The economic value of slaves for trade cannot be questioned, given the going rate in Victoria of £30 for a female slave (Sproat 1868: 92; and see note 9 above) and the existence of an active trade in slaves from the Kwakiutl to the Tsimshian and Haida (Oberg 1973: 108). Slaves, in fact, were the principal item of exchange for the Kwakiutl and other southern peoples (Boas 1889: 832). War captives "were liable to be sold, and the warriors often came to be rich" (Boas 1966: 108). The trade value of slaves probably assumed increasing importance through the 1840s, as middleman positions eroded and as the local supply of fur animals decreased (Rich 1944: LVII). Slave raiding seems to have engrossed most Kwakiutl groups in the late 1840s and 1850s.

Around 1850, the Nimkish made an overland raid on the Muchalat Nootka (Codere 1950: 114). Two other overland raids on the Nootka are mentioned by Boas (1966: 117–118) and Hunt (1906: 135–136). The circumstances surrounding these three attacks are unclear, but at least

one coincided with the rise of Nootka wealth through the dogfish oil trade, and netted the Nimkish attackers plunder and many slaves (Drucker 1951: 354). Slaves or plunder may have figured in the "atrocious massacre" in 1853 of the Koskimoqs by the Newitty (Douglas, quoted in Fisher 1977: 57). Fort Rupert groups and Kwakiutl from Knight's Inlet, Kingcome Inlet, and Blunden Harbor regularly raided the Bella Coola for slaves and plunder (Drucker and Heizer 1967: 16; McIlwraith 1948/II: 362-364). Blunden Harbor people also raided the Tsimshian in 1860. The expressed motive in one raid was revenge, but the attackers planned to take slaves (Codere 1950: 116; Curtis 1915: 116-120). It was the repeated slave raids that finally provoked the Bella Coola retaliatory strikes already described. These retaliations in turn provoked probably the most well known of all Kwakiutl war expeditions.

After the third and final Bella Coola attack, a great alliance of Southern Kwakiutl set out to punish their attackers. On the way to Bella Coola, they met a party of friendly Bella Bella. The war party had pledged to kill the first people they met, and they fell upon the Bella Bella, killing them all and returning home claiming that "they had done a great thing" (Boas 1897: 427-430; 1966: 113-115; Codere 1950: 111; McIlwraith 1948/II: 371; Rohner and Rohner 1970: 200). Codere interprets this as an example of the ceremonial nature of Kwakiutl fighting, but a closer reading of Boas's and McIlwraith's accounts reveals more complexity. True, the war party had pledged to kill the first people they met. But the people in the first canoes to meet the Bella Bella (the Southern Kwakiutl were travelling in a drawn-out line) had decided to ignore that pledge and continue on to Bella Coola. As they exchanged civilities with the Bella Bella, other Southern Kwakiutl canoes arrived. In one was a war leader who had many Bella Coola relatives, and who had been against the planned raid. He calmly approached and killed a Bella Bella, starting the melee in which all the Bella Bella were killed. In doing this, "his real reason was to assist his Bella Coola kinsmen" (McIlwraith 1948/II: 371). Other members of the war party were furious with what he had done, and threatened to kill him. But they feared the vengeance of other Kwakiutl with close ties to the Bella Bella, and decided that the only thing to do was to return home. The comment about having done a "great thing" was immediately followed by a discussion among the raiders of the grave danger posed by the offended relatives (Boas 1966: 115). In context, it is clearly a case of putting on a good face in a very bad situation.

Codere does not include the Northern Kwakiutl in her analysis.

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The little information I found on them pertained mostly to the Bella Bella Heiltsuk,<sup>23</sup> who were involved in many wars. They fought other Heiltsuk (Boas 1928: 125–135); they fought the Westerners at the founding of Fort McLoughlin (Dunn 1845: 167–170); they fought the Bella Coola (Poole 1872: 185); they fought Haida passing by on the way to Victoria (Poole 1872: 282); and they fought Salish on their own expeditions to Victoria (Walkem 1914: 16–18). They raided the Haida (Boas 1928: 137–147; Niblack 1970: 342; Simpson 1847: 203) and Tsimshian (Garfield 1939: 268–269) in retaliation for previous slave raids. In one instance, they wiped out a village of Rivers Inlet Kwakiutl for failing to repay debts incurred in potlatching (McIlwraith 1948/I: 230; II: 376). They were heavily involved in the slave trade (Dunn 1845: 184; Knight 1978: 298), and some of the above accounts report the taking of slaves. But it is not clear whether they obtained most of these slaves through raiding or through trade.

