

War in the Tribal Zone

Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare



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1992

SCHOOL OF AMERICAN RESEARCH PRESS
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

The Violent Edge of Empire

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THIS book is about the transformation of indigenous patterns of warfare brought about by the proximity or intrusion of expanding states. The primary concern is changes associated with European colonial expansionism since the fifteenth century, and more recently with the expansion of independent Third World states. To put these epochs of state expansion in perspective, the scope of comparison is broadened to include studies of more ancient expanding states. The indigenous peoples discussed here as affected by European or other state expansionism are themselves organized in a range of political forms from bands to empires, although a dominant concern in the volume is the tribal form of organization. Though the focus here is warfare, to place war in an analytic context it is considered along with all the social transformations associated with state contact.

The impact of colonial states on indigenous warfare has not been recognized as a topic for cross-cultural investigation in the past. The School of American Research advanced seminar that preceded this volume was organized in order to define and explore this new theoretical domain, itself created by the intersection of two broad currents in recent anthropological research.

The first of these currents is anthropology's general shift away from synchronic theory and toward diachronic, historical analysis (Cohn 1980; Ortner 1984; Roseberry 1989; Wolf 1982). The once-pervasive assumption that societies tend toward equilibrium, and the associated research orientations of one or another type of functionalism, created a bias against history. Western contact was perceived as a source of contamination that obscured and disrupted the integrated, pristine cultural system. The ethnographic objective, then, was to reconstruct that pristine culture, and the study of contact was consigned to the neglected area of acculturation studies. That situation is changing, with increasing attention being paid to the colonial context of most ethnographic situations (Asad 1973; Bodley 1982; Cooper and Stoler 1989; Rodney 1972; Willis 1972). Now, the idea of the timeless primitive is good only for postmortem dissection (Kuper 1988; Rosaldo 1980; Stocking 1987); Levi-Strauss's ambiguous distinction between "hot" and "cold" societies is rejected (Douglas 1989; Friedman 1975; Hill 1988; Leach 1989); and the possibility of reconstructing a precontact "ethnographic present" is challenged (Dobyns 1983; Ramenofsky 1987). The common premise of the papers collected here is that the study of culture must always recognize its changing historical circumstances.

The other relevant research current is the burgeoning anthropological literature on war and peace (Ferguson 1984a; Ferguson with Farragher 1988; Haas 1990a). Most studies, however, especially the older ones, give little attention to history and the effects of Western contact. That neglect is even more pronounced in general theoretical formulations and textbook discussions. "Warfare among the so-and-so" usually is depicted and analyzed as part of a stable and long-standing cultural system, and the major role attributed to expanding states is that of pacification (Ferguson 1990a).

But pacification occurs rather late in the process. As the late Klaus-Friedrich Koch, one of the leading theorists on war in the 1970s, commented in one of his last publications,

many accounts of warfare among tribal peoples were written after these peoples had suffered the direct or indirect conse-

quences of foreign intrusion, and we know very little about the stimulating and aggravating effects of this intrusion on indigenous modes of violent conflict. (Koch 1983:200-201)

In our view, the frequent effect of such an intrusion is an overall militarization; that is, an increase in armed collective violence whose conduct, purposes, and technologies rapidly adapt to the threats generated by state expansion.

That area continuously affected by the proximity of a state, but not under state administration, we call the "tribal zone." Within the tribal zone, the wider consequence of the presence of the state is the radical transformation of extant sociopolitical formations, often resulting in "tribalization," the genesis of new tribes.¹

By bringing together the historical and the military, this volume also connects with theoretical developments in historical sociology and political science, in which a growing body of literature (Giddens 1985; Knutsen 1987; Mann 1986; McNeill 1982; Tilly 1975, 1985) seeks to incorporate collective violence as a topic within the mainstream of social research. Military factors are given analytic attention comparable to that traditionally devoted to economics, politics, and ideology. That perspective is implicit in this volume, since the objective is to discover how differential involvement in armed conflict in the contact situation produces observed historical trajectories.

While the importance of history and the role of violent conflict may be readily seen, it is more difficult to know what that recognition implies: at the very least, it involves the need to revitalize our ideas about the ethnographic universe, going beyond the rejection of untenable notions of self-contained, stable local societies, and instead developing a conceptual framework for understanding conflict and change as part of the historical process underlying observed ethnographic patterns.

How, then, do we get beyond the analytic anomie that has resulted from the collapse of old paradigms and led to the conceptual impasse of deconstructionism? We approach the great number of factors involved, and the enormous range of variation they present, through the device of an analytically and temporally progressive focus. Thus, the chapters in this volume are ordered by four complementary criteria: (1) chronology, following the passage from ancient to modern cases; (2) evolutionary complexity, beginning with empires and ending with localized bands and villages; (3) relative position during state expansion, starting with the perspective of the center and concluding with that of the periphery; and (4) the level and units of analysis, early papers dealing with properties of

4 empires and states, the final papers considering the organization of small groups.

This is the "rolling focus" mentioned in the Preface, the organizing device by which this vast subject matter is handled. This shifting analytic focus will be evident throughout the Introduction, which considers a series of interrelated topics in an order which roughly parallels the changing emphasis of discussion throughout the chapters. In this introductory chapter, however, the contextual material, the varying circumstances of state expansionism, and aspects of contact other than war, are discussed prior to the topic of war itself. We also attempt here to relate these topics to recent developments in anthropological theory.

WORLD SYSTEMS AND EXPANDING STATES

Our interest in the consequences of an expanding Europe may lead some to categorize this volume as an application of world system theory (Wallerstein 1974, 1980), and clearly, there is a degree of affinity. But the papers presented here support the standard criticism of that theory: that it overemphasizes determination by the center and underrates the active role of peripheral peoples. In this sense, these essays are more closely aligned with an approach that focuses on "anthropological subjects at the intersections of global and local histories" (Roseberry 1988: 173; see also Steward et al. 1956; Ferguson 1988a; Whitehead 1988).

A second difference from world system theory responds to a criticism leveled at political-economic approaches in general: that they are "too economic," or "not political enough" (Ortner 1984: 142; e.g., Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987). In contrast, the contributors to this volume focus on military articulation and the political patterns through which it occurs. This focus does not, however, imply any necessary contradiction of existing world systems (or structural Marxist) theories on the nature and transformative effect of capitalist penetration of noncapitalist societies. The contributors to this volume are simply looking at another side of the process of articulation, one that may complement more economically oriented analyses.

A third difference from the standard world system approach is that this volume, while placing great stress on the significance of European expansion, also seeks in its early chapters to fit this epoch into a larger, global perspective. From their inception on the planet, states have developed and existed within a broader matrix involving the flow of people, products, and ideas (Chang 1986; Claessen and Skalnik 1978; Claessen and van de Velde 1987; Curtin 1984; Kipp and Schortman 1989; Nissen

1988). In the long view, the *modern* world system is as much a creation⁵ as a creator of connections (McNeill 1982).

From the time of the first urban centers, the networks that engender states also have connected them to nonstate peoples, and the connection has had a great impact on the latter (Algaze 1989). In the ensuing millennia, the regions of state-nonstate contact (i.e., "tribal zones") have expanded along with the global expansion of states. As a result, some form of contact with states has been very common for nonstate peoples (Curtin 1984; Headland and Reid 1989; Khazanov 1984; Kopytoff 1987a; Wolf 1982).

The scope of such contacts can be seen by considering the cases examined in this volume, an exercise that serves the additional function of introducing individual papers. The first four chapters following this introduction are concerned largely with the dynamics of state expansionism, and they call attention to huge areas of state-nonstate interaction. The Roman empire, whose North African presence is discussed by Mattingly, was of course in contact with "barbarians" all over Europe, and its land and sea trade to China passed through territories of many nonstate peoples (Randers-Pehrson 1983; Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987: pt. 4). Those east-west sea-lanes became secondary centers of state formation. The succession of states in Sri Lanka and South India discussed by Gunawardana thrived on this trade, especially after the rise of Byzantium, at the same time that they transformed the political structure of nearby nonstate peoples (and see Gibson 1990; Warren 1981). Hassig describes a similar pattern of interaction with nonstate peoples for the Aztecs, the last in a long series of Mesoamerican empires. In West Africa, the European slave trade discussed by Law built upon an earlier trade which crossed the Sahara to the Arab Mediterranean (Lovejoy 1983; Reyna 1990), and which, as Mattingly shows, extends back to Roman times.

Crossing over to the New World and to a more tribal focus, Whitehead notes the existence in Guyana and Amazonia of complex polities and extensive trade systems before the European arrival (see also Whitehead 1989). This emphasizes a point raised by Gunawardana, that political expansionism of some form antedates the rise of states. The Yanomami discussed by Ferguson may have been within the sphere of one of these extinct and virtually unknown centers. The ancestral Iroquois, for all of the interpretive controversies noted by Abler, were clearly part of a broad, even continental trade system, and were enmeshed, in a peripheral way, in the processes leading to the rise and fall of complex societies in the Mississippi Valley (Dincauze and Hasenstab 1989). Similarly, the Asháninka

6 (or Campa) discussed by Brown and Fernández were one of many non-state peoples (Salomon 1986) with established connections to the Inca empire. Highland New Guinea, the site of Strathern's account, is about as remote as can be from all centers of state activity, and seems to offer some of the best material for relatively pristine warfare (Connolly and Anderson 1988). Yet even there, the subsistence base observed at "first contact" was reliant on cultigens introduced from the New World in the last three hundred years (Feil 1987).

Documentary information about the consequences of these connections between state and nonstate peoples usually is very limited prior to the epoch of European expansion, but there is no justification for assuming that social transformation and human innovation did not produce historical change at the periphery as much as at the center. Constant change seems a more realistic expectation than the old assumption of timeless stability (see Bloch 1986: 194). In our view, all societies have the same amount of history behind them. European explorers only step into local history, they do not set it in motion. The uniqueness of European contact is thus taken not as a given, but as a question, a topic to be investigated. It is to an examination of the dynamics of that historical process that we now turn.

Anthropologists familiar with the debate over the use of the term "tribe" may not know that a similar debate has been and is going on in other social sciences about the term "state" (Brown 1989). "The state" had virtually disappeared from comparative historical studies. Recent efforts to "bring the state back in" (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985) have met with strong opposition (Ferguson and Mansbach 1989). Anthropology may have avoided this debate because the state, as a centralized, institutionalized, authoritative system of political rule, is in obvious evolutionary contrast to nonstate societies, especially when state and non-state are thrown together by the establishment of new colonial states. But besides indicating this contrast, "the state" is also useful for understanding contact.

Using "the state" in a narrow sense—as the institutions of political control, the government—we find support for Skocpol's (1985: 3) view of "states as weighty actors." When it comes to surrounding nonstate peoples, governments have *policies*, policies that affect if not control the behavior of state agents,² and policies that change over time. Such changes are described throughout this volume (and see Fitzhugh 1985; Washburn 1988). But "the state" can also be taken in a broader sense, as a society that includes the particular mix of social agents and interests present within its borders at any given time. As Ribeiro (1970; and see Henley

7 1978) emphasizes, the dominant economic enterprises in state expansion will strongly condition all social relations along the contact "front." So too, in the political sphere, changes in sovereignty and policy or shifts in borders can have a tremendous impact on the lives of proximate nonstate peoples. This is dramatically illustrated, for example, in the rapid passage of the North American Southwest from Spanish to Mexican to United States territory (Kroeber and Fontana 1986; Spicer 1962).

Thus, contact situations can be broadly compared by the strategic posture and degree of territorial advance of the state. One distinction is whether the state seeks territorial or hegemonic control (Luttwak 1976): that is, conquest and direct control over defeated lands and peoples (territorial), or establishment of military superiority and indirect control through local authorities (hegemonic). This contrast is considered prominently in the chapters by Mattingly, Gunawardana, and Hassig, and was discussed extensively at the seminar. Our conclusion was that the distinction works best when applied to studies of imperial policy "from the center"; at the peripheries, the territory versus hegemony distinction is too broad, since there are always blends of direct and indirect control. Even from the perspective of a state, territory and hegemony are not the only possible strategic objectives. As Law points out, West African states wanted neither, their relation with nonstate neighbors being one of predator and prey.

In the seminar discussions we found an alternative distinction to be of greater utility in understanding the dynamics of the tribal zone, that of "coercion" versus "seduction." The primary means of coercion are military threats; those of seduction are gifts, trade opportunities, and pledges of political support. These tactical alternatives also occur in some kind of blend or mix, but unlike the territory/hegemony distinction, specific elements of the mix are clearly identifiable in peripheral situations.

Finally, the process of state intrusion can be characterized by degree or intensity of contact. Four broad phases are identified: indirect contact, direct contact, encapsulation, and incorporation. This is a logical progression, and not necessarily a generalization about actual process, as annihilation of native peoples can occur early in the sequence, as sometimes happened in the Americas and the Pacific through the impact of epidemics. Furthermore, even the logic of the progression may not apply to all situations of state expansion. European expansionism differs from that of Rome or Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka, in that the incessant outward drive of the developing world capitalist order virtually foreclosed the possibility of long-term coexistence with tribal groupings around the state frontiers. The Aztecs had their own internal dynamic requiring unending wars of

8 expansion, but these were directed against other city-states rather than at tribal peoples on the state peripheries. Thus, ancient states offered long-term coexistence as a major alternative to the annihilation or incorporation of tribal peoples.³

THE TRIBAL ZONE

When it comes to the analysis of specific situations, these broad categories are of less value, as the state disappears into a welter of specific "factors and actors" (a phrase introduced by Strathern). This is so whether one focuses on the dynamics of state expansionism itself or on its articulation with indigenous warfare patterns. Consideration here will begin with the factors associated with an intrusive state which can spread beyond the direct observation of state agents (indirect contact) and whose changing parameters continue to shape situations throughout later phases.

First among these factors is disease. The impact of disease is a critical marker separating state contact situations. The introduction of new diseases for which indigenous people have little or no resistance apparently was not a characteristic of ancient state expansion, since such expansion was typically into immediately adjacent areas. Thus, we note that the population of North Africa actually increased during the Roman period. By contrast, in the European epoch, introduced epidemic diseases had a tremendous impact in those situations involving New World and Pacific peoples long isolated from Old World diseases.⁴ On this point, the Slave Coast of West Africa is in sharp contrast to the New World cases that follow it. A different sort of contrast is presented by Highland Papua New Guinea, where modern medical technology and the political will to make it available have reduced the consequences of disease, with the result that the area's population has grown substantially in the post-contact period.

Dobyns (1983), Ramenofsky (1987), and Purdy (1988) document some of the catastrophic consequences of Old World diseases in North America, and argue that their introduction led to rapid and massive population decline, frequently if not always prior to direct observation by Europeans. In this volume, Ablner and Whitehead consider the impact of early epidemics, but conclude that massive losses probably did not occur until well into the period of direct contact. One general implication of these cases is that settlement patterns and social networks must be taken into account when deriving estimates of the rate and extent of disease transmission. In northeastern South America, for example, it was only the permanent establishment of the mission complex in the eighteenth cen-

9 tury that brought regular epidemics to the Orinoco Basin. More recently among the Yanomami, disease has been carried into remote areas by Yanomami men who have journeyed downriver to acquire newly accessible Western manufactures.

These and other cases (Crosby 1986; Fitzhugh 1985) leave little question, however, that when epidemics occur among nonresistant populations, the effect is devastating, leading to fundamental changes in population density; settlement size, duration, and location; and age profiles. Ferguson describes how the loss of so many people at one time tears apart the fabric of social relations and contributes to various kinds of violence among the Yanomami. The Iroquois exhibit an even more direct connection between war and disease in their unusual practice of capturing adult men to integrate into their society. And it is interesting to note that both the Carib and the Iroquois only rose to political and military prominence after the virtual elimination by disease and other factors of once more powerful, but more exposed, neighbors (Brasser 1978a; Whitehead 1989). The same circumstance is true for other notably warlike peoples, including the Cherokee (Perdue 1979:20) and the warriors of the Amazon River (Hemming 1987).

Another set of influential factors relates to ecological change, the modification of the physical environment by the introduction of new plants and animals. This phenomenon is not unique to European colonization, as diffusionist studies of the Old World show, but Europe accelerated and globalized the process. The most massive impact is seen in areas that Crosby (1986) calls Neo-Europes, areas environmentally suitable for the spread of a European plant-and-animal complex but without an evolved state production system. The rapid spread of this biological complex facilitated settlement by European colonizers (and see Cronon 1983; Super 1988). But the picture is even more complicated, as European expansionism has brought important "lateral transfers" of domesticants, often from tropic to tropic. Manioc and corn were brought from the New World to West Africa, for example, allowing for population growth even during the period of the slave trade (Smith 1988:4; Wolf 1982:204).