According to Codere (1961: 455), circa 1865 marked the end of Kwakiutl warfare. She associates this with the beginning of the Fort Rupert potlatch period. (Potlatching, in her view, was an alternative to warfare in the quest for prestige.) But elsewhere (1950: 94–96) she puts the two big jumps in potlatch activity at 1849, the founding of Fort Rupert, and circa 1875, coincident with the influx of wages from commercial salmon fishing (Codere 1950: 31–33). What actually happened around 1865 was the great smallpox epidemic of 1863. It first hit the Lekwiltok in 1862 (Brink 1974: 38). In 1853, the Kwakiutl numbered about 7000 people. By 1872, they were down to 3500 (Codere 1950: 52). It was not an increase in potlatching that stopped Kwakiutl warfare, but depopulation and the frequent use of warships against natives who “made trouble” (see Codere 1950: 115–116).

Codere was one of the first to recognize the significance of war as a social institution on the Northwest Coast, and the necessity of a historical perspective in analyzing native societies. Her work provided inspiration for this reexamination. But in light of the new material presented here, her interpretations cannot be supported. Kwakiutl war was “real” war, and it was directed at the control of resources.

As a final comment on Kwakiutl warfare, it is appropriate to let the Kwakiutl speak for themselves. “When I was a young man I saw streams of blood shed in war” (Duff 1969: 59). “In olden times we fought so that the blood ran over the ground” (Boas 1966: 119). “Your days, young men, are good, but our past ways were evil when we were all at war against one another” (Boas 1966: 119; also see Boas 1974: 107; Halliday 1935: 138).

### Other Motives in Northwest Coast Warfare

The view that Northwest Coast warfare was a struggle over resources does not imply that no other motives entered into warmaking. Students of the Northwest Coast have identified three major non-economic motives in war: revenge, the desire to take trophy heads, and the desire to capture ceremonial titles and prerogatives. In briefly discussing these, I continue to follow the lead of Swadesh (1948).

Swadesh considers motivations in seven Nootka war texts. Revenge often was stated as a goal, but Swadesh concludes that it was little more than a pretext. The decision to attack was based on more material considerations. Insults calling for revenge were remembered or forgotten at one's convenience. I believe his conclusions can be generalized to all Northwest Coast peoples. Vengeance could be used to justify territorial expansion or slave raiding, as discussed earlier, but it alone was rarely sufficient cause for war. Among the northern peoples, institutional mechanisms requiring either compensation or retribution for deaths may have been stronger than in the south.<sup>24</sup> But even in the north, if every uncompensated death led to war, no one would be alive today.

Attacks motivated purely by revenge—the desire to strike back at someone who has wronged you—should be distinguished from defensive retaliation. Retaliatory strikes were group affairs undertaken with the intent of preventing future attacks by previous raiders, or by others who might be tempted to raid by perceived weakness. (Of course, in practice it would be impossible to draw a clear dividing line between revenge and retaliatory strikes.) Several clear examples of retaliatory missions were discussed above, such as the combined Kwakiutl expedition against the Bella Coola, the disastrous Bella Coola attacks on slave-raiding Tsimshian, and the various counterattacks by Salish groups. The accounts of these retaliations show that they were far from automatic responses. They were well considered and reluctantly undertaken when the alternative prospect was to suffer continued raids by one's enemies.

Swadesh also examines the motive of headhunting. In battle, Nootka usually sought to take heads. But wars never were initiated in order to acquire these trophies. Again, his conclusion seems generalizable to all Northwest Coast peoples. The quest for heads was an effect, rather than a cause, of warfare.

Warriors wanted their enemies to fear them. The war descriptions show that perceived weakness invited attack, whereas apparent military prowess could panic an enemy force. Warriors who had taken

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many heads acquired reputations as terrifying killers. The region-wide pattern of staking heads or entire bodies in front of settlements conveyed a real message to potential adversaries, and it would not even matter if some of those heads were taken in ambushes on isolated fishermen rather than in heated battle.