The spread of introduced plants and animals also was involved in the development of new cultural patterns among indigenous peoples, some of whom obdurately resisted European settlers. The role of the horse on the Great Plains is the classic example. Thurman (1989), in a seminar paper that could not be included in this collection, emphasized that this introduction led to the florescence of a new and vital culture pattern (and see Ewers 1980; Lewis 1970; Secoy 1953). New World sweet potatoes

10 were introduced to New Guinea, touching off, some say, an "ipomoean revolution" that transformed Highland societies (Feil 1987).

The *effective* environment (physical surroundings as they are significant for human use) also changes in response to changes in the economic reasons for state expansion. Furthermore, human activity leads to modification of the physical environment itself. Such changes are not related to state contact only, since recent research suggests that indigenous peoples have effected long-term modification of huge areas of Amazonian forest (Posey and Balee 1989), but European contact certainly intensifies the process. Subsistence resources are depleted (Ferguson, this volume; Thomas 1985:154; Whitehead 1988:30-32), fur-bearing animals are wiped out (Abler, this volume; Ferguson 1984b), or a wholesale transformation takes place, as in the current assaults on the rain forests of the world. Even less catastrophic interventions can lead to ecological impoverishment and the limitation of future use possibilities (Bunker 1988). Such major changes in the relationship between a people and their environment will be accompanied by a restructuring of labor patterns, and thereby lead to substantial modifications of the rest of social life.

A third set of factors is technological change. The ability to manufacture utilitarian and luxury goods beyond the productive capabilities of nonstate peoples may be one of the key factors in the development of the first states (Algaze 1989; Nissen 1988; Szykiewicz 1989), and the circulation of these items beyond state borders has been a basis of state-nonstate interactions ever since. But the development of its mass-production technology made Europe different. Considering cheap metal tools alone (guns will be considered below), there has been a tremendous impact in areas that did not have local metalworkers, since steel cutting implements have been calculated as being three to nine times more efficient than stone (Carneiro 1979a; Colchester 1984). Scattered exceptions notwithstanding, the rule is a tremendous demand for metal among nonstate peoples (Whitehead, Brown and Fernández, Ferguson, this volume; Fitzhugh 1985; Rodman and Cooper 1983). As one of the first French traders among the Ottawa put it, "The savages love knives better than we serve God" (quoted in Turner 1977:32). Certainly, the metals worked by the artisans of Rome and ancient Sri Lanka would have been highly valued by nearby peoples with lithic technology, but it is doubtful that these metal implements could have been supplied in sufficient quantities or low enough costs to become routine means of production.

Metal tools circulate widely in indigenous trade networks (Whitehead 1988:160-63) and typically have replaced stone tools before any trained

observers arrive (Carneiro 1979b; Ferguson 1990a). These trade networks are intimately involved in war and alliance, as will be discussed later. But beyond those direct links to war, there is the question of what happens to a society when its basic technology is suddenly replaced. The well-known studies by Salisbury (1962) and Sharp (1974), which indicate the magnitude of expectable changes, stand out dramatically in a literature that glosses over the presence of steel.

The impact of disease, ecological transformation, and technological change will vary. It is apparent, for instance, that these factors have had a much more acute effect in the Americas than in Africa. The question must be approached empirically. In some cases, no impact will be found. But often, singly or in combination, these factors radically transform the basic orders of social life, as has occurred with the Yanomami (Ferguson, this volume; and see Fitzhugh 1985). Moreover, all these factors typically, though not always, travel far ahead of observers. They are the media of indirect contact; their extent defines the scope of the tribal zone, which thus, by definition, becomes a very dynamic field. Therefore, we should be very cautious about accepting even "first contact" reports as representing societies unaffected by Europe.⁵

Turning now to the actual presence of state agents, the "actors" in our formulation, we generally encounter a very heterogeneous group. In this, European states are probably no different from ancient states. The first order of sorting depends on whether there is only one expanding state present or multiple states are present and in competition. Other things being equal, the existence of competition among the Europeans gives native people more autonomy and a better rate of exchange for products. But as Whitehead and Abler (this volume) show, there is a price: more bloodshed, as indigenous people are drawn into European wars. A variation on this theme occurs when a European society is divided into hostile factions, with their own ties to native allies as in the British North American colonies in the 1630s (Fausz 1985:226).

Underneath these "national" divisions, the analyst encounters a multiplicity of types of actors: government administrators, soldiers, priests, traders, settlers, felons, scientists (including anthropologists), and so forth, all with their own circumstances and interests.⁶ The interactions of these actors with each other and with indigenous people thus produce historical process on the local level. For indigenous people, state actors may seem tremendously fickle, rearranging themselves frequently and quickly in response to many factors. What may seem a small change from a distance, such as the relocation of a trading post or the replacement of

12 a captain at a fort, can have a tremendous impact on the lives of indigenous people, creating political crises and worse (Fitzhugh 1985; Rodman and Cooper 1983; Whitehead 1988). Many of the chapters that follow show that such small-scale changes have strongly influenced the pattern of warfare.

TRIBALIZATION

Beyond these particular interactions linking state agents and indigenous peoples, there is a larger process of structural articulation. The restructuring of indigenous forms of social organization as a result of connecting to European colonizers has been the subject of a great deal of work. Dependency theory, world system theory, and structural Marxism all focus on economic articulation. Some structural Marxists have attempted to expand their framework to encompass political articulation (e.g., Reyna 1990), but they have been more concerned with the development of models than with the historical process. Wolf (1982) opens up a new area of research into ideological articulation and struggle. Without implying any necessary criticism of these previous and largely complementary efforts, in this volume we focus on military and political articulation. This brings us to the issue of tribe.

Many uses of the term "tribe" can be found in the literature (Helm 1968), but two meanings are most relevant here. Service (1962) uses tribe to designate a general stage in sociocultural evolution. Sahlins (1968) elaborates on the tribal stage, stressing the role of institutions such as age-grades and clan systems which integrate bands or villages into a larger polity. Fried (1967, 1968, 1975) pays little attention to integrative structures, focusing instead on the matter of uniformity and bounding; that is, on the distinction of one tribe from another (see Haas 1990b:174). Fried rejects tribe as a stage in evolution and sees it instead as a "secondary" phenomenon, the product of contact with a more complex society, and particularly, with a state. All of these authors associate the emergence of tribes with an increase in warfare (Fried 1975:71-72; Sahlins 1968:5-7; Service 1962:113-15). In this volume the evolutionary questions are left largely unexplored (see Haas 1982, 1990b), although Whitehead discusses some of the theoretical implications of differing evolutionary perspectives for the historical analysis of Amerindian societies.

Whether or not tribes evolved in the pre-state past, the main issue here is that of the relationship between state expansion and the formation of tribes. That issue is clouded by an ambiguity in Fried's position. The

theory is that a tribe is a political unit brought into being, in various ways, by contact with a state—any state. The tribe-creating capacity of ancient states is noted by Fried (1968:18), and he calls attention to the great expanse of tribal peoples across central Asia from the fifth century B.C. to the seventeenth century A.D. (Fried 1975:72).⁷ But except for this and a few other passing references, this classic area of tribalism is not scrutinized by Fried, and neither is another center of tribalism, the Middle East (Crone 1986:55).⁸ Instead, Fried pays most attention to tribalization associated with European expansionism (e.g.; Fried 1979:4), and the message that seems to have had the widest hearing in anthropology is that "Europe created tribes." In other statements, however, Fried makes it seem as though tribes have *never* existed (Fried 1975:1), and most of his illustrations puncturing holes in tribal theory are taken from areas of European colonialism, precisely where one would theoretically expect to find tribes.

The papers collected here in one sense underscore that ambiguity (and see Fitzhugh 1985). Although many tribes will be seen to emerge in response to state expansion, the reader will also encounter a variety of other political forms in the tribal zone: secondary states, open-ended alliance networks, autonomous villages, clan segments and extended families, specialized bandit groups, and so on (see Whitehead, this volume, for discussion). Tribes may be the most prominent political feature of the tribal zone, but they remain only one of many possible outcomes of contact. Resolution of this ambiguity is possible, but it requires that we look first at the forces at work in the tribal zone that create or modify political groupings among indigenous people.

States have difficulty dealing with peoples without authoritative leaders and with constantly changing group identity and membership. All expanding states seek to identify and elevate friendly leaders. They are given titles, emblems, and active political and military support. The status of state-identified leaders is also increased by their central position in trade relations with the state, because of both their control of basic technology and their privileged access to prestige items (Menezes 1977; Szykiewicz 1989; Washburn 1988; and see Kipp and Schortman 1989). At the same time, however, a leader must exist within the constraints of local social organization. Breakdown of old patterns may undermine authority, as described by Strathern, but an increase in warfare can refocus support of tested leaders. The kind of authority that actually emerges also depends on the prior political organization of the native people and the nature of the contact process. When states connect with chiefdoms, and the contact

allows a period of indigenous autonomy, secondary states (Price 1978) may form rather than or in addition to tribes, as happened in West Africa (Law, this volume; and see Kopytoff 1987a, 1987b).

State agents, whether they be Roman governors in North Africa or Roman Catholic missionaries on the Upper Amazon, also seek to identify or, if need be, to create clear political boundaries ("polity") in place of the multilayered and constantly shifting allegiances they actually encounter ("anarchy"). Tribal identification then becomes a means of relating to the political apparatus of the state. This lesson has been taught by the recent history of tribalism in Africa (Vail 1989), it is manifest in contemporary developments in Highland New Guinea (Strathern, this volume), and it looks to be the future, as it has been the past, of indigenous people in Amazonia (*Cultural Survival Quarterly* 1989; Whitten 1981). So it is that the needs and policies of states create tribes.

This is not the whole story, however. Where do the groups that become tribes come from? State contact changes the patterning of social relations, sometimes reinforcing existing patterns, sometimes reorienting them, sometimes shattering them and rebuilding from scratch. Two primary forces that structure the new patterns are trade and war. In European contact situations especially, trade in manufactures creates new networks of connections. Built as they are upon a flow of critical means of production, these are very strong connections, and connections that carry a tendency toward unequal political status. The political and military aspects of trade are even more pronounced if trade includes a flow of captive labor.

War does several things to indigenous groups. It reduces numbers, as does disease, and so may force previously separate peoples to come together, if only to increase the pool of marriage partners. War forces alliances: deliberate efforts to draw peoples together and cement their relationships. And war crystallizes oppositions: it separates peoples into clearly identifiable groups. Generally, war leads to the differential survival of ethnic formations and political organizations. In these ways, Western contact forces new political alignments and oppositions, generating the groups which the state can elevate to the political status of tribes.

But trade and war patterns are linked to a state presence that is continuously redefining itself, and the nature of political groups is also connected to other simultaneous social transformations occurring in the tribal zone. In European cases these transformations may be especially destabilizing because of, along with everything else, the rapid and radical changes associated with capitalist penetration. This general instability in European contact situations can explain why European contact typically

does not produce the evolved forms of tribalism described by Sahlins.¹⁵ While the genesis of group identities and boundaries can occur rapidly in the conflict situations typical of the European tribal zone, the creation of socially integrative mechanisms and structures, such as sodalities and age-grades, cannot occur while the world is being turned upside down (see Szykiewicz 1989).⁹

The importance of historical time in the process of tribalization can be appreciated by looking across the frontier of the northern United States—from a situation of virtually complete breakdown of larger political structures related to the colonial presence in New England (Brasser 1978b:85; Thomas 1985), to the Iroquois and other loose confederacies which were elaborated on top of village polities at the fringes of early European contact (Abler, this volume; Engelbrecht 1985), to the distinctively tribal organization that developed on the Great Plains during the time of indirect contact (Biolsi 1984; Hanson 1988; Hoebel 1978). Of course, it was only a matter of decades before the classic Great Plains tribes were forcibly incorporated into the United States, a development that highlights the fact that European expansion was inimical to the enduring linkages that connected ancient states and tribes.¹⁰

A similar argument applies to ethnicity. Since "tribe" and "ethnic group" are often used interchangeably by anthropologists, Fried's polemic against the former may be taken to apply to many assumptions about the latter. Nonetheless, we would argue that a useful and important distinction may be made between these concepts, hinging on the idea that tribes are bounded and/or structured political organizations, while ethnic groups are a cultural phenomenon with only latent organizational potential.¹¹

The papers collected in this volume provide examples, from both ancient and European state expansions, of ethnic groups being created in response to the same forces involved in tribalization. The creation and significance of ethnic divisions responds to the efforts of state agents and the patterns of conflict and cooperation existing in the tribal zone. As these change, so does the structure and meaning of ethnicity (Brown 1989; Fardon 1988; Gonzalez 1989; Whitten 1976; and see Barth 1969; Moerman 1968). Whitehead's concept of "ethnic formation" calls direct attention to this historical specificity. Thus, even if it is not linked to one political group, an ethnic formation is inherently political, shaped by and shaping the politics of "us versus them" in political systems ranging from egalitarian bands to empires.

These processes are not confined to the indigenous side of the encounter. From the time of the *Reconquista* to the imperial rivalries of the

16 twentieth century, Europe's dealings with non-Europeans have affected the crystallization of European national identities. At the same time, another level of cultural identification is involved. Europe's expansion is a unique event in global history in that it involved simultaneous contact with so many culturally, politically, and physically diverse peoples. Despite the often intense interstate struggles between colonizing Europeans, there was a degree of commonality in culture when seen against this global diversity. Christianity often provided the ideological expression of this unity, as did racialist systems of classification, and hierarchies based on the idea of social evolutionary progress (Adas 1989; Berkhofer 1978; Kiernan 1972; Pearce 1988). Such ideologies allowed the development of a self-perceived identity as Europeans, in addition to the development of "colonial" and "national" identities (Canny and Pagden 1989; Hulme 1986). As Whitehead discusses, these identities connect to the larger ideological opposition of civilization versus barbarism or savagery, which for centuries has been part of the myth charter of European state systems (Bronson 1988; Hobbes 1651; Pagden 1982; and see Garraty and Gay 1981:727).¹² European states may not be unusual in this ideology: the elite of ancient Sri Lankan states (Gunawardana, this volume) had their own traditions of noble and ignoble savages.

STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND HISTORY

The previous section focused on changes in large-scale social organization, the articulation of expanding states with the broad patterning of indigenous societies. Underlying these macroscopic changes are the actions of indigenous peoples, the behaviors that actually produce process. Just as the state dissolves into a variety of factors and actors when one "gets down to cases," so too do tribes and ethnic formations give way to native people and their circumstances.

Usually, especially when contact involves relatively egalitarian societies, indigenous people do not exhibit the same kind of functional specialization as state agents (soldiers, settlers, and so on), although these begin to emerge at higher levels of political complexity. But there is still a great deal of diversity in individual situations and interests, based on differences in tribal, ethnic, or other social identity, on position within political hierarchies, and on the overall context of contact-related changes in social organization and ecological adaptation. All of these have major implications for the life of any person, and will affect all perceptions and decisions.

Nevertheless, the most salient issue for anyone in the tribal zone often

17 is the question of relationship to the agents of the state. Cases collected here indicate that ambivalence may be the rule, as it certainly was regarding European colonizers. Against the seductive lure of manufactured goods and powerful political backing, there is the coercive and unpredictable behavior of the colonizers, the dependency and loss of autonomy that comes with cooperation, and in many parts of the world, the virtual certainty of epidemic disease.

All of these circumstances and possibilities can change rapidly. Together, they present to any individual a political field that can be complex, dense, obscure, and shifting. Evaluations and decisions must be made. The three basic options in regard to state agents are resistance, cooperation, and flight. Often a result of being faced with this persistent matrix of choice is factional division among the natives, centering on how to deal with the intruders. Some leaders advocate attack, others conciliation; some take followers closer to the frontier, others lead into the wilderness; some assimilate, while others valorize local traditions.

Specific circumstances determine what kinds of decisions can be made, what options are possible, the probable consequences of any action, and the likelihood of a given behavior becoming more or less widespread. But within those constraints, there may be great latitude for action and innovation, and the understandings and agreements worked out by individual leaders play a crucial role in patterning war and alliance. Here then we see "agency," in an appreciation of the fact that social processes exist only in the actions of individual persons, and that people are active subjects in the creation of their own history. A decision to escape into unknown lands, a dream that becomes a prophecy, a political marriage, a successful surprise attack are thus the individual behaviors that determine the particular course of the historical processes at the local level and within wider social constraints.