Fighting over ceremonial titles or prerogatives is a more complex issue. It seems to have had different significance in different cultures. But in the actual war accounts, as opposed to later ethnographers' interpretations of warfare, the quest for titles and prerogatives has little prominence. Swadesh found no case of war initiated for that goal. Probably the best-documented example of a battle involving the acquisition of an important ceremonial prerogative is the aforementioned slaughter of the Bella Bella by the Southern Kwakiutl. By killing the Bella Bella, the victors obtained right to the "cannibal dance," which was the highest ranked of all winter ceremonial dances when Boas arrived in the field. But as already explained, that battle erupted for entirely different reasons. One suspects that the subsequent high evaluation of the dance was an attempt to save face for an expedition that went disastrously wrong.

Two points should be remembered when evaluating later statements about ceremonial motives in war. First, many titles and prerogatives were connected intimately to ownership of resources—as Sapir (1967: 35) put it, "privileges are bound to the soil"—so fighting over titles also could be fighting for something more substantial. Second, the fact that these ceremonial distinctions and their manner of acquisition were so important in the ritual cycle and status system makes it more likely that their capture in war would be recounted to later ethnographers than would be more mundane prizes such as plunder or slaves.

These three are not the only nonmaterial motives cited in explaining Northwest Coast wars. Codere (1950: 114), for example, attributes a Kwakiutl raid on the Nootka after the death of the Kwakiutl chief's daughter to a desire "to get someone to die with those who are dead." But, as already discussed, this raid coincided with the Nootka's new prosperity, and netted the attackers much booty. Another example is the Bella Coola's own claim that wars were fought over errors in potlatch procedures. But as noted, McIlwraith interprets this as a pretext concealing other motives.

All these nonmaterial motives were part of the ideological superstructure of the warfare complex. There can be no doubt that they figured into preraid deliberations, and a few conflicts seem to be attributable to them exclusively. The feud between two Fort Simpson Tsimshian groups mentioned earlier seems to involve bad feeling

rather than competition over resources. Boas (1897: 424) reports the murder of six people in order to possess their rights to a particularly important ceremony. No slaves or plunder are reported taken. Sapir and Swadesh (1955: 442) report a case from the Nootka after the end of active warfare, in which a few hot-headed youths went on a raid. They killed two people and plundered their home, but their primary motive seems to have been to take a head. Incidents such as these form a small part of the total war record, and do not invalidate the point that the major patterns of warfare are explicable as conflict over control of resources.

### Social Organization and Northwest Coast Warfare

Northwest Coast peoples varied considerably in rules of descent, marriage, and postmarital residence. These variations were reflected in differences in the overall social structure of villages and in the kinds of social linkages between separate villages (see Rosman and Rubel 1971). Such social differences affected local war patterns, defining the basic social unit that made war, structuring larger mobilizations of forces and the formation of military alliances, and influencing the choice of specific targets for raids. A detailed study of war within a particular subregion probably would not be intelligible unless these social factors were considered. However, they are not essential for the less detailed regional analysis attempted here. A few examples illustrate this distinction.

In the case of Ucluelet Nootka needing a salmon stream, their selection of a specific target was based largely on the strength of kinship ties to the various groups that controlled suitable streams. For the present analysis, the choice of a particular target is less important than the fact that a streamless group would attack some group with a stream. In the case of the Southern Kwakiutl-Bella Coola hostilities discussed earlier, the course of a particular campaign was altered by the kinship ties of one Kwakiutl man to the Bella Coola. But this does not invalidate the general pattern, which generally pitted the Kwakiutl against the Bella Coola. Likewise, the conflicts and alliances between several Tlingit groups around Angoon cannot be understood without reference to kinship ties and other factors. But the general outline of Tlingit fighting fits well into the broad pattern of the northern river peoples.

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attention in this chapter, and that is the limits of available data for the period considered. Detailed information on social organization began to accumulate only in the late nineteenth century, well after the end of active warfare and the disruptive impact of epidemic diseases. For many peoples, the details of kinship were not recorded until after more than a century of Western contact. It would be extremely hazardous to project later structures backwards in time, for the available record suggests that change was more common than persistence, especially in the critical aspects of residence and village organization (Drucker 1963: 112-123; Sapir 1967: 40-47). Boas's (1890: 609) conclusions after his early and intensive research should stand as a warning:

The social organization of the Kwakiutl is very difficult to understand. It appears that, in consequence of wars and other events, the number and arrangement of tribes and gentes have undergone considerable changes . . . The impression conveyed by the arrangement of tribes and gentes is that their present arrangement is comparatively modern and has undergone great changes.