Participants in this seminar differ in how much of the indigenous perspective they bring into focus and what characteristics they ascribe to it. But the overall thrust of the papers is very similar to that found in other collections about European contact (Fitzhugh 1985; Rodman 1983:19-21): that indigenous peoples make pragmatic responses to changing conditions in order to maintain tolerable living conditions and prevent military losses. It thus contradicts a currently popular assumption that indigenous behavior in contact situations will appear enigmatic to Westerners because native actors respond to conditions with a radically different cultural logic.

Obviously, native beliefs and values will be necessary to explain specific historical trajectories. As authors in this volume show, native

18 categories such as religious doctrines (Gunawardana, Hassig), ethnic oppositions (Whitehead), prophecies (Abler; Brown and Fernández), the valorization of violent aggression (Ferguson, Strathern), witchcraft beliefs (Ferguson), and rules of war (Strathern) are very relevant to the explanation of historical events. Nevertheless, in all these cases, existing cultural patterns are reshaped and employed practically, and in ways that show substantial cross-cultural uniformity. The compelling reason for pragmatism is not difficult to fathom. Those who lose in the often violent conflicts of the tribal zone may cease to exist, as persons or as cultural units.

MILITARIZATION IN THE TRIBAL ZONE

Up to this point, this essay has outlined the major dimensions of the encounter between expanding states and indigenous peoples, what is involved when states move into new territory, and what happens to nearby nonstate peoples when they do. This has been done in order to develop a context in which to situate an understanding of warfare. In the following section, war itself is the focus. Discussing war in the tribal zone requires some form of classification. Here, war will be classified according to its basic relationship to state agents, in the following three categories: (1) war by indigenous people directed against the state presence, that is, wars of resistance and rebellion; (2) war by indigenous people carried out under the control or influence of state agents, that is, ethnic soldiering; and (3) war between indigenous peoples responding to their own perceived interests in the changing circumstances of the tribal zone, or internecine warfare.

Under these headings, other more functional divisions are discussed. But it must be emphasized that these three categories are for purposes of exposition only, and in reality one would find many overlapping, ambiguous, and anomalous cases. A fourth and final discussion deals with the changing conduct of warfare in the tribal zone.

WARS OF RESISTANCE AND REBELLION

The form of warfare most directly related to state expansion is that which puts state agents in direct combat with indigenous people. This involves attacks by the intruding state on the natives, their settlements, and their provision grounds; alternating with native attacks on state outposts, such as forts, watering places, or sites of resource extraction (Belich 1989; Bodley 1982; Crowder 1971; Utley and Washburn 1985). Raids by either side can be directed at removing an unwanted presence, accompanied by other

19 motives, such as slave taking by the state, or the plundering of manufactures by natives. The most disastrous scenario for indigenous people occurs when the state seeks to exclusively occupy new territory. When conditions are right, state systems have shown a ferocious ability to sweep away indigenous inhabitants, as in the "winning of the West" in North America (Utley and Washburn 1985), the British occupation of Tasmania (Moorehead 1967), or the invasion of the Brazilian forests (S. Davis 1977).

This kind of fighting may be very localized, involving a single village or band, or even a single leader with a personal following. As conditions in the tribal zone deteriorate, however, a basis is created for formerly disparate peoples to join in pan-ethnic coalitions against the intrusive state.¹³ Broad movements of resistance are often inspired in such contexts by prophecies of a millennium, as discussed here by Brown and Fernández; although, as Thurman stressed in seminar discussions, prophetic leadership of this sort may arise when conditions have already thrown different peoples together. Occasionally, armed rebellions have been successful at driving out invaders, as with the Jívaro in 1599 (Harner 1973), the Puebloans in 1680 (Sando 1979; Terrell 1973), or the Carib in 1684 (Whitehead 1988). In all these cases, however, the state sooner or later returned to establish control.

Ancient and European states are both similar and different in their ability to successfully wage war against tribal peoples. They are similar in that the primary military advantage of any state is its ability to authoritatively direct and sustain massive force against a target. Even if indigenous fighters are able to repel state forces in open field combat, a state can send more men, and keep sending them, until native forces are routed. This makes state armies most effective against fixed targets, and thus against the more sedentary and centralized indigenous polities (Hedeager 1987: 126). European colonial and modern state armies have the additional advantage of being independent of labor demands for subsistence production, a major constraint on nonstate and ancient state forces, such as the Aztecs (Hassig, this volume; and see Belich 1989).

Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, often have a major advantage in mobility. The effectiveness of state armies is limited by logistical considerations (Hassig, this volume; Goldberg and Findlow 1984; Mann 1986). Protracted campaigns against people without any central authority, living in small and mobile settlements, are very costly, if not logistically impossible. The advantages of mobility are greatly magnified if indigenous people are mounted, as with the nomads of central Asia and the Middle East (Barfield 1989; Crone 1986), the (postcontact) horse

20 warriors of the Great Plains (Bolsi 1984), or their Paraguayan counterparts, the Guaicuru (Hemming 1978). States may opt for a hardened perimeter defense at the point where they lose effective superiority, sometimes leaving walls as the high-water mark of their control (Goldberg and Findlow 1984; Jagchid and Symons 1989; Lattimore 1940; Luttwak 1976). However, such a balance of forces is most apparent in ancient states. European expansionism since 1500, in contrast, has proceeded rapidly and globally, rarely being halted for long on a tribal frontier, once sufficient resources have been committed to expansion. The economic motor of this expansion often has been the relentless pursuit of profit. But the ability to expand has depended on other factors, corollaries of the developing system of industrial capitalism.

One major factor in this expansion is weaponry. Contrary to popular notions, early firearms usually did not have a decisive advantage over native weapons in terms of range, accuracy, or rate of fire (Hassig, this volume; Townsend 1983), and in wet climates, they often did not work at all (e.g., Medina 1988). Nevertheless, they clearly had some advantage, since native peoples often went to great lengths to obtain muskets. Abler (this volume; and 1989a) suggests that lead shot deprived the enemy of one of the primary defensive techniques of arrow warfare: dodging the projectile. Also, in some cases at least, guns could penetrate armor or shields that would stop arrows. Law's study of western Africa indicates that the military implications of firearms existed only in relationship to the organization and professionalism of the army (a general point emphasized by Turney-High [1971]), and that the transformation of army structure was part of a broader process of sociopolitical centralization. Cannons and swivel guns, however, did provide a less ambiguous advantage. These could both destroy fortifications and seacraft and be used as effective antipersonnel weapons from either (McNeill 1982:95-101).

The relative effectiveness of sidearms, and so Europe's battlefield advantage, took a great leap after 1850 with the development of rifling and repeating weapons (McNeill 1982:231ff.; O'Connell 1989:200). The contrast lives on today in the New Guinea Highlands, where crude locally made shotguns and high-powered rifles both draw blood, but the latter make the bigger impact (Strathern, this volume). A comparable if not greater leap occurred in stages beginning in 1862, with the development of machine guns. Long before they were used widely on other Europeans, Maxims and Brownings were making possible conquests in Africa, as well as other colonial exploits (Ellis 1975:79-103). The seminar paper by Turton on violence in the Horn of Africa added a contemporary and horrifying perspective on this point, reporting that wholesale slaughter re-

placed individual killings when one side in a local tribal conflict was provided with automatic weapons. 21

A second technological consideration giving increasing advantage to the Europeans was transportation and communication. The transportation system developed by the Spanish in Mexico enabled them to intensify control and exploitation beyond anything the Aztecs could accomplish (Hassig, this volume). Over the centuries, larger, stronger, and faster ships, and the spreading networks of roads, railroads, and telegraph lines, made it possible to bring force to bear more quickly, at greater distances, and at less cost. In the twentieth century, motor launches, bush airplanes, and helicopters have enabled imperial and Third World states to strike at resistant indigenous peoples far from centers of state control.

Organizationally, European armed forces were being qualitatively transformed, in a gradual "military revolution" which began virtually contemporaneously with the start of Europe's expansion (Headrick 1981; McNeill 1982; Parker 1989). Over its first three centuries, the balance of destructive power shifted in favor of the colonialists. By the start of the nineteenth century, this tragic evolution produced the bureaucratized and thoroughly drilled modern military. Only at this relatively late date did Europeans attain a usually decisive edge over the forces of non-Western states.

Nevertheless, European dominance was built only partly on military abilities. In those areas where there was little resistance to Old World diseases, epidemics could do as much damage as armies. Certainly, newly introduced pathogens took more lives than bullets. The case of the Aztecs also illustrates another advantage often held by the Europeans, that of being the new contender entering into an extant conflict situation. European support leads to one side's victory, but the victors themselves are soon overwhelmed by the increasing European presence. This brings us to the next category of warfare in the tribal zone, in which expanding states induce indigenous people to make war on other indigenous people.