Details on a second critical aspect of social organization—the pre- and postcontact kinship ties between groups—are almost wholly lacking in published material. (Durlach, cited in Rosman and Rubel 1971: 42, is an exception.) Lacking all this information, it is impossible to apply patterns of social organization to an understanding of war. It may be possible to reconstruct an adequate picture of social organization for specific localities using archival materials or interviews with living informants. However, that goes far beyond the scope of this investigation.

### Summary and Conclusions

Although war was endemic on the Northwest Coast, it was not an inherent characteristic of the societies themselves. The wars are not attributable to a value system glorifying homicide, nor to quirks in social organization compelling groups to fight. Wars were caused by pressures of the material conditions of life. When the pressures eased, warfare declined or ceased (pp. 290, 297, 303). The basis of this interpretation, as developed throughout this chapter, is that observed patterns of warfare conform to expectations of the probable behavior of people who are attempting to protect or further their material interests. But war patterns and associated material goals are complicated, and the presentation has been very detailed, so a summary is warranted.

Before contact, and sometimes well into the contact period, some wars were fought to get food. Groups experiencing hunger raided for accumulated food stores (pp. 278, 282, 285), but a more durable solution for famine-prone groups was to conquer territory with a reliable supply of resources. Generally, estuaries and areas with productive salmon streams offered the best resource base, and so were the most frequent targets of groups from less favorable areas. This type of conflict occurred on two levels, local and regional. Locally, groups that had been forced into inland, streamless, or exposed beach areas by military defeat and displacement, or by population growth and fissioning within prime resource areas, tried to take better territory from other groups in their vicinity (pp. 285, 298, 302). Regionally, peoples from distant interior regions repeatedly pushed down the passes and river valleys toward the rich coastal zone (pp. 274, 278, 280, 282, 298), often forcing the resident coastal groups into less productive areas, and so leading to further hostilities (pp. 274, 293). The Nootka and Kwakiutl felt the large-scale coastwards pressures less than other Northwest Coast peoples, due to the absence of major passages to the interior in their region.

Demand for food and the associated wars declined after contact. Disease and war drastically reduced the number of people to be fed, and in some cases, Westerners became important suppliers of foodstuffs. But blanket statements are not possible. The timing and extent of depopulation varied by locality. Thus, the Nootka returned to precontact population levels after contact, whereas the Haida remained below precontact levels, but an ecological change probably reduced their food supply. So some conflicts over food extended well into the historic period. A different kind of subsistence problem was faced by some Haida, related to the difficult living conditions on their western coast. This problem, too, was "solved" by depopulation.

Control of trade was contested by force long before the first Western ship arrived. But it was when Northwest Coast peoples had become dependent on the Western trade for basic consumption items, luxury goods, and (above all) weapons and ammunition, that trade control became the center of constant struggle. Postcontact wars were fought less over the control of subsistence resources than over the control of trade goods.

As with depopulation, the timing and circumstances of Western trade penetration varied by locality. (Sometimes depopulation and this trade were directly related.) MacDonald has asserted that Western trade items were entering some native trade networks as much as a century before direct contact. The first direct Western trade was confined to bartering for sea otter pelts on the outer coasts, with the important

exception of Tlingit uprisings visiting some the 1820s, a variety of possible Western processes

A native ecology to control passage to the interior (pp. 304, 307). This possible alternative could continue in this controllers, and attitudes travelling north (pp. 295, 307) often carried out this activity and on the middle

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exception of the Russian-Aleut hunting activity that provoked the Tlingit uprising. By the turn of the nineteenth century, trade ships were visiting some inner coasts and a few trade posts were established. By the 1820s, Western interests gradually were shifting to include a wider variety of pelts, including those that were traded out from the interior. Fixed Western posts multiplied, especially in the 1840s, accelerating the process of Western domination of native life.

A native group could use any one or a combination of four strategies to control local trade. (1) By dominating a river mouth or other passage to the interior, trade to and from the interior could be monopolized. (pp. 275, 279, 280, 283, 298). (2) By dominating strategic locations along the coast, coastal trade could be intercepted (pp. 276, 286, 304, 307). This was more difficult, because of the wider spatial mobility possible along the coast. (3) Groups living around Western posts often could control access to Western traders (pp. 275, 279, 287, 299). Success in this type of endeavor depended on the strength of the would-be controllers, the strength of the visiting native traders, and the strength and attitude of the Westerners. (4) Finally, there was the activity of travelling middlemen, which often accompanied other forms of control (pp. 295, 303, 304). Those who controlled river mouths, for instance, often carried goods to and from inland peoples. Without the established power base of a river mouth and/or Western post, the viability of this activity depended on several aspects of the Westerners' behavior, and on the ability of other native groups to circumvent or compete with the middlemen.

Attempts to control trade generated intergroup violence in several ways. The first three strategies of trade control involved occupation of particular locations. A few wars aimed at conquest of these positions (pp. 279, 280; see also 275, 299). But, in the postcontact period at least, the wealth, weapons, native allies, and Western support commanded by groups already established in lucrative positions gave them such an edge that they virtually were immune to attack on their home ground (pp. 275, 280, 287). Rather than territorial conquest, trade-related warfare usually involved the manner in which trade controllers extracted a share of another group's wealth. That was done in three ways: through plundering, through levying a tax or tribute, or through buying goods and reselling them at higher prices (middleman activity).

The plundering of passing trade parties or of accumulated stores of trade goods was in itself a form of warfare. It was a costly approach in which many losses could be sustained for a onetime reward. Plundering as a form of trade control seems to have occurred mostly in the coastal trade, when the attackers did not have the ability to impose

more stable and profitable arrangements. (Plunder, of course, also was taken in wars launched for other reasons.) Where local control was more firmly established, plundering seems to have been supplanted by a tribute extracted from passing traders. Tributes collected by northern river controllers such as Legaic of the Fort Simpson Tsimshian were so long in place that they probably were rarely questioned. However, extraction of tribute by the deadly Lekwiltok Kwakiutl, or the reports of violence after unauthorized passage on Tlingit trade routes, show that the threat of violence underlay this practice.

Middlemen interceded in trade between native suppliers and Western buyers. Although it is clear that enormous profits were made by some middlemen, details about their transactions are lacking in published sources. There undoubtedly existed a variety of arrangements, and these offer a promising area of research in trade company records. One specific question would concern the profits made by the "home guard" groups around Western posts—did they rely primarily on tribute, on buying and reselling, on a combination of the two, or on some other system entirely?

However they carried out their business, middleman activity generated at least four kinds of conflict. First, when the activity of middlemen represented an unnecessary cost for suppliers, as it usually did, the would-be middlemen often had to demonstrate clear military superiority to force cooperation (pp. 286, 292, 295, 305). Second, within an ongoing middleman relationship, friction between the two parties sometimes led to outbursts of violence, as was common at Fort Simpson. Third, force was applied on occasions when a party tried to circumvent established middlemen, as is documented among the Tlingit and suspected for the Bella Coola. Fourth, when several groups competed as middlemen in one area, physical elimination of competitors seems to have been attempted at least among the Southern Kwakiutl.

Besides subsistence and trade resources, there was a third type of "resource" that generated warfare, namely, slaves. The need for captive humans led to raiding before contact, but the demand and consequent raiding increased in historic times as the available free labor force declined, as several types of labor-intensive activity expanded, and as the wealthy collected slaves as tokens of their riches and status (see Price, Chapter 6, this volume). However, most slave raiding was generated only indirectly by the use-value of slaves. The groups that did most of the raiding sought slaves as items of exchange. At times, the capture and trade of humans became the major industry for groups excluded from the main centers of trade control (pp. 277, 281, 291, 299, 305). For many such groups slave raiding and trading was less a choice than a necessity, because it provided the means to obtain the guns and

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This last point is one example of how war could feed back on itself to further stimulate and shape war patterns. Other examples include defensive retaliation and the headhunting complex. War not only set groups against each other; it also created alliances. Elsewhere (Ferguson 1983) I argue that the pressure of intensive warfare determined the redistributive orientation of Northwest Coast economies. The exchanges of food, property, and women involved in the potlatch complex defused potential conflicts between neighbors, and simultaneously knit them together in alliances that were crucial in wars with nonallied groups. Generally, groups who potlatched together were allies in war.

War led to changes in power relationships, and this too fed back to influence war patterns. Under relentless attacks from outside, war leaders sometimes acquired great power in organizing daily life (pp. 283, 300). Under the command of an effective war leader, a beleaguered group might be able to switch over to the offensive, attacking others. Another example of the war-power-war linkage was war's effects on social stratification. Through the interaction of local military superiority, trade control, and the support of Westerners, some Nootka groups appear to approach a situation of social stratification. Under these circumstances, Nootka chiefs decided when and whom to attack, and they launched wars to subjugate nearby groups, at least to the extent of controlling their trade. When clear military superiority was established, a time of peace set in. The Nootka case is especially well documented, but I suspect that similar circumstances led to parallel developments elsewhere on the Northwest Coast. Reports of confederacy formation (Drucker 1963: 122), or of status ranking of households, lineages, villages, or other units (Donald and Mitchell 1975; Rosman and Rubel 1971) may be made more intelligible by considering the inputs of war, trade, and contact. Developments among the Nootka also warrant consideration by students of sociopolitical evolution as an example of a process often discussed but infrequently observed—the emergence of a form of stratification as a result of contact with a state-level society.