ETHNIC SOLDIERING

The second broad category of warfare involves indigenous people who fight under the control or influence of state agents. Ethnic soldiers and martial tribes have been an aspect of state expansionism from earliest times. Ancient states of the Middle East regularly maintained separate units of ethnic fighters (Faulkner 1953; Saggs 1984; Schulman 1964), and similar direction of native forces is one of the recurrent points in this volume. Indigenous peoples are employed to attack forces of other

22 states, native allies and auxiliaries of rival states, and independent native peoples. They are drawn into the service of state agents by varying combinations of coercive and seductive measures. The extent of state control also varies greatly, in a range running from independent native polities with negotiated alliances (Whitehead, this volume), to hired tribal raiders (Murphy 1960) and regular tribal auxiliary units (Hemming 1978), to ethnic groups disproportionately incorporated into state armies (*Cultural Survival Quarterly* 1987a, 1987b, Mazrui 1977), to a standing army of ethnic mercenaries, upon whose sometimes questionable loyalty the state depends (Gunawardana, this volume).

Ethnic soldiers may be used as raiders to procure something the state needs, but more usually they are used to further the colonial and geopolitical interests of the metropolitan state. Whitehead and Abler provide clear illustrations of this with the general alignment of different ethnic groups with different imperial powers, although they also show that it was never quite that simple. This kind of fighting caused tremendous destruction of native peoples all along the early North American frontier (Fitzhugh 1985; Perdue 1979; Utley and Washburn 1985). Recent cases seem more complicated. In East Africa, as described by Turton (1989; see also Gamst 1986; Markakis 1990), global East-West polarization is refracted through the political structures of independent Third World states and extends down to capitalize indigenous warfare with sophisticated new weaponry. But that is only one possibility among many (see Nietschmann 1987).

Ethnic soldiers are also used in violence within states. As indigenous peoples become more integrated into national political and economic systems, the strains of those systems ramify throughout indigenous societies. So in Papua New Guinea (Strathern, this volume) we see traditional oppositions and new conflicts on the local level intertwine with power struggles of national economic and political elites. Brown and Fernández show that indigenous peoples may be drawn into externally led revolts against a national power structure, and Whitehead shows that they can be used to perform the functions of police (see also Whitehead 1990b).

In all of these situations, but more so in cases of greater indigenous autonomy, there may be a mix of incentives to raid: those of the state agents, and those of the native people. In early phases of direct contact, it may be more a case of indigenous people using Europeans than the reverse, as certainly was the case in West Africa (Law, this volume). But more than just a mix of incentives, there is a dialectical interaction. Native peoples play off European interests to pursue standing grievances; Euro-

23 peans stir up strife and factionalism to encourage natives to attack each other. And with time, native interests and conflicts themselves become a product of the interactions of the tribal zone.

INTERNECINE WARFARE

The third category of warfare encompasses wars carried out by politically autonomous native peoples, pursuing their own perceived interests under the changing conditions of the tribal zone. This category includes wars related to the control of trade. Control of trade is, of course, a major impetus to war between states, as described in this volume by Gunawardana. Military conflict related to state trade into or through nonstate territory is suggested by the earliest archaeological evidence of war (Roper 1975), and probably has been a major cause of war among nonstate peoples ever since. But the sudden arrival of European agents produced a dramatic rearrangement and militarization of trade networks.

Three often interrelated aspects of this trade merit special note. One is the flow of Western manufactures, from basic tools to prestige items, for great distances beyond their source. As discussed earlier, trade in these items often is a primary political concern for indigenous peoples. A second aspect, actually a subtype in the manufactures trade, is the trade in guns. The demand for guns often leads to more fighting, as on the Northwest Coast of North America (Ferguson 1984b) or among the Maori of New Zealand (Vayda 1960, 1976), where in different ways war captives became a means for obtaining weapons, or among the Jívaroan groups of the Andean piedmont, where rifles were traded for shrunken heads (Bennett Ross 1984). Furthermore, the unequal acquisition of effective firearms by one side in an ongoing conflict can dramatically lower their risk in war, and so encourage them in new attacks (Ferguson, this volume; Todd 1979; Vayda 1976).

The third aspect is trade in captive laborers, which of all indigenous "products" implies a high level of force as a necessary accompaniment to trade. The slave trade supported the elaboration of militaristic states throughout West Africa, a result which Law calls "indigenous subimperialism" (see also Warren 1982). That is an apt characterization, even when, as in northeastern South America, the raiding was carried out by nonstate peoples (Whitehead, this volume; Ferguson 1990a).¹⁴ In North America as well, extensive areas far beyond the frontier were disrupted by native peoples raiding to capture slaves for the Europeans (Bailey 1973; Deagan 1985; Lewis 1970:186; McNitt 1990; Perdue 1979; Turner 1977:9).¹⁵

29 Law also observes that the production of slaves through war must be distinguished from the control of the trade in captive workers, which involves its own kind of conflicts. Thus, control of the flow of semi-free workers for the Australian plantations played an important role in military developments in the Solomons and nearby islands (Rodman 1983).

The control of trade brings wealth and power. Networks of alliance radiate outward from Western centers, built upon flows of precious commodities. Patterns of opposition likewise develop, reflecting tensions related to unfavorable positions in the trade. Those who are able seek to maximize the political, economic, and military advantages of trade control by establishing themselves as monopolists; not in production, usually, but by controlling some middleman position which cannot be circumvented (Brasser 1978b; Ferguson 1984b; Fitzhugh 1985; Griffen 1988; Milloy 1988; Rodman and Cooper 1983; Whitehead 1988). The possible extent of trade-related conflicts is indicated by MacDonald's (1979, 1980) excavations of Northwest Coast forts, showing intensified militarism along interior trade routes with the introduction of European items from the east, 75 years or more before direct contact along the Pacific coast (and see Jablow 1950; Lewis 1970; Mekeel 1943).

In addition to wars related to middleman control, there are wars of plunder. Abler describes how Hunt's (1940) view on Iroquois war as an effort to become middlemen has given way to a perspective that sees their wars as an effort to plunder pelts and control new trapping lands. Plunder, however, is a high-risk, high-cost way to obtain the benefits of trade with Europeans, and may be used only when more monopolistic control is not militarily possible (Ferguson 1984b). Ferguson (this volume, and 1990a) describes a different situation, in which those without access to Western manufactures obtain them by plunder.

Conflict related to trade extends outward from the European frontier, and so is often beyond direct observation. Moreover, indigenous interests and European interests in the control of trade are often antagonistic, as traders or missionaries may want nonviolent, open access to their posts. Analysts should be sensitive to the possibility that recorded native explanations and accounts of wars have been tailored to manipulate European trade behavior. As a result of these obscuring conditions, only the most obvious cases tend to be reported, as when a certain tribe or chief has a tight, enforced monopoly on certain trade (Jablow 1950; Whitehead 1988: 165-70), or when large-scale fighting is associated with a distant or disadvantaged group seeking less restricted access to trade (Maybury-Lewis 1974: 18-22; Murphy 1960: 29-30). But the Yanomami case (Ferguson, this volume) indicates that strains associated with Western trade

can ramify through the dendritic connections of exchange, fostering antagonism, factionalism, and war even among closely related people.

In addition to trade-related conflicts, autonomous warfare by indigenous people also includes conflicts related to territorial displacements. When an expanding state frontier pushes out previous occupants, dislocated people may move into uninhabited areas. Many of our current "most primitives" may have this origin (Fox 1969; Kloos 1977; Stearman 1984). Alternatively, displaced people may be able to disperse and assimilate into other populations, as Turton described for East African refugees. But they may also enter into war with previous occupants or other refugees (Balée 1988; Biolsi 1984). This kind of fighting may be even more remote from Western observation than are trade conflicts, and details are correspondingly more obscure.