The end of Northwest Coast warfare came at different times in different places. It was hastened by the smallpox epidemic of 1863, but it was the growing Western presence that proved to be the deciding factor. Native trade monopolies decayed, groups lost their autonomy via integration into Western industries and churches, the slave trade was suppressed, and gunboats were kept ready to deal with "troublesome Indians."

In interpreting Northwest Coast warfare, I have sided with

Swadesh against Codere. But on two points, I must switch sides. Codere, more than Swadesh, recognized the importance of a historical perspective in studying Northwest Coast societies. And she, more than Swadesh, established that war had to be considered as an important variable in understanding native social systems. It is unfortunate that these general points have had less influence than her particular explanations of war and potlatch. Only a few researchers since Codere have integrated war into their studies, whereas many have persisted in treating Northwest Coast societies as timeless entities, or at best have made a passing bow at the most obvious consequences of contact. A rather glaring example of this neglect of history concerns the issue of trade control. With a few exceptions, trade control is scarcely mentioned in anthropological reconstructions of native societies. But if one peruses accounts by witnesses of the contact period, the crucial role of trade control in native life fairly leaps off the pages. Yet the neglect of history, particularly in relation to trade in contact situations, is not a peculiarity of Northwest Coast research. It is a weak spot in a great many anthropological analyses of war. Exceptions exist (e.g., Hunt 1940; Lewis 1970: 178-180; Murphy 1957; Vayda 1976: Chapter 4), but they clearly are exceptions. It is time to correct this situation.

### Acknowledgments

Many people offered encouragement and criticism during the development of this essay. Thanks are owed to all the participants of the Columbia war seminar, to Alexander Alland, June Collins, Morton Fried, Michael Harner, Marvin Harris, George MacDonald, Robert Murphy, and Paula Rubel. I owe more than thanks to my main critic, moral supporter, and sometimes typist, Leslie Farragher Ferguson. Mistakes and misinterpretations I claim for myself.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Some of these encounters do not fit what is normally thought of as war. But I found no qualitative divisions in the material warranting the exclusion of some acts of group conflict. Perhaps I have been influenced by the Kwakiutl term for war, which encompassed any acts of violence between peoples of different groups (Boas 1966: 108).

<sup>2</sup>One exception was a raid participated in by the captive Jewitt in 1803, in which only native weapons were used (Jewitt 1896: 193).

<sup>3</sup>The old image of an assured and unlimited yearly abundance of salmon has been challenged effectively by several studies showing marked yearly fluctuations in numbers (Blackman 1976; Donald and Mitchell 1975; Pidcocke 1965; Suttles 1960; Vayda 1961).

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Some questions about the applicability of these studies to precommercial fishing times remain, but other studies relating fluctuations to natural conditions (DeLaguna 1972: 51; Neave 1958; *New York Times* 1979; Pidcocke 1960; Suttles 1962), coupled with some indications of fluctuations in early reports (Sproat 1868: 216, 217), have shifted the burden of proof. Even if salmon are abundant, floods can wash out weirs (MacDonald 1969: 244), downstream weirs can cut off upstream runs (Stewart 1977: 100), or late-arriving salmon can strain dwindling winter stores (Brabant 1900: 54; Collison 1915: 67; Jewitt 1931). At the river mouths, coastal resources can provide alternative foods in the worst situations, as attested to by layers of barnacles in middens (MacDonald 1969: 244; cf. Drucker and Heizer 1967: 149). Upstream, famine seems to have been a frequent occurrence (Bishop 1983: 151; Boas in Suttles 1962: 138; Collison 1915: 66, 308; MacDonald 1969: 244; also see Collins 1950: 332; Duff 1959: 28).

<sup>4</sup>The relationship of depopulation to warfare is suggested by an observation of Portlock in 1787. Landing by Cape Edgecumbe, he found the inhabitants already had been reduced by smallpox. They were "in awe" of the warlike people to the west of the cape, who had been spared by the epidemic (Portlock 1968: 272, 288).

<sup>5</sup>Tlingit warfare is comparatively well described, thanks especially to DeLaguna (1960; 1972). It should be kept in mind, however, that her descriptions pertain mostly to the two communities she studied, Angoon and Yakutat, and so should not be considered exhaustive of Tlingit wars.

<sup>6</sup>Their recent movement to more exposed coastal areas may explain their technological problems with ocean fishing.

<sup>7</sup>A recent work by Fisher (1977) attacks the view that Northwest Coast peoples were passive and manipulated participants in the Western fur trade. I agree completely that natives were active agents in this trade, and that their behavior often shaped the responses of the Westerners. But I think that Fisher goes too far when he suggests that natives, in fact, dominated the Westerners. He suggests, for instance, that native peoples had the ability physically to eliminate the Western presence, had they desired to do so (1977: 23, 39). But Fisher does not consider the Tlingit—because their territory is in what is now Alaska, and he deals only with British Columbia—and the Tlingit represent the only instance of a concerted attempt to expel foreign traders in the entire history of the Northwest Coast. The failure of this uprising indicates that native power was not as great as Fisher implies.

<sup>8</sup>Wike (1951: 30–53) shows that after the initial period of trade, when tools and metals were popular trade items, native interests settled into a constant demand for weapons, ammunition, food, rum, clothing, blankets, and slaves (which the western traders purchased elsewhere on the coast).

<sup>9</sup>Several authors claim that slaves were of little social or economic importance in Northwest Coast societies (Drucker 1939; Fried 1967; Garfield 1939). Others argue for their critical importance as sources of captive labor (Adams 1973; Donald 1983; MacLeod 1928; Niblack 1970; Oberg 1973; Ruyle 1973; also see Townsend 1978; 1983). The latter group presents extensive evidence showing that slaves were important in food gathering, food processing and storage, defending their owners, fighting in war, drudge labor, production of commodities for sale or trade, and other tasks. My own findings are in accord with their conclusions, and there are many indications (referred to throughout this chapter) that the use-value of slaves increased significantly under conditions of contact.

The value of slaves is indicated by their sale price. At Bella Bella in the mid-1830s, one "full grown, athletic" male was worth nine blankets, a gun, powder and ball, two dressed elk hides, and sundry other articles (Dunn 1845: 184). At Victoria in the 1860s, female slaves to be used as prostitutes were worth £30 of goods (Sproat 1868: 92). About

the same time, to the south of Shoal Water Bay, slaves brought \$100 to \$500 or more worth of goods (Swan 1972: 166). In the Queen Charlotte Islands in the late 1870s (when slave raiding had been suppressed) slaves were bringing up to \$1000 in goods (Dawson 1880: 132).

<sup>10</sup>One other internal Tlingit conflict is mentioned by Birket-Smith and DeLaguna (1938: 317), but this account is so sketchy that it cannot even be placed in time.

<sup>11</sup>MacDonald (1979: 11; 1980: 24) believes that prior to the penetration of Western trade goods, wars were not commonly fought with territorial conquest as intent or result, at least in the northern part of the coast. Several of the precontact territorial movements described in this paper would be, in his view, more probably to control protohistoric trade than subsistence resources. Evaluation of this view must await his future publications.

<sup>12</sup>Fisher (1977: 35) believes that because the Chilcotin did not trade at the Chilcotin post, they had "opted out of the fur trade." But he also states that the Chilcotin were highly dissatisfied with the terms of trade at that post, and it seems more likely that they had simply opted to take their trade elsewhere. The need for weapons alone made it unlikely that any group would withdraw voluntarily from the fur trade.

<sup>13</sup>The narrator of this account described how the usurper always would take the best of everything caught or made. He contrasted this to other chiefs, who only did this when preparing a feast (Sapir and Swadesh 1955: 346).

<sup>14</sup>For example, Meares characterized areal political arrangements as "feudal" (1790: 229), and Boit, in 1791, said that the Ahousat were "under the Jurisdiction" of Wick-ananish (Howay 1969: 385).

<sup>15</sup>This perspective clears up a question that has stood for almost two centuries, concerning the contradictory reports about the relationship in 1792 of the Nimkish Kwakiutl to the Moachat Nootka. One of Vancouver's men reported that they were "under the authority of Maquina" (Vancouver 1967/I: 331). But Vancouver himself found that, although the Nimkish chief considered both Maquina and Wickanish to be his superiors, "so far as I could learn, he did not consider himself to be under the authority of either" (Vancouver 1967/I: 346). The Nimkish were engaged in regular trade with the Nootka (Vancouver 1967/I: 348-349), and it seems that the misperceived "authority" was a recognition of an economic, not political, relationship.