Considering all these processes of militarization in the tribal zone, there is reason to suspect that, in addition to the Yanomami, other classic anthropological cases of "pristine" warfare are related to European contact. In Highland New Guinea, Salisbury (1962) reports a great increase in warfare when steel tools began to come in through native networks (and see Blick 1988). Kelly's (1985) controversial reconstruction of Nuer history shows intense state militarism at their borders, and the florescence of a slave trade along rivers through their area, at least roughly coincident in time and space with the Nuer expansions (and see Holt and Daly 1979; Mercer 1971). These findings also suggest new perspectives on standing arguments about the role of European contact in generating the wars of the Zulu (Peires 1981) and Quechans (Forbes 1965; Kroeber and Fontana 1986).¹⁶

THE CHANGING CONDUCT OF WAR

Along with the causes of war, the way war is waged can also change with contact, and these changes can stimulate additional wars (Whitehead 1990a). An illustration of this concerns the introduction of guns. As noted earlier, even the early firearms were more difficult to dodge or to shield against than slings and arrows. In some cases, this seems to have led to a major shift in indigenous military tactics. As Abler describes for the Iroquois, in their first military encounter involving firearms, they prepared for battle by forming lines.¹⁷ Champlain's fire killed several men and routed the Iroquois, who henceforth relied more on the surprise attacks that American schoolchildren learn as "fighting Indian style." A similar pattern, of a line being decimated by gunfire, followed by a shift to mobile tactics, occurred on the northern Great Plains (Lewis 1970: 183-84) and

among the Carib of Brazil (Whitehead 1990a). Strathern also describes the vulnerability of lines to firearms, followed by a decline in open battles in favor of more individualistic violence. It may be that other peoples too gave up an indigenous tradition of set-piece projectile combats with the introduction of firearms.

While the introduction of guns may encourage a change in the conduct of war toward the use of guerilla tactics, other aspects of the situation may foster greater concentration of military force. Control over access to firearms can be a basis for increased political centralization and domination in both secondary state (Law, this volume; Goody 1971; Warren 1982) and nonstate systems (Abler, Brown and Fernández, and Ferguson, this volume; Rodman and Cooper 1983; Turner 1977). Dobyns (1972) described the "military transculturation" of Northern Pimans, who were trained in Spanish formations. The teaching of state military tactics is a very common practice in contact situations, part of the use of ethnic soldiers (Law, this volume; Whitehead 1990b; Hemming 1978).

In the ancient world, tribal peoples, often following a charismatic leader, converting to "civilized" forms of combat have dealt major blows to once-dominant empires (Delbruck 1990; Hedeager 1987; cf. Tainter 1988). More formidable tribal forces can lead to a shift in imperial strategy, away from hegemony to a more fixed territorial defense (Luttwak 1976; McNeill 1982:33-35; and see Mattingly and Hassig, this volume). In the long run, this may mark the beginnings of the dynamics of imperial collapse (Yoffee and Cowgill 1988; Ferrill 1986). The possibility of tribal peoples meeting and defeating state forces in set-piece battles was dealt a severe blow with the revolution in military technology of the nineteenth century; but that may be changing, as demonstrated by the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. It seems a real possibility that tribal peoples armed with modern weapons and using state military practices will pose a greater challenge to state armies in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

For a seminar intended to explore a new subject area, it is not realistic to expect the development of a general theory. The participants did take steps toward that goal, however, formulating tentative diagrams of key variables and relationships, which are included as an appendix to this volume. But the findings of these authors do support two basic conclusions: (1) that the effects of expanding states, and particularly of European colonialism, typically precede extensive descriptions of indigenous warfare, so that by far the greater part of our ethnographic information about nonstate warfare is postcontact; and (2) that very frequently the result of

state impingement is to generate warfare and transform its conduct and purpose, rather than to suppress it. For the anthropology of war, these findings suggest the need to reconsider current assumptions and theories about the causes and practice of war in nonstate societies, which have been formed without reference to the contact-related variables identified here. What has been assumed to be "pristine" warfare now seems more likely to be a reflection of the European presence. This does not mean that nothing can be known about war outside of the influence of Europe or other state systems. Archaeological data and judicious use of early reports from some situations can provide such information. The point, rather, is that we cannot discriminate precontact war patterns without a theoretically informed sensitivity to the influences of contact even in its earliest phases.

The tribal zone can be a very violent place. At its worst, it can consume a population, leading to major demographic losses (Cook 1973; Turner 1985). Violence can saturate the fabric of social life, as with the Yanomami, in Highland New Guinea, or along the Connecticut River in the mid-seventeenth century (Thomas 1985). However, and this point merits special emphasis, this is not necessarily so. The purpose of this volume is to examine warfare in relation to state expansion. Were the focus on the tribal zone in itself, intense militarization would appear at one end of a range of possibilities, with peaceful contact at the other.¹⁸ Our argument is not that all state expansion generates indigenous warfare, but that indigenous warfare in proximity to an expanding state is probably related to that intrusion.

In focusing on warfare, this volume deals with indigenous peoples who retain at least some degree of political autonomy. As the contact process proceeds from encapsulation to incorporation, warfare may be succeeded by new forms of violence. Under the right circumstances, the process of incorporation may be halted by broad rebellions against the state. But there can also be new individualistic forms of violence, as is occurring in Highland New Guinea (Strathern, this volume), and as was expressed with the *kanaima* assassination cult in highland Guayana (Whitehead 1990a). But those developments, and the process of pacification, go beyond the scope of this volume.¹⁹

Our conclusions on the militarization of the tribal zone, combined with other points on tribalization and ethnogenesis, can be applied to a central element in contemporary Western ideology. With astonishing frequency, in popular media and even scholarly tracts, one finds collective violence explained as an outgrowth of "tribal loyalties." With greater or lesser biologism, it is asserted that humans are fundamentally tribalistic in orientation, and that relations between tribes are inherently hostile. In

other words, people tend to identify blindly with their own social group or "tribe," and to react with virtually instinctive animosity toward those belonging to other groups.

This Hobbesian image rests on a triple fallacy. First, that the warfare recorded among nonstate peoples is a continuation of pre-state warfare, rather than being a historical product of the state presence. Second, that the ethnic divisions and tribes which are observed making war are survivals of ancient forms of organization, rather than being configured, in the great majority of cases, in relatively recent historical time. Third, that when war does involve tribes, the relationship between tribes is automatically one of unreasoned hostility and violence, rather than exhibiting the entire range of diplomatic-military possibilities found among states during times of war.

Stereotypes of savages notwithstanding, it would be an extremely rare occurrence for members of one tribe to attack members of another simply because they are different, apart from any other source of conflict. Certainly nothing like that is suggested in any of the cases examined here. "Tribal loyalty" can indeed be fierce, with appropriate reinforcement, but it can be evanescent or nonexistent in other situations. Any idea that an innate sense of tribalism inclines people toward collective violence is sheer fantasy.

Our emphasis on the need for a historical perspective on indigenous warfare suggests one other general implication for the discipline of anthropology. The initial development of a historical approach in anthropology was associated with studies of local communities within states. Those studies also led to a recognition of the need to situate community studies in a larger social context (Ferguson 1988a; Roseberry 1988). These "part-societies" within state systems were and continue to be contrasted to indigenous nonstate societies. The latter were imagined to be largely self-contained, such that all significant cultural patterns could be directly observed in the locality of the ethnographer. In our view, this distinction is untenable, if not positively misleading. Indigenous nonstate peoples too live within, react to, and shape a larger complex social universe. Attempts to understand their behavior, institutions, and beliefs which do not take this wider and historically changing context into account may radically misconstrue ethnographic reality.

Notes

1. Haas (1990b:172) defines tribes as follows:

In simplest terms, a tribe is a bounded network of communities united by social and political ties and generally sharing the same language, ideology,

and material culture. The communities in a tribe are economically autonomous and there is no centralized political hierarchy.

2. For our purposes, "state agent" designates any member of a state society operating in the tribal zone, regardless of the nature of his or her connection to the formal institutions of the state.

3. A study of a "classic" tribe of northern Europe or Asia would have been an appropriate addition to our seminar. The organizers opted for some less well-known ancient state-tribe situations.

4. It was not just "European" diseases that afflicted New World peoples, but "African" ones as well, such as malaria, hookworm, yaws, and leprosy (Deagan 1985:290; Whitehead 1988:23).

5. "First contacts" by sea may be a general exception to that caution.

6. Mann's (1986) formulation of four networks of social power—ideological, economic, military, and political—each with its own scope, constraints, and characteristics, could prove useful for approaching this range of actors, but his paradigm is not pursued in this volume.

7. Recent investigations of Eurasian nomads (Golden 1991; Khazanov 1984) place new emphasis on their long-term interactions with neighboring states.

8. Gottwald (1979) describes a process very consistent with Fried's views leading to the tribalization of the Israelites in the period of 1250 to 1050 B.C.