<sup>16</sup>Dawson (1887: 71) believes that the Newwitty Kwakiutl were responsible for the attack on the Tonquin.

<sup>17</sup>Although no good information exists on the natality rates of early coast populations, two factors suggest that they were high. First, the people were relatively sedentary. Several authors suggest that sedentism leads to population growth by relaxing the problem of child transport (see Dumond 1975). Second, Northwest Coast peoples had a diet high in fats and oils (Drucker 1963: 53). The Tlingit were reported to consume a pint of fish oil each day (Oberg 1973: 115). Frisch argues that fertility is affected by the ratio of fat to total body weight in females (1975; Frisch and McArthur 1974).

<sup>18</sup>In 1864, the Clayoquot's other old ally, the Ahousat, sacked a schooner that they lured in with promises of dogfish oil (Sproat 1868: 196). How this relates, if at all, to other conflicts is unclear.

<sup>19</sup>Attacks on trade vessels also occurred in 1810 (Bancroft 1884: 326) and 1852 (Collison 1915: 40), but I lack other information on these.

<sup>20</sup>In a footnote, Codere (1950: 105) suggests that the two wars mentioned above from Kwakiutl Tales might represent "conditions among the early Kwakiutl more like conditions among the Nootka at a later time," but she declines to give this further consideration. If she had, she might have concluded that this earlier period ended only with the depopulation of Kwakiutl territory in the 1830s.

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## References

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<sup>21</sup>This is one of Codere's seven cases of fighting, and she attempts to minimize its significance by saying that the HBC agent "gives little evidence . . . that he considers the war to be destructive of anything save his profits" (1950: 114). But in reading this agent's letters, it becomes clear that he was rarely concerned with anything but profits. He never mentions a war anywhere on the coast unless it was interfering directly with returns. In fact, he thought the Indian wars were of some benefit, because they directed aggressive impulses away from the whites (Fisher 1977: 57).

Codere continues to assert that the Kwakiutl were perceived as so unwarlike that the HBC officials thought they could be intimidated by "the awful spectacle of a steamboat!". It is true that native peoples were intimidated by the steamboat. They could not understand what power made it move (Simpson 1847: 241). Greater cause for respect, however, was that this ship was a heavily armed gunboat, and the HBC's main "enforcer" on the coast (Simpson 1847: 236; Rich 1944: 18).

<sup>22</sup>Another result of the exclusion of the U.S. competition was the immediate reduction of the prices the HBC paid for furs, which led to a marked increase in the company's profits (Rich 1941: 270, 286). This move "excited much discontent and was strongly opposed by the Natives" (Rich 1941: 270), but there was nothing they could do about it. This demonstrates, again, that the native control over the fur trade emphasized by Fisher (1977) had definite limits.

<sup>23</sup>Recently it has been suggested that the Bella Bella were and are much more distinct from the Southern Kwakiutl than had been thought previously (see Harris 1979: 202n).

<sup>24</sup>One of the most persuasive cases for a nonmaterial basis to Northwest Coast fighting is made by Oberg (1967, 1973). He presents a long list of "crimes" and "shameful acts" that, in traditional Tlingit society, supposedly required compensatory payments in lives or property. Refusal or inability to make proper compensation, he asserts, would lead to feud or war (which he [1973: 61] equates). Although this work stands as a valuable discussion of Tlingit law, circumstances of Oberg's research (see Oberg 1973: XI-XV) strongly suggest that it should be read as a description of norms, rather than an account of the way things really worked.

Oberg had been trained in economics, with only one year of anthropology courses before reaching the field in 1931. He spent about nine months with the Tlingit, divided between three sites. He arrived at a time of native-white tensions, and many Tlingit were less than enthusiastic about cooperating. His principal informant was a "mixed blood" man, who had left home while young and had just returned after 20 years away. Oberg prepared his dissertation under the supervision of Radcliffe-Brown of the structural-functional school. All this suggests a somewhat idealized view of traditional Tlingit society, as do statements like "so effective was ridicule that . . . in the case of blunders at ceremonials, [the individual] often died as a result of social disapproval" (1967: 218), or his assertion that war was an unusual occurrence of little social or economic significance that just "did not fit into the general scheme of activities" (1973: 78).

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