9. Turton's (1989) report at the advanced seminar noted the great difficulty in carrying out ceremonies essential to the functioning of an age-set system in the context of greatly escalated warfare. Eder's (1987) study of "detribalization" among the Philippine Batak, while not a situation of warfare, also details the breakdown of cultural institutions in a rapidly changing tribal zone.

10. Haas (1990b) makes a similar argument for tribalization as a process rather than an event. However, his study of pre-state tribe formation among Kayenta Anasazi operates in the much longer time frame of in situ sociocultural evolution. The evolution of these tribes occurred in identifiable stages, over a period of about 750 years.

11. See Nietschmann (1987) for a relevant argument, asserting that "ethnic group" and related terms should be replaced by "nations."

12. The fact that so many "tribal" names are pejorative terms, assigned by neighboring indigenous peoples and indicating less than human qualities, suggests that states are not alone in this kind of classification. However, it was noted in seminar discussions that many of these assignments occur as those more in contact with state agents label those who are less in contact, with whom they may be in contact-related competition or actual warfare. Thus, it is not always clear that these negative labels represent precontact categories.

13. Many indigenous attacks on Europeans occur following a substantial reduction in the amount of manufactured goods crossing the frontier (e.g., Ferguson 1984a:294-95; Mekeel 1943:150; Utley and Washburn 1985:90-91; Sahlins 1987:68-71; and see Szykiwicz 1989:154).

14. The east-west sea trade previously noted in regard to Sri Lanka also

other words, people tend to identify blindly with their own social group or "tribe," and to react with virtually instinctive animosity toward those belonging to other groups.

This Hobbesian image rests on a triple fallacy. First, that the warfare recorded among nonstate peoples is a continuation of pre-state warfare, rather than being a historical product of the state presence. Second, that the ethnic divisions and tribes which are observed making war are survivals of ancient forms of organization, rather than being configured, in the great majority of cases, in relatively recent historical time. Third, that when war does involve tribes, the relationship between tribes is automatically one of unreasoned hostility and violence, rather than exhibiting the entire range of diplomatic-military possibilities found among states during times of war.

Stereotypes of savages notwithstanding, it would be an extremely rare occurrence for members of one tribe to attack members of another simply because they are different, apart from any other source of conflict. Certainly nothing like that is suggested in any of the cases examined here. "Tribal loyalty" can indeed be fierce, with appropriate reinforcement, but it can be evanescent or nonexistent in other situations. Any idea that an innate sense of tribalism inclines people toward collective violence is sheer fantasy.

Our emphasis on the need for a historical perspective on indigenous warfare suggests one other general implication for the discipline of anthropology. The initial development of a historical approach in anthropology was associated with studies of local communities within states. Those studies also led to a recognition of the need to situate community studies in a larger social context (Ferguson 1988a; Roseberry 1988). These "part-societies" within state systems were and continue to be contrasted to indigenous nonstate societies. The latter were imagined to be largely self-contained, such that all significant cultural patterns could be directly observed in the locality of the ethnographer. In our view, this distinction is untenable, if not positively misleading. Indigenous nonstate peoples too live within, react to, and shape a larger complex social universe. Attempts to understand their behavior, institutions, and beliefs which do not take this wider and historically changing context into account may radically misconstrue ethnographic reality.

Notes

1. Haas (1990b:172) defines tribes as follows:

In simplest terms, a tribe is a bounded network of communities united by social and political ties and generally sharing the same language, ideology,

and material culture. The communities in a tribe are economically autonomous and there is no centralized political hierarchy.

2. For our purposes, "state agent" designates any member of a state society operating in the tribal zone, regardless of the nature of his or her connection to the formal institutions of the state.

3. A study of a "classic" tribe of northern Europe or Asia would have been an appropriate addition to our seminar. The organizers opted for some less well-known ancient state-tribe situations.

4. It was not just "European" diseases that afflicted New World peoples, but "African" ones as well, such as malaria, hookworm, yaws, and leprosy (Deagan 1985:290; Whitehead 1988:23).

5. "First contacts" by sea may be a general exception to that caution.

6. Mann's (1986) formulation of four networks of social power—ideological, economic, military, and political—each with its own scope, constraints, and characteristics, could prove useful for approaching this range of actors, but his paradigm is not pursued in this volume.

7. Recent investigations of Eurasian nomads (Golden 1991; Khazanov 1984) place new emphasis on their long-term interactions with neighboring states.

8. Gottwald (1979) describes a process very consistent with Fried's views leading to the tribalization of the Israelites in the period of 1250 to 1050 B.C.

9. Turton's (1989) report at the advanced seminar noted the great difficulty in carrying out ceremonies essential to the functioning of an age-set system in the context of greatly escalated warfare. Eder's (1987) study of "detrribalization" among the Philippine Batak, while not a situation of warfare, also details the breakdown of cultural institutions in a rapidly changing tribal zone.

10. Haas (1990b) makes a similar argument for tribalization as a process rather than an event. However, his study of pre-state tribe formation among Kayenta Anasazi operates in the much longer time frame of in situ sociocultural evolution. The evolution of these tribes occurred in identifiable stages, over a period of about 750 years.

11. See Nietschmann (1987) for a relevant argument, asserting that "ethnic group" and related terms should be replaced by "nations."

12. The fact that so many "tribal" names are pejorative terms, assigned by neighboring indigenous peoples and indicating less than human qualities, suggests that states are not alone in this kind of classification. However, it was noted in seminar discussions that many of these assignments occur as those more in contact with state agents label those who are less in contact, with whom they may be in contact-related competition or actual warfare. Thus, it is not always clear that these negative labels represent precontact categories.

13. Many indigenous attacks on Europeans occur following a substantial reduction in the amount of manufactured goods crossing the frontier (e.g., Ferguson 1984a:294–95; Mekeel 1943:150; Utley and Washburn 1985:90–91; Sahlin 1987:68–71; and see Szykiewicz 1989:154).

14. The east-west sea trade previously noted in regard to Sri Lanka also

engendered a series of Southeast Asian states. The Philippine Sulu state (Warren 1981, 1982) of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries participated in this trade, largely through reliance on slave labor. Gibson (1990) shows how this demand for labor resulted in several broad types of local societies, distinguished by their ability to mobilize force and, inversely, by their degree of victimization by raiders.

15. On the Pacific Northwest Coast, the slave raiding which increased during the contact period served the interests of the newly wealthy and powerful indigenous trade controllers, and did not involve substantial supply to Europeans (Donald 1987; Ferguson 1984b; Mitchell 1984). This stimulated indigenous demand for slaves in turn stimulated raiding as far away as the upper Columbia River and into northern California (Ruby and Brown 1976:21-22).

16. On the other hand, Smith (1987) argues that Western Woods Cree did not embark on military expansion westward when they acquired guns, as previously had been thought. That finding should stand as a caution. It never can be assumed that any of these contact-related causes of war are operating in a given case. The matter must be investigated empirically, and the theoretical possibility kept open that indigenous warfare has not been greatly modified by contact.

17. Anthropologists often take the formation of military lines to indicate a "ritual combat," but as Turney-High (1971) emphasized, battle lines respond to the practical necessities of combat.

18. Especially noteworthy in this context are a number of distinct Southeast Asian societies, including the Buid, Semai, and Bataak, who were targets of slave raids from the Sulu sultanate. Their response was withdrawal into the forest and the elaboration of a remarkably similar ethos of nonviolence (Gibson 1990). It would be interesting to compare these people with other predated peoples, such as the Piaroa, Maku, or Akuriyo of northern Amazonia.

19. During the seminar discussions, Ferguson noted that many ethnographic reports of feuding which involve a high number of killings come from the partially incorporated peripheries of state systems, rather than from more autonomous peoples (e.g., Bennett Ross 1984; Boehm 1984; Goodwin and Basso 1971:178-85; Keiser 1986; Wilson 1981; and see Black-Michaud 1975:29-30). He suggested that there may be a pattern here, related to their fringe positions, involving: (1) subversion or elimination of native mechanisms of social control at the same time that the state is unable to exercise effective legal control; (2) breakup of larger social structures and increasing individualization of life chances; (3) sharp interpersonal competition relating to the demands of the state; and (4) as the culturally constructed response to such a perilous situation, an honor complex involving a sensitivity to insult and readiness to respond to any personal slight with violence. A fifth element is a prior history of warfare, which would carry over into a more pronounced ideology and sophisticated practice of violence. Where there is no prior history of war, conditions 1 to 4 may produce a high homicide rate, without the trappings associated with feud, perhaps like those discussed by Knauff (1987